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The United States acute care hospital (ACH) market provides a unique 
environment in which to examine questions about market structure and performance. 
The ACHs operate in a mature market of health services that is highly regulated and 
has one dominant primary consumer of services. The uncharacteristic industry 
structure offers the opportunity to analyze pervasive agency relationships and capital 
structure issues in a new setting. In addition, the policies of the U.S. Government have 
created an environment in which tacit collusion is likely to flourish, which leads to 
market buyer power (monopsony, or buyers acting as one monopoly buyer). A key 
question is the extent to which monopsony and agency affect capital structure 
decisions. Agency is defined by Ross (1973, p.134) as a relationship formed between 
a principle and their agents, “when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, 
or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of 
decision problems.” This thesis extends the agency framework provided by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), along with the econometric understanding of monopsony in 
healthcare via tacit collusion, as suggested by Pauly (1998) and Sevilla (2005), and 
the research constraints of monopsony under an all-or-nothing contract, as outlined by 
Taylor (2003).   
Using data on ACHs from the period of 1995 to 2007 for approximately 5,000 
ACHs, which was derived from the Medicare Cost Report and medical payments for a 
sub-population of 1,500, this research examines the determinants of capital structure 
in a distorted market. Building upon this initial analysis, the research seeks to 
examine the effects of market distortions upon free cash flow, and ultimately, capital 
structure.  Two theories of distortion are presented that would affect free cash flow: 
The first is that of the agency cost of free cash flow and signaling, and the second is a 
theory of monopsony via tacit collusion between buyers. 
A model of the agency relationship between ACHs and the U.S. Government 
is proposed, promoting agency cost (signaling and the agency cost of free cash flows) 
as a causal relation with free cash flows and capital structure (Jensen & Meckling 
1976; Jensen 1986).  Empirical models of agency are constructed, examining the 
dependence on government business and the relation to the leverage (signaling) and 
free cash flows (agency cost of free cash flows) for ACHs.  In addition, a 
4 
 
complementary theory of capital structure determinant via market power 
(monopsony) is formulated, suggesting that monopsony conditions within the ACH 
market affect free cash flows and capital structure. The analysis provides a framework 
for understanding the environments in which ACHs operate and the strength of 
bargaining within the market. The research concludes with a review of the 
determinants of capital structure in light of the inefficiencies and distortions of the 
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Many commentators suspect market inefficiencies in U.S. healthcare, but such 
inefficiencies are not well understood.  This thesis aims to provide empirical evidence 
of the presence of market distortions within the healthcare market. Two theoretical 
frameworks are used: agency theory and collusive monopsony, as both are postulated 
to exist in U.S. Healthcare (Buchanan 1988; Folland et al 1997; McGuire et al 1988).  
In doing so, it examines their effects upon the capital structure decisions of acute care 
hospitals (ACHs). 
ACHs in the U.S. are commercial enterprises, and therefore need to cover their 
cost of capital, yet health insurance companies and government healthcare programs, 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, seek to restrain the cost of healthcare, and hence 
ACHs’ revenues and the value of their outputs.  However, ACHs purchase resources 
in a competitive market for goods and services; therefore, ACHs must incur market 
prices on their inputs. This dichotomy of controlled reimbursement and market-based 
costs has an effect upon free cash flows of ACHs and subsequently, their capital 
structures.   
The purpose of this research is to use data on ACHs to determine whether both 
agency and monopsony are present and to identify how this may affect the capital 
structure of ACHs.  The question of how the market structure of healthcare affects 
capital structure might be addressed in relation to only one theory, Agency theory--
and consequently agency costs--reflect an organizational dilemma of incentives and 
the principal’s actions to coerce the agent to act in the best interests of the principal.  
While the conflict  between principal and agent may be of a contractual nature, these 
lead  to real costs and consequences for firms.  As determined in the literature on 
corporate finance, these agency costs help to explain agent decisions of capital 
structure. One the other hand, relying on agency theory alone would be to exclude 
certain aspects of observable behavior within US healthcare.  Monopsony theory 
provides an alternative approach to examining at the situation that exists between 
ACHs and payors. In doing so, it takes into account the behavior of market 
participants from a supply and demand perspective and, in particular, where the 
pursuit of excess rents is a priority for participant’s actions.  The combined results 
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from applying both theories provide strong results to explain how decisions of capital 
structure are affected by the structure of the U.S. ACH market. 
 
1.1 Research in Literature 
This research builds on the previous works of Ross (1973) who argued that 
"Examples of agency are universal.  Essentially all contractual arrangements…contain 
important elements of agency"(p. 134).  In their paper, Becker and Koch (2006) 
suggest the presence of agency cost in U.S. ACH market.  Likewise, it extends the 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) analysis of agency cost inherent in contracts between 
corporations that lack the ability to form a complete contract akin to Milgrom and 
Robert (1992).  Specifically, Jensen’s (1986) idea of the agency cost of free cash 
flows and the use of signalling is, in this case, applied to the principal-agent 
relationship between the U.S. Government and ACHs.  Consideration for the presence 
of a principal-agent relationship in healthcare is given in line with Ryan (1994), 
McLean (1989) and Dranove and White (1989) and which is further supported by the 
research of Peterson et al (2006), Jack (2005), Eldridge and Palmer (2009), Schneider 
and Mathios(2006) and Conrad and Perry (2009).  The present study considers pricing 
schemes by payors in order control agency problems inherent in the principal-agent 
relationship similar to Peterson et al (2006) and Melnick et al (1989), a position, 
which is further supported via the research of Conrad and Perry (2009), and Eldridge 
and Palmer (2009).   Studying the effects of how the restrictions of free cash flows 
affect financing constraints, is similar to the work of Calem and Rizzo (1995), who 
suggested that financing contraints are a function of agency cost in debt markets. 
However, this research takes this premise further, considering the presence of agency 
cost of free cash flows as an underlying cause of the reduction in liquidity within the 
healthcare market and consequently its effects upon decisions of capital structure .  
The analysis broadens the perspective of agency research in this area using a much 
larger sample size than prior studies. In addition, the influence of hospital size is 
considered, so that the agency and monopsony effects upon hospitals by size is better 
understood  
Wedig et al. (1988) found that no differences in capital structure of ACHs 
could be attributed to ownership structure.  By using data for individual hospital units, 
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rather than business entities, a defining feature of this research is that it is able to 
ignore ownership structure (that is, whether the hospital operates as a ‘for profit’ or 
‘non-profit’ entity) when considering how the healthcare market affects capital 
structure.  This is helpful as it allows the research to analyze the entire market of 
ACHs without consequences due to differences of ownership type effecting research 
outcomes. 
The research extends Pauly’s (1998) study of traditional monopsony in 
healthcare by examining input prices for health services. However, in doing so, this 
research expands beyond the traditional economics definition of monopsony and 
considers collusive monopsony under the all-or-nothing supply curve as described by 
Taylor (2003).  This is an improvement over Pauly (1988), as traditional monopsony 
does not necessarily characterize the contractual framework found within the U.S. 
healthcare market, where there is a dominant payer but also private healthcare paid for 
by insurance companies.  In addition, the research examines the possibility that ACHs 
have market power and ruling out efficiency-improving situations of monopoly 
busting of the ACHs by payors. This element of the research uses methodologies 
similar to those of Feldman and Wholey (2001), who analyzed the prices paid within 
U.S. healthcare, examining the market of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO’s) 
and ACHs.  They specifically considered the presence of traditional monopsony and 
the possible efficiency-improving breakup of monopoly power.  They concluded that 
no monopsony is evident, and considered price changes to be a function of the 
monopoly breakup of ACHs’ market power.   
However, traditional monopsony does not describe accurately the market or 
the contractual nature of the payor and ACHs.  The outcome of this research shows 
that perhaps there exists an efficient alloctation of resources but an unfair allocation 
of economic rents between buyer and seller.  Specifically, this research not only 
considers monopsony presence but also the unfair allocation of economic rents on the 
capital structure of ACHs.  The research extends Sevilla’s (2005) use of monopsony 
under the all-or-nothing supply curve to ACH health services, analyzing payors’ 
effects on ACHs, but while Sevilla (2005) looks at the variance of prices paid to 
charges, this study examines prices via the Lerner’s Index to show monopsony 
presence with the healthcare market of ACHs.  In addition, this research makes use of 
the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), similar to Seth (2006), in order to analyze for 
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a concentration of payors, combining it with collusion via the New Empirical 
Industrial Organization (NEIO) model to seek evidence of collusive monopsony and 
payor market power. 
 
1.2 Advantages of The Research 
The advantage of studying ACHs from a research standpoint is that they are 
private corporations, and therefore must manage their capital structures to ensure 
financial health.  Understanding how ACHs’ capital structures are affected by the 
distortions created by the healthcare structure in the U.S. is an important addition to 
industry, financial, and economic knowledge, as the U.S. healthcare market is a 
highly regulated market. It accounted for approximately 15% of the U.S. GDP in 
2004, and is expected to become 19.6% of the GDP, or $4.5 trillion, by 2019 (Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, September 2010).  By focusing on a single 
industry or market means the analysis avoids the problems of their being structural 
differences between industries (Calem and Rizzo, 1995). 
The ACH market is made up of for-profit, non-profit, and teaching hospitals.  
In 2005, excluding hospitals of the Veterans Administration (which are government-
owned), there were about 947,000 beds in a total of 5,756 hospitals, with 37,000,000 
admissions, and a total expense of $570 billion (Jonas 2007).  As the data used in this 
research is at the hospital level, the research is able to examine an entire industry with 
a homogenous product for evidence of agency and monopsony and their effect on 
capital structure of ACHs. Using the population is a further advantage for examining 
these theories, as prior research of Wedig et al (1988) suggests differences in 
ownership structure (for-profit, non-for-profit or teaching hospitals) can be ignored as 
they have no effect on the capital structure of ACHs. 
From 1995-2007, the government consumed, on average, 65 percent of acute 
healthcare services measured in patient days via government healthcare insurance 
programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid.  This study of agency and monopsony 
dynamics in the U.S. healthcare market will help policy makers and academics to 
better understand the markets in which large public consumption through a single 
major buyer of an output affects the producers’ capital structure.   How current 
regulation and market behavior of the buyer may affect the capital structure of the 
23 
 
upstream producers (in this case hospitals) when the consequences of agency costs 
and market power are analyzed is important, as inefficiency in any market is 
detrimental to consumers.  
The structure of the research allows for focus on the informational asymmetry 
inherent in U.S. healthcare, where forming a complete contract is difficult due to the 
inability to monitor, which allows for a large degree of agent opportunism.  Prior 
evidence of asymmetric information indicates that it is appropriate to apply agency 
theory and, equally, monopsony theory, thus taking into account four out of the five 
recommendations by Eisenhart (1989) for agency research (McLean 1994, Melnick et 
al 1989, Ryan 1994, Dranove and White 1987, 1989, Bronsteen et al 2007, Mooney 
and Ryan 1993, Lee and Zenios 2007, Conrad and Perry 2009, Eldridge and Palmer 
2008, Peterson et al 2006, Schneider and Mathios 2005, Chalkley and Khalil 2005).  
Using these theories and the unique features of the market and data used in this thesis, 
which will be discuss later, provides a set of models for determining the presence of 
agency effects and the market power of payors. This joint approach provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of decisions of capital structure in the presence of 
agency and monopsony within U.S. healthcare. 
 
1.3 Description of The Data 
This research makes use of public information about ACHs’ financial records, 
as well as some private, previously unexplored data, and uses linear and panel data 
regression methodologies in order to provide new insights into the distortions and 
their effects on ACHs’ capital structures.  Data utilized within this study consist of 
hospital financial data from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Service’s (CMS) 
Medicare Cost Report (MCR) on, and private medical claims/remit data obtained 
from an industry third-party claims processor (hereafter, claims data) that previously 
was unused for research.  The MCR data cover approximately 5,600 ACHs for the 
years of 1995-2007, thus allowing a study of agency using the entire ACH population, 
which accepts government funds.  The claims data consist of 12.7 million claims 
covering approximately 1,500 ACHs from 2000-2007 which are used to create the 
Lerner’s Index and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index that are used to analyze for the 
presence of monopsony.  This combination of the MCR and the claims data allows the 
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research to simultaneously consider the market power of both payor and ACH, within 
the same market and time period. 
Data was available for the breakdown of results by year and hospital size; 
however ownership structure information was ignored due to data limitations and the 
suggestions provided by previous research that it was not necessary in light of the 
subject matter of this research. 
 
1.4 Agency Theory 
One question that the research investigates is how the purchasers of healthcare 
(insurers) seek to control, via pricing of healthcare services, the inefficiencies and 
consequently the additional costs generated by ACHs’ overinvestment, a form of 
agency costs, as this may lead to investing in negative net present value (NPV) 
projects—and consequently how these controls affect the capital structure of ACHs. 
The ACHs have stable cash flows, but little opportunity for growth, which increases 
their likelihood of overinvesting (Parrino & Weisbach 1999).  Overinvesting by 
ACHs leads to increased costs, as ACHs pass on additional cost to consumers.  The 
government is a major consumer of health services and wishes to reduce costs; 
therefore, it seeks to control ACH behaviour, thereby limiting overinvestment and 
other agency costs.   
In the absence of control mechanisms, agency theory indicates that where the 
principal (the government) and the agent’s (the ACH) interests diverge, and where the 
agent can take unobservable or difficult to observe actions in his own self-interest, the 
agent will do so. A key element that governs contractual relationships subject to 
agency problems is how the principal can reduce these agency costs.  One such 
element is the use of debt to reduce agency costs.  Jensen (1986) suggests that debt 
reduces agency cost by the addition of external monitors in the form of lenders.  The 
lenders insure that firms are run efficiently, as future dollars are promised to repay the 
debt, thus limiting the ability of managers to squander the firm’s resources in ways 
that fail to add value.  This limits the free cash flow at the agent’s disposal, thereby 
limiting the ability to overinvest and increasing the performance requirements of 
future investments.  Value for the principal is created for firms with high agency 
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costs, especially when debt reduces the likelihood of overinvestment (Harvey et al. 
2003). 
   Traditionally, firm success depends on the investment of free cash flow (FCF), 
and/or borrowed funds on positive NPV projects that add value to the firm. In either 
case, FCF or borrowed funds, a return on the investment must be generated, or else a 
firm’s financial success may be compromised.  In the case of the healthcare market, 
achieving the objective of obtaining a positive return on investment is complicated by 
the existence of moral hazard created by health insurance that insulates the insured 
from the price consequences of consuming healthcare services. Therefore, the insured 
considers other variables of the healthcare product other than price to help determine 
consumption.  Price and quality are often the two major variables considered in the 
consumption of any product purchased.  When price is removed, quality becomes the 
major driver, thus, the effect of the moral hazard of health insurance.   As a result of 
the moral hazard of health insurance, ACHs must compete on quality or perceived 
quality (Newhouse 1981; Nahata et al. 2005).  A project that increases the perception 
of quality is considered by the ACH as an acceptable venture if it attracts additional 
patients; however, projects that increase perceptions of quality are not always positive 
NPV investments. This construct of competition on quality within the market has led 
to excessive capital spending by competing hospitals, which some have called a 
“medical care arms race” (Glied 2003, p. 127).  As excessive capital spending in 
negative NPV projects or overinvestment adds to the cost of providing healthcare, and 
ultimately is covered by the government through an increase in the costs of 
healthcare, the government seeks mechanisms to limit this behavior within the ACH 
market.  Primarily, this is accomplished via the reimbursement rate for health 
services.  
By reducing the reimbursement for health services, the government is able to 
restrict free cash flows of ACHs, thereby limiting their ability to overinvest.  This is 
typical principal behavior within agency theory.  Typically, this is described as the 
agency cost of free cash flow.  As such, the agency cost of free cash flow is 
hypothesized to exist, as the government does not provide healthcare services directly 
for those lives it covers via government insurance.  Instead, the government contracts 
with hospitals to provide healthcare services for government-covered lives via 
Medicare, Medicaid, and other government programs.  This is a problem, as 
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asymmetry of information is high, which interferes with the ability of the government 
and the ACHs to form a complete contract.  Under this scenario, the only 
communication left to align incentives between the government and ACHs is price.   
The government has a desire to limit healthcare costs and thus inefficiencies 
within the ACH market.  In this case, an inefficiency is seen as an overinvestment 
problem derived from excess cash flows and a distorted market with competition 
reliant upon perceived quality.  Projects that increase quality can be viewed as loss 
leaders for hospitals where the projects themselves do not have proper payback, as 
they are ultimately underutilized, but do attract additional patients overall.  The 
problem from a government perspective is that the facility that patients seek is 
irrelevant, as the government is responsible only for payment.  Under this scenario, 
when the government is consuming the majority of health services, the government is 
paying for the additional cost of the heavy competition by hospitals, as some hospital 
services added to attract patients  are underutilized or are allocative inefficient.  
Ultimately, the expenditure of capital dollars by ACHs is passed on to the consumer 
through additional costs. Government cost reductions/savings are created by hospitals 
as a reduction of investment in negative NPV projects, meaning that dollars are not 
wasted on services with high capital cost, but those with low utilization.  By limiting 
the free cash flows of ACHs, the government reduces the likelihood of bearing the 
additional cost of healthcare due to overinvestment. 
 
1.5 Testing for Agency Cost 
One of the primary research questions is, do agency costs exist? The presence 
of agency effects is tested via signaling and the agency cost of free cash flows and 
their effects on decisions of capital structure.  
Two models are proposed to seek evidence of agency cost.  Signaling is 
proposed to exist within the ACH market, in which the signaling mechanism is the 
willingness to take on debt and be monitored by third-party lenders.    In this case, the 
government seeks to reduce monitoring costs that arise as a result of the agency 
problem. It does this by encouraging debt.  Those ACHs that obtain a higher 
proportion of their revenues from government-purchased healthcare services signal 
efficiency by having greater amounts of debt in their capital structure.  Due to 
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asymmetric information between the ACHs and the government, debt providers can 
act as third-party monitors.  They have a fiduciary interest in the welfare of the ACH, 
and so they monitor management’s efficient use of capital. The debt provider 
understands that inefficient use of capital ultimately jeopardizes a firm’s financial 
health and the ability to be repaid.   This idea follows Jensen’s (1986) premise that 
external debt reduces monitoring costs by reducing free cash flows and bringing in 
lenders to act as third-party monitors. “…conditions of asymmetric information create 
incentives for the relatively uninformed parties to draw inferences from the choices 
made by the better-informed parties.  The informed parties, if they recognized that 
their actions are being interpreted as signals, may attempt to manipulate the signals to 
convey a particularly favorable message.  Financial decisions can serve as just this 
kind of signal” Milgrom and Roberts (1992).A second model of agency cost is 
proposed: the agency cost of free cash flow.  As previously discussed, the federal 
government does not provide healthcare services itself for citizens who are covered by 
Medicare and Medicaid; rather, it contracts with hospitals.  It is hypothesized that the 
government, seeking to lower the cost of healthcare services, lowers reimbursement to 
ACHs.  By reducing reimbursement, the government reduces free cash flows, thereby 
restricting excess cash flows under ACH management’s control and limiting access to 
debt markets (Calem & Rizzo 1995).  Both place limitations upon the capital structure 
of ACHs. This action has the consequence of reducing the overinvestment problem, 
thereby lowering cost of healthcare for the government.   
 
1.6 Collusive Monopsony 
An Additional question the research investigates is how collusive monopsony 
or a lack thereof affects decisions of capital structure.  Collusive monopsony is 
proposed to complement the agency models.  The monopsony models are based upon 
the premise that a collusive monopsony exists within the U.S healthcare market. 
Monopsony is a condition similar to monopoly; in essence, it is the mirror image, or 
isomer, of a monopoly.  Whereas in a monopoly, there is a concentration and market 
power in the supply market, a monopsony represents the concentration and market 
power of the buyer.  In both cases, there is only the opportunity to transact with the 
monopolist or monopsonist.  In this case, a collusive monopsony between government 
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and private insurers is suggested, similar to Pauly (1998) and Seth (2006), wherein the 
buyer market colludes to act as a single consumer of the inputs of health services from 
ACHs.  Monopsonists drive down market prices of inputs below the competitive 
norm, pushing suppliers off their average cost curve and onto their marginal cost 
curve.  The monopsonist reaps excess market rents.  In the case of healthcare, private 
insurers take these excess market rents as additional profits for shareholders, while 
public insurers such as Medicare and Medicaid view these as a reduction in the 
overall healthcare cost.   
Collusive monopsony conditions exist because the payment data and market 
behavior of the largest insurers, Medicare and Medicaid, are public information.  
Private insurers utilize this public data to change their market behavior and their 
reimbursement of health services.  The behavior of this mechanism is very similar to 
price leader behavior in a market, in which although there may be no formal 
relationship of suppliers in a market, a market leader, who typically has the dominant 
share of the market, determines the prices.  While the insurers may not communicate 
formally with government, and vice versa, pricing, or in this case reimbursement, is 
driven by the market leader: government.  This acts to limit the reimbursement of 
ACHs, and consequently controls the behavior of ACHs, as it reduces the ACHs’ free 
cash flows, thereby restricting access to debt markets, and thus placing restrictions on 
choice of capital structures.  This leaves ACHs more dependent on internal funds for 
investment, which changes the performance requirement for future investment, as it 
increases opportunity costs.  This reduces the likelihood of overinvestment.   
 
1.7 Testing for Collusive Monopsony 
The other primary research question is: does collusive monopsony exist and if 
so what affect does it have upon decisions of capital structure?  In researching this 
question, two models are proposed to test for the presence of collusive monopsony.  
The first model suggests that payers have market power, which affects free cash 
flows.  To test this premise, an HHI was created for payors in each ACH market.  This 
provides a measurement of concentration of the payor market faced by each ACH.  
Then, values of the HHI were compared against values of the HHI that were deemed 
acceptable by the U.S. Department of Justice.  Concentration via the HHI was 
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regressed against free cash flows of the respective ACH.  The positive correlation of 
the HHI and free cash flows of ACHs provided evidence of collusion within the 
market.  Markets with high concentration are more likely to have collusion than 
markets with lower concentration (Cabral 2000).  Combining measures of 
concentration, evidence of collusion, and an assumption of demand elasticity, this 
research was able to provide evidence of the market power of payors via the NEIO.   
The NEIO is an equation that provides an understanding of the relationship between 
the three characteristics (concentration, collusion, and demand elasticity) mentioned 
previously with the Lerner’s Index measurement of market power.  This provides a 
methodology to estimate the market power of the payor. 
The second model acts to determine the market power of hospitals by creating 
a modified Lerner’s Index, using average cost rather than marginal costs for each 
hospital, and regressing this upon the free cash flows and Net Income from Services 
to Patient (NISP) of the ACHs.  The relationship of the Lerner’s Index and free cash 
flows enables the research to examine whether the market power of ACHs affects the 
capital structure of ACHs via free cash flows.   In addition, the relationship of the 
market power of ACHs and NISP allows the research to examine if ACHs are price 
takers.  By examining both buyer (payor) and seller (ACH) market power the research 
is able to provide clear evidence of collusive monopsony and to examine its affects 
upon free cash flows and thus its impact upon decisions of capital structures. 
 
1.8 Research Findings 
The research provided evidence that agency and collusive monopsony are 
creating distortions in the ACH market.  Agency cost and collusive monopsony are 
shown to have a negative impact upon ACHs’ real free cash flows.  Additionally, the 
presence of collusive monopsony is shown to have two to three times the negative 
effects on future free cash flows than the agency cost of free cash flows.  This 
limitation in free cash flow, according to Calem and Rizzo (1995), acts as a restriction 
in access to debt markets, as less future free cash flows are available to be promised to 
lenders.  This reduction in access to debt markets causes hospitals with lower free 
cash flows to be more dependent on internal cash flows for capital investment.  This 
dependency on internal cash flows raises the opportunity cost of investments, which 
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may cause managers to have higher hurdle rates.  This change or restriction of 
investment reduces the likelihood of overinvestment by hospitals.  The reduction in 
overinvestment by ACHs is seen as savings for public and private payors in the cost 
of healthcare.  Savings to government taking the form of less tax dollars spent on 
healthcare, which is a savings for the overall public and likewise savings for private 
payors, can be distributed to shareholders and or it’s insured in the form of lower 
premiums. 
These findings are important as there has beenfew studies on agency costs in 
US healthcare when analyzed in the context of its relevance to capitals structure.   
 
1.9 Contributions  
The research examines an area which for mainstream financial economists is 
often seen as difficult to research due to data issues and requiring specialized 
knowledge of the of U.S. healthcare market. This is characterized by 
“professionalism, licensure, non-profit organizations, third-party payment structure, 
heavy government regulation”(Robinson 2001, p. 131).  The research applies 
methodologies common to finance research and microeconomics that are only rarely 
used to examine U.S. healthcare, due to the barriers presented by the specialized 
knowledge necessary to conduct research in this area.  The relatively small number of 
empirical studies that exist are based on small datasets and test limited theories.  A 
key feature of this research is that it combines established methodologies with an 
interesting research topic through using a dataset that had not previously been utilized 
within a study (the MCR with 65,689 cases and 12M healthcare claims). This means 
the research presented in this thesis is able to provide a new perspective with which to 
expand our understanding of decisions of capital structure in the presence of 
contractual agency effects within the ACH market. Furthermore, in addressing these 
questions, by focusing on a single specific industry with similar characteristics of 
participants, the research avoids problems due to structural differences between 
industries akin to Calem and Rizzo (1995). 
The study of contractual agency as proposed in this research is based upon the 
principal-agent relationship akin to Jensen and Meckling (1976), but expands the 
understanding of the agency relationship in line with Milgrom and Roberts (1992). In 
31 
 
addition, it expands on the recommendations made by Eisenhardt (1989) for agency 
research, by adding the complementary theoretical perspective of collusive 
monopsony. 
At a practical level, empirical evidence of behaviour under agency cost is 
important because it allows for an understanding of the construct of the principal 
agent relationship and the behaviours and consequences it might generate.  It provides 
a basis on which one might judge future transactions under similar frameworks and 
conditions to help in our understanding of the potential negative distortional effects 
and the complications agency cost might generate within a transaction or market.  
A key area of this research is that it investigates and offers a better 
understanding of the behaviour the principal and the agent under conditions that are 
different from traditional principal-agent relationships, where there is direct 
communication between the principal and agent, other than just the price.  In addition 
the research gives consideration to agent behaviour and the agent’s need to compete 
on quality with little to no concern for price (Newhouse, 1981; Wang, 1999; Glied, 
2003; Nahata, 2005).  The findings present a clear expansion in the understanding of 
the effects of agency cost within the US healthcare system and how decisions of 
capital structures are affected by these costs, thus providing an empirical basis upon 
which to base future relationships. 
The findings on the effects of monopsony in the U.S add detail and validity to 
the agency results. Furthermore, to date, there has been little study on ACHs and the 
presence of the monopsony construct (the all-or-nothing contract) akin to Taylor 
(2003) and the effects monopsony has on their decisions of capital structure and none 
that combine both agency and monopsony theory to provide a more expansive 
understanding of determinants of capital structure. By examining monopsony the 
study builds on the previous works of Sevilla (2005), Taylor (2003) and Pauly (1998).  
The research also provides a novel approach to examining for the presence of 
monopsony by analysing both sides of the market, buyer (payors) and sellers (ACHs).  
This allows for self-supporting position of monopsony to be attained, which is a 
methodology not seen in any of the previous research analysed in the process of 
writing this thesis. 
Given the U.S. Healthcare market significance as a proportion of U.S. GDP, 
inefficiencies which are present, large or small, form an important area of study. Even 
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small inefficiencies represent significant dollar amounts when the effects of such 
inefficiencies are measured.  Based upon the insights of this research, having an 
understanding how policy decisions and the structure of the market affect the U.S. 
healthcare market is important to those who originate regulation and control the 
markets in which these inefficiencies exist, or try to manage the market process. The 
insights mean that policymakers are better equipped to form appropriate conclusions 
and sounder regulation and decisions.  This is important as recent legislation via the 
“Affordable Care Act” has been passed by Congress and signed into law by President 
Obama in 2010, which will effectively transform a large part of the regulatory, 
monitoring and market framework discussed in this thesis.  As the Department of 
Health and Human Services moves to implement the legislation, it will be important 
to understand how changes in the way the US healthcare market operates being 
considered might impact ACHs decisions of capital structure and therefore the 
capability and financial soundness of ACHs themselves.  The financial strength of 
ACHs has potential consequences for the quality of healthcare services delivered, 
which is one of the primary objectives of the legislation beyond equal access to all. 
Insights from the findings of this thesis and therefore have immediate relevance to 
social policy in the United States.  
 
1.10 Thesis Structure 
In order to understand the environment in which ACHs operate, a history and 
discussion of the market structure is provided in the next chapter.  The structure of 
this thesis is as follows:  Chapter Two provides a historical overview of the U.S. 
healthcare market. This enables the reader to understand the current structure of the 
market and the factors that led to the current market distortions that are examined in 
the subsequent chapters.  Chapter Three is an overview of the financial condition of 
ACHs during the period of this longitudinal study.  The chapter provides the basis for 
understanding the financial state of ACHs, and acts to provide aggregate financial 
characteristics to the ACHs.  The financial ratios described in this chapter also are 
used in Chapters Four and Six.  Chapter Four is an in-depth study of the U.S. 
healthcare market within an agency framework. This is tested in two ways: via agency 
costs of free cash flows, and signaling.  Chapter Five discusses the monopsony 
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construct, its existence from a legal perspective, and an examination of previous 
monopsony research.  Chapter Six examines the empirical evidence of monopsony 
and consequent effects upon capital structure via the panel data regression analysis 
mentioned previously. Chapter Seven concludes the research and provides an 
aggregate discussion of both agency and monopsony within U.S. healthcare and its 




2. History and Structure of the Acute Care Hospital Market 
2.1 History 
In order to understand the research undertaken in this thesis, it is important to 
be conscious of the history of the U.S. healthcare market, its evolution, and its 
components.   This chapter provides background information on the U.S. healthcare 
system and explains the underlying developments in the structure of the ACH market. 
The purpose of this chapter is provide background for the reader unfamiliar with U.S. 
healthcare.  The chapter is not meant to indicate that this history has a direct effect on 
the empirical chapters of this thesis other than to describe how the healthcare market 
has developed and operates.  This chapter largely draws on the works of four authors: 
Matcha (2003), Radich (2008), Mamdani (2001), and Jonas et al. (2007).   
The U.S. has been shaped by many forces, including a strong belief in limited 
government, individual freedom, and exercise of power by private interests, in 
addition to crises in the healthcare system, political agendas, pragmatism, and 
technology (Inglehart 1992).  Duane Matcha (2003, p.4), in his book, Health Care 
Systems of the Developed World, describes a healthcare system as, “any combination 
of components identified by a society that facilitates the provision of health and health 
care for its members.” Almost from its inception, healthcare in the U.S has been 
influenced by various market distortions that have impacted its financial structure and 
its present organization.   
The first hospital and medical school in the U.S. was located at Henricropolis 
in the state of Virginia (1612); the next was in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1732. As 
the U.S. developed, so did its healthcare infrastructure.  There were approximately 
178 hospitals in the U.S. by 1873 (Jonas 2007).  The U.S. Government’s first 
involvement in healthcare began with the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen Act of 
1798, under which the seamen were taxed to cover the cost of their medical care 
(Matcha 2003). With the War of Independence and throughout the nineteenth century, 
the health of the average American remained poor.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. healthcare had emerged as a 
commodity, a product available to the majority of citizens.  Everyone could have 
healthcare as long as they could pay for the service. This resulted in care primarily for 
the wealthy.  Changes in Western Europe in the 1920s, specifically the formation of 
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socialized medical programs, influenced the U.S.  Within the U.S., interests moved 
toward similar programs for U.S. citizens.  At the time, there were four basic cost 
concerns: individual loss of income, individual medical costs, indirect cost of illness 
to society, and the social cost of medical care (Radich 2008). However, both hospitals 
and physicians feared government control of healthcare because of concerns that the 
government would interfere in the doctor-patient relationship. In order to rebuff 
advancement in socialized medical programs, and to increase economic revenue 
stability, a group of physicians formed Blue Shield, insurance to pay for physician 
care, and Blue Cross, insurance to cover hospital costs. Blue Shield was formed in 
1929 at Baylor University Hospital in Houston, Texas where the schoolteachers were 
contracted to be covered. The insurance premium, when paid, included 21 days of 
hospital care (Radich 2008).    
The Great Depression brought additional problems to the U.S. for hospitals, 
and with them, additional economic instability.  To combat this economic instability, 
many hospitals and physicians looked to insurance as a possible solution. The era’s 
economic instability gave rise to private and public insurance in the U.S.  In 1933, the 
American Hospital Association (AHA) approved insurance as a legitimate solution to 
the economic instability affecting many hospitals across the nation (Radich 2008).  
Plans approved by the AHA had to be non-profit and promote public welfare. This 
gave rise to demands for greater control and coverage by the U.S. Government.  One 
such organization that emerged was the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care 
(CCMC), which argued that the use of group insurance or government taxation could 
help defray the cost of medical care.  Adversaries of the CCMC fought to maintain the 
status quo, preferring limited government involvement (Radich 2008).   
In 1937, the Kaiser Foundation grew out of the Kaiser Construction Company 
(Radich 2008).  At the time, the Kaiser Construction Company was building the 
Grand Coulee Dam in Washington.  In order to increase workforce productivity and 
reduce medical costs, Kaiser Construction contracted with a local physician to treat its 
workforce.  All employees were covered under the plan.  In that same year, the Group 
Health Association (GHA) was formed by the Federal Home Loan Bank.  The goal 
was to reduce the number of mortgage defaults occurring from excessive medical 
costs (Radich 2008).   
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The first GHA plan was the health insurance plan in New York City.   The 
GHA also developed similar plans with regard to the coverage of patients. From these 
plans rose two opposing forces: the medical community that was concerned with 
obtaining fees for services, and the plan sponsor, whose focus was on controlling the 
costs. While fee-for-service had been the mainstay of the medical profession, 
insurance plans now moved to hiring physicians and hospitals directly, or using a 
capitated rate to reimburse.  In an effort to control the spread of insurance, the 
American Medical Association (AMA) only approved certain plans.  The GHA was 
not approved by the AMA, as it viewed the GHA as unethical and unlicensed (Radich 
2008).  The AMA led efforts to control the spread of these “unethical” insurers, but 
later was indicted on charges of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act for use of its 
tactics to suppress the GHA (Radich 2008).   
In further efforts to control insurance, 26 states passed laws that prohibited or 
limited formation of consumer-organized medical plans.   The medical service plans 
were physician-centric in these states and had to be approved by the state medical 
society, formed by doctors, and/or a majority of directors had to be doctors (Radich 
2008).  Another limitation of group practice plans was that most states required free 
choice of a patient’s hospital/doctor.   
After World War II,  America encountered a labor shortage.  This shortage of 
labor brought about additional competition for the limited workers who were 
available.  Employer-provided health insurance was used to attract and retain 
personnel.  Unions, whose power increased as a result of the Wagner Act and 
collective bargaining, demanded additional health insurance coverage (Radich 2008).  
An agreement was reached between the government, labor unions, and industry.  
Health benefits paid to employees by their employers would be tax-free.  This 
increased the demand overall for health insurance, and the sector grew vigorously.  
The Hill Burton Act was passed in 1946.  This act, along with its amendment in 1975, 
required hospitals that accepted federal funds to provide care for all, including and 
most importantly the poor (Mamdani 2001).   
President Truman proposed a national health insurance program in the late 
1940s.  The program was opposed and defeated by the AMA. However, the seed of 
the idea of a national health insurance had been planted.  According to Radich (2008), 
over 60 percent of the population had hospital insurance, 50 percent of the population 
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had insurance for surgical procedures, and 25 percent had insurance for in-hospital 
services. Employers covered 35 percent of the net cost of health insurance for 
employees, and just over 20 percent for employees’ dependents. 
The fifties and sixties mainly saw competition between plans such as Blue 
Cross and commercial indemnity companies.  Blue Cross guaranteed full payment of 
healthcare bills, and commercial indemnity companies paid the majority, but it left the 
insured with some out-of-pocket expenses. In addition, commercial indemnity 
companies provided employers with cost-sharing provisions (Radich 2008).  In 1965, 
Medicare and Medicaid were passed into law (Services 2009).  This saw government 
(federal, state, and local) take on 46 % of the total healthcare expenditure (Mamdani 
2001).  During this time, medical expenses were not challenged for payment, as long 
as they were considered reasonable, and due to unchecked spending, this led to large 
increases in healthcare expenditure.     
Both physicians and hospitals had lobbied hard against the Great Society 
program of Lyndon Johnson, which brought Medicaid and Medicare into being; 
however, both entities gained economically by its passing.  It was during this period 
that hospital growth in beds and services was extensive.  Healthcare as a portion of 
the GDP grew from 7.1% in 1970, to 13.9% in 1999 (Mamdani 2001).  While 
outpacing other nations’ spending on healthcare, the U.S. lagged behind most other 
industrialized nations in terms of both the life expectancy and infant mortality rate 
(Mamdani 2001).  As such, more demand was placed on the government to address 
the humanist aspect of care for all, setting the political tone that exists today. 
The idea of cost containment evolved with the development of the Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO) by the Kaiser Permanente Foundation (KPF).  The 
KPF is a later form of the Kaiser Foundation, which was founded in 1937. The KPF 
showed that while HMOs originally were designed to improve the quality of care, 
they also were effective at reducing costs (Mamdani 2001).  The HMO achieved this 
through the reduction of care or improper utilization of both hospitals and physicians 
services.  Health maintenance was a major focus, and reduced cost through 
preventative medicine such as vaccines and screenings for cancer.  The HMO, unlike 
insurers, directly provided the healthcare to their clients. This differed from insurers, 
who just were responsible for paying for the cost of healthcare services provided by 
the physician or hospital. The HMO proved to be so effective that President Nixon 
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approved a bill (1973 federal HMO Act) promoting the widespread growth of HMOs.  
This bill provided grants and loans for the startup of new and the expansion of 
existing HMOs. It also allowed federally qualified HMOs to form in states that 
restricted the developments of HMOs (Radich 2008).  
The HMOs currently are defined by the National Center for Health Statistics 
as: 
“a health care system that assumes or shares both the financial risks and the delivery 
risks associated with providing comprehensive medical service to a voluntarily 
enrolled population in a particular geographic area, usually in return for a fixed, 
prepaid fee (NCHS 2007).  Pure HMO enrollees use only the prepaid capitated health 
services of the HMO panel of medical care providers.  Open-ended HMO enrollees 
use the prepaid HMO health services, but in addition may receive medical care from 
providers who are not part of the HMO panel.  There is usually a substantial 
deductible, copayment, or coinsurance associated with the use of non-panel 
providers” (NCHS 2007).    
Economist Harold Luft (1981) described five criteria that represent minimal 
requirements for an organization to be an HMO: 1) contractual responsibility of the 
organization to provide medical services; 2) defined enrollment; 3) voluntary 
enrollment; 4) fixed payment to healthcare providers on behalf of the insured; and 5) 
the organization bears the risk of covering its enrollees.  In addition to the creation of 
HMOs, the 1970s also saw the development of the Preferred Provider Organization 
(PPO).  A PPO differs from an HMO in that they allow their participants to use out-
of-panel physicians for a higher fee.   
President Reagan followed in 1983 with the Budget Reconciliation Act, which 
provided immunity from medical malpractice lawsuits for HMOs (Mamdani 2001).  
The U.S. Government also pushed efforts to closely monitor the need for 
hospitalization, the length of stay (total time in the hospital), and outpatient surgical 
procedures. The Regional Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) 
sought to establish standards for admission, as well as a focus on utilization.  
Committees were required to monitor physician usage of laboratory and radiological 
services and other medical resources.  The PSRO also established conditions for 
hospitalization, and they established a firm set of guidelines that physicians were 
required to follow for a patient’s admission.  If the requirements for admission were 
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not followed, the payment was denied.  The establishment of these standards was a 
factor for change in the healthcare market.  The market for outpatient services was 
enlarged to provide more services on an outpatient basis, as these were less costly, 
rather than by hospitalization.    
Due to the increasing cost of insurance premiums, HMOs became the favored 
model for providing employees with healthcare coverage at a low cost.  The HMO 
structure spread widely and helped to reduce the growth of healthcare costs within the 
U.S.  The Surgeon General under President Ronald Reagan, Dr. C. Everett Koop 
(1996, p. 69), noted at the time, 
“The biggest surprise in the past two years has been the rapid growth of a 
system known as managed care.  Millions of Americans have been shifted into 
health maintenance organizations, dramatically restructuring the financing and 
delivery of health care.  The original impetus for managed care came from 
physicians who wanted the freedom to treat their patients without being 
worried about whether they could pay for each visit, test, or procedure.  In the 
early HMOs, cost containment was an unexpected benefit, not a primary 
purpose…But now the rapidly proliferating HMOs—most of them investor-
owned and for profit—seem to be interested firstly in managing cost and only 
secondarily maintaining health.” 
  
While the U.S. had reduced the growth in healthcare costs to a manageable 
level, the U.S. still focused on healthcare for humanitarian reasons.  Socialized 
medicine, or universal coverage, was still of major concern.  President Clinton, upon 
taking office in 1992, presented a comprehensive plan to bring about universal 
coverage.  While this entire plan did not make it into law, two subprograms from this 
initiative did: the Children’s Healthcare Insurance Program (CHIP), which expanded 
coverage to provide healthcare for children who were not covered under Medicaid, 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which 
controlled the use and protection of patient information (Matcha 2003). 
Eventually, HMOs modernized to become Managed Care Organizations 
(MCOs).  Austrin (1999, p.1118), defines an MCO as, “…a system that uses financial 
incentives and management controls to direct patients to providers who are 
responsible for giving appropriate, cost effective care.  Managed care systems are 
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intended to control the cost of healthcare by emphasizing prevention, early 
intervention and outpatient care.” The MCOs are forms of PPOs, which were 
described earlier in this chapter.   
The MCOs are different from the classical model of an employer paying 
premiums to an insurer that covers only 80% of cost, leaving the patient to cover the 
rest.  The MCOs control cost by limiting the demand side of the equation, controlling 
and limiting moral hazard within the sector created by insurance.  Under MCOs, 
patients may only use MCO physicians or hospitals, or those that have been 
contracted via the MCO to provide services.  Patient demand is reduced by the use of 
a gatekeeper system.  The gatekeeper interviews each patient and determines if the 
patient is ill enough to be in need of hospital or physician.  Most procedures require 
second opinions, and all hospitalizations require pre-certification before being 
approved. This basically uses a system of incentives and penalties that encourage 
certain behaviors of physicians, which effectively regulates the utilization of ancillary 
services and consultations.  Managed care has become an integral part of the 
healthcare delivery equation.  
According to the U.S. Bureau of Census (1999), the number of HMOs/MCOs 
has increased from 235 in 1980, to 651 in 1998.  Enrollment figures in HMOs grew as 
well, from 9.1 million in 1980, to 65 million in 1998 (Matcha 2003).  Prior to 
managed care, physicians held the power and control.  However, MCOs altered this, 
especially in the 1990s.  Pricing control successfully had moved from the hands of 
ACHs and physicians to MCOs. “The physicians, of whom there were 793,263 active 
in 2001, by tradition and by license have been the most powerful, dominant group.  In 
the mid 1990’s, however, a major change in the locus of control over medical practice 
did take place, as a significant portion of it moved to the managed care companies” 
(Jonas 2007, p. 10).   Keeping coverage costs low has allowed employers to cover 
additional lives with less cost.  The government also has used managed care to control 
costs.  It has used MCOs to manage the Medicare and Medicaid plans in many states, 
with lower overall costs as a result.  Managed care had an effect on the cost of 
healthcare provided in the 1990s through an increase in utilization, which allowed for 





2.2 Current Political Climate 
Managed care’s ability to control costs gives rise to additional pressure placed 
on the government. This political imperative to control costs also has contributed to 
the political climate that has evolved into government’s drive to achieve healthcare as 
a social agenda. The U.S. Government has been under pressure by some to expand its 
role in healthcare.  Some argue that healthcare is part of the social/community market, 
and therein community and social values are more important than private profit 
(Matcha 2003). Others argue that individuals are responsible for their own welfare, 
and should be responsible for purchasing and controlling consumption of their own 
healthcare.  There are an estimated 43 million people who are uninsured in the U.S., 
with millions more having what many believe is inadequate insurance (Jonas et al. 
2007). This provides a discourse for argument, as some contend that a capitalistic, 
competitive market is not designed to take care of those who are inadequately insured, 
or who have no insurance at all. Nevertheless, the legislation that is passed tries to 
solve issues of access, costs and quality all by creating market constructs or 
frameworks in order for the market to solve the problem. 
The U.S. Government’s regulation of healthcare institutions and the structure 
of the healthcare system have been a reactive process primarily.  Changes usually are 
made to the system after serious encounters when low quality providers come to light, 
or when serious financial problems develop.  For instance, it was recently suggested 
by Dr. Donald Berwick, the previous head of the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, that approximately 20 to 30 percent of government health expenditures were 
wasted due to overtreatment of patients, failure to coordinate care and the 
administrative complexities of the healthcare system, high regulation and outright 
fraud (Khan, 2011).  The industry is plagued by high health costs and ever higher 
insurance premiums (White, 2004).  These rapid increases in costs, insurance and the 
number of uninsured, suggests that managed care organizations (MCOs) once thought 
to be the market solution to the rise in healthcare costs is no longer working properly.  
There is thought that the failure of MCOs is driven by consumer markets, which act to 
undermine MCOs, and there is some question if MCOs can work to address the 
effects of over spending on technology (overinvestment) and quality of care in light of 
the presence of consumerism. Consumerism is defined as consumers valuing choice in 
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its own right to choose, as many are uncomfortable with shifting decision to payers.  
This rise in consumerism has led to effectively patients’ bill of rights legislation in 
some states.  This has led many of the MCOs to become less restrictive with patients.  
Reduction in control over the patient base by payors would seem to benefit ACHs 
negotiating with payors.  This has also been complicated by mergers of ACHs to 
make large chains of ACH’s or conglomerates, both on a for-profit and non-for-profit 
basis.  This has led some to believe that perhaps the market power for ACHs is back 
on the rise (White 2004).  Another trend closely related has been payors changing 
their benefit design to increase consumer cost sharing.  This exposes the patient to 
more of the cost of healthcare services.  In addition, MCOs have tried to develop 
systems to truly manage the higher risk higher costs patients.   
  Jonas (2007) suggests that many of these problems are caused by the 
decentralized nature of healthcare, which is primarily administrated by a private 
structure with little planning. An example could be the use of MCOs to manage costs.   
However, an opposing viewpoint could be that decentralization does not mean little or 
no planning, but rather that planning is market driven.  With either viewpoint 
expressed, the market for the provision of healthcare in the U.S. is complex. 
These returns to tried solutions of the past have angered many politicians, 
patients and practitioners.  It should be noted that, while not affecting this research, 
the economic environment for healthcare is being changed significantly.  As of March 
23, 2010, the Obama Administration has pushed through the new Affordable Care 
Act.  The Act was structured to provide additional rights and protections to consumers 
effectively putting the patient back in control of their own healthcare—not the 
insurance company.  The individual states are required to setup consumer assistance 
programs to help with complaints and appeals regarding health coverage and to 
inform the patients of their rights and responsibilities. These programs were setup up 
in order to inform consumers of theirs rights to appeal insurance actions such as 
appeals for denial of payment for healthcare services by insurers.  In addition, these 
programs educate the population on preventative care and how some patients could 
receive preventative care at no cost.  A patient’s bill of rights was included in The Act 
to outline to consumer protections, such as those to children with pre-existing 
conditions could no longer be denied insurance coverage.  The plan also addresses 
doctor choice and outlining new rules for ER access and what payors are forced to 
43 
 
cover when a patient goes out of the panel of physicians and hospitals contracted with 
the insurer.  The theory would be that the insurer would be required to cover more 
costs.  This is further addressed in that insurance cancellations are limited, such as 
those with a pre-existing condition.  The Affordable Care Act is meant to provide a 
greater variety of alternative providers to the individual private insurance market, 
expanding coverage for young adults to be covered on their parents plan until the age 
of 26. 
One of the major items to come out of the legislation is the creation of 
affordable insurance exchanges to be setup in each state.  The idea is that an 
individual would be able to compare like plans, so therefore apple to apples 
comparisons, and thus use pricing to determine the best insurer to choose.   
As suggested, earlier the U.S. government often seeks to solve problems in 
U.S. healthcare by creating frameworks for market-based solutions.  MCOs provide a 
good example of previous efforts to create such market framework.  The affordable 
care act take this premise further by creating a new type of non-for profit, consumer 
run health insurer call a Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan or (CO-OP). 
Premium costs which have been climbing for many years prior to The Act, are 
now under pressure as The Act provides new methods to hold insurance companies 
accountable and keep premium costs down to the end patient.  The idea was to make 
sure consumers were getting the most for their insurance dollar.  The new healthcare 
law takes this a step further by limiting insurers’ ability to use profits for certain 
expenses, thus forcing insurers to focus on using premiums to provide and improve 
quality of care for the insured.  This premise of limiting insurer’s business control is 
taken further by limiting and removing lifetime and annual limits that were sometimes 
placed on health insurance plans, with a requirement to end the practice by 2014.  The 
Act also protects the consumer from unreasonable insurance premium rate increases, 
with a justification required at an increase of ten percent or more. 
Government insurance concerning people age 65 or older was expanded with 
greater drug coverage and more cost-free preventative care services.  The Act 
extended new tax credits for small business and non-profits to provide insurance for 
their employees.   
The Affordable Care Act has been a very politically sensitive agenda with 
very determined organizations either for or against.  The Act was place into law in 
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one of the most contentious pieces of legislation passed in the U.S. in recent history.  
The Affordable Care Act has been challenged from a number of angles the largest 
seems to be its constitutionality revolving around its individual mandate.  The 
individual mandate would require all citizens of the U.S. to purchase health insurance.  
Lawsuits have been filed in federal court and it is expected to make it to The Supreme 
Court in the U.S. sometime in summer of 2012, before the law goes into effect.  This 
is an unusual scenario, as The Supreme Court will not hear a case regarding a piece of 
legislation until it is fully implemented into law. 
If this legislation withstands challenge in the judicial branch, it will radically 
change reimbursement methodologies and the healthcare insurance market.  The act 
promises to cover all citizens with some form of healthcare insurance, whether private 
or public.  The long-term effects of such legislation are unknown at the time of this 
research.  However, the current legislation and changes that are being made to 
healthcare law in the U.S. are significant.  It is therefore important to understand how 
the current market system functions and to better understand any distortional effects 
created in the market by the current market setup.  Thus, the importance of this study.  
While more individuals may be covered by insurance under the new legislation, some 
of the conditions and theories discussed in this research still exist.  This new 
legislation may magnify agency or monopsony effects within the healthcare market; 
therefore, it is important to understand how these distortions affect ACHs as goals set 
out in the legislation may be undermined.  
To understand these distortional effects of agency and monopsony a better 
understanding for the delivery and financing of healthcare is coordinated.  It is under 
this premise that we seek to provide the necessary information regarding the 
mechanics of healthcare in the U.S. 
 
 2.3 Mechanics of Healthcare: Financing and Delivery  
Healthcare remains an expensive commodity, and while many point to various 
reasons for this, it is the need to cover more with less money that motivates the 
government to interject themselves into this market. Approximately one-third of the 
U.S. healthcare dollar is spent on inpatient hospital care, making hospital care the 
single most expensive component of the health care system.  As health care costs rise 
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and the population ages, policy makers are concerned with the growing burden of 
hospital-based medical care and expenses to government, consumers, and insurers. 
(Agency for the Healthcare Research and Quality, 2007)   
There are three types of owners of hospitals, or rather, ownership 
classifications: 1) private, not-for-profit; 2) private, for-profit; and 3) government 
owned and operated.  Most of the hospitals at the time of this research are private, 
96%, and 89% of the hospitals are community hospitals. Of all hospitals, 60% are 
non-profit, 22% are state/local, and 18% are private, for-profit.  U.S. healthcare 
spending for 2004 was $1.85 trillion dollars, approximately 15.6% of the GDP, with 
predictions that it could increase to 19.6% of the GDP, or $4.5 trillion by 2019 
(Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, September 2010).   
 Healthcare spending and the inflation of healthcare costs have been a major 
problem in the U.S., usually increasing at a rate of two to three times that of the 
general inflation factor (Jonas et al. 2007).  The only time this trend in healthcare 
spending and inflation was curbed was in the mid-1990s, when managed care gained 
traction in curbing rising healthcare costs.  It was not the reduction in actual prices 
associated with healthcare services that were reduced, but rather, the utilization of 
services.  Managed care was acting as a gatekeeper to healthcare services, curbing the 
effects of the moral hazard of health insurance.  According to Jonas et al. (2007), in 
2005, U.S. personal health care accounted for 84% of total health expenditures, 
approximating $1.99 trillion.  This statistic shows that as a percentage, personal 
healthcare has dropped only barely from 1980, when personal health accounted for 
85% of the total health expenditures (Jonas et al. 2007).   
 
2.3.1 Payers & Payments 
There are three mechanisms for payment of healthcare institutions in the U.S. 
healthcare system:  1) government (46% of total expenditures in 2003); 2) insurance/ 
managed care (36% of total healthcare expenditures in 2003); and 3) 
individual/personal (14% of total healthcare expenditures in 2003) (Jonas et al. 2007).  
These funds are paid to hospitals, physicians, pharmaceuticals, nursing homes, 
dentists, etc., with hospitals receiving approximately 33% of the funds in 2002 (Jonas 
et al. 2007). Patients, third-party payers, and even the providers themselves contribute 
these dollars. If the patient contributes the dollars, they are considered out-of-pocket 
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expenses.  The insurance portion is from the patient’s insurance company or managed 
care organization.   
Providers contribute through the donation of services or forgiving patient 
debts on services rendered.  Insurance or third-party payers technically are classified 
into two groups: private and public.  The private group is a combination of 
insurance/managed care organizations and out-of-pocket expenses.  The public group 
is federal, state, and local agencies that act as third-party payers or deliver the health 
care directly.  Examples of public insurers are Medicare and Medicaid, which do not 
provide the services themselves, but reimburse health care organizations acting on 
their behalf.   
 
2.3.2 Public Health 
Medicare and Medicaid, along with various other governmental programs, are 
public forms of insurance, as mentioned previously in this chapter. The programs 
cover those citizens who are over the age of 65 in Medicare or meet poverty levels to 
qualify in Medicaid.  These are the social nets of the U.S. healthcare system.  Both are 
operated by the CMS.   
 
2.3.3 Medicare 
Medicare, which began in 1965, has been adapted and expanded over the 
years.  Coverage was expanded in 1973 to cover permanently disabled workers and 
their dependents who were eligible for old age, survivor, and disability insurance 
under social security (Jonas et al. 2007).  There are four parts to Medicare: Part A, 
hospital insurance; Part B, physician and professional health services insurance; Part 
C, Medicare Plus (MCO enrollment); and Part D, prescription drug coverage.  In 
2005, government entities covered 57% of hospital care dollars, with expenditures of 
$331.4 billion in personal health services (Jonas et al. 2007). Under Medicare, 
hospitals are reimbursed on an episode-of-care basis under a fiscal structure named 
the Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG).  Medicare has predefined classifications in 
which patients are placed based upon their illnesses and conditions; those 
classifications are the DRG. Managed care became involved in Medicare in the early 
1990s as that form of private insurance became integral to the market.  Within a 
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decade, they had removed themselves from that part of the market, claiming that 
Medicare reimbursement was too low (Jonas et al. 2007).   
 
2.3.4 Medicaid 
Medicaid was created by Congress in 1965 to provide health coverage for the 
poor in the U.S.  Unlike Medicare, an individual must apply for coverage and meet 
certain income requirements.  Medicaid is administered at the state level, so coverage 
varies from state to state.  In 2003, Medicaid covered approximately 55 million 
people, and was worth 17% of all personal healthcare spending (Jonas 2007). 
 
2.3.5 The U.S. Healthcare Market 
Within the U.S. healthcare market, the industry participants have declared that 
the sector is overregulated.  Jonas et.al.  (2007, p. 107) wrote, “In the view of these 
and other stakeholders, the healthcare sector in the United States is already the most 
regulated of all economic sectors.” The U.S. health system is a unique market; if one 
examines how the market is not only extremely regulated when it comes to payments, 
but also in all of the market’s other qualities, he will find that the system further sets 
itself apart from that of a normal competitive market system. For example, Kenneth 
Arrow cites in his 1963 article, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care,” that uncertainty, asymmetries of information, and the non-market ability of risk 
inherent in medicine are additional factors that set this market apart from others.  
 
2.3.6 Private Health 
Private health insurance usually is acquired through one’s employer; however, 
it is possible to purchase coverage outside of one’s employment. Generally, private 
health insurance more expensive when purchased outside of employment. 
Approximately 69% of Americans had health insurance in 2005, which was down 
from 70% in 1990 (Jonas et al. 2007). What is significant about this is the stability of 
covered lives within the U.S. healthcare market.  Private insurance covered 35% of 
the national healthcare expenditures in 2005.   Adding in private out-of-pocket 





Predominantly in the U.S., bills for medical services (claims) are sent 
electronically by providers to payors.  The electronic bill then is sent to a 
clearinghouse so that it may be routed to the appropriate payor.  The payor then either 
processes the bill, rejects it for various reasons, or puts it on hold, pending additional 
information from the hospital.  For bills that are considered “good” or correct, 
payments typically are received by providers in 15 to 60 days, dependent upon the 
payor.  If there are errors with the bill, which is entirely up to the payor to determine, 
payment can be received by the provider as many as 60 to 120 days later. While the 
U.S. prides itself on a very efficient capitalistic market, the health care system is not 
considered an efficient system.  It is held that our healthcare system requires 
tremendous amounts of eligibility determination, benefit checking, 
coinsurance/deductible calculation/ billing/collection, pre-utilization authorization, 
and utilization review, all of which add to the inefficiency of the system (Himmelstein 
& Woolhandler 2001). 
 
2.3.8 Cost/Cost Plus 
Reimbursement of providers in the U.S. health system can take place in one or 
a combination of six ways: cost or cost plus, per diem, fee-for-service, fixed price, 
capitation, and value.  Of these, per diem, fee-for-service, and capitation probably are 
used the most widely. Cost plus reimbursement is one in which the provider tabulates 
and maintains his costs incurred while providing services to a patient.  Cost plus is 
based broadly on the assumption that opposing parties can agree on an objective 
estimation of costs.  When the patient is discharged from the hospital, the hospital 
submits the bill and then is reimbursed for those charges for services rendered, plus a 
percentage over cost, which accounts for the provider’s profits.  Under most, if not all 
contracts, there are items that are non-reimbursable expenses.  Most organizations 
must use the profit gain on the delivery of the services to cover costs that were not 
reimbursed.  Cost plus used to be the primary reimbursement method for most 
providers.  The primary problem with this method of payment is that it penalizes 





2.3.9 Per Diem 
The per diem is calculated based on the diagnosis of the patient and the length 
of stay determined by the particular illness/procedure.  The length of stay determines 
the maximum allowable days for a particular diagnosis, and thus, a maximum 
reimbursement.  Medicaid and Medicare use a DRG as the primary method of 
determining the appropriate length of stay.  Per diems are very common payment 
methods for hospitals.  Under this payment method, hospitals are motivated to reduce 
overhead; however, a reduction in overhead does not translate necessarily into 
efficiency.   
 
2.3.10 Fee for service 
Fee for service is the oldest form of reimbursement method for the payment of 
health services.  Most physicians, dentists, and small private providers still prefer this 
method of reimbursement.  Under this scenario, the provider will bear all risks of 
inefficiency for service.  Most services are rendered under a price-for-service list, so 
that payment may be known in advance.  According to some critics, this method of 
reimbursement has been one of the major causes of problems in healthcare.  “In the 
past, this piecework system was a major cause of many of the observed problems in 
health care delivery system.  Although the patient’s risk that he or she overpays for a 
service is reduced, such systems do not reward the providers for better quality 
service” (Jonas 2007, p.148).   
 
2.3.11 Fixed Price 
Under fixed price, the payment system and its operation as a market is closer 
to that of a commodity market, in that the quantity of service is known, as is the price 
for that quantity of service.  While many view the fee-for-service model as one that 
benefits the provider, the fixed price is more patient or buyer-centric.  The best 
example of such a payment regimen is that of Medicare and the changes to Medicare 
that were made in the 1980s, which moved towards this payment methodology.  “The 
prospective payment system (PPS) was adopted for Medicare by the federal 
government in 1983 for Medicare Part A benefits (i.e., payments to hospitals) as a 
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way to control costs.  It can be seen as forcing productization on the hospitals—at 
least with respect to the patients covered by Medicare” (Jonas 2007).  Hospitals 
receive a flat rate for the patient, no matter what the services or volume of services 
that have been administered.  This system is such that it promotes the efficiency of 
delivery of healthcare, but it does nothing for quality.  A moral hazard can be found 
under this reimbursement regimen, as providers are incentivized to find healthier 
patients to be treated.  This type of reverse adverse selection would be beneficial to 
HMOs and MCOs, which run the Medicare/Medicaid plans in each state. 
 
2.3.12 Capitation 
Capitation is the payment schedule of paying the provider a fixed payment per 
patient for an agreed upon set of services that are rendered by the provider.  No matter 
how many services actually are delivered to the patient, the payment per patient 
remains the same, regardless.  Under capitation, providers are incentivized to choose 
patients that are likely to use the least amount of services.  Again, HMOs and MCOs 
are the most likely to take advantage of this scenario.   
 
2.3.13 Value 
Value-based payments normally are not the case in health care, although they 
do happen.  Value-based compensation is when a provider is paid according to the 
value of the treatment rendered.  This system values the lives of wealthier people 
more than the poor, as wealthier individuals would have greater value in monetary 
terms than the poor.   
 
2.4 U.S. Healthcare Regulation a Functional Discussion 
 The U.S Healthcare market is unique combining a high level of government 
regulations with a reliance on market systems to allocate resources effectively.  As 
discussed previously, healthcare within the U.S. is characterized by a dynamic 
environment with shared equity concerns and problems with uncertainty.  This is 
complicated by rapid technological changes and sharp increases in healthcare costs.  
There are four types of uncertainty: first is uncertainty of when healthcare services are 
needed, second, what types of services are required when they are needed and third, 
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how much healthcare services are needed?  Fourth, most of all is that outcomes of 
healthcare services are uncertain. 
In order to overcome some of these uncertainties the market created health 
insurance in one form or another.  The presence of insurance brought about its own 
problems as it raised cost and efficiency issues as it insulates the consumer from price 
(moral hazard of insurance) and often distorts demand.  This creates another problem 
as most insurers do not provide the services themselves and therefore rely on agents to 
dispense services.  In this case, physicians and hospitals acting as agents solve the 
uncertainty. This dependency on agents ultimately gives rise to problems of agency 
such as abuse, fraud and inefficiency as agents’ acts in their own self interests.  
“Reliance on agent has, however raised issues of agency abuse- acts or omissions by 
providers for the own benefit at the expense of their patients” (White 2004) p.139. 
“…these agency problems have created a demand for regulatory oversight through 
such means as professional licensure and government quality assurance efforts which 
have posed challenges of their own”(White 2004) p.139. 
Equitable distribution of healthcare services has long been a problem with a 
society unwilling to rely on price alone to determine distribution.  This single issue 
has relied on public interests intervening and the creation of large systems of 
redistribution.  These redistributive systems have led to difficult choices regarding 
access, quality and cost by public policy makers.  This has led to difficulties in 
wanting to treat everyone equitably especially in light of no public will for universal 
health coverage. 
These efforts have been complicated by the sporadic and dynamic growth of 
U.S. healthcare.  As we have seen earlier in this chapter there has been a long history 
of rapid healthcare expansion dating back to the turn of the 20
th
 century.  This 
expansion combined with increases with newer technologies has added to the 
magnitude of increases in healthcare costs has led to severe increases in health 
expenditures.   
These characteristics of uncertainty of the healthcare market have provided a 
central focus for policy makers, with the primary goal of how to address with rules 
and regulation.  Thus, government regulation has played an important role in shaping 
U.S. healthcare and consequently has there is a need to understand this regulation as 
its structure provides the background environment for this study. 
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 The government had on-going efforts during the time of this study to control 
healthcare focusing on equitable access, reducing cost caused by agency problems and 
dynamic growth.  Equitable access has been addressed via creation of government 
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid which act as an insurer for those who 
cannot afford healthcare and regulations such as EMTALA (Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Leave Act).   While Medicare, Medicaid and other government 
programs are not regulation themselves there are regulations that must be complied 
with in order to participate as a provider rendering care to patients which are covered 
under these programs.  Likewise, EMTALA drives access to healthcare for all in 
cases of emergency.   
There are no regulations controlling price of healthcare services per se, 
however Medicare and Medicaid control price via pricing schedule listed by DRG 
(Diagnosis Related Grouper).  Quality assurance is driven via CMS guidelines for 
services; however these types of quality measures were not in practice during the time 
of this study.  Other than the CMS guidelines for quality assurance, government 
programs control for quality by requiring each ACH to become JACHO (Joint 
Commission)
1
 certified.  JACHO sets standards for the quality of healthcare delivery 
in the U.S. and is considered as self-regulating body recognized by Medicare and 
Medicaid.  The JACHO standards are quite stringent on ACHs to obtain the 
certification, however a fundamental flaw with these accreditations is that there is no 
guarantee that the facility will in fact deliver quality care beyond the date of 
certification.  So in fact there is little monitoring of quality of health services 
delivered, especially during the period of this study as quality measures had yet to be 
put into place. 
What seems like very few regulations from an overview standpoint is actually 
quite numerous for providers that wish to provide services to government covered 




 An independent, not-for-profit organization, The Joint Commission accredits and certifies 
more than 19,000 health care organizations and programs in the United States. Joint 
Commission accreditation and certification is recognized nationwide as a symbol of quality 




patients must meet numerous requirements.  Most of the government regulations have 
been trying to create frameworks for limiting moral hazard of insurance and pricing 
controls by forming regulations that allows private market participants to solve these 
problems.  Two examples of these are HMOs and MCOs both of which have been 
discussed earlier. 
The regulation presented previously allows the reader to understand the basics of 
how price, quality and equitable access are addressed by regulation.  These 
regulations, which set prices paid for government healthcare services are the subject 
of this research as they have consequences on ACH free cash flows and likewise 
affect decisions of capital structure.   An understanding of the capability of the 
government to monitor the services rendered helps the reader to comprehend the 
difficulties in making sure that contracts between providers and government funded 
insurance programs are monitored effectively.  This provides an outline on the 
inability of government payors to form a complete contract with providers (ACHs).   
Chapter 4 discusses this dilemma in detail along with how the government uses 
incentives and possibly pricing pressures to control for these problems and their effect 
on free cash flows and likewise decisions of capital structure.  These regulations have 
no outlined effect on the research or any of the tests conducted.  
 
2.5 Acute Care Hospitals: an Environment for Analysis 
The market morphologies that healthcare have been through has created a unique 
environment to study theoretical concepts of finance and economics.  The market for 
health services in particular ACH services are a homogenous they are all health 
services, yet the market is distinct geographically for each hospital, so that ACHs only 
compete with nearby ACHs.  This provides the opportunity to analyse finance and 
industrial organization theory, where the empirical research can avoid problems with 
cross industry data that is likely to distort the outcomes.  Therefore findings from this 
research are likely to be more accurate in explanating both theoretical concepts at 
least in describing theoretical costs within the US healthcare market. 
ACHs are organizations that must maintain financial health.  Whether for-profit or 
non-for-profit ACHs borrow monies and have similar capital structures (Wedig et al 
1988).  ACHs must be able to repay principal and interest on all debt and therefore 
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must be considerate of its burden and the ability of its revenue stream to support 
borrowings.  The ability to disregard the ownership structure within this market 
allows the research to broaden the sample to the entire population so that all ACHs 
may be taken into account with regard to influences on decisions of capital structure.   
Payors are restricted by state lines which lead to payor dynamics which are 
relevant to each state.  Therefore competition of payors takes place within each state, 
with differing market penetration within the state based upon employer or city 
composition.  This means that ACHs face varying degrees of competition amongst 
payors.  Taking into account a homogeneous product in a single vertical market 
allows the research to analyse for the presence of monopsony across an entire market 
of ACHs.  This is only possible because of the claim level detail in the medical claims 
available for study, which when combined with the public Medicare Cost Report 
allows the research to consider competition at the local geographic area of the 
particular ACH. 
ACHs compete with one another based upon quality or perceived quality (Glied 
2003).  This leaves ACHs within closer proximity to spend more on capital 
expenditures which enhance competitiveness.  However, likely differences in quality 
between ACHs remains possible, as some ACHs overinvest more than others 
(Nahata2005). 
ACHs have contractual arrangements are such that allow for market power to 
come to bear as payors have the ability to utilize the time and duration of the contract 
to negotiate aggressively.  Not to mention that contracts are negotiated on an all or 
nothing basis akin to Taylor (2003).  In this case payors both public and private try to 
account for their lack of ability to monitor services rendered to patients.  In this case 
payors are incentivized to control for lack of monitoring via pricing for ACH services.  
Influencing prices via contracts allows for the opportunity to wield market power. 
These attributes of the ACH and its market place provide a unique environment in 
which to do research.  The greatest benefit of the research is that in many of the 
empirical sections are utilizing the entire population of ACHs that accept government 
funds.  ACHs in the U.S. provide excellent opportunity for this research to provide 
insight into agency cost and monopsony cost not only to the academic community but 





The historical changes in U.S. healthcare outlined within this chapter provide 
a unique environment in which the research takes place.  Historically, we can see that 
pressures have been placed on the U.S. government to resolve issues of equitable 
access, costs and quality of healthcare services, whether provided for patients via 
government or private insurers.  From a cultural perspective there is evidence in 
history that citizens are uncomfortable with the idea of control over the individual and 
therefore universal coverage during the timeframe of this study was not attainable; 
however, tax advantages for private insurance was welcomed.  Additionally, they 
wanted to be in control of their own healthcare hence the rejection of HMOs and 
MCOs in favor of traditional indemnity insurance, which allowed the patient to 
choose, no matter how uninformed the patient might be.  However, U.S. citizens 
continued to want to gain control over costs in healthcare.   
We can see that legislators tried to solve these problems by using market 
forces and structures to solve these dilemmas.  The Creation of HMOs and MCOs are 
a good example of this type of legislation.  However, these unique solutions, using 
market structures to resolve these types of problems, created issues of their own.  
Namely, the inability of government insurers to form a complete contract due to the 
inability to monitor services delivered to patients, as monitoring quality was only 
accomplished through single or multi year accreditation by JACHO. 
This environment of historical changes in regulation and the economic market 
place, which existed, provides a unique opportunity to look at agency problems 
between the principal and its agents.  Likewise, conditions of monopsony—which is a 
market condition—can be analyzed, as the government often allowed or created 
market forces or structures to handle most problems, ultimately believing that the 
market was a better determinant of these types of resolutions than government 
bureaucratic agencies and or regulations.  This is a unique market for the study of 
agency theory and monopsony theory, one in which costs of both may exist 
simultaneously. 
The historical permutations of the U.S. healthcare market have created a 
highly-regulated environment with multiple means for payment for services from a 
wide range of payers, ranging from the federal government to private insurers. This 
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environment creates complex conditions in which ACHs must navigate to be 
financially healthy.  The existing healthcare system forces the ACHs to take into 
account market conditions when deciding matters of capital structure.  It is these 
capital structure decisions and the agency and monopsony conditions created by the 






3. Liquidity and Capital Structure Trends 
3.1 Introduction 
With the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the changes present in 
the market during the years 1995 to 2007, this chapter examines the financial 
condition of ACHs. This is done by examining the financial ratios over the period of 
this study using ratios for profitability, leverage, cash position, liquidity and 
efficiency.  The methodological approach of this chapter is to analyze the mean values 
of the financial ratios for all the ACHs studied.  The data covers the entire population 
so that the mean ratios between time periods and size of ACHs can be analyzed 
directly without statistical tests for differences.  This would not be the case with 
inferential statistical techniques, but the use of inferential methodologies is not the 
aim of this chapter.  This is to contextualize the empirical results discussed in 
Chapters four and six. 
The examination of the trends and ratios discussed here provide the necessary 
background of the ratios that are used later as well as providing insights of the trends 
in ACHs’ liquidity and capital structure. These are used in the empirical chapters as 
key variables in explaining both the effects of agency and monopsony costs. On 
theoretical grounds, these costs are premised to affect either or both the liquidity or 
the free cash flow of ACHs and consequently decisions of capital structure.  In 
addition, as theory suggests, agency and monopsony costs influence free cash flows 
and hence profitability and liquidity. Consequently, these also will be analyzed.  
However, a key aim of the research is to not only observe the influence of both 
agency and monopsony on free cash flow but to extend this to an understanding of 
how these ultimately influence capital structure. Hence, this requires a consideration 
of the leverage of ACHs as this will be used in several of the later empirical analyses.  
As part of this examination, this chapter will also look at the cash position, as it may 
help to determine the financial health of the ACH as well as provide possible control 
variables later on.  Efficiency ratios are included to analyze the effectiveness of ACHs 
in utilizing its assets in operations.  Efficient use of assets is important, as previous 
research suggests that ACHs overinvest and therefore underutilize assets in place.  
The existence of overinvestment is important as it supports the premise of reducing 
agency costs via pricing of healthcare services by the federal government. 
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    A small financial history of the ACH market is provided, along with 
possible influences on the financial conditions of ACHs at the time.  The remainder of 
the chapter is broken into several components: data, and its format, uses, and 
construction of ratios, and the financial trending of ACHs and its implications. 
The information described in this chapter is the data used in the empirical 
analyses that form the major analytic elements of this thesis.  Given this, it is 
important to understand the characteristics of this data and how financial ratios are 
subsequently created or extracted from this data.  Therefore, each ratio is explained in 
some detail with additional discussion given in the Appendix.
2
    
The trends in financial ratios are relevant as patterns across the classifications 
of ratios can show movements in ACH financial health within the population during 
the period of this study.  
A proper understanding of the history of U.S. healthcare during the period of 
this research is a necessary precondition to contextualizing the results presented later.  
Hence, Section 3.2 is designed to supplement the background given in Chapter 2 with 
greater detail of the underlying financial condition of ACHs during the period under 
analysis.   Furthermore, this chapter provides an understanding of the ratios used 
subsequently in the empirical analyses and how the data is manipulated based on the 
methods used by previous researchers. Likewise, a basis for the creation of the ratios 
and organization of the data base upon previous research is necessary as many of the 
decisions regarding data manipulation and or ratio creation was supported by previous 
research. 
 
3.2 Background (History and Literature) 
In 1995, the healthcare market in the U.S. was dominated by managed care.  
The 1996 survey of employers by KPMG Peat Marwick found that 73% of 
individuals covered through their employers were enrolled in some form of a 
managed care plan, and approximately 31% were enrolled in an HMO (Ginsburg 




 Appendix sections are3.5.1 for profitability ratios, 3.5.2 leverage ratios, 3.5.3 cash position ratios 
and 3.5.4 liquidity ratios.  
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2005).  Prior to 1990, HMOs had per capita costs that were 10 to 15% less than 
traditional insurance plans (Glied 2000).  Most of this was accomplished through 
supply-side cost sharing, controlling utilization, and limiting the provider network to 
providers who were willing to meet stringent cost parameters.  Supply-side cost 
sharing is a similar tactic to one used by Medicare, in which a provider receives a 
fixed fee for a procedure or case.  Medicare has reimbursed since 1983 using a flat fee 
that is determined by the DRG.  According to Soulam and Gaumer (1991), 
introduction of the DRG as a cost-saving mechanism resulted in reduced payments to 
hospitals by 20%,  based on larger employers who had multiple HMO providers that 
varied by geographic region.    
Insurers were expanding into new markets via acquisition and new programs 
via Medicare.  The effectiveness of these regimes of authorization requirements and 
use of capitation in the early 1990s had a great effect on curbing cost.  This led to the 
reduction in concerns over what some had called a “medical arms race,” which was 
helping to drive up medical cost (Gaynor  1999, p.157). The ACHs were concerned 
with coping with managed care and the reduction in reimbursement associated with its 
predominance in the market.  Managed care was proving effective in reducing 
healthcare cost increases year after year. In an effort to achieve greater economies of 
scale and greater negotiating power with managed care, hospitals were consolidating.   
During the mid-nineties, President Clinton was pushing for greater 
development of managed care and integrated delivery.  The market changed as 
consumers and physicians turned against managed care.    Patients sought greater 
choice within plans, which forced managed care companies to expand the providers in 
their network and to negotiate with ACHs on their rates. While the ACHs had an 
improved bargaining position, managed care, traditional insurers, and government 
healthcare programs still were bargaining from a position of strength with providers.  
The ACHs adapted strategies to control the costs and services used (Glied 2003).  
Managed care continued to grow as a percentage of the insured healthcare population, 
growing from 41 % (102 million) in 1993, to 76 % (172 million) in 1997 (Health 
Insurance Associaton of America 2002). 
The late 1990s to early 2000s is considered a time of mixed direction for 
healthcare, as ACHs were gaining ground due to the demise of managed care.  
Managed care groups were being forced to expand their network providers, and the 
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leverage provided by ACH mergers previously in the decade meant that ACHs had 
greater negotiating power with managed care providers.  This was offset by the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which cut prices for Medicare expenditures by $112 
billion dollars for the next four years (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MEDPAC 2000). 
Historically, the healthcare market was in flux, as the next phase of consumer-
driven healthcare had not begun.  Managed care as a solution to lowering healthcare 
costs was abandoned; traditional insurance became prominent again.  This had an 
effect on ACHs’ reimbursements, because larger traditional plans such as Blue Cross 
Blue Shield (BCBS) were able to negotiate lower rates based upon the size of their 
market share (Ginsburg 2005).   Many traditional insurers merged across various 
markets, and many changed from non-profit to for-profit status. 
The years of 2003 to 2006 saw an increase in consumer-directed delivery, with 
patient financial incentives and support for customers to choose the appropriate 
provider.  Pricing for medical services was still under heavy pressure from payors.  
Through a combination of aggressive price searching used by HMOs and PPOs, and 
Medicare’s use of its dominant position to negotiate better-than-market prices, 
utilization was reduced and ACHs’ profit margins were shrinking.  Ultimately, 
shrinking profit margins contributed to slower diffusion of technologies in the sector 
and to a more extensive use of existing capacity (Glied 2003).  Medicare was gaining 
prominence due to the growth of the elderly of the Baby Boomer generation.  
Medicare influenced Medicaid and the commercial insurers’ reimbursements of 
ACHs (Ginsburg 2005).   
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Description of data 
The data used in this study was provided by the CMS, and will be referred to 
most often as the MCR.  The cost report contains provider information such as facility 
characteristics, utilization data, cost and charges by cost center (in total and for 
Medicare), Medicare settlement data, and financial statement data. The CMS 
maintains the cost report data in the Healthcare Provider Cost Reporting Information 
System (HCRIS).   
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All ACHs that accept Medicare or Medicaid are required to file annually 
within each fiscal year with the respective Medicare financial intermediary for their 
geographic area.  The MCR’s purpose is to provide information to the CMS to 
calculate reimbursement or Medicare/Medicaid payments to ACHs and other 
healthcare providers.  Most of the filings are completed in an electronic format.  
 The database used in this study covers the years of 1995 to 2007.  It is 
comprised of 65,689 records over the 13 years, with an average of hospital cases of 
5,474 per year.  All null and duplicate value cases were removed prior to this record 
count. In some cases, financial records were not filed on an annual basis, with some 
ACHs filing more than one time per annual year.  For purposes of this research, these 
cases were removed as well.  All financial records that reflected 363 days or more 
were deemed acceptable for the study.  Because the filing of financial data did not 
cover 363 days, 5,235 cases were excluded from the population.  
 
3.3.2 Advantages of the Data 
The MCR is a valid database of financial information on approximately 5,474 
individual hospitals per year at the operating unit or hospital level.  The population in 
the database represents all operating ACHs within the U.S. who accept government 
reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid.  The data includes an income statement, 
balance sheet, and a change in net assets via Schedule G.    Data is provided in an MS 
SQL format, which simplified the study’s planning and execution.  It is the most 
comprehensive data set on the financial condition of hospitals within the U.S.  The 
MCR contains the highest-level (filtered and aggregated) hospital financial 
information.  The MCR provides information at the hospital departmental level 
regarding cost and cost analysis.  All data is provided in a single format for each 
hospital  
This data provides a useful base for observing influences upon the financial 
condition of ACHs over time.  For this research, it excludes concerns over cross-
industry influences.  The exclusion allows the research to rule out differences in 
financial condition due to the underlying business model generating returns.  While 
other sources of data remain available from commercial vendors, these other 
databases account for a subsample of the ACH market within the U.S., and data was 
not reported on a regular basis; in other words, data was there for one year, but not the 
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next.  Alternatives could be the data in the aggregate form of the hospital system, 
rather than at the individual hospital level.  
The database is comprised of a population N = 55,582 cases, with 545 
variables per case.  The population distribution can be seen by year in Figure 3.1, 
below. All years contain just fewer than 5,000 cases, with 1995 and 2007 having a 
reduced case count of approximately 25% of the normal case volume per year.  While 
the frequency case count for those years is a statistically viable sample, it will not be 
as reliable as the years 1996 through 2006, which contain larger populations for those 
years.  It is unknown why 1995 contains fewer cases in the database provided by the 
CMS; however, the reduction in the number of cases in 2007 is due to the lack of 
availability of the additional cases from the CMS at the time that this research was 
conducted.  This is mainly because the hospitals had not filed their cost reports at the 
time that the database for that year was created/updated and made available.  The 
database is released more than once a year, so one may receive data for hospitals 
whose fiscal year end date had occurred before the MCR was released for a partial 
year, for example, the first six months of 2007 or the first quarter of 2007.   
 
Figure 3.1:  Histogram N Cases by Fiscal Year.   
Thirteen years of data are present in the database 1995-2007.   The years 1995 and 2007 
represent roughly 25% of the sample size present each year for the years 1996-2006.  Each 
of the years from 1996-2006 contains just under 5,000 ACHs reporting for each year. Except 
for 1995 and 2007, the sample size in all other years remains stable. 
While many variables will be analyzed in this research, the size of the hospital 
will be an important variable, as capacity certainly has an effect on the financial 
capabilities of the ACH.   In Figure 3.2, the distribution of cases in the population N is 
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segmented into five categories of hospital size.  The categories created take into 
account various ACH size ranges and adjust for operating similarities.  Each category 
or class has different operating concerns and revenue generating units.  This is not to 
say that all hospitals within a category or class are the same, but rather that they have 
similar operations and similar operating concerns.  All have a large frequency in the 
population, except for Category 5, which is a very small sub-population.  This may 
have a tendency to skew the results calculated for this category, and will be 
scrutinized in the research conducted with this category.   
 
Figure 3.2: Population Outline by Hospital Size.   
Frequency of cases is analyzed for the entire period of the study 1995-2007.  Category size 
can be seen in Table 3.1.  Category 1, representing hospitals from 0 to 100 beds, contains 
the largest sample, with just under 30k cases of ACHs participating.  Category 2, which 
represents hospitals with a bed size from 100 to 250 beds, provides the second largest 
frequency of cases, with just under 20k cases of ACHs.  Category 3 represents hospitals with 
250-500 beds, and has just under 10k cases in the sample.  Category 4 represents hospitals 
with a bed size of 500 to 1,000, and has approximately 2,000 cases in the sample.  Category 
5, representing hospitals with a bed size over 1,000 provides the smallest number of cases 
within the sample, with under 1,000 cases. 
The categories of hospital size defined by bed size for this research are as follows:  
Table 1: ACH Category by Bed Size:  
Integer values represent the number of beds in each ACH.  The number of beds was 
identified with the variable “num_beds” from the MCR.   
  
Category 1 2 3 4 5
Size 0>X<=100 100>X<=250 250>X<=500 500>X<=1000 X>1000
NOTE: (X) denotes bed size
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3.3.3 Disadvantages of Data 
The MCR has been criticized as unreliable, unaudited, lacking in detail, and 
vaguely defined (Kane  2001).  The greatest criticism is the lack of rigorous third-
party auditing of the information provided in the MCR.  Most hospital-audited 
financial statements are designed to provide information regarding an income 
statement, a balance sheet, a statement of cash flows, changes in net assets, and to 
give footnotes detailing the underlying nuances of transactions listed in the previous 
statements.  The MCR is lacking in comparison.  Schedule G of the MCR does not 
provide a statement of cash flows or footnotes.  Largay and Stickney (1980), Sloan 
(1996) and Kane and Magnus (2001) all suggest that the absence of cash flow 
statements is a major deficiency.   This makes an analysis of cash flows difficult, and 
requires greater diligence in creating ratios that accurately reflect cash positions.  
There are additional research questions that may be difficult to answer given 
the information from within the MCR.  Any questions regarding short-term operating 
accountability or long-term financial stewardship of the firm are difficult to analyze 
(Kane 2001).  Kane (2001) provided a summary of key limitations with the MCRs 
financial accounting elements: 1) major differences in the reported profits; 2) 
inadequate balance sheet and income statement detail; and 3) inaccuracies related to 
estimation of cash sources and uses. Cleverly (1992), Cleverly and Harvey (1990, 
1992), and Bazzoli and Cleverly (1994) all call for greater, more complete financial 
disclosure by hospitals than currently is supplied in the MCR.  In addition, the data 
does not distinguish between for-profit and non-for-profit, rural and urban hospitals. 
While some effort is made in the current research to use standard industry 
characterizations, for example in regards to rural and urban, a true delineation is not 
possible.  Therefore, comments within the research can only use the logic of these 
characterizations.  For instance, it is widely known that small hospitals are located in 
areas with smaller populations and those urban areas or areas of smaller populations 
are more likely to be rural in character.  Likewise, larger hospitals are located in areas 
with larger populations that are more likely located in large cities.  A similar situation 
presents itself for the for-profit and non-for-profit categories.  While teaching 
hospitals can be identified in the data and that it is known that most if not all teaching 
hospitals are public non-for-profit, it remains a problem to be able to identify other 
non-for-profit ACHs which may be in the data.  For example, county run hospitals.  
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Therefore, it is not possible to break down variables and findings based on these 
characteristics. 
 
3.3.4 Data Preparation  
While the CMS and other health researchers prepare the MCR for use, the 
database itself is not entirely without error when the data is released.  Errors and 
omissions occur and must be cleansed or removed in order for research to be 
conducted properly. An original N= 65,689 cases were available in the distributed 
version of MCR by the CMS.  After a quality test was performed on the data, it was 
found that the MCR contained duplicate records.  A match was performed, using the 
fiscal year beginning date, fiscal year end date, hospital name, zip code, and state.  
Approximately 92 cases were removed as a result of this process. 
A cleanup of the hospital state and zip code was necessary.  All zip codes were 
verified via a third-party database of zip codes from the U.S. Postal Service. The state 
was adjusted when it was different by observing previous years' reporting to 
determine the actual state.  This normally was verified by zip code.  Hospitals not 
identified via this methodology were researched individually on the Internet through 
their websites, and the address was confirmed.  No cases were removed as a result of 
state or zip code errors. 
The U.S. covers more than just the 50 U.S. states under Medicare and 
Medicaid; U.S. territories also are included.  This research was limited to the 48 
contiguous states, plus Alaska and Hawaii; therefore, any cases that occurred outside 
the 50 states were excluded from this research.  These would include the U.S. 
territories of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. 
Hospitals report to the CMS throughout the year as their fiscal year end date is 
reached; however, sub-year reporting was found in the MCR when reporting for less 
than 363 days occurred.  In this body of research, 363 days was used to reference a 
full year’s data as opposed to 365 days, as the largest portion of cases within the 
database reported a year to be 363 days or more.  More than 363 days were allowed, 
but a year was set as the minimum time frame allowed to be reported.  Any 
calculations that used days as the measurement were adjusted accordingly. Because 
they reported less than 363 days, 5,235 cases were removed.   
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The mean for each variable, whether the mean was by itself or broken down 
by year or size, were created with all of the cases for that particular year and size.  Not 
all of the hospitals were present throughout the longitudinal study.  They may have 
reported for a few years, stopped reporting, and started to report again later in the 
study.  No hospitals were excluded for this reason.  The reasons for the lack of 
reporting were unknown at the time that this research was conducted.   
While the MCR provided basic balance sheets and income statement variables, 
not all variables used in the creation of ratios used in this study were present in the 
original database in its initial form, and some had to be created.  Most ratio formulas 
took the underlying variables directly from the MCR.   If the variable was not 
available, it was created by way of the other variables present.  Evidence of this will 
be visible in the definition of each ratio using data variable names.  Null values were 
prevalent for some variables within the MCR database.  Where appropriate, a zero 
value was used to replace the null or missing value.  This was done so that ratios 
could be calculated, and this included multiple variables that might not have been 
reported as zero, but rather were left blank in the reporting.  An example of this is 
temporary investments.  Many ACHs did not report a value for this field, which 
ultimately is reflected in the MCR database as a null or missing value.  Changing this 
field to a zero did not change any ratios calculated with this field.  This allowed many 
cases that would have been excluded from the sample of the ratios because of missing 
data to be included, thus increasing the sample size for the ratio.   
All data provided in the MCR was input manually into the system at some 
point.  Errors in inputs led to the recording of extreme values for various variables. 
These values were not removed from the population, but rather dealt with as extremes 
and outliers when creating the subsamples for each ratio.  Evidence of this will be 
provided in the discussion on each ratio, where relevant.   
Hospital type was considered in creation of the population to be studied.  
While the MCR included many types of health facilities, general short-term, general 
long-term, cancer, psychiatric, rehabilitation, religious non-medical, childrens, and 
alchohol and drug, amongst others, only those that met characteristics of ACHs were 
included.  The variable of hospital type was limited to values of 1, 2, and 7.  Hospitals 
types are as follows: 1) General Short-Term; 2) General Long-Term; and 7) 
Children’s Hospital.  Removal of all other hospital types left a population of N = 
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55,582 cases.  There were some records within the MCR data (38) that contained null 




The methodologies employed within this chapter provide a general view into 
the data.  All statistical calculations were done at a 95% confidence interval.  The 
population of each ratio was analyzed via box plot and stem and leaf to identify 
extremes and outliers.  Definitions of outlier and extremes are those defined by J.W. 
Tukey (1977) to be three inter-quartile ranges below the twenty-fifth percentile or 
above the seventy-fifth percentile.  Outliers were removed from each population as 
necessary to provide as close to a normalized distribution as possible.  
Once a sample was created by removing outliers and extremes, a histogram of 
the distribution of each was created. The removal of outliers improves the stability of 
the variance of each year’s distribution and allows for a relatively homogeneous 
statistic. This method improves the comparability of variables over time (Frecka 
1983; Rees 1990) 
The removal of outliers along with additional box plot and traditional 
statistical descriptives were used to verify that a sample had been normalized.  In all 
samples, a mean and mode for that sample must be considered an acceptable value for 
that particular ratio, with a small standard deviation and acceptable range.  Both 
skewness and kurtosis were used to verify that the character of the distribution is 
acceptable, with limited skewness and limited kurtosis signifying normalization.   
Each ratio’s statistical descriptives are presented pre- and post-removal of outliers and 
can be seen in Table 3.2, below.  For each ratio, the sample is normalized.  Additional 









Table 3.2: Sample Descriptive for Each Ratio, Pre- and Post-Removal of Outliers.  
 Removal of the outliers is denoted by (-x) after the variable name using Tukey’s (1977) 
definition of outliers. (n) represents the sample size pre- and post- removal of outliers.  
Deviation of mean and the median due to the presence of outliers can be seen in many 
variables prior to the removal of outliers.   
 
In all cases, the primary ratio is utilized. No square root transformations were 
necessary, as a square root transformation is only marginally effective in correcting 
the distortions in accounting ratios, which usually appear to be skewed ,exhibiting non 
normal characteristics and kurtosis Rees (1990) Each mean ratio was compared with 
two variables to see behavior, and the first and foremost was the fiscal year in which 
the cost report had been reported.  This showed any longitudinal time trends that 
might have been present.  Trends in this chapter were considered just for their own 
merits, and any independent variables that might have influenced these trends were 
not considered.   
Other than time, size is the other variable that the individual ratios were 
compared against in order to understand how ratios varied by ACH size.  The number 
Chapter 3
Descriptives of Variables
Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
RoE 54619 41.98 0.0747 74064 21643214 56.875 19.801 x<= -0.26 & x>= 0.42
RoE -X 44629 0.0743 0.0713 0.11895 0.68 0.125 0.624
RoA 54047 37566.92 0.03 5088640 8.81E+08 -121.52 16973.44 x<= -0.150 & x>= 0.220
RoA - X 45634 0.0334 0.03 0.06655 0.35 -0.057 0.249
FAT 53179 1022.01 4.49 189654 44280143 170.26 32447.82 X<= -3.6  & X>= 13.7
FAT - X 47943 4.8 4.16 2.65 17.26 1.06 0.764
Current Ratio 53761 3.24 2.03 87.75 19898.78 83.43 13976.81 x<= -1.4 & x>= 5.8
Current Ratio -X 49524 2.14 1.95 1.217 7.18 0.639 0.292
Quick Ratio 50043 2.78 1.9 70.47 19642.78 69.163 18666.36 X<= -1.3 & X>= 5.4
Quick Ratio - X 45991 2 1.82 1.13 6.68 0.65 0.298
DCOH 55564 108.81 36.768 5737.647 1356149 235.197 55399.032 x<= -160 & x>= 275
DCOH -X 52050 57.7826 31.296 68.525 434.61 1.18 0.668
Cash Ratio 53946 3.87 2.27 107.866 23005.77 92.93 13875.72 x<= -2.1 & x>= 7.1
Cash Ratio - X 50168 2.47 2.164 1.533 9.2 0.725 0.229
Oper Margin 54019 -0.0546 -0.01 0.87927 182.67 16.029 6679.606 x<= -0.26 & x>=0.23
Oper Margin -X 48615 -0.0136 -0.1 0.09045 0.47 -0.112 0.146
Net Margin 54078 0.0148 0.01742 0.183182 33.872 -99.124 14886.324 X<= -0.80 X>=0.118
Net Margin - X 49699 0.01919 0.01799 0.036954 0.198 0.041 0.089
Debt Ratio 53904 300.075 0.45 69431.498 16120298 232.172 53903.798 X<=-0.39& X>=1.34
Debt Ratio - X 49996 0.4778 0.44 0.29558 1.71 0.5 0.084
Debt /Equity 47850 2497.917 0.7 3.12959 66817193 204.22 43436.85 X<= -1.5 & X >= 3.2
Debt /Equity  - X 42651 0.778 0.61 0.71562 4.55 1.024 1.03
DSO 53931 126.199 92.64 2143.57 496654 217.61 49005.71 x<= -27 & x>=222
DSO - X 51138 96.813 89.88 41.905 245.87 0.655 0.097
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of beds within a facility determined its size.  The number of beds was signified by the 
variable “num_beds” within the MCR (Medicare Cost Report) data itself (The 
breakdown of these size categories is described in Section 3.4.2.).  These interactions 
were analyzed using tables and simple statistical descriptives of the comparison.   
3.4.2 Ratios to Be Used in the Analysis 
Using the research of Chen and Shimerda (1981) as a basis for choosing the 
financial ratios to be studied, 12 ratios were chosen.  While this study does not 
attempt to separate financially-distressed firms from non-distressed firms, ratios that 
gave clarity to condition and were more sensitive to indicating the distress of ACHs 
were chosen.  Ratios have been shown to be predictive of firm distress:  “financially-
distressed firms can be separated from the non-failed firms in the year before the 
declaration of bankruptcy at an accuracy rate of better than 90% by examining 
financial ratios” (Altman 1968, in Chen & Shimerda 1981, p. 51). 
Chen and Shimerda (1981), suggested that all of the financial ratios can be 
assigned to one of the seven basic financial factors:  return on investment, financial 
leverage, capital turnover, cash position, liquidity (short-term), inventory turnover, 
and receivables turnover.  While some overlapping in ratios does occur as a result of 
data peculiarities, ratios within this study address these seven basic financial factors. 
A list of recommended financial ratios, descriptions, and equations for each can be 
seen in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: The Seven Basic Financial Factors and Recommended Ratios, by Chen and 
Shimerda (1981), along with description and equation for each. 
  
According to previous studies, these ratios have the highest loading score for 
each of the seven financial factors. However, exactly which ratio should represent a 
Ratio Type Description Equation
Profitability Return on Investment net income/total assets
Risk Leverage ratio long-term debt/equity
Efficiency Receivable turnover sales/ quick assets
capital turnover sales/ total assets
Inventory Turnover sales/ current assets
Liquidity Cash position cash / total assets
Liquidity ratio current assets / total assets
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factor is still up for debate, as suggested by Chen and Shimerda (1981, p. 53): “An 
acceptable theoretical foundation for the election of ratios for decision making has yet 
to be found, and the scattered heterogeneous empirical evidence in the published 
studies does not identify a complete set of useful ratios.” Chen and Shimerda (1981) 
suggested that the financial ratios that capture most of the information for the 
financial factor they represent should be chosen, so that a group of ratios will contain 
more unique information.   
To develop a predictive model of hospital closure using financial accounting 
ratios, Wertheim and Lynn (1993) brought the selection of ratios in line with 
healthcare in the U.S. and ACHs in their study.  Their study compared 71 U.S. 
hospitals using data taken from the two years preceding closure against data taken 
from 71 operating hospitals with the same demographics between 1987 and 1995, and 
it used Logit analysis.  Univariate and multivariate tests were used to examine the 
relationship between 21 financial ratios.  They drew from the previous predictive 
models of the LaJolla Management Corporation for the Bureau of Health Finance 
(1981), the Farmers Home Administration checklist of financial ratios for assessing 
rural hospitals (1983), Cleverly and Nilsen’s (1980) analysis of 14 closed hospitals in 
New York, NY, Kwon et al.’s (1988) analysis of financial and operational 
characteristics of Catholic hospitals, and Cleverly’s (1985) financial flexibility index, 
or FFI. Wertheim and Lynn (1993) found, using the Lachenbruch Procedure, that 17 
of the 21 ratios were significant indicators of hospital closure in the year prior to 
closure, while only eight of the 21 were found to be significant in predicting hospital 
closure in year two.   The predictive ability of a ratio decreasing two years prior to 
closure was found to be in line with prior research on the subject.  “Rose and Giroux 
(1984) indicate that as a firm approaches failure, financial factors leading to that 
closure become more pronounced” (Wertheim & Lynn 1993, p.539). 
Wertheim and Lynn (1993) narrowed down the set of seven financial factors 
to four factors: 1) ratios representing leverage; 2) liquidity; 3) capital efficiency; and 
4) asset availability.  These ratios ultimately can provide significant information that 
is useful in the prediction of hospital closures. Ratios for asset availability, capital 
efficiency, and leverage were greater at predicting ACH closures than liquidity in a 
multivariate model (Wertheim & Lynn, 1993).  Total liabilities/total assets, total 
revenues/total expenses, and total assets/bed days available were found to be 
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significant in predicting hospital closure.  Their findings also concluded that leverage 
increased as capital efficiency and asset availability decreased prior to hospital 
closure.   
Zeller et al. (1996) put forth seven financial characteristics that emerged from 
their taxonomy of hospital financial ratios.  They are: 1) profitability; 2) fixed asset 
efficiency; 3) capital structure; 4) fixed asset age; 5) working capital efficiency; 6) 
liquidity, and 7) debt coverage.   “The ratios classified by the same financial factor are 
highly correlated, and selection of one ratio to represent a factor can account for the 
most information provided by all ratios of that factor” (Chen 1981, p. 59).  An ACH’s 
location, rural or urban, and its mission, teaching or non-teaching, should not affect 
the framework for financial ratio analysis (Zeller et al. 1996).  Ratios included in this 
study and comparisons to other studies mentioned previously are shown in Table 3.4.   
Table 3.4:  Ratios Used to Determine Hospital Failure by Previous Researchers, divided 
by authors’ ratio preference:  
All ratios used within this research are listed under “This Research.”  Multiple variables are 
listed under “This Research,” instead of just one, because the MCR is not audited; therefore, 








Academic Studies Chen, et…al. (1981) Zeller, et…al. (1996)
Wertheim and Lynn 
(1993) This Research
Non Healthcare Study Non-for Profit Hospital
All hospital (closure) 
One Year Prior
Financial Characteristics Ratios
statistically significant in 
predicting distress in firms. Profitability Profitability 
ROE, ROA, Net Margin, 
Operating Margin
Financial Leverage Capital Structure Leverage
Debt Ratio, Debt/Equity 
Ratio
Capital Turnover Working Capital Efficeincy Capital Efficiency
Cash Position
Days Cash on Hand, 
Cash Ratio
Liquidity (short-term) Liquidity Liquidity Current and Quick Ratio
Inventory Turnover
Receivables Turnover DSO






Table 3.5: Ratios for This Research with Description and Equations.  
Several ratios were chosen for each ratio type. The multiple ratios are meant to provide a 
broad base of financial characteristics, as all information is taken from the CMS cost report.  
Therefore, if a single ratio is distorted, multple ratios for the same ratio type would provide a 
more broad base for comparison. Equations for each ratio are included.  Equity is defined as 




The results presented here are key to understanding the later analyses of the 
effects of agency and monopsony on decisions of capital structure of ACHs.  There 
are some key considerations to be made prior to reviewing the results of the ratio 
analysis. 
The first is that ACHs can be found in two main types of ownership structure: 
for-profit and non-for-profit. Non-for-profit entities are considered the same as non-
governmental organizations or civil society organizations elsewhere in the world.   
While there is no variable in the database to identify ownership structure, there may 
be some concern that these ownership types may lead to different capital structures 
because non-for-profits do not receive the same tax shield generated by debt as for-
profit entities.  That said previous research of Wedig et al (1988) on ACH capital 
structure, suggests that the capital structures of ACHs are not affected by type of 
ownership and that non-for-profit ACHs show no difference in capital structure 
compared to for-profit ACHs.  “Holding constant the ownership-payment interaction, 
tax shield, and other variables correlated with ownership, we find no differences in 
capital structure by ownership.  This result persists in spite of the fact that the specific 
Ratio Type Description Equation
Profitability Return on Equity Net Income/ Equity
Return on Assets Net Income/Total Assets
Net Income Margin Net Income/  Sales
Operating Income Margin Operating Income/ Net Sales
Leverage Debt Ratio Total Debt/ Total Assets
Debt to Equity ratio Long-Term Debt/Equity








Efficiency Days Sales Outstanding (Gross Receivables/Net Sales) x 365
Fixed Assest Turnover Sales/Fixed Assets
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motives for holding debt are quite different across ownership” (Wedig et al 1988, 
p.37).  This prior finding consequently supports our approach, which is to consider 
leverage ratios across ACHs sizes and years without regard to ownership type. 
The second and also a key concern is that an ACH’s location, rural or urban, 
and its mission, teaching or non-teaching, may affect the framework for financial ratio 
analysis.  Research by Zeller et al. (1996) suggests that the composition of financial 
ratios are not affected by these characteristics. This means that we are able to compare 
and contrast the financial health of ACHs without regard to such features.   
Third is that there may be some concern that certain ownership types of ACHs 
may not recognize equity on the balance sheet in the same way.  For-profit hospitals 
issue shares to shareholders in the ACH, thus allowing for a measure of equity and 
hence the creation of financial ratios mearsuring performance in comparison to the 
equity investment.  On the other hand, non-for-profit ACHs are generally owned by 
the community or educational system which in turn is state or community owned. 
Consequently there are potential difficulties in identifying a similar equity investment 
category.   However Conrad (1984) points out that non-for-profits can be measured 
for equity performance as they still generate a return of equity capital due to 
competition in the final product market for ACH services as well as in the capital 
markets.  Non-for-profits often keep retained earnings, fund balances or more recently 
net assets, which are functionally equivalent to the equity investrment cateogry and 
allow a definition of equity in financial ratios such as return on equity, and so on.  
Researchers such as Long and Silver (1976), Long (1976) and Day (2008), argue for 
the use of corporate finance principles in the non-for-profit healthcare sector by 
suggesting that the same economic principles for investment decision making and 
financial performance measurent apply between for-profit and non-for-profit 
hospitals. Conrad (1984) furthers this approach in the light of his use of return on 
equity taking the view that return on equity is an appropriate measure for non-for-
profit financial performance.  Based on the above findings, in this research the equity 
for non-for-profits is therefore defined as total assets minus total liabilities—rather 
than net assets.  This will is discussed later on in this chapter when examining the 




That prior researchers have found no differences concerning location and 
ownership type are important to this research as it reduces concerns that the observed 
relationships that are found later on are driven by such characteristics. This means the 
research can focus on the industry as a whole taking into account the entire population 
of ACHs provided in the MCR during the timeframe of this study. 
 
3.5.1 Profitability 
The profitability of ACHs is included as a variable as prior researchers have 
used it also and it is a component of free cash flows, which will be discussed later on.  
However, problems with free cash flows should be indicative within the profitability 
ratio. As profitability and free cash flow are linked, it is important to understand 
changes in profitability over timeframe as free cash flow is a key variable to be 
discussed later in empirical chapters where it used to provide evidence of agency and 
monopsony.  Fluctuations in profitability affect the ability of the ACH to obtain debt, 
decisions of which are a main concern of this research. 
ACH profitability is measured via four ratios: return on equity (ROE), return 
on assets (ROA), net income margin (NIM), and operating income margin (OIM).  
Equations for each profitability ratio are given in Table 3.4.
3
     
Before discussing the profitability ratios, a proper understanding of net income 
and operating income is needed as the MCR differs on the definition of operating 
income from US GAAP, while net income does not.  Operating income normally is 
described as the amount of profit realized from a business's operations gross income 
after taking out operating expenses, such as cost of goods sold (COGS), wages and 
depreciation. This is often described as (EBIT) or earnings before interests and taxes.   
The MCR differs in its definition of Operating Income in that the MCR refers to 
operating income as the Net Income from Services to Patients (NISP).  Therefore, in 
this case the MCR definition does not start with gross income, but rather only 




 A detailed breakdown showing how each profitability ratio is created can be found in the 




includes revenues generated at the ACH from services to patients.  This definition of 
Operating Income excludes Other Income obtained from sources such as Schedule G3 
of the MCR. Other Income includes contributions, donations, income from 
investments, revenues from television and phone rental, purchase discounts, rebates or 
refunds, parking revenues, revenues from laundry, meals, rent, sales of medical or 
surgical supplies, sale of drugs, medical record sales, tuition, and revenues from 
vending.  However, Net Income includes both the revenues defined as Operating 
Income and revenues, which are defined as Other Income via the MCR.  This 
difference in the definition between net income and operating income is important as 
will be shown further in section 3.5.1. 
The data shows that ACHs have been affected financially over time.  All 
profitability ratios had their highest values in 1995 or 1996, and their lowest values in 
1999, with the exception of the net income margin, which had its lowest value in 
2002. Evidence of this can be followed in Table 3.5.  All the measures of profitability 
trend downward, as shown in Figure 3.4.  While the trough of each profitability ratio 
may vary, the worst performing periods correlate to the years 1998-2002, with the 
exception of the operating margin, which had its worst performance beginning in 
1996 as opposed to 1998.  As shown in Table 3.5, net income margin, which had its 
highest value in 1995 at 3.03%, is halved by the year 1999 at 1.5%, with a further 
one-tenth of a percent decrease by 2002.   By 1999, all ratios decreased significantly. 
The return on equity (RoE) was down 39%, while the return on assets (RoA) was 
down 48%. The Net Income Margin was down 50.5%, and the Operating Margin was 
down by 289%.   
All profitability ratios were positive, with the exception of the Operating 
Margin, for which the mean is negative.  While this may seem to contradict the 
positive net margin, this is due to the MCR not following Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) reporting.  The Operating Margin measured only the 
margin that was derived directly from service to patients.   This provided evidence 
that ACHs on average were not profitable on services delivered to patients, and that 
they must be profitable on other services delivered.  This also helps explain the 
magnitude in change over time between net income margin which decreased 50.5% 
while the operating margin decreased 289%.  The larger decrease in operating margin 
can be directly be attributable to margin on patient services.  This suggests that payors 
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reimbursement for service to patients was decreasing at a greater rate in comparison 
to underlying cost to service patients.  The change in net income shows that these 
sharp decreases in operating margin were diluted by the contribution to net margin 
made by other income sources.  These other income sources are classified as Other 
Revenues by the MCR and were discussed previously. 
 Figure 3.4: Mean Profitability Ratios by Fiscal Year Reported:  
The low points in all the profitability ratios occur between 1998-1999.  Large increases in 
managed care in the preceding years provide a possible explaination of decreases in 
profitability, as managed care reduced reimbursement to ACHs.  In additon, the dip in the 
ratios coincides with the implementation of the balanced budget amendment in 1997, which 
significantly reduced the CMS expenditures. 
Any revenue not specified in any other field also falls into this category.  Of 
these, rent for living quarters, medical/surgical supply sales, and drug sales were 
categorized most often by GAAP as operational revenue.  If these revenues were 
included in full or in part, then the operating margin would be positive.  As these are 
important revenues for ACHs, the Net Margin was positive, as all such revenues and 
expenses were reflected in this ratio.  While Net Margin during the worst years did 
approach zero percent, the minimum net margin achieved was approximately 1.4% in 
2002, with a max net margin of 3% in 1995 and 1996.  
The finding that on average operating margins were negative is a key piece of 
evidence that ACH cash flows may be under pressure via reimbursement on services 
to patients and that over the period under analysis ACHs were not able to generate 
income in comparison to the underlying costs of services rendered.  The later tests of 
agency and monopsony rely on the relationship between costs and their full or partial 










1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Return on Equity Return on Assets
Net Income Margin Operating Income Margin
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government may reduce fees for health services in order to limit overinvestment and 
other undesirable behavior by ACHs.  Likewise, collusive monopsony is suggested to 
have a negative effect on free cash flows of ACHs by limiting reimbursement for 
health services.  While both theories will be discussed further in chapters four and six, 
it should be noted that the average negative operating margin ratio provides evidence 
that there is prima facie evidence for agency and monopsony effects in U.S. 
healthcare. 
These low margins affected both RoA and RoE.  As would be expected, both 
mean RoE and RoA had similar graph characteristics, as can be observed in Figure 
3.4. As both had the same numerator, the denominator was the only variable that 
changed.   All profitability ratio performance is illustrated in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5:  Mean Ratios by Fiscal Year Reported.   
Several ratios are provided for each ratio type by year.  Further breakdown of movement 
within the ratios by year is provided later in this chapter.   
 
 
It should be noted, the equity definition for non-for-profits are retained 
earnings and fund balances on the balance sheet.  As reflected in the margins, both the 
mean RoA and RoE had very sharp declines in return initially in the longitudinal 
study, with stabilization and the worst performance during the same periods, 1998-
2002.  Both increased for the remainder of the study, with the exception of the mean 
RoA in the year 2007, which was reduced.  At its height, the mean RoE provided a 
return slightly under 9.5% in 1996, with its worst performance at 5.5% in 1999.  
Ratio Type Description 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Profitability Return on Equity 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
Return on Assets 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Net Income Margin 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Operating Income Margin 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Leverage Debt Ratio 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.50
Debt to Equity ratio 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.81
Cash Position Days Cash on Hand 69.81 64.35 63.06 58.49 56.85 54.96 56.10 55.53 56.36 56.35 56.93 55.85 50.36
Cash Ratio 2.51 2.43 2.41 2.46 2.46 2.47 2.49 2.48 2.49 2.48 2.49 2.50 2.57
Liquidity Current Ratio 2.20 2.16 2.14 2.16 2.15 2.15 2.17 2.13 2.12 2.13 2.11 2.12 2.12
Quick Ratio 2.04 2.02 2.00 2.02 2.01 2.00 2.02 1.99 1.98 2.00 1.98 1.98 1.98
Efficiency Days Sales Outstanding 96.07 96.17 99.23 104.84 105.93 103.48 97.93 94.05 93.57 90.46 90.00 91.29 91.76
Fixed Assest Turnover 4.00 4.09 4.13 4.17 4.33 4.55 4.81 5.09 5.31 5.50 5.67 5.65 5.73
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While mean RoE was relatively low in comparison to other industries, it was on 
average positive over the period.    
Though the profitability ratios showed evidence that ACH returns were under 
pressure at the beginning of this longitudinal study, the downward trend at the 
beginning of the study stabilized, suggesting that the industry was adapting to the new 
pressures within the market. This also suggested that the industry was adjusting its 
business model to succeed in spite of any external pressures within the market is 
suggested by the positive operating income margin.    
Table 3.6: ACH Financial Ratios by ACH Size Category: 
RoE with the exception of Category 1 indicates that larger ACHs generate a larger return on 
equity. RoA larger ACHs generate larger return on assets, which perhaps suggests greater 
efficiency or economies of scale with larger ACHs.  Net Income also confirms that larger 
ACHs generate larger net incomes, with the exception of Category 5.  Category 2 provides 
the best performance for the operating margin.  This suggests that based upon the definition 
of operating margins, Category 2 ACHs perhaps have better cost management for patient 
services.  Categories 1, 4, and 5 have the worst performing operating margins.   
 
As shown in Figure 3.5, below, and Table 3.6, above, larger ACHs had a 
larger RoE.  This led to the possible conclusion that larger institutions have greater 
leveraged returns than smaller facilities.  Larger ACHs had a larger RoA, and with the 
exception of Category 5, larger ACHs had larger Net Income Margins.  Category 2 
had the lowest Net Income and the highest Operating Margin.  This indicates that 
Category 2 ACHs derived more revenue from service to patients, and less from what 
the MCR deems other revenues.  Overall as shown by the profitability ratios, smaller 
hospitals are less profitable.  This supports the previous research of Morellec and 
Ratio Type Category 1 2 3 4 5
Profitability Return on Equity 0.082 0.079 0.084 0.085 0.088
Return on Assets 0.030 0.035 0.041 0.040 0.042
Net Income Margin 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.019
Operating Income Margin -0.022 -0.002 -0.006 -0.021 -0.015
Leverage Debt Ratio 0.458 0.504 0.487 0.510 0.443
Debt to Equity ratio 0.716 0.822 0.859 0.946 1.036
Cash Position Days Cash on Hand 54.550 57.710 67.550 70.530 47.630
Cash Ratio 2.500 2.470 2.430 2.200 2.240
Liquidity Current Ratio 2.190 2.100 2.090 2.100 2.040
Quick Ratio 2.050 1.940 1.970 2.040 2.020
Efficiency Days Sales Outstanding 96.790 97.630 96.260 92.610 96.090
Fixed Assest Turnover 4.590 4.960 5.170 5.120 5.030
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Smith (1997), which provided evidence that financially weaker ACHs were small 
rural hospitals. 
 
Figure 3.5: Mean Profitability Ratios by Size Return on Equity and Return on Assets: 
 Both increase performance with size.  Net margin increases with size, except in Category 5, 
which performs similarly to Category 1.  Operating income margin decreases with size with 
the exception of Category 1, which is the worst performing, followed by Category 2, which is 
the best.  Operating margin is negative, as it only incorporates income from service to 
patients.  Net income is positive, because in addition to operating income, net income 
includes revenues that are derived from service to patients as well as other income.  This 
provides evidence that hospitals have losses from delivering services to patients and must 
compensate with other income streams in order to create a positive net margin. 
3.5.2  Leverage 
Leverage is measured via two ratios: the debt ratio and debt to equity ratio. 
The debt ratio looks at the comparison of total debt to total assets, and the debt to 
equity ratio compares long-term debt to equity.  For this research, equity is defined as 
net assets for both for-profit and non-for-profit ACHs.  Equations for each leverage 
ratio are available in Table 3.4 on pg.77.  Leverage increased over time from a debt 
ratio perspective from an initial value of 0.45 in 1995, to 0.50 in 2007.  The debt to 
equity ratio increased from 1995 through 2002, and declined through 2006, but 
remained above 2000 levels. The highest debt ratio occurred in 2002, with a value of 
0.4952.  The highest debt-to-equity ratio occurred in 1997, with a value of 0.7892.  
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Figure 3.6: Leverage Ratios by Fiscal Year Reported : 
The debt ratio increases year on year, which is evident via the blue graph along  with the 
linear trend line.  This provides evidence that ACHs are taking on additional debt as time 
increases.  The debt to equity ratio shows variation via the red graph.  While the trend line for 
the debt to equity ratio is flat, changes through the years are most likely due to underlying 
changes in equity values.   
The debt ratio is acceptable; however, it is evident that pressure within the 
industry concerning profitability and cash coincided with this increase in the debt 
ratio.  Any decreases in the mean debt ratio also coincided with improvements in 
profitability and liquidity.   
Debt to equity was not as clear as the debt ratio.  
4
Debt to equity went through 
several cycles during the term of this study.  There was an initial increase in the debt 
to equity ratio from 1995 through 1997; however, the debt to equity ratio dropped to 
below 1996 values in 1998, only to increase the next year.  The debt to equity 
increases are explained by the increase in long-term debt.  This is not as evident in the 
debt ratio, as an increase in total liabilities was balanced by the increase in total 
assets.  This makes sense, as ACHs are known to invest heavily in capital assets, and 
this may be a sign of heavy capital spending associated with overinvestment.  
Overinvestment is a key driver in the healthcare market for government action as it is 
viewed as a major underlying cause of high healthcare costs (Glied 2003). 
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Figure 3.7: Leverage Ratios by ACH Size Category: 
 It is evident from the illustration that larger ACHs have more debt, whether measured by the 
debt ratio or the debt to equity ratio.  This may suggest that larger hospitals are more 
dependent on debt to purchase capital items.  It also may be indicative of overinvestment, 
which will be discussed later in this thesis. 
In Figure 3.7, we can see that larger ACHs had larger mean debt-to-equity 
ratios.  Category 5 had the largest mean debt-to-equity value.  The debt ratio remained 
relatively flat across all ACH size categories.  The highest debt ratio was found for 
Category 4.    Category 1 had the lowest debt and debt-to-equity ratio; this suggests 
that ACHs in Category 1 provided the lowest leveraged returns and the lowest 
profitability ratios.  In addition, the finding that larger ACHs had larger debt ratios 
also is indicative that larger ACHs overinvest more.  As leverage ratios vary by size 
substantiates previous research, it suggests that larger ACHs in larger population 
centers face higher levels of competition, which leads ACHs to invest more in 
equipment and services that enhance quality or perceptions of quality (Newhouse 
1981).  Glied (2003) and Nahata (2005) show that quality is the key variable in 
competition between hospitals.  In their model, increased competition leads to excess 
spending on capital expenditures, which in the absence of greater profitability drives 
up debt levels. This “medical arms race” is important corollary evidence of excess 
capital spending which is related to overinvestment and consequently the tests using 
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3.5.3 Cash Position 
The cash position of the ACHs is measured via two ratios: the cash ratio and 
days cash on hand.  The cash ratio looks at short-term assets such as cash, temporary 
inventory, and accounts receivable (AR) in relation to the current liabilities of the 
ACH.  Days cash on hand compares the cash on hand against daily operating 
expenses.  It provides an analysis of survival time should unexpected shortfall in 
operation impede the cash flow.  Equations for both cash position ratios are available 
in Table 3.4 on pg.77. 
Cash position reflected in the cash ratio and the cash-on-hand ratio begin with 
a negative trend.  The cash ratio showed a steep decline initially, with a quick 
recovery in 1997, and thereafter an improving cash ratio was found. This can be seen 
in Figure 3.8.  The cash ratio remained relatively high, with the lowest value found in 
1997 at 2.41.    As shown, the cash ratio improved in 1997, just as the Days Sales 
Outstanding (DSO), a reflection of AR outstanding, increased.   
 
Figure 3.8: Mean DSO and Cash Ratio by Fiscal Year Reported: 
Here, we see the typical trade off of  the DSO and the Cash Ratio.  In this, the Cash Ratio 
also includes the AR in the formula, so increases in the Cash Ratio often reflect increases in 
operational cash flows and not a contraction in the AR cycle.  The improvement in the cash 
ratio was not necessarily an improvement in financial condition. From 1995 to 2007, there 
was a reduction of approximately 20 mean days cash on hand from 70 days to approximately 
50 days.  The reduced amount of cash on hand to cover liabilities puts ACHs at risk.  The 
DSO also reflected a decline, although it improved after a trough in 1999.  The worst 
performing period was from the years 1999 to 2001, which coincides with a recession in the 
U.S. economy from November of 2000 to October of 2001.  It was during this time frame that 














































 Figure 3.9: DSO and DCOH by Fiscal Year Reported: 
This graph provides a better picture of the trade-off in between cash and the AR cycle 
represented by the DSO.  In this case, the DCOH is the actual cash on hand divided by the 
average daily total expenses for the firm.  The decrease in cash on hand accompanies the 
increase in managed care in the mid-nineties, including the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  
Likewise, as ACHs adjusted to the new law and lower reimbursement and managed care 
power weaned in 2000 or so, cash on hand started to make a recovery, although it was small.  
The DSO in this case reflects the slow payment of the managed care payor, and as the 
managed care power weans, the DSO decreases. 
This increase in the DSO ultimately led to less cash on hand. While the DSO 
did improve beyond 1995 levels, it remained high, with values above 90 days.  It is 
evident in Figure 3.9 that the DSO and the days cash on hand (DCOH) worked 
conversely with one another; as the DSO increased, the DCOH decreased.  The 
DCOH trended downward over the study period, while the cash ratio trended 
upwards.  This divergence between the DCOH and the cash ratio may point to 
increasing cost over time.  If reimbursement schedules did not adjust for inflation and 
market prices over time, and the expenses of an ACH did, one would expect the cash 
ratio to increase and the DCOH to decrease, because the denominator of DCOH, 
which includes expenses, would be increasing over time.  This would cause the 
formula for the DCOH, assuming the cash remained the same, to produce a lower 
DCOH over time.  This divergence in reimbursement and cost may be evidence of 
agency and monopsony costs in U.S. healthcare, as reimbursement is the key revenue 
variable that affects ACHs’ free cash flows.  If payors contribute less over time and or 
do not increase reimbursement to compensate for rising costs of delivery health 
services then payors are adversely affecting the financial condition of hospitals.  
Control over reimbursement can be construed as efforts by payors to control 
underlying issues of excessive healthcare cost created by both the principal agent 
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which cause inefficiencies (Peterson et al 2006; McLean 1989; Lee and Zenios 2007; 
Chalkley and Khalil 2005; Eldridge and Palmer 2008). 
 
Figure 3.10: The DSO and DCOH by Fiscal Year Reported:   
The DSO shows no competitive advantage for size in regards to the ability to collect AR.  This 
is likely indicative of the lack of the market power of hospitals to influence payment patterns 
and timelines of insurers.  The DCOH is highest for Category 4 and lowest for Category 5.  
With the exception of Category 5, the larger ACHs are able to generate larger amounts of 
cash in relation to average daily expenses. 
Figure 3.10 shows that Category 4 had the largest DCOH, with a value of 
70.53 days, and Category 5 the lowest, with a value of 47.63 days.  Excluding 
Category 5, due to sample size, Category 1 provided the lowest DCOH, at 54.55 days.  
Also excluding Category 5, the larger the ACH, the larger the DCOH.  The mean 
Cash Ratio by size did not provide a clear trend.  The largest mean cash ratio was 
Category 1 at 2.5, with the lowest in Category 4.  Excluding Category 5, there is a 
clear trend of the mean Cash Ratio decreasing by size.  
 
3.5.4 Liquidity 
Liquidity is measured via two ratios: the current ratio and the quick ratio.  The 
current ratio analyses current assets in relation to current liabilities of the ACH.  The 
quick ratio provides a similar angle of analysis; however, it removes inventories of the 
ACH from the comparison provided by the current ratio.  Equations for the current 
and quick ratios are available in Table 3.4.  The ACHs’ working capital efficiency as 
measured by the current and quick ratios has declined steadily over the length of the 
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viewed by fiscal year.  The ACHs were not that sensitive to inventories, so both the 
quick and the current ratios remained similar in values.   
Figure 3.11: Liquidity Ratios by Fiscal Year Reported: 
Both the current and quick ratios both show declines over the course of the study.  This 
suggests that cash and other short assets are decreasing in comparison to short-term 
liabilities.  The decrease in both liquidity measures also coincide with the decrease in the 
DCOH illustrated earlier.   
The current ratio dropped from an initial value of 2.20 (it’s highest) in 1995, to 
2.11 in 2005.  This shows that working capital efficiency was reduced within the 
ACH market.  The quick ratio confirmed this trend, as it decreased from an initial 
value of 2.04 in 1995 to 1.98 in 2003, remaining at this level through 2007.   Both 
mean liquidity ratio values decreased over time.  This suggested that the ACHs’ 
liquidity was reduced over the period of the study.  This trend is supported further by 
the decrease in the DCOH, as discussed in Section 3.5.3. Quick ratios remained at 
comfortable levels.  The declining quick ratios from 2005 to 2007 coincide with 
changes with the U.S. economy that some believe to be the beginning of the credit 


















Figure 3.12: Liquidity Ratios by ACH Size.   
Smaller hospitals have higher liquidity ratios.  The current ratios are decreasing by size, 
suggesting that larger hospitals have less liquidity.  The quick ratio is variable by size.  The 
highest quick ratio is that provided by Category 1 hospitals, and the lowest by Category 2.   
Overall liquidity ratios are non-volatile and remain confined for the length of 
the study, as shown in Figure 3.11.  In Figure 3.12, Category 1 had higher liquidity 
ratios, Category 5 had a lower current ratio, and Category 2 had the lowest quick 
ratio.  Previous research by Calem and Rizzo (1995) supports these findings as they 
find that small ACHs are more dependent on internal cash flows for capital 
investment.  The liquidity ratios for smaller hospitals are larger and may be evidence 
that smaller hospitals are compensating for this dependency on internal cash flows for 
capital investment by holding more cash.  This is important as agency and monopsony 
are postulated to affect reimbursement, which in turn limits free cash flows and thus 
affects access to debt markets. The result is to leave ACHs more dependent on 
internal cash flows for investment.  Thus, liquidity ratios provide some evidence that 
ACHs are compensating for the effects of agency and monopsony.  While Category 1 
may have been the most efficient in liquidity terms, there was no evidence of an 
advantage to size.   
 
3.5.5  Efficiency 
Efficiency is measured via two ratios: Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) and 
Fixed Asset Turnover (FATR).  The DSO measures efficiency in the receivable 
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Fixed asset turnover provides measurement of efficiency of the ACH to utilize its 
fixed assets to generate gross revenues.  Equations for both efficiency ratios are 
provided in Table 3.4.  As discussed in Section 3.2, heavy external and internal 
pressures were placed upon the ACHs to increase the efficiency and lower the cost of 
healthcare.  A lot of those cost reductions came in the form of reduced payments to 
ACHs as shown in the cash ratio and the DCOH.  The ACHs adjusted or adapted to 
these changes within their market.  In order to increase returns with lower payments, 
ACHs had to decrease the cost of provisioning these services.  One way was to 
increase the utilization of assets currently in place.   
The FATR analyzes efficiency of assets.  As this ratio was observed over the 
length of this study, it was evident that ACHs already were increasing their utilization 
of assets.  This was reflected in the ever-increasing FATR ratio in Figure 3.13.  The 
FATR increased from a 1995 value of 4.0, to a value of 5.73 in 2007.  This increase in 
efficiency is what allowed other aspects of profitability to recover and coincides with 
similar increases in the profit ratios shown in Figure 3.3.  This is one of the ways that 
the industry reacted to forces within the market from government and commercial 
payers reducing reimbursement as evidenced by the decrease in operating margin in 
section 3.5.1.  This also provided evidence of ACHs making efforts to minimize 
allocative inefficient services, or increasing utilization of assets in place, thereby 
reducing overinvestment.  While this may not outweigh or countermand forces that 
encourage overinvestment, such as competition over quality, it does show that ACHs 
were responding accordingly.  This premise will be discussed further in later chapters.  
Figure 3.13: Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio by Fiscal Year Reported:  
The FATR increased year on year and is evidence of the ACHs improving the utilization of 















Figure 3.14:  Fixed Asset Turnover by ACH Size Category.: 
Larger ACHs are more efficient in the use of assets.  This is in line with expectations.  
Categories 3, provides the highest efficiency in the use of assets.  Categories 4 and 5 are 
less efficient in use of assets.  This may provide evidence of overinvestment in larger 
hospitals, which is discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. 
Figure 3.14 shows that Category 3 provided the greatest efficiency in terms of 
use of assets.  There is evidence that there is an optimum size to maximize the 
utilization of assets.  Category 1 provided the least efficient use of assets.  This is 
most likely due to smaller ACHs’ location in rural areas, where high utilization is not 
possible, because the demand for healthcare services is lower.  Likewise, the larger 
ACHs are more likely to be situated in urban areas, where there is a high demand for 
healthcare and the volume of potential patients is larger. On the other hand, greater 
demand is offset by competitive forces driving capital expenditures in the form of the 
‘medical arms race’ discussed previously.  Where these forces balance seems to be in 
the midsized market where there is enough patient volume to maximize utilization of 
assets, but which is not offset by competition leading to overinvestment and 
underutilized assets that are acquired only to enhance quality or perceived quality.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this chapter was to examine the nature of the ACHs’ 
financial ratios based on the dataset in the MCR in order to understand the general 
financial health of ACHs during the timeframe of this study. A second objective was 
to find evidence in the data of agency and monopsony. The observable consequences 
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reimbursement by payors in comparison to underlying costs, and lower utilization in 
areas with greater competition (Glied 2003; Nahata 2005; Peterson et al 2006; 
Eldridge and Palmer 2008).  In addition, what we find is the ACH market experienced 
financial pressures, as discussed in Section 3.2.  These pressures affected profitability, 
liquidity, working capital, and fixed asset efficiencies, as well as debt levels.  While 
the mean values for the ratios discussed provide an aggregate view of the industry in 
the longitudinal study, they also provide evidence that previously mentioned historical 
policies and efforts to control cost in healthcare had an effect.   
 Figure 3.15: Mean DCOH, DSO, and Cash Ratio by Fiscal Year Reported:   
The mean cash ratio increased over time, and the mean DSO and DCOH decreased over 
time.   One would expect to see an increase in the cash ratio with a decrease in the DSO.  A 
decrease in the DSO assumes that receivables that are collected sooner within the 
receivables cycle increases cash.  As AR is included in the cash ratio calculation, the 
decrease in DSO is offset and balanced by cash within the same formula.  Therefore, the 
increase in the cash ratio must be related to increases in cash from operations.  The 
decrease in the DCOH suggests that ACHs have less cash on hand in comparison to a day’s 
operational expenses.  If there is a lower DCOH over time, and cash itself increases over 
time, then operational expenses are increasing at a rate over time greater than the increase in 
actual cash accounted for in the cash ratio.  The contrasting nature of the cash ratio and the 
DCOH may suggests that ACHs are being squeezed between pricing methodologies to keep 
reimbursement low, and the ever-increasing market prices of goods and services of the open 
market. 
Figure 3.15 shows evidence of the intrusion of such pressure on ACHs.  This 
graph shows the mean cash ratio, which increased over time, the mean DSO, which 
decreased over time, and the mean DCOH, which decreased over time.  Normally, 
one would expect to see an increase in the cash ratio with a decrease in the DSO.  
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receivables collected sooner within the receivables cycle increases cash.  As AR is 
included in the cash ratio calculation, the decrease in DSO was offset by and balanced 
by cash within the same formula.  Therefore, the increase in the cash ratio uncovered 
by this study must be related to increases in cash from operations.   
When observing the previous phenomena with the DCOH over the same 
period, there is evidence of market pricing pressures upon ACHs.  The decrease in the 
DCOH suggests that ACHs have less cash on hand in comparison to a day’s 
operational expenses.  Therefore, if there is a lower DCOH over time, and it is known 
that cash itself increases over time, then the only explanation for the decrease in the 
day’s cash on hand is that operational expenses are increasing at a rate over time 
greater than the increase in actual cash accounted for in the cash ratio.  Therefore, this 
may suggest that ACHs are being squeezed between pricing strategies by payors to 
keep reimbursement for healthcare services low, and the ever-increasing market 
prices of goods and services purchased by ACHs on the open market, as provided by 
evidence of the contrasting nature of the cash ratio and the DCOH.  
If in addition we examine profitability ratios, which all show a decreasing 
trend over the period studied, we can find additional evidence of the trends seen in the 
divergence of the DCOH and the cash ratio.  This provides additional evidence that 
ACH reimbursement for services over this period was not covering the costs of the 
services rendered.  This effect is especially noticeable in ACHs’ operating margin as 
this is a good indicator of margin accrued from services to patients.  While not 
conclusive, this may be evidence for agency and monopsony effects as both are 
postulated to affect free cash flows via reimbursement for health services. 
Overinvestment is a key component of the agency argument put forth in this 
thesis.  As Newhouse (1981), Glied (2003) and Nahata (2005) find ACHs may be 
overinvesting in projects that have low or negative net present values, driven by the 
need to compete on quality.  Supporting this argument, Wang (1999) finds that firms 
with higher levels of competition overinvest more. We see evidence of this in Section 
3.5.2 where larger ACHs have higher debt ratios, which suggests more capital 
spending by larger hospitals in highly competitive geographic areas.  Evidence of 




The liquidity ratios discussed in Section 3.5.4 provide additional evidence that 
smaller ACHs were more liquid in comparison to larger ACHs.  In this case, as 
suggested by Calem and Rizzo (1995), smaller ACHs may be compensating for their 
reliance on internal funds for capital expenditures.  This is shown by the fact that 
smaller ACHs have higher liquidity ratios than larger ACHs.  The Calem and Rizzo 
(1995) findings are also confirmed by the leverage ratios which show that smaller 
ACHs carry less debt than larger ACHs, which suggests that perhaps smaller ACHs 
have difficulty taking on debt—a condition also identified by Calem and Rizzo.  The 
interaction of these two ratios types supports the contention presented in this thesis, 
which suggests that payors are controlling compensation to ACHs to address 
underlying informational asymmetry issues that are typical of agency relationships. In 
this case payors control reimbursements in order to minimize that element of costs 
that is not essential to the delivery of healthcare.   
Given the above, and that overinvestment is the result of the ‘medical arms 
race’, this would suggest that efficient utilization of assets in place would be falling 
over the period under examination.  However, throughout the term of the study the 
fixed asset turnover ratio would indicate the opposite. This ratio suggests that ACHs 
have improved their utilization of assets in place to generate revenues.  This might 
provide contrary evidence to overinvestment.  However, this trend could equally 
suggest that efforts by payors to reduce overinvestment and to increase utilization 
through reducing reimbursement have been effective over time causing the mean 
efficiency use of assets to increase by 1.5 times the utilization at the beginning of the 
study.  Viewed in this light, it may provide additional evidence for the presence of 
agency and monopsony in the market. Given the constant demand for healthcare, as it 
has been shown to have a relatively inelastic demand curve, one would not imagine 
such volatility as what is evidenced in the financial ratios.  One could point to 
competition as perhaps a driver of such volatility of the financial ratios, but hospitals 
compete on a limited geographic basis.  This possibly leaves these changes in overall 
ACHs to market-wide forces.  The combination of the larger market forces of 
government regulation and commercial payer reimbursement are large enough to have 
market-wide change as a result.  The remainder of this thesis examines this evidence 
of large market forces by way of regulatory and price control behavior and possible 





One of the primary research questions seeks evidence of signaling and agency 
cost of free cash flows in the principal-agent relationship between the government and 
ACHs. The purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence of agency costs (signaling 
and agency costs of free cash flows) in the U.S. ACH market via regression analysis 
and analyze the role that agency plays in the government’s reimbursement or fee 
schedule and how it affects ACH’s decisions of capital structure.  
Most principal-agent research is presented with goal conflict as the core of the 
argument, with the assumption that the principal is more risk averse than the agent.  
For this research, we assume that the agent acts in their own self-interest against the 
interests of the principal.  In this case, the agency relationship is complicated by the 
presence of a moral hazard within the healthcare market, which is thought to cause 
overinvestment by ACHs(Newhouse 1981; Glied 2003 and Nahata 2005). 
Specialization is increasing agency costs in the relationship between the government 
by way of the CMS and ACHs, as ACHs offer specialized services (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).   
Eisenhardt (1989) describes agency research and theory as falling into two 
categories: positivist and principal-agent.  Positivists focus on conflicting goals of the 
principal-agent and the necessary governance mechanisms that will bring into 
alignment the goals of the agent and principal so that self-interested behavior is 
minimized.  Positivists focus predominantly on the relationship between owners and 
managers of public corporations.  The research by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama 
(1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983), is positivist in approach. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) studied ownership structure within corporations. Fama (1980) explored 
managerial labor markets and examined controls of self-interest behavior with large 
corporations.  Fama and Jensen (1983) analyzed the role of the board of directors as 
an information system to help stockholders monitor management’s behavior.   
In contrast to positivism, principal-agent research is more concerned with the 
general theory of the principal-agent relationship.  Generally, the theory is applied in 
a broader concept, often used to describe any principal-agent relationship in any 
relationship in which an agency problem can exist.  Principal-agent research normally 
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entails specific assumptions of the agency relationship, followed by the logical 
deduction of the organization of the agency problem, and concluding with empirical 
proof.    Using an easily measured outcome and an assumption that the agent is more 
risk averse than the principal, a simple model is created to explain the relationship and 
test for the presence of agency effects. The model measures the cost of the behavior of 
the agent, the cost of measuring outcomes, and the shifting of risk from the principal 
to the agent.   
The research in this chapter will explore these principal agent relationships, 
using both categories of agency in order to examine the effects on the capital structure 
of ACHs.  From a positivist perspective, this research analyzes the goal conflict and 
the aligning incentives/motives between the government (principal) and the ACHs 
(agent).  In addition, the research considers the principal-agent perspective, discussing 
the agency relationship between the government and ACHs.  Agency relationships of 
this type and similar are well documented in healthcare (McLean 1994, Melnick et al 
1989, Ryan 1994, Dranove and White 1987, 1989, Bronsteen et al 2007, Mooney and 
Ryan 1993, Lee and Zenios 2007, Conrad and Perry 2009, Eldridge and Palmer 2008, 
Peterson et al 2006, Schneider and Mathios 2005, Chalkley and Khalil 2005). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency conflict can occur in any 
organization, which suggests that all organizations: firms, educational organizations, 
government, mutuals, and any other similar entity, are open to agency conflict.  This 
position regarding agency conflict is shared by Ross (1973) and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992). Furthermore, agency can be present in any contractual relationship, rather 
than just within organizations; in this case, the contractual relationship is between the 
U.S. Government and ACHs, with whom it contracts for healthcare services. 
Agency problems can influence the managerial decisions of capital structure 
(McLean 1989).  In the case of the U.S. Government and ACHs, it is proposed in this 
research that agency influences ACHs’ decisions of capital structure.  The agency 
relationship between the government and ACHs can provide insight into matters of 
contractual agency problems and their effects upon decisions of capital structure.  The 
research is important, as it helps to expand the understanding of decisions of the 
capital structure of firms in the presence of contractual agency effects, and 
specifically within the ACH market.  The remainder of this chapter will focus on the 
description of the ACH market in light of the agency problem, examine how agency 
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exists, test for its presence, and measure its influence on free cash flows, and 
consequently, capital structures.   
Empirical evidence of behavior under agency cost is important, because it 
allows for an understanding of the construct of the principal-agent relationship in real-
life terms.  It provides a basis by which to comprehend future relationships and the 
behaviors and consequences they might generate.  In the case of finance, it provides a 
basis on which one might predict the outcomes of future transactions under similar 
frameworks and conditions, and to understand any potential negative distortional 
effects it might generate within the transaction or market.   
Given the structure of the principal-agent relationship between the CMS and 
ACHs, one might take the view that the agency problem within the ACH market is 
minimal if one is to consider (e.g., Lambert 1983) that both parties have a long-term 
relationship in place. In this relationship, through time, one might expect that the 
CMS would be likely to become more informed about the ACHs).  This is true to 
some extent, in that the CMS is able to amass considerable information on the 
activities of those ACHs that provide services to Medicare and Medicaid patients.   
However, healthcare services on the whole are not monitored on a direct basis on the 
delivery of every service, but rather are monitored from a distance via what has been 
billed and/or what has been reported on or complained about from those covered by 
the CMS.  Direct monitoring of quality exists via third parties, such as the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JACHO), an industry self-regulating body 
that surveys hospitals according to self-determined standards.  The U.S. Government 
began in 1965 using the JACHO certification as a minimum set of standards for 
participation in Medicare and Medicaid (Joint Commission 2010).  JACHO is used 
for monitoring, whether for annual or multi-year approval, and therefore the ACH is 
not measured or monitored on a daily basis. As a result, asymmetric information 
remains. Because of the process by which CMS monitors quality and delivery, the 
relationship between the parties is more like a short-term relationship in which the 
likelihood of the agent’s, or ACHs’ undertaking, self-interested behavior is greater 
(Eisenhardt 1989).  In addition, there is an inherent divergence in the objectives 
between CMS and ACHs in terms of maximum revenues, profitability, and minimum 
costs, amongst others, which contributes to the potential principal-agent problem.   
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The short-term characteristics of the relationship, created by the monitoring 
process, are exacerbated by the structure of the ACH market itself.  The ACH market 
within the U.S. is not a competitive market, and it has high barriers to entry created by 
the special licensing needed to own and operate hospitals.  A large asymmetry of 
information exists, as the consumer is not well informed on the quality or price of 
services delivered, or the payor (CMS) of the quality or quantity of services 
delivered(Chalkley and Khalil 2005, Mooney and Ryan 1993, Dranove  and White 
1989, Ryan 1994).  The market is dominated by the government as the largest 
consumer of goods and services, which regularly influences market performance and 
behavior (Pauly 1998).  By definition, a competitive market is free of collusion and 
has low barriers to entry for both the buyer and the seller, both the buyer and seller are 
well informed, and a single buyer or seller cannot influence or affect the market 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992).  The market characteristics described previously that act 
to distort the competitive ACH market are thought by some to create an oligopoly 
market that protects prices and hinders market entry (Wang et al. 1999).  
 
4.1.1 Relevance of the Study to Agency Research 
One of the benefits of studying agency under the conditions previously 
discussed is that this research is able to focus on a specific industry with common 
characteristics.  This allows for the avoidance of problems of structural differences 
between different industries (Calem 1995). Furthermore, the research is able to ignore 
variations in an ACH’s ownership structure, i.e. for-profit and non-for-profit, as it has 
been shown to be insignificant in its effects on capital structure of ACHs in the U.S. 
(Wedig 1988).    This is important, as there are several forms of ACH ownership 
within the market: public, private, and teaching with variation in for-profit and non-
for-profit status.   In addition, the research is able to consider the agency effects under 
the conditions of a contractual arrangement.  The arrangement is such that the 
ultimate purchaser of health services, the government, actually is not responsible for 
decisions of consumption, but rather the facilitators of financial payment, under which 
they ultimately are responsible for paying for the consumed services of the patient and 
thus try to induce behavior through payment for services (Peterson et al 2006).   
Under this scenario, one is able to consider principal behavior in trying to 
control a situation in which the principal neither controls where or when something is 
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consumed, nor how much is consumed. This presents a unique problem for the 
principal to consider.  Understanding principal behavior under these conditions is 
important to agency research, as they are different from the traditional principal-agent 
relationship, in which there is a direct communication with the agent other than 
payment for services rendered. In addition, understanding principal behavior’s effects 
on agent decisions of capital structure is important, as a healthy capital structure is 
pertinent to a successful firm.  Agency effects that negatively impact agent decisions 
of capital structure not only may have consequences for the firm in question, but 
could impact an entire market, especially if the principal in questions consumes 
services from the majority of market participants and behaves similarly with all.  This 
study provides a non-traditional view of agency effects on decisions of capital 
structure, one in which there is a clear separation of choice of consumption via the 
patient and ultimate purchaser (CMS).  There is asymmetric information not only 
between the principal and the agent, but in this case, between the principal (CMS) and 
the consumer (patient) (Bronsteen et al 2007). 
The environment for the research provides a unique set of conditions under 
which to consider agent behavior.  In this case, the research is able to examine the 
ACHs’ need to compete in a market that encourages competition through quality due 
to the presence of a moral hazard condition for the patient.  A moral hazard within the 
industry influences consumer choice based upon quality or perceived quality, and not 
price (Newhouse 1981).  Competition via quality presents a circumstance in which the 
agent has the need to spend heavily on capital expenditures in order to remain 
competitive (Glied 2003).   
There is previous research that suggests evidence of agency’s effects on 
hospitals in the U.S.   Becker and Koch (2006) claimed ACHs: 1) appear to be 
overleveraged; 2) are unprepared for reductions and changes in reimbursement; and 3) 
lack sufficient reserves.  All of these factors can be interpreted as the effects of 
agency costs on the U.S. ACH market.  The overleveraging could be caused by both 
liquidity issues as well as signaling.  The lack of preparation for reimbursement 
changes and ACHs not maintaining sufficient reserves could be the result of reduced 
free cash flows.   
The factors presented by Becker and Koch (2006) are characteristics that 
restrain ACHs from being competitive.  Under this scenario, competition is dependent 
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on access to capital.  Access to capital, unless raised for a firm via equity, is 
determined by the availability of free cash flows and the stability of future free cash 
flows to support borrowings.  If the access to free cash flow is reduced by agency 
through actions of the principal, then access to debt markets is limited, and thus 
leverage and opportunity for growth also is limited (Calem and Rizzo 1995).  This 
research seeks to understand the effects of the principal–agent relationship described 
previously, and analyze how its behavior affects decisions of capital structure.   
 
4.1.2 Conditions for Agency 
An agency relationship is said to exist whenever one individual or firm (the 
agent) acts on behalf of another (the principal), where self-interest influences the 
decisions of the agent, and where asymmetric information allows the agent to take 
unobservable actions in his/her own self-interest, unless incentivized otherwise (Ross 
1973; Milgrom & Roberts 1992).  Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 5) described the 
agency relationship as, "a contract under which one or more persons (the principal) 
engages another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.”  This relationship 
applies in the case of U.S. Government-provided healthcare services, because the 
government does not provide healthcare services directly, but rather contracts with 
ACHs to deliver care to its customers. This arrangement is no different to that which 
exists in commercial contracts, whereby an agent, whether an individual or an outside 
firm, is hired to perform a service by which the agent acts on behalf of the principal.  
As Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 312) noted: "Contractual relations are the essence 
of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, and so 
on.  The problem of agency costs and monitoring exists for all of these contracts...." 
A key requirement for agency conditions to exist is that there needs to be 
asymmetric information between the principal and the agent. Asymmetric information 
is present within the ACH market.  The U.S. Government has very little information 
to determine whether the terms of its contract with hospitals are being met. This is 
primarily driven by the lack of data on outcomes of delivery of care because there are 
very few mechanisms for sharing data on outcomes of patient services, this lack of 
information leads to the  inability to monitor by the principal.  Compounding this 
there is no way to ensure that the patient treated was in fact the patient with proper 
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legal coverage by CMS, which creates an opportunity for fraud, in this case not 
necessarily by the agent.  In addition, a payment policy may create perverse 
incentives to game the system for financial gain as certain procedures may be 
reimbursed at higher rates, but may be delivered clinically similar and therefore give 
incentive to bill for the procedure with higher reimbursement (Chalkley and Khalil 
2005; McLean 1989; Peterson et al 2006).  As Maynard (1991, p. 1277) notes, “There 
are a number of features of healthcare systems which make monitoring outcomes and 
policy formulation especially problematic- poor data on outcomes and perverse 
incentives facing agents….”  This lack of information on the part of CMS provides a 
basis for asymmetric information on the part of the ACHs. In addition, this 
asymmetric information allows for fraud, both in terms of poor delivery of the final 
services, but also theft of services by illegal patients and monies by institutions that 
fraudulently bill for services not delivered.  The conditions of asymmetric information 
in this context create problems with forming a complete contract.   Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) pointed out two problems that exist with asymmetrical information: 
The first is that buyers cannot monitor the quality of the output of an agent, such as a 
product or service, and that given the nature of the incentives involved, the supplier of 
the good can—and will—substitute poorer quality goods and services. In addition, 
they might provide little diligence in providing these services.  The second problem is 
that the principal and agent transaction may fail to occur at all, because the principal 
fears victimization, or perhaps monitoring costs are too high to reduce the likelihood 
of opportunistic behavior.  In this case, the U.S. Government has experienced 
victimization via fraud.  It is well documented within the U.S. healthcare system 
(Moroney 2003) that fraud and waste exist, and that the U.S. Government is trying to 
contain the high cost of healthcare, some of which is ultimately caused by asymmetric 
information and agency cost (Maynard 1991).  While it is doubtful that government 
and ACHs would fail to transact, the presence of fraud and the difficulty in 
monitoring increase the likelihood of the government seeking additional ways to 
police and motivate ACH (agent) behavior.   
Within the U.S. healthcare market, the economic structure for rents and 
incentives is clear.  The principal in the market is the U.S. Government, and the 
agents are the ACHs.  The principal must have some economic rents to be derived 
from the relationship, and there must be a need to align incentives for the agent to 
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maximize the principal’s rents and ensure against fraud and or waste.  The 
relationship is expressed in Equation 4-1. 
Equation 4-1: 
   ∫   ∑       
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The agency argument put forth is one of control of free cash flows and 
signaling of compliance via external debt.  The U.S. Government seeks to reduce the 
cost (  of providing healthcare in the U.S., limiting  ∑        
 
   , and thereby 
increasing .  In order to accomplish this, the U.S. Government via the CMS must 
ensure that ACHs are dis-incentivized to overinvest. The government measures 
success in preventing overinvestment in the savings on healthcare expenditures as 
shown in Equation 4-1.   "The principal can limit divergences from his interest by 
establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs 
designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent" (Jensen & Meckling 1976, p. 5). 
Because it uses agents to deliver these services and does not perform services 
directly, the U.S. Government seeks to minimize the free cash flows to hospitals. 
Minimizing free cash flows reduces access to debt markets, limiting the ability to 
finance projects; in addition, the reduction in free cash increases opportunity costs, 
forcing managers to be more cautious with their investments. The overall effect is one 
of reducing overinvestment by ACHs.  The U.S. Government reduces free cash flows 
in order to maintain a control over the cost of healthcare.  It controls cash flows in 
three ways: 1) through reimbursement; 2) through policy; and 3) by allowing a 
collusive monopsony to exist within the payors of healthcare, for both government 
and commercial payors.  All of these reduce free cash flows, and thus the likelihood 
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of overinvestment.  In this chapter, only reimbursement is considered as a mechanism 
for controlling free cash flows.  Policy and monopsony are discussed further in 
Chapters 5 and 6.   
The reduction in free cash flows via reimbursement is to ensure among other 
things that positive NPV projects are chosen.  The NPV projects in this scenario are 
ones that are economically efficient and provide a positive return.  The selection of 
NPV projects by ACHs is distorted, as there is a moral hazard within the healthcare 
market.   The moral hazard in this case causes ACHs to compete on the quality or 
perceived quality of goods, (Glied 2003; Nahata 2005). 
 
4.1.3 Moral Hazard 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 167) described a moral hazard as, “...the form 
of post-contractual opportunism that arises because the actions that have efficiency 
consequences are not freely observable and so the person taking them may choose to 
pursue his or her private interests at others’ expense.” They felt that a moral hazard 
could develop in any situation in which individuals are allowed or tempted to choose 
an inefficient action, because the interest of the individual is not aligned with group 
interests, and that action cannot be monitored easily. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) 
suggested there are three conditions that must be present in an environment for a 
moral hazard to exist: 
1. There must be some potential divergence of interests between people. 
2. There must be some basis for gainful exchange or other cooperation between 
the individuals; in other words, there must be a reason for a transaction. 
3. There must be difficulties in determining whether in fact the terms of the 
agreement have been followed and in enforcing those contract terms.  These 
difficulties often arise because monitoring actions or verifying reported 
information is costly or impossible. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 167) summarized the outcome  in healthcare: “if you 
are covered under health insurance or belong to a Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO), so that you are insured against all or most of the costs of visits to the doctor, 
you are likely to make greater use of medical services of all kinds...”  
The healthcare market in the U.S. is one in which those insured via private 
insurance or government programs are at risk of overconsumption, or a “moral 
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hazard,” due to a lack of monetary risk in consumption.   To be more succinct, when 
payments are made by insurance companies or the government, the patient has no 
incentive to minimize the consumption of medical services.  Sometimes, even ACHs 
have no incentive to minimize the supply of medical services. 
Of course, this makes the demand for healthcare inelastic to price.  People will 
consume if they see a need/want to consume, even though the marginal cost of the 
service could exceed the marginal benefit.  The distortions within this market, via 
public and private health insurance, shelter the consumers of medical services from 
many of the financial consequences of their own decisions.   The separation between 
the prices paid by the patient and the actual cost of service leads to a moral hazard. 
The existence of a moral hazard via health insurance is well documented in U.S. 
healthcare by Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Pauly (1986), Gaynor (2000), Smet 
(2002), and Glied (2003), among others. 
Newhouse (1981) suggested that improperly structured insurance reduces the 
amount of price competition in the marketplace, and thus the healthcare provider 
competes on the basis of quality, as price is not a consideration in the consumption 
equation utilized by the patient/consumer.  This perspective is confirmed later by the 
research of Wang (1999), Glied (2003), and Nahata (2005).  “Studies have shown that 
hospital payment arrangements lead to higher costs and contribute to lower 
production efficiency by forcing hospitals to invest excessive amounts in technology, 
provide more patient amenities, and provide excess services to attract physicians and 
patients” (Wang 1999, p. 85). 
The effect of the moral hazard of insurance leads to competition of the ACHs 
for patients on other market parameters, such as quality.  This leads to over-
acquisition of capital items, or the creation of programs that increase the perception of 
quality.  This need to compete on quality rather than price leads to an arms race, with 
ACHs competing with newer/better equipment, technologies, and services. The 
research of  Robinson and Luft (1985) showed that this “arms race” generated 20 
percent higher costs in the more competitive markets than in the less competitive 
markets.  This was confirmed by Smet (2002) and Glied (2003).  Glied’s explanation 
for higher costs follows: 
“Studies through the 1980’s found that when many hospitals compete in the 
same market, prices in that market is higher- not lower- than in setting with 
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fewer competitors.  Competing hospitals engaged in a ‘medical care arms 
race,’ buying more costly equipment than their neighbors.  Consumers, who 
both lack information about the value of this equipment for their condition and 
who generally do not face full costs at the margin, select the hospital that 
appears to offer the highest quality service.” (Glied 2003, p. 127) 
  While the healthcare market has tried to contain the moral hazard via 
consumer cost sharing, ultimately the moral hazard distorts the market so that ACHs 
are not required to compete for patients based upon costs. Instead, ACHs are forced to 
use indirect means to gain consumer confidence, loyalty, and ultimately, more 
patients.   In other words, patients are not considering cost in their decisions to 
purchase healthcare services; therefore, they have no incentive to choose the cheapest 
or moderately priced care, but rather choose healthcare services based upon other 
factors, such as quality or perceived quality (Newhouse 1981; Glied 2003; Nahata 
2005).  Because of this particular moral hazard, the scope for attracting customers is 
changed and narrowed.  Patients choose healthcare providers based upon service 
offerings; in other words, based upon who offers the most comprehensive services.   
This drives hospitals to enhance their images of quality via questionable projects, and 
includes projects that have a negative NPV.  
For the government, ACHs’ negative NPV projects can be projects that when 
completed are considered underutilized due to low patient volume.  This is considered 
an issue of allocative efficiency. “Allocative efficiency problems arise in hospitals 
when substantial resources are allocated to treatments of questionable effectiveness, 
when unnecessary tests are employed, or when hospital clinical services are 
underutilized due to low patient demand” (Wang 1999, p. 84).  Wang et al. (1999) 
recognized significant increases in excess hospital services from 1989 to 1993 that 
could not be supported by efficient medical practices.  They concluded that this 
increase in spending within the market could have been caused by ACHs attempting 
to gain market share.  Their data showed excessive use of hospital capital resources in 
the form of excess hospital services.  
In the case of projects that are considered allocative inefficient, the cost for the 
project must be recouped from the patients as a whole, which means that the 
government ultimately is going to bear the cost for these types of investments pro-
rata.  Considering that the U.S. Government consumed 65% of healthcare services 
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during the time frame of this study, one can understand their desire to restrict such 
investments in order to decrease costs. When one considers that the government 
ultimately will pay for a large proportion of such negative NPV projects (whether by 
overinvestment or allocative inefficiency) via increased cost to the government, due to 
the impossibility of creating a complete contract, the government is forced to utilize 
indirect means of control.  In this case indirect means, such as controlling the amount 
of reimbursement, which typically are found where the agency relationship exists, 
(Peterson et al 2006; .Conrad and Perry 2009). 
 
4.1.4 Specialization 
Specialization within healthcare further adds to the cost of agency within 
healthcare.  Hospitals provide specialized services within healthcare, which are 
delivered by employees with focused training, such as doctors and nurses, who take 
many years to obtain their qualifications.  There is licensure for the practice, limiting 
entry into the field for the physician and the nurse. In addition, the hospital itself has 
acquired the right to provide healthcare services via licensing, and has acquired 
specialized assets and technology to be able to deliver competent care to patients.  
While there may be competition within geographic regions, it would be very difficult 
to replace the entities providing the healthcare services.   
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 33) recognized the importance of specialization 
in the increase of agency costs in their study: "The size of the divergence (the agency 
costs) will be directly related to the cost of replacing the manager.  If his 
responsibilities require very little knowledge specialized to the firm, if it is easy to 
evaluate his performance, and if replacement search costs are modest, the divergence 
from the ideal will be relatively small and vice versa." In other words, because ACHs 
are such specialized units, it makes monitoring and replacement difficult.   The 




In contractual situations, agents signal their compliance or proper management 
of the contractual arrangement.  Often in cases with pre-contractual private 
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information, some of the privately informed people would gain if they could make 
their information known.  The difficulty is that there may be no simple, direct means 
to reveal the private information. This creates incentives to find ways to convey the 
information.  One such strategy is via signaling.   
Signaling may exist within the context of the U.S. healthcare market. The U.S 
government lacks the resources to monitor individual hospitals adequately.  
Therefore, it lowers its monitoring cost by using external monitors/lenders. Prior 
research indicates that lenders/banks monitor borrowers.  Banks monitor borrowers to 
ensure that borrowers—in this case, the ACHs—are managing the business prudently 
and efficiently so that the borrower may return the borrowed capital plus borrowing 
costs.  Often, banks require financial covenants that act as guidelines for the financial 
performance of the firms.  These financial guidelines, along with direct monitoring 
via audits of the firm, ensure compliance with required firm financial performance. 
Debt, according to Jensen (1986, p. 11), “increases efficiency by forcing 
organizations with large cash flows but few high-return investment projects to 
disgorge cash to investors.  The debt helps prevent such firms from wasting resources 
on low-return projects.”  Furthermore, debt reduces the agency cost of free cash flows 
by reducing the excess cash available to managers, thus reducing the likelihood of 
overinvestment (Jensen, 1986). In the context of the agency problem between the U.S. 
Government and ACHs, debt can be seen as a method of signaling efficiency to the 
U.S. Government.  Debt replaces direct monitoring costs for the government with 
external monitoring via the lenders.  The ACHs incur debt, among other reasons, 
knowing that it signals to the government that they are being monitored on a regular 
basis to ensure that they are running efficiently and are minimizing their investment in 
negative NPV projects.     
A corollary is that hospitals that provide more services to the government 
would seek to send greater signaling of efficiency.   Hospitals that derive larger 
proportions of revenue from the government want to ensure that those streams of 
revenues are not jeopardized, and are thus compelled to signal compliance with the 
operational wishes of their largest customer.  The government is trying to reduce 
overinvestment or investment in allocative inefficient services.  Typically, the 
government encourages this through lower reimbursement to ACHs.  Incentives to 
align the goals of providers of healthcare services and insurers via payment schemes 
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or reimbursement schedules are well known (Peterson et al 2006; Eldridge and Palmer 
2009; Melnick et al 1989; Conrad and Perry 2009; Lee and Zenios 2007).   The ACHs 
know that the government can and does change reimbursement for them.  If there is a 
risk of ACHs losing revenues because of the government’s need to reduce 
overinvestment or allocative inefficient services, then the ACHs likely will want to 
signal compliance with the government’s wishes, thereby ensuring that 
reimbursement is not cut for their hospital or they are not subjected to planned 
reimbursement schedules which may lower potential revenues.  In effect, the ACHs 
seek to show compliance so that they are not penalized by way of lower 
reimbursements.  Debt provides the mechanism for signaling compliance. 
Therefore, one would expect a direct correlation of debt and hospital revenues 
derived from providing government services.  Hospitals with higher revenues from 
government payors are at a greater financial risk should government change 
reimbursement.  For this reason, one would expect that as the proportion of 
government-derived revenues increase, so too would the concern over ACHs’ 
vulnerability to changes in reimbursement.  As the ACHs’ vulnerability increases, the 
likelihood should be greater for the ACHs to want to signal efficiency. 
We know that in most agency relationships, the principal and the agent will 
both incur costs to ensure that the principal’s interests are protected.  Principals will 
incur monitoring costs, and agents often will incur bonding costs (Jensen & Meckling 
1976; Chalkley and Khalil 2005; McLean 1989).   In this case, bonding costs are the 
costs incurred by the agent to guarantee to the principal that the agent will not take 
decisions or actions that will harm the principal. In this case, the cost of debt can be 
viewed as bonding costs, costs that the hospitals incur to bond themselves to the 
principal (the U.S. Government).  The debt that the ACH takes on acts as a guarantee 
that the ACH (the agent) will not take actions in the form of overinvestment and 
allocative inefficient services that harm the principal, in this case the government. 
 
4.2 Agency Theory 
4.2.1 Prior Research  
In order to understand the agency relationship described earlier, a better 
understanding of previous research is necessary.  The purpose of this section is to 
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examine previous literature that has context and support for the agency argument put 
forth within this chapter.  The research presented here is meant to inform the reader of 
previous academic works that have relevance to this study, and to draw parallels 
between the previous literature and the argument presented within this chapter.   
If one examines the ACH market and the agency framework that has been 
discussed, one can see that what one has is a single principal, the government, which 
hires many agents on its behalf, ACHs, to provide healthcare for citizens covered by 
Medicare and Medicaid.  From a broad perspective, this framework is similar to the 
research conducted by Stephen Ross.  In his research, Stephen Ross (1973) created a 
set of utility functions under several relative payoff structures to examine the conflict 
of Pareto efficiency (assuming perfect information) with the needs to motivate agents 
within a principal-agent relationship. Ross concluded that payoff structures that solve 
the principal’s problem and lead to Pareto efficiency, in which no further 
improvement in efficiency can be made, are attainable and actually quite likely to 
occur within the market.  Effectively, Pareto efficiency can be attained by incurring 
the cost necessary to ensure agent compliance.  However, when there are many agents 
acting on behalf of the principal, the fee may be the only communication between the 
principal and the agent.  In this case, Ross noted that while it may be feasible to 
monitor the agents in action, it would be too expensive.  This is very similar to 
conditions within the ACH market, where in this case, the government’s only 
mechanism for communication is the reimbursement rate.  The government would 
like to be able to ensure compliance via monitoring costs; however, similar to one of 
the conclusions reached by Ross, the economic viability of such a system for 
monitoring is not there, as the cost are too great.  Ross (1973) also supports the 
general principal that agency costs may be present in any agency relationship and that 
agency relationships may be found in any contractual arrangement where a principal 
contracts with an agent to act on the principal’s behalf. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) brought agency theory to the forefront of finance, 
as their work combined agency theory, property rights theory, and the theory of 
finance to provide a theory of ownership of the firm.  They defined the concept of 
agency costs in light of the separation of ownership and control, that is, between the 
principal and agent, together with the associated costs of the relationship.  They 
created a model of the firm with equity and debt and examined the resulting agency 
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costs.  They suggested that the principal could act to monitor the agent to limit the 
deviation of the agent’s dealings from those that are in the best interest of the 
principal.  Additionally, they suggested that it is beneficial for the agent to incur 
bonding costs in order to guarantee to the principal that the agent will not take actions 
out of line with principal’s interest. In their model, both monitoring and bonding costs 
were considered agency costs, along with the residual loss.   
This research uses the Jensen and Meckling (1976) model of agency costs, and 
argues that ACHs take on bonding costs, in effect signaling behavior, which limits 
deviation from the principal’s interests.  Bonding reduces monitoring costs, and where 
debt is being used, the reduction in free cash flows limits the options of the agent 
(ACHs) and therefore minimizes the likely cost of aberrant activity.  
Jensen (1986) expanded agency theory, incorporating discussions of the 
agency costs of free cash flows and corporate finance.  Free cash flows were defined 
by Jensen (1986, p. 323) to be, “cash flows in excess of that required to fund all 
projects that have positive NPVs when discounted at the relevant cost of capital.”  He 
analyzed the conflict between managers and shareholders and the role of reducing free 
cash flows under managerial discretion in diminishing the conflict between the 
principal and the agent (management).  Jensen (1986) suggested that debt is a signal 
and a way of reducing the manager’s discretion of the use of free cash flows. Jensen 
covered two important points related to this research on agency costs: 1) the benefits 
of debt in reducing agency cost of free cash flows; and 2) how debt can substitute for 
dividends. 
These two points of agency are important to this research and should be 
discussed further. The first is that managers with excess free cash flows can signal to 
shareholders by declaring a permanent increase in the dividend.  However, according 
to Jensen (1986), this is a weak promise, as dividends could be changed in the future.  
Secondly, debt can enable managers to bond their promise to the payout of future cash 
flows; thus, debt can be an effective substitute for dividends.  Jensen suggested that 
debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flows by reducing the resources under 
management’s control, and is thus likely to reduce overinvestment.   
Jensen’s (1986) theory suggested that firms with large amounts of free cash 
flows that are allowed to accumulate under the firm management’s control are more 
likely to be wasted on projects/mergers that are of minimal value to the firm and 
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possibly even value destroying.  This is an important result, because this research 
suggests that a similar agency problem exists between the CMS and ACHs in the U.S.  
The ACHs are similar to the firm with prior large free cash flows.  Due to the ACHs’ 
need to compete on quality as well as the characteristics Jensen describes, ACHs are 
likely to overinvest or invest in allocative inefficient services, as discussed previously.  
In the case where ACHs overinvest, they are likely to increase the cost to their 
customers to cover the overinvestment.  Government costs will increase, because the 
CMS consumes the majority of healthcare.  However, if the government (principal) is 
able to reduce the resources under management of the ACH (agent), then the ACH is 
more apt to operate efficiently and ensure that projects are scrutinized for value 
creation and allocative efficiency. This effort effectively aligns the goals of the 
principal and agent.  
Kim and Sorensen (1986) analyzed the capital structures of firms in relation to 
insider ownership of public firms.  They extended Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
work by looking at firms with multiple shareholders, and testing empirically for the 
presence of agency costs and how these costs relate to capital structure.  They used a 
sample of 186 companies divided into groups with high inside ownership (above 
25%) and low inside ownership (below 5%).  The groups then were broken into 
separate industries so that only like industries were compared.  Using analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and simple regression, they found that firms with insider 
ownership had 6% to 7% higher debt to total assets than those of lower inside 
ownership within the same industry.  These findings are relevant to this research, as 
they indicate that debt levels and agency effects are related in the way that Kim and 
Sorensen's (1986) theory predicted that firms with high inside ownership have lower 
agency costs.  This is supported by the views of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who 
suggested that owner/managers have little or no agency costs. 
Wedig et al. (1988) also used this agency framework to analyze the capital 
structure of hospitals in relation to ownership structure.  Hospitals in the U.S. are 
categorized as either non-profit or profit based hospitals, and the majority are non-
profit.  Wedig et al. suggested that capital structure is an interesting subject in light of 
the fact that nonprofit hospitals are exempt from tax, yet maintain debt obligations, 
even though there are no tax advantages from doing so.  According to Wedig et al., 
the bulk of revenues within hospitals are derived from public or private insurers, and 
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this reimbursement mechanism affects the cost of both debt and equity.  They 
examined how capital structure is affected by the reimbursement policies of the major 
insurers, taking into account differences in ownership structure.  In addition, they 
assessed the debt/asset ratios of hospitals and determined the roles that reimbursement 
policies, tax policy, and bankruptcy risk play in capital structure.  Wedig et al. 
concluded that hospitals with high reimbursement via cost-based reimbursement have 
greater debt than hospitals with a lower reimbursement mechanism.  They suggested 
that this would be a problem going forward if reimbursement is reduced.  They also 
concluded that the type of ownership provides for no differences in capital structure, 
even in light of the differences for holding such debt.  This is important to the 
research as no variable within the data allows for ownership structure. 
McLean (1989) examines the application of agency theory to healthcare 
organizations.  He suggests that although agency theory was developed as a 
theoretical model for use in economics and finance, it is applicable for use by 
managers of healthcare organizations and policy makers.  McLean states “several 
types of arrangements used to finance healthcare organizations can be understood as 
ways of dealing with agency problems” (McLean 1989, p.65).  He suggests that 
unequal access to capital amongst providers may be a result of varying degrees of 
agency costs.  McLean (1989) applies his theory of agency in healthcare to hospital 
based medical care in the U.S. examines the participants within the healthcare market 
and describing how agency theory fits.  He suggests that hospital managers show 
signs of agency problems when they use their managerial discretion to consume 
perquisites to a greater extent than allowed by contract, a perfectly plausible event in 
healthcare, which creates opportunity for abhorrent behaviors due to the lack of 
monitoring output or the amount of input into health services.  Debt according to 
McLean (1989) helps resolve problems of agency in healthcare in a way described by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) by reducing the resources under managements’ control 
as cash flows must be promised in order to acquire debt.  McLean suggests that 
providers of healthcare are temporary agents that have a propensity to over consume 
perquisites in the form of reduced effort and or higher fees.  This is made possible  by 
the monitoring problem within healthcare.  McLean (1989) concludes that agency 
theory is applicable in many cases to healthcare. 
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McLean’s discussion is important to this research as it supports the theoretical 
application of agency theory to the U.S. healthcare market, specifically addressing the 
relationship between patient and provider, payor and provider and physician/ provider 
relationships.  He further suggests that agency cost may explain the unequal access to 
capital by providers.   
While no direct agency costs are attributed to the unequal access to capital, the 
inference that it can have impact on access to capital is important. This research puts 
forth the premise that agency cost of free cash flows impacts decisions of capital 
structure by limiting payments to ACHs and thereby limiting the amount of cash 
flows with which they can promise in order to obtain debt.  The outcome of this 
limitation in the available cash flows to support borrowings, limits the debt capacity 
for an ACH.  The inequality is driven by ACHs, which have differing cash flows to 
promise, which means that ACHs with better cash flows can obtain more debt, while 
those with lower cash flows have less.  This will be discussed further later on. 
Eisenhardt (1989) assessed agency theory and reviewed the empirical 
literature to determine the strains of agency research that provide testable positions 
and to evaluate empirical agency theory.  She concluded that there are two strains: (1) 
positivist, examples of which are Berle and Means (1931), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Fama (1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983), which is interested in describing 
governing mechanisms that minimize or remove agency costs; and (2) principal-agent 
research, examples of which are Anderson (1985), Eisenhardt (1985, 1988), Eccles 
(1985), and Conlon and Parks (1988), which is concerned with empirical research of 
the principal-agent relationship. According to Eisenhardt (1989), principal-agent 
research provides greater opportunities for empirical testing.   
She separated the two strains of research by noting, “Positivist theory 
identifies various contract alternatives, and principal agent theory indicates which 
contract is the most efficient under varying levels of outcome uncertainty, risk 
aversion and information…” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 60).  She concluded with five 
recommendations for research within the principal-agency model: 1) focus on 
information systems, risk, and outcome uncertainty; 2) focus on theory relevant 
situations in which contracting problems are difficult and agent opportunism is high; 
3) expand into richer contexts and apply agency to organizational situations where 
asymmetric information is present; 4) use agency as a complement to other theories; 
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and 5) look beyond economic literature.  The research in this chapter follows many of 
the guidelines laid out by Eisenhardt (1989) and recognizes the strength in applying 
agency to real market/contractual situations within the healthcare market.    
Stulz (1990) analyzed financing policies, observing how they restrict 
management’s self-interested behaviors in the presence of asymmetric information.  
He constructed a model of an atomistic shareholder who did not have access to the 
firm’s cash flows, nor insight into management’s investment decisions. Stulz assumed 
that it was too expensive for shareholders to demand dissemination of cash ex-post.  
He then suggested that managers enjoy increasing perquisites with an increase in 
investment, even when it involves negative NPV projects, so consequently, managers 
always will choose to invest rather than pay out cash.  Informational asymmetries 
under these conditions cause problems for firms with too little cash flow to invest in 
positive NPV projects, as managers lack credibility in convincing the shareholders 
that they do not have enough cash flow to take advantage of the positive NPV 
opportunities.   
Stulz (1990) concluded that financing policy reduces the agency cost of 
managerial discretion.  Agency cost of managerial discretion has two costs: 
overinvestment and underinvestment.  Stulz found that debt that requires management 
to pay out funds from cash flows, which exacerbates the underinvestment costs. An 
increase in underinvestment cost is a reduction in overinvestment costs.  Stulz 
confirmed the premise put forward in this research: Government can drive down 
overinvestment by ACHs by reducing free cash flows to ACHs. 
Calem and Rizzo (1995) analyzed the agency cost of capital markets in U.S. 
hospitals. They suggested that investment activity is related closely to the liquidity or 
internal funds of the hospital, which can determine access to debt markets.  They 
pointed to previous research of Sandrick (1986) and Wilkinson(1988) to suggest that 
access to debt markets at the time of the study was becoming difficult, driven by 
various cost containment methodologies by insurers which lowered hospital operating 
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margins and thus liquidity (Calem and Rizzo, 1995).
5
  They suggested that there may 
be a causal relationship between investment activity and the availability of internal 
funds.  Using a balanced panel data set of 1,400 hospitals from 1985-1989 and GLS 
regression analysis, they postulated that small hospitals and freestanding hospitals 
were more likely to encounter financing constraints in comparison with large 
hospitals or multi-hospital chains.   By separating the hospitals by size and chain 
affiliation, they examined the relationship of liquidity and investment.  Measuring 
investment by way of the change in fixed assets from one period to the next, and 
controlling for labor, labor to capital, occupancy of beds, market growth, credit 
standing, and marginal revenue of product, they used a fixed effects model to regress 
investment against liquidity and control variables.  Results from their regression 
analysis concluded that small hospitals and freestanding hospitals face borrowing 
constraints due to agency costs as liquidity was closely related with investment in 
small and freestanding hospitals.  This is in contrast to their finding that large 
hospitals do not, as the internal liquidity of large, multi-chain hospitals did not 
correlate to investment.  While Calem and Rizzo (1995) were not analyzing Agency 
Costs of Free Cash Flows as suggested in this research, but rather Agency Costs of 
Capital Markets, it is important to notice that they reference underlying payment 
methodologies as primary reasons for increased difficulty in access to debt markets 
and as a consequence making select ACHs more reliant on internal fund for 
investment.  It is interesting to note that the premise suggested under the existence of 
agency cost of free cash flow may actually increase agency costs of capital markets as 
described by Calem and Rizzo (1995).  It is the effect of these payment 
methodologies on free cash flows and the consequence of such changes  may lead to 
difficulties in ACHs obtaining debt to fund new investment, therefore leaving them 
more reliant on internal funds.  Additionally, this research may provide evidence of a 




 Calem and Rizzo primarily point to the Prospective Payment System, implemented by Medicare 
in 1984 as the primary example of cost containment via payment methodologies.  The Prospective 
Payment System provided a fixed level of payment for specific services regardless of the hospitals 
actual charges. This payment arrangement increased the hospitals risk of incurring uncovered charges 
and therefore lowered margins on those services. 
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different type of agency cost that affects hospitals, which is acting as a primary driver 
for increasing the agency costs of capital markets. 
Leland (1998) considered the optimum amount and maturity of debt for a firm.  
He noted that the agency costs of debt related to the asset substitution problem 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976) are significantly less than the tax advantages provided by 
debt.   Therefore, firms will position themselves by taking on the optimum level of 
debt regardless of the value transferred to the bond holders because of the risk 
reduction value presented in debt.   
Parrino and Weisbach (1999) suggested that the optimum leverage for a firm 
is when the incremental increase in the cost of debt via agency costs equals that of tax 
benefits for the increase in debt.  They suggested that overinvestment is more likely in 
firms with stable cash flows and little growth opportunities.  They concluded that the 
stockholder/bondholder conflict affects debt levels, and that this distortion usually 
increases as the debt levels increase.  Their findings also concluded that the agency 
cost of debt can be large and can vary greatly across firms.  This is important, as 
ACHs have stable cash flows and few growth opportunities.  Therefore, if ACHs have 
few growth opportunities, they are more likely to have overinvestment. 
Rivenson (2000) considered the liquidity of hospitals and the differences 
between non-profit and for-profit hospitals, as well as what strategies are used by 
ACHs to determine their cash position. Through public data and interviews, they 
concluded that the cash reserves were increased deliberately by nonprofit ACHs, 
mostly derived from previously built-up reserves that subsequently had been invested, 
as well as improved payables and receivables policies.  They suggested that in light of 
the anticipated future reduction in reimbursement by the public and private insurers, 
ACHs have been holding greater cash reserves.  Accordingly, this increase in cash 
reserves and investments serves to supplement earnings from healthcare services, and 
to provide access to capital markets and a lower cost of capital (Rivenson 2000).   
Harvey et al. (2003) analyzed the effect of capital structure on limiting agency 
costs.  They suggested that debt creates value for firms that have high agency costs, 
especially when the debt reduces the likelihood of overinvesting.  Using 1,014 
exchange listed firms from emerging markets, and including ownership and stock 
return data, Harvey et al., using a three-stage least squares regression model, 
concluded that debt mitigates the reduction in firm value that is induced by 
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asymmetric information between the principal and agent, in this case management and 
stockholders.  This is accomplished by reducing the overinvestment problem by 
increasing debt. 
Morellec (2004) analyzed the impact of managerial discretion and corporate 
control mechanism on debt levels and the value of the firm.  Capital structure in the 
study incorporates the tax advantage of debt minus bankruptcy and the agency costs 
associated with management discretion.   Morellec uses a contingent claims model to 
analyze the relationship between debt and management discretion (assuming 
managers obtain perquisites from investment).  He analyzed the impact of 
management’s opportunistic behavior on leverage policy, asset values, and firm value.  
He concluded that principal-agent conflicts via the manager-shareholder relationship 
explain the lower debt levels experienced in real firms, as well as the fact that firms 
with high growth opportunities carry less debt.  He also suggested that these agency 
conflicts could explain the apparent cross-sectional variation in capital structures.  
Morellec supported the position that principals can and do benefit from a reduction in 
free cash flow.  
Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) conducted tests on data from emerging market 
firms’ ownership structures to see which would lead to large/extreme agency costs.  
They used both traditional financial statement data and global debt contract data to 
analyze the premise that debt should create value in firms with high expected agency 
costs. To measure a firm’s potential overinvestment tendency, they used higher levels 
of assets in place and limited growth opportunities.  Cross-sectional tests utilizing 
financial accounting data revealed that leverage mitigates losses in a firm’s value.  
They reported that the benefit of leverage is concentrated in companies that have 
limited growth opportunities or have a higher percentage of assets in place. This 
suggests that there is evidence of large-scale recognition that debt can minimize 
overinvestment, thus creating value for the principal. The work of Harvey, Lins, and 
Roper is applicable directly to this research, as the argument put forth in this study 
recognizes that ACHs’ management may signal efficiency to government payors, and 
in doing so minimize overinvestment by the ACHs, thereby creating value for the 
government via savings, as described earlier. 
Iacobucci and Winter (2005) analyzed the incentives for asset securitization 
that are driven by informational asymmetries within a corporation.  They defined 
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asset securitization as the partial or complete segregation of a specific set of cash 
flows from a corporation’s other assets, and the issuance of securities based on these 
cash flows.  Under their findings, asset securitization enhances monitoring efficiency 
by reducing noise in the relationship between firm and managerial performance, and 
consequently the agency cost of free cash flow, which is supported by Jensen (1986). 
In the context of this research, the increase in monitoring efficiency comes at 
the expense of small ACHs.  According to Calem and Rizzo (1995), small and 
freestanding hospitals face borrowing constraints due to agency costs.  He noted, 
“From a policy perspective, the results suggest that efforts to limit payments to 
hospitals during the past decade may have been particularly onerous to the investment 
decisions of small hospitals and free standing ones.  Such hospitals, we find are more 
dependent on their own liquidity for investment funds” (Calem and Rizzo1995, p. 
1012).  Borrowing constraints upon small hospitals are created by efforts to limit 
payments to hospitals, as discussed by Calem and Rizzo (1995), and this is evident in 
the data provided in this research, as small hospitals consistently show lower debt 
than other larger sized facilities.  When looking at debt measurements from Chapter 3, 
Category 1 hospitals (those with less than 100 beds) had less debt.  Category 1 sized 
facilities showed the lowest debt to equity ratio, with a value of 0.73, and the second 
lowest debt ratio, with a debt ratio of 0.45.  Calem and Rizzo suggested that limitation 
in payments is the underlying cause of these constraints.  The findings in Chapter 3 
also suggest that larger hospitals are better able to reduce the effects of agency.   
Chalkley and Khalil (2005) utilizing an agency theory framework between 
insurers and providers (ACHs) demonstrate that monitoring schemes differ in their 
effectiveness in utilizing patients as a disciplining mechanism and showed that the 
choice of the type of monitoring tool itself may depend on the strength of the patients 
change in demand to variation in quality of service.  The agency framework used in 
their research assessed two fundamental ways of calculating payments, one based 
upon input measures (treatments) the other on output measures (health outcomes or 
improvement to health statusThey showed that when demand is responsive to quality 
of service, payment mechanisms based upon outputs or outcomes, reduce the overall 
cost to the insurer when compared against payment mechanisms based upon treatment 
or inputs.  They suggest that this is because payments based upon outputs or outcomes 
make misrepresentation of the type of patient being treated more costly to the 
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provider in terms of demands for services, because services rendered will have to be 
tailored to the patient type such that the outcome is consistent with what was 
originally claimed by the provider. 
The research of Chalkley and Khalil is important to this research in several 
ways, one is that they recognize the Agency relationship between insurers and ACHs. 
The government is the largest insurer and consumer of health services in the U.S.  
They in effect hire agents (ACHs) to act on their behalf to treat patients.  The 
principal-agent relationship is one in which monitoring is difficult.  This difficulty in 
monitoring means that the principal must incur monitoring costs in order to limit 
abhorrent behavior by the agent, in this case providers.  The second key point from 
the research of Chalkely and Khalil (2005) extends this last point.  They recognize 
that payors may be able to reduce agency costs through payment schemes to providers 
(ACHs).  This research suggests two forms of symptoms of the agency relationship 
may be present within U.S. healthcare, signaling and agency costs of free cash flows.  
In this case, signaling by ACHs maybe an effort on their part not to be subjected to 
payment schemes as described in Chalkley and Khalil (2005) and likewise agency 
costs of free cash flows may likely be a form of agency costs incurred by those ACHs 
already being subject to payment schemes.  
Nahata et al. (2005) examined the moral hazard within U.S. healthcare.  They 
analyzed the demand for medical services in relation to out-of-pocket expenses by the 
insured.  Their assumption was that a third-party insurer always is involved in the 
consumption of the healthcare services. They incorporated the demand inelasticity of 
medical services, in which any increase in medical services could be passed on 
directly to the consumer.  Using a broad range of elasticity, a utility function (utility 
maximization model) was created to analyze demand under various conditions.  The 
finding was that cost sharing between the consumer and insurer is the single most 
important factor in limiting the rise in medical expenditures.  Their findings support 
the notion that providers do not compete based upon price, but rather on quality or the 
perception of quality.   
As described by Nahata et al. (2005), the moral hazard in the healthcare 
markets is one of the prime reasons that ACHs compete on quality or perceived 
quality, and thus have a propensity to overinvest, as discussed previously.   Like “loss 
leaders” in retail, the investments by ACHs are not always to generate a direct return 
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on the investment, but rather work as an indirect means of increasing patient volume, 
and thus revenues.  Under this scenario, the CMS ultimately will carry the burden of 
those losses in its request for additional reimbursement, or perhaps greater quantity of 
services rendered.  Ideally, by reducing the amount of free cash flows available to 
hospitals, the CMS curbs ACHs’ ability to overinvest.   
Peterson et al (2006) provides a review of 17 empirical studies, from 1980 to 
2005, on pay for performance in healthcare to examine the effect of explicit financial 
incentives on measures of the quality of health care services.  Pay for performance 
was a concern as they point to the poor quality of healthcare in the United States, 
suggesting via a report from the Institutes of Medicine (2001) that numerous factors 
contributed to the poor quality of health services including the structure of the present 
healthcare payment system.  CMS along with private payors have been using explicit 
financial incentives to try to induce quality, but questions remain as to the 
effectiveness, optimal design and implementation needed to be answered.  Peterson et 
al (2006) suggest that the provider patient relationship is a type of principal agent 
relationship.  The principal (the patient) cannot directly observe or know the level of 
skill or effort expended by the agent (the provider) doing the contracted work.  
Because of this lack of information on the part of the principal (the patient), they do 
not have knowledge of their own medical condition, how much care they need and or 
expected outcomes of services rendered, so hence rely strictly on their agent to 
perform these action/services.  Because of the asymmetry of information on need and 
outcome for healthcare services, demand for healthcare services maybe unresponsive 
to quality.  In this light, performance-based pay or explicit financial incentives may 
provide an answer when patient demand is unresponsive to quality.  Peterson et al 
(2006), conclude that providers are paid the same regardless of quality of the 
healthcare they provide, producing no financial incentives for quality and in some 
cases disincentives.  Based upon the literature search conducted they suggest that 
performance based pay provides a real opportunity to align both principal and agent 
interests using incentives for the agent. 
Schneider and Mathios (2006) expanded the application of principal agency 
theory to health services.  They used a principal-agent framework to examine the role 
that monitoring costs faced by an insurer had on healthcare utilization.  Using a 
theoretical model to consider an alternative to incentive-compatible contracting, they 
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proposed for the insurer to actually monitor the care prescribed by providers under a 
fee for service arrangement.  They compared ACH length of stay for fee for service 
patients with those of capitated patients in both high and low monitoring conditions.  
Looking at the variance in length of stay, they assumed high monitoring costs with a 
higher variance in length of stay for a given procedure.  Their theoretical model 
develops predictions for healthcare utilization for fee for service arrangements in 
cases of both low and high monitoring costs.  Testing predictions of the theoretical 
model via utilization using length of stay measures in their the research; they compare 
outcomes of those treated by providers under a fee for service arrangement with those 
treated under a capitated plan.  Utilizing the two basic types of insurance plans within 
the U.S, traditional indemnity (fee for service) and managed care (capitated), they 
suggest that capitated plans transfer the financial risk of treatment from the insurer to 
the ACH.  This provides an excellent example to implement and how the incentive 
compatible contract to contain excessive use of services (measure by the length of 
stay) can be used to contain agency costs.  Using principal-agent theory, they suggest 
that this transfer of risk from the insurer to the provider maybe expensive if the 
provider is risk averse.  This may be a problem as incentive compatible contracts may 
cause the provider to not be as good an agent for the patient or the insurer, which 
might lead to a condition of the under provision or lack of quality of care depending 
on how risk averse the provider is.  
Bazzoli et al. (2006) examined ACHs’ financial performance from 1993-2000, 
separating the study into two time frames.   They analyzed financial data accumulated 
from the CMS cost reports and the survey data from the AHA.  Using this 
information, their sample was divided into groups: those considered financially 
strong, and those considered financially weak.  Performance was dictated by the use 
of profit margin and ACH cash flows with strong or weak performances, divided at 
the twenty-fifth and the seventy-fifth percentiles.  Over time, performance was 
examined to understand better whether strong hospitals were getting stronger and 
weak hospitals were getting weaker.   
Bazzoli et al. (2006) concluded that the strong hospitals were not getting 
stronger over time, as the very highest performers at best were maintaining their 
financial performances, while the weaker institutions were performing worse at the 
end of the longitudinal study.  Weaker hospitals were found mostly to be rural 
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hospitals (Morellec & Smith 2007).  This is consistent with Calem and Rizzo (1995), 
who found that small rural hospitals face borrowing constraints due to agency costs.  
The evidence for Calem and Rizzo is shown in thefindings of Morellec and Smith 
(2007), which provided evidence that the restriction or constraints on borrowing is 
most likely the result of the lack of profit margin and consequently free cash flows 
within this dimension of the U.S. ACH market. 
Eldridge and Palmer (2008), conduct a systematic review of current literature 
on the topic of performance-based payments as a methodology to improve the 
performance of health systems in low-income countries.  The use of performance-
based payments had recently become a popular methodology to achieve specific 
health targets in low-income countries.  In their research, they find performance based 
payments as the primary approach used to resolved problems of the principal agent 
relationship.  They describe the principal-agent relationship as “one in which an actor 
(the principal) can act more effectively by relying on the services of a so-called 
“agent” whose utility function differs in some sense from the principal, meaning that 
they cannot be relied upon to act in entirely the way desired by the principal” 
(Eldridge and Palmer 2008). The problem, as they suggest for the principal, is how 
best to create a contract that will incentivize or motivate the agent to behave in the 
desired manner required by the principal, even when the principal cannot monitor 
outcomes or output.  Recognizing that many health systems in the developed world 
are adopting this approach and have made great strides in moving from input based 
budgets to fee-for-service models, including payments based upon diagnosis-related 
groupers.  Using the research of Peterson et al (2006) they suggest that performance-
based pay has been found to have generally positive effects in aligning incentives , 
but recognize that adverse activities such as gaming are still of concern.  They 
conclude by recognizing some of the success of performance based payments but 
provide for some concern in utilizing these methodologies in low-income countries as 
these methodologies transfer risk to the providers of healthcare services, which are 
working in more challenging or fragile settings.  Where monitoring is difficult,.they 
suggest it may be difficult to define proper performance and how to measure it, 
whether the targets are achievable and more importantly how incentives via payments 
may skew activities and the performance of the providers in a way that may be 
detrimental to the local health services long-term.  
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Conrad and Perry (2009) asks the question, utilizing a conceptual theoretical 
framework drawn from microeconomics, behavioral economics and agency theory, 
whether financial incentives can improve the quality of healthcare services.  They 
analyze eight propositions in their research. (1) Rewards vs Penalties, (2) Nature of 
Incented Entity and Focal Quality Behavior, (3) General versus Selective Incentives, 
(4) Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Motivation, (5) Relative versus Absolute Performance 
Incentives, (6)Size of Incentives, (7) Certainty of Incentives and (8) Frequency and 
Duration of the Incentive Payoffs.  They conclude that properly designed incentives 
can improve the quality of healthcare services along the dimensions of structure, 
process and outcomes.  However, they suggest that under the current market structure 
for healthcare services,  incentive-induced improvements to quality of healthcare 
services are likely to be small. 
The Conrad and Perry (2009) paper is important to this research as their 
approach recognizes and considers the principal-agent relationship and the need to 
align incentives between the principal, the payor in their research with the agent, the 
provider via payment methodologies.  The alignment of incentives and solving agency 
problems within the healthcare market between CMS (a government payor) and 
ACHs (a healthcare provider) is one of the primary considerations of this research.  
The recognition of this problem by other researchers suggests an understanding of the 
principal-agent problem between CMS and ACHs and a need to align incentives via 
payments as a valid strategy, supports the premise of this chapter that agency costs 
may exists and the government may be trying to solve these via reimbursement 
strategies.  Likewise, that agents may be trying to reduce agency problems and costs 
by bonding (signaling). 
 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Description of the Data 
Data used in this study was collected from the CMS, and is referred to most 
often as the MCR.  The MCR contains provider information such as facility 
characteristics, utilization data, cost and charges by cost center (in total and for 
Medicare), Medicare settlement data, and financial statement data. The CMS 
maintains the cost report data in the HCRIS.  A full description of the data was 
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provided in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3, and a list of ratio variables was provided in 
Section 3.5.2. 
Additional variables were created for analysis in Chapter 4.  A description of 
the variable, its creation, and its use is discussed below.  A table of all variables used 
in Chapter 4 can be found in Table 4.1.   Separate variables were used for signaling 
and agency cost of free cash flows.   
No breakdown by certain characteristics, i.e. for-profit/ non-for-profit, is 
possible, as the variables necessary to do so are not contained in the data.   
 
4.3.2  Additional Variables 
This chapter proposes two separate models of agency: one for signaling, and 
the other for agency cost of free cash flows.  In both models, the percentage of 
government business, (%Gov_Bus) is used as a primary variable, in the case of 
signaling the dependent variable and for agency cost as the primary independent 
variable.  Therefore, it is important to understand how this variable is calculated.   
Due to the formatting and information of the MCR, we were not able to get 
direct information of what percentage of the ACHs’ revenue is derived in dollars from 
government sources, and so a proxy had to be established.  The variable %Gov_Bus is 
a proxy, using inpatient and outpatient days from government payers as a percentage 
of total inpatient and outpatient days/visits for all payers accepted by the ACH as 
reported by the MCR for each year.  Government payors include Medicare and 
Medicaid, amongst others.  While this does not provide exact dollar reimbursement or 
revenues from government sources, it did allow this study a proxy of those revenues. 
As government payers pay inpatient services by a DRG, each DRG has a length of 
stay measure associated with it.  The length of stay measure quantifies the maximum 
allowable number of days recognized by the government for a given DRG.  Each 
DRG is paid a flat fee that takes into account the appropriate number of patient days 
utilized by the DRG.  Outpatient procedures are delivered via a patient day.  
Normally, one has no overnight hospital services, and is counted as outpatient.  
Because the payment can be equated to patient days, this allowed us to take the 
percentage of patient days consumed by the government of total patient days and 
directly correlate it back pro-rata to free cash flows. While this was not an exact 
match, it provided a good proxy.  This is not to say there are not limitations to the 
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proxy to accurately represent the percentage of revenues derived from government 
payors. Government payors reimburse less than private payors for services rendered 
by ACHs, so ACHs may be receiving higher reimbursement for those patient days 
sold effectively to private payors for each patient day.  This will have some tendency 
to mean the actual revenues derived from the government may be overstated slightly.   
However this is expected to be minimal as the government reimburses on average 
around 25 % to 27% of charges where private payors reimburse on average around 
30% of charges according the claims data used later in this research. 
The MCR provided the necessary variables to calculate %Gov_Bus, which is 
defined as the sum of Title XVIII and Title XIX, divided by total inpatient/outpatient 
days.   Title XVIII is defined as Medicare (Social Security Agency).  Title XIX is 
defined as Medicaid (Social Security Agency).  The CHIPS program was ignored for 
the purposes of this research, as it was deemed small, and most importantly, not all 
ACHs participate in it. Government employees also were excluded, as the amount was 
relatively small and not definable from a research perspective. 
Total Inpatient/Outpatient Days is defined as the total number of patient days 
produced by the ACH for that year on both an inpatient and outpatient basis.  Total 
Inpatients/Outpatients had a total N of 53,240 out of 55,582, with 2,342, or 4.2% 
missing. As Total In/Outpatient Days is a given number from the MCR, these cases 
were dropped. Using Tukey’s (1977) definition, outliers and extremes are those with 
values above 100,707 Day/Visits, and a total of 34% of the cases were categorized as 
extremes. 
The extremes were allowed to remain in the study, as the highest Day/Visits 
was 582,274 patient days/visits, which is possible with a hospital with 1,595 beds. 
Also in consideration for this decision was the fact that Total In/Outpatient 
Days/visits  also is comprised of outpatient visits, which do not required a hospital 
bed to provide healthcare services.  
The Total In/Out Days/Visits on the other prospective end with a value of zero 
were excluded, as the hospital was considered non-operational for this portion of the 
study. For    %Gov_Bus = (TitleXVII + TitleXIX) patient days/(Total In/Outpatient 
Days), N= 50,095 with 5,487 missing. The %Gov_Bus is a calculated variable, so 




The mode of %Gov_Bus was close to 1.00.  Initially, this value was of 
concern; however, upon further review, it was determined that the majority of ACHs 
with values close to  1.00 were highly correlated, with a value of 1 in (num_bed_cat), 
which described ACHs in the category with the lowest number of beds, between (0-
100) beds.  These hospitals tend to be in rural areas, where few have private 
insurance, and reimbursement is derived primarily from Medicare and Medicaid.   
All negative values for %Gov_Bus were rejected, as negative values for this 
variable were considered invalid.  All values for %Gov_Bus had to be greater than 
zero (%Gov_Bus > 0).  All missing values were ignored, and those cases were 
omitted from the study.  Methodologies for the analysis of both signaling and agency 
costs of free cash flows were similar; however, they will be addressed separately. 
 
4.3.2.1 Variables included in Signalling Models 
 
Figure 4.1: Signaling Variables: 
Shows the variable to be included in the signaling model.    This figure provides the variable 
name and the definition of calculation of the variable.  In addition, it provides the actual 
variable name used in the data.  All variables were calculated with the exception of fiscal 
year.  Multiple variables are used for some variable categories. For example, Leverage has 
four underlying actual variables that are used in the modeling.  This was done so that the 
modeling could observe the relationship of %Gov_Bus and multiple definitions of leverage.  A 
full list of variables for Chapter 4 is available in the Appendix to Chapter 4.  The list provides 
variable name, nomenclature, whether the variable was calculated or provided with the data 





Variable Name Actual Variable Definition
% Gov Bus % Gov Bus CMS patient days /Total In/Out patient days
Leverage
Leverage Total Longterm Liabilities/Total Assets
Leverage_2 Leverage ( non-negative value)
Debt/Equity Total Debt /Equity
Debt Ratio Total Liabilities/ Total Assets
Profitability
Net Margin Net Income/ Sales
Cash flows
Operation Cash Flows FCF + CAPEX
Liquidity
Liquidity Current Assets/ Total Assets
Size
LnTA Natural Log of Total Assets
Time
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Reported
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Table 4.1: Correlation Matrix for Variables in Signaling Regression:  
This shows the correlation matrix for the variables used in the signaling regression.  Of 
interest is the negative correlation of the Leverage, Leverage2 and the Debt Ratio.  Signaling 
theory would suggest a positive relation between all the variables and the percentage of 
government business.  These negative relationships are contrary to the signaling theory put 
forward in this thesis.  Net Margin is also slightly negative which may explain the negative 
correlation with government business as this may have impact on cash flows which effect an 
ACHs ability to take on debt. Operation Cash Flows hasa similar relationship.  Liquidity 
however has a slightly positive relationship this is counterintuitive with the relationship of 
Net_Margin and Operation Cash Flows.  LnTA has a negative relationship with %Gov_Bus 
which suggest that larger ACHs have less of their total business coming from government 
sources.   All variables denoting leverage variable show a dgree of endogeneity with one 
another; however this does not present a problem within the regressions as they are not 
included together in any single model.   
 
Table 4.2: Statistical Descriptives of Signaling Variables:   
All variables have large samples with few missing cases.  This allows a more complete 
analysis via regression as fewer cases are omitted due to missing variable data.  The 
smallest sample size for a variable is for the Debt to Equity Ratio with 42,651 cases.  All 




Leverage (primary independent variable) - (Leverage, Leverage2, Debt 
Ratio, Debt/Equity) several definitions of leverage were used to measure and control 
for the outstanding debt of each ACH.  The different measures allowed multiple 
%Gov_Bus Leverage Leverage2 Debt to Equity Debt Ratio Net_Margin Operation CF Liquidity LnTA Fiscal Year
% Gov_Bus 1.0000
Leverage -0.1117 1.0000
Leverage2 -0.1117 1.0000 1.0000
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.0045 -0.0019 -0.0019 1.0000
Debt Ratio -0.0512 0.8149 0.8149 0.0147 1.0000
Net_Margin -0.0629 -0.0901 -0.0901 -0.0022 -0.2086 1.0000
Operation cash Flows -0.0799 -0.0065 -0.0065 0.0120 0.0356 0.1291 1.0000
Liquidity 0.1951 -0.2495 -0.2495 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0130 -0.1969 1.0000
LnTA -0.3981 0.2590 0.2590 0.0027 0.0693 0.1472 0.1349 -0.4808 1.0000
Fiscal Year -0.0280 0.0450 0.0450 0.0032 0.0364 -0.0364 0.0176 0.0115 0.1017 1.0000
FiscalYear~d    -0.0280   0.0450   0.0450   0.0032   0.0364  -0.0364   0.0176   0.0115   0.1017   1.0000
        LnTA    -0.3981   0.2590   0.2590   0.0027   0.0693   0.1472   0.1349  -0.4808   1.0000
   Liquidity     0.1951  -0.2495  -0.2495  -0.0016  -0.0012  -0.0130  -0.1969   1.0000
Operating_~s    -0.0799  -0.0065  -0.0065   0.0120   0.0356   0.1291   1.0000
    Net_Marg    -0.0629  -0.0901  -0.0901  -0.0022  -0.2086   1.0000
   DebtRatio    -0.0512   0.8149   0.8149   0.0147   1.0000
DebtToEqui~o     0.0045  -0.0019  -0.0019   1.0000
   Leverage2    -0.1117   1.0000   1.0000
    Leverage    -0.1117   1.0000
Percent_Go~s     1.0000
                                                                                                        
               Percen~s Leverage Levera~2 DebtTo~o DebtRa~o Net_Marg Operat~s Liquid~y     LnTA Fiscal~d
Variable n Mean Median Std Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis
% Gov_Bus 48910 0.6575 0.6728 0.14678 0.7500 -0.3680 -0.3520
Leverage 45109 0.3058 0.2838 0.22741 1.3300 0.5090 -0.0170
Leverage2 44419 0.3171 0.2905 0.22379 0.9900 0.6790 -0.0290
Debt to Equity Ratio 42651 0.7780 0.6100 0.71562 4.5500 1.0240 1.0300
Debt Ratio 49996 0.4778 0.4400 0.29558 1.7100 0.5000 0.0840
Net_Margin 51471 0.0093 0.0200 0.06171 0.8900 -3.4670 24.9660
Operation cash Flows 44005 4344600 2112300 12133500 68059285 0.4480 0.7630
Liquidity 51527 0.3510 0.3216 0.16205 0.9000 0.5920 -0.2320
Fiscal Year 55582 2001.03 2001 3.351 12 0 -1.1830
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models to be considered, each accounting for the various definitions and the possible 
relationship with %Gov_Bus.  Debt is the primary independent variable in the 
signaling regressions. It is proposed that a positive correlation exists between the 
percentage of government business and all Leverage ratios.  This relationship is 
proposed, as ACHs may desire to signal to the government efficient use of capital in 
order to protect revenues derived via government sources.  ACHs may use signaling 
as there is very little capability for monitoring of health services and/or ACHs by the 
government.   Initial results from the correlation matrix in Table 4.1 contradict the 
signaling premise as three out of the four leverage ratios how a negative relationship, 
however this is to ignore the possible effect of  control variables .  In this case, control 
variables are important as they help to better explain the relationship between 
Leverage and %Gov_Bus and ultimately may yield a negative relationship in the 
panel data regression analysis.  All definitions are available in Figure 4.1.  Additional 
information on the variables included in Chapter 4 is included in the Appendix, 
including name, nomenclature, if the variable was provided or calculated, outliers and 
definition. 
Profitability - (Net Margin) was included as a control for profitability, and as 
access to debt markets can be constrained by non-profitable firms, therefore limiting 
leverage, which may affect their ability to signal.  Evidence of this may be seen in 
Table 4.1 as Net Margin has a negative relationship with all the leverage variables.  
This may suggest that similar to Calem and Rizzo (1995) smaller hospitals are more 
reliant on internal cash flows for investment.  Therefore, as Net Margin increases 
ACHs are using more internal funds for investment.  However, this does not align 
with a rational conclusion that the higherthe Net Margin the more debt an ACH could 
take on.  The correlation matrix in Table 4.1 suggests that as ACHs get larger they 
take on more debt.  This is shown in the positive relationship with LnTA and the 
leverage ratios. Profitability as measured by net margin takes into account other 
income of ACHs besides revenues derived from services to patients.  This is 
important as net margins were shown to be positive in Chapter 3; however, operating 
margins, which are derived from service to patients, are not.  Therefore, ACHs are 
only generating a profit on those revenues derived from other sources besides service 
to patients.  This may explain the deviation in the leverage ratios and Net Margin.  
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Cash Flows - (Operational Cash Flows) were included as a control within the 
study in order to account for any variation in access to debt markets, which would 
influence the ability to signal via debt.  Operational Cash Flows are promised to 
lenders in order to take on debt.  The less the free cash flows the less debt that an 
ACH can potentially take on.  A positive correlation can initially be seen in Table 4.1 
between Cash Flows and the Debt to Equity Ratio and the Debt Ratio.  This provides 
evidence to support this overall relationship.  Operational Cash Flows is defined as 
free cash flows plus capital expenditures.  Cash flows including capital expenditures 
is important and capex can be paid for with financing and or out of cash flows.  
Therefore, pre-investment dollars were added to cash flows in order to give a control 
variable that captured the full pre-investment potential of an ACH. 
Liquidity - (Liquidity) was included in the model to control for ACHs’ ability 
to access debt markets.  It also is a measure of overinvestment.  In this case, liquidity 
would suffer under prolonged overinvestment.  Liquidity, in this case measured as 
current assets as a ratio to total assets, indicates the potential for an ACH to use 
internal funds rather than obtain new debt.  We would expect to see a negative 
relationship between debt and liquidity.  As liquidity increases, it provides an 
additional alternative source of investment funds.  In Table 4.1, we see that liquidity 
is negatively correlated with all leverage variables.   
Size - (LnTA) the natural log of total assets was used as a control for size.  
This logic followed previous research in its utilization to control for size.  Controlling 
for size takes into account the magnitude of assets of the ACH and their ability to 
generate more revenues and thus free cash flows, which can support more leverage.  
Larger ACHs should have larger proportions of leverage in place.  Total Assets is a 
variable provided by the MCR. 
Time - Fiscal year is the control for time.  Its inclusion was to reduce temporal 
effects within the model caused by time.  Fiscal year is a variable provided by the 
MCR.  Time accounts for temporal effects of the increase in government participation 
within the healthcare market, where the government is consuming more of the 
healthcare services generated year on year.  Additional information on the variables 
included in Chapter 4 is included in the Appendix, including name, nomenclature, if 




4.3.2.2 Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow Variables 
Free Cash Flows Defined 
The agency cost model of free cash flows uses free cash flows as the 
dependent variable.   While Jensen (1986, p. 323) defines FCF as, “cash flows in 
excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive NPVs when discounted 
at the relevant cost of capital,” this study uses the accounting definition of FCF:   
FCF = (net income + amortization/depreciation - changes in working capital - 
Capex) 
(All FCFs are presented in nominal dollars). 
Calculated Free Cash Flows  
In order to calculate free cash flows from the MCR data, several underlying 
variables had to be calculated.  Net Income was taken directly from the MCR data.  
Depreciation and amortization partially were provided by the MCR data.  
Amortization was not and could not be calculated. The amount of amortization is 
likely to be insignificant, so it was ignored when calculating the overall variable 
depreciation and amortization.  The change in working capital was determined 
previously in this research, and as such is defined in those chapters.  Change in 
working capital was not able to be quantified for the year 1995, as this was the first 
year of the study and the author did not have prior year information to calculate the 
change.  CAPEX was a calculated variable composed of the change between capital 
assets at time (t) and capital assets at (t - 1).  Only the new purchases/acquisitions 
were considered to be CAPEX or investment.  While MCR data considered donations 
as growth to capital assets, this research excluded them from consideration, as no 
operationally-derived cash flows were spent to acquire the assets. 
Initially, there were problems with calculating the FCF due to N or (n) being 
greatly reduced.  The sample size by variable is as follows: Net Income N= 55,230, 
Total Depreciation N=1161, Change in Working Capital N= 54,051, CAPEX N= 
1,161, and ultimately, FCF N= 1,044.  From the information, it was determined that 
calculation problems existed within the Total Depreciation variable and CAPEX.   
Improper values were handled in the CAPEX variable by changing the value 
within the database from system missing to zero, as it was possible for firms not to 
have reported their old capital assets and new capital assets, which were the 
underlying variables used for the calculation.  System missing values were replaced in 
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both variables with zero, and the most likely cause was user input error by the ACH 
filing the MCR.  No attempt was  made to recreate the system missing data, as 
underlying variables necessary for recreation were unavailable.  The adjusted 
variables were used to create a new CAPEX calculation with an N= 55,582.  Any new 
CAPEX values that remained with a negative number were removed, as negative 
CAPEX values were unlikely due to ACHs’ competition via quality driving capital 
expenditures.  In addition, replacement of at least some of the capital equipment is 
necessary by each ACH every year.  Thus, negative values were viewed as 
implausible.   
Total Depreciation, with an N = 1161, was analyzed along with its underlying 
four variables.  The variables were as follows: depreciation of old capital related cost 
building and fixtures, depreciation of old capital related cost movable equipment, 
depreciation of new capital related cost build and fixtures, and depreciation new 
capital related cost movable equipment.  In all cases, zero replaced the system missing 
denoted values.  Missing values were assumed to be missing as a result of user error 
in reporting, as all ACHs have long-term assets and would have some depreciation 
expense.  Post-correction to the underlying variables of  Total Depreciation, N= 
55,582.   
All negative values were removed and counted as system missing in the data, 
as a negative Total Depreciation value is not possible.   These were removed rather 
than placing a zero for depreciation, because ACHs have large assets in place, and it 
is unlikely for an ACH to have zero depreciation within a year.  Therefore, to rule out 
any error this might bring into the research, these were removed. Net Income as a 
variable also was corrected, and any system-missing values were replaced by zero.   
Limitations with the calculation of free cash flows were presented by missing 
data within the MCR, specifically total depreciation and capex.  Very few firms’ cases 
reported total depreciation or capital expenditures.  The cases where total depreciation 
was unavailable cause the free cash flows to be understated, while in the cases where 
capital expenditures were unavailable cause the free cash flows variable to be 
overstated.  As both variables were unavailable for the majority of cases within the 
MCR it is likely that free cash flows on a whole are slightly understated as ACHs 
have many assets in place and carry a large proportion of accumulated depreciation on 
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their balance sheets.  It is more likely that total depreciation expense would slightly 
exceed total capex each year, therefore the slight understatement of free cash flows. 
 
 Table 4.3: Variable Categories and Definitions for Cost of Free Cash Flow Analysis:  
The table provides names of variables used in the Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow 
regressions.  Definitions are the calculations used to generate the variable.  With the 
exception of Fiscal Year, all variables were calculated.  Additional information on the variables 
included in Chapter 4 is included in the Appendix, including name, nomenclature, if the 




Variables used in Agency Cost of Free Cash Flows Analysis
Variable Category Actual Variable Definition
Cash Flows
Free Cash Flows net income = (amort/depreciation) - changes in working capital - capex
% Gov Bus % Gov Bus CMS patient days /Total In/Out patient days
Size
Size Category Only sizes 1-4 out of the 5 categories were utilized
LnTA Natural Log of Total Assets
Time
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Reported
Inflation
Consumer Price Index Consumer Price Index for Hospitals 1996-2007
Capital Expenditures
Capex Change in capital assets between time (t) and (t + 1)
Change in Fixed Assets FA- Prev_Yr_FA
Leverage
Leverage Total Longterm Liabilities/Total Assets
Leverage_2 Leverage ( non-negative value)
Debt/Equity Total Debt /Equity
Debt Ratio Total Liabilities/ Total Assets
Cost of Capital
CCProxy total interest expense/ total long-term liabilities
Profitability




Table 4.4:  Correlation Matrix for Agency Cost FCF Variables in Regression:   
From the correlation matrix we can see that the primary independent variable %Gov_Bus has 
a small positive correlation with the dependent variable Free Cash Flows (FCF).  This is 
unexpected.  If this holds true after the regression analysis, it could contribute to a lack of 
evidence of agency cost of free cash flows.  The binary for hospital size shows that for the 
most part FCF are negatively correlated, the only exception being Hosp_Size 1.  This 
suggests that small hospitals have more FCF.  While this may seem significant. this may be 
due to the fact that larger hospitals are investing more in Capex therefore taking on more debt 
and thus using more cash flows to pay for debt service. Capex supports this as it positively 
correlates with the binary variables representing the larger hospital sizes 3-5 and it is also 
positively correlates with the natural log of total assets.  As expected net margin is positively 
correlated with FCF.  A more detailed discussion regarding the matrix can be found in the 
text. 
 
Table 4.5 Statistical Descriptives of Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow Variables:  
All outliers and extremes have been removed from each variable.   Hosp_Size variables are 
binary so no descritives are presented other than sample size.  All variables considered have 
a large sample size except for the CC proxy with 29k cases.  Missing cases with the data set 
limits the regressions by only allowing cases with all variables present to be included within 
the analysis.  Therefore, cases that do not contain all variables are omitted.  All statistical 
descriptives presented for the variables above are considered within acceptable values.   
Size - (LnTA) & (Hospital Size _1-4):  The natural log of total assets was 
used as a control for size.  This follows previous research in which size was seen as a 
Free Cash Flow %Gov_Bus Hosp_Size 1 Hosp_Size 2 Hosp_Size 3 Hosp_Size 4 Hosp_Size 5 LnTA Fiscal Year CPI 96_07 Capex Change FA Leverage CC Proxy Net_Margin
Free Cash Flow 1.0000
%Gov_Bus 0.0566 1.0000
Hosp_Size 1 0.1095 0.2976 1.0000
Hosp_Size 2 -0.0561 -0.1568 -0.7620 1.0000
Hosp_Size 3 -0.0793 -0.2004 -0.3931 -0.2472 1.0000
Hosp_Size 4 -0.0253 -0.0885 -0.1317 -0.0828 -0.0427 1.0000
Hosp_Size 5 -0.0047 -0.0265 -0.0342 -0.0215 -0.0111 -0.0037 1.0000
LnTa -0.1582 -0.3948 -0.6978 0.3882 0.4355 0.2161 0.0714 1.0000
Fiscal Year 0.0369 -0.0195 0.0586 -0.0335 -0.0336 -0.0274 0.0113 0.0836 1.0000
CPI 96_07 0.0392 -0.0130 0.0566 -0.0343 -0.0302 -0.0237 0.0092 0.0800 0.9822 1.0000
Capex 2 -0.1832 -0.2219 -0.3500 0.0912 0.2902 0.2960 0.1516 0.4766 -0.0140 -0.0089 1.0000
Change in FA -0.0013 -0.0069 0.0047 -0.0035 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0095 0.0107 -0.0009 1.0000
Leverage -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0050 -0.0038 -0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0661 -0.0046 -0.0049 -0.0019 0.0000 1.0000
CC Proxy 0.0047 -0.0116 -0.0077 0.0108 -0.0033 -0.0013 -0.0007 0.0041 -0.0058 -0.0075 -0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0002 1.0000
Net Margin 0.0535 -0.0325 -0.0310 0.0139 0.0236 0.0123 0.0002 0.1048 -0.0090 -0.0009 0.0530 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0002 1.0000
Variable n Mean Median Std Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis
Free Cash Flow 43247 1538100 549163 12217600 68423446 0.1480 0.7520
%Gov_Bus 48910 0.6575 0.6728 0.14678 0.7500 -0.3680 -0.3520
Hosp_Size 1 28753 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Hosp_Size 2 16904 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Hosp_Size 3 7878 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Hosp_Size 4 1843 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Hosp_Size 5 148 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Fiscal Year 55582 2001.03 2001 3.3510 12 0.0000 -1.1830
CPI 96_07 54453 130.6652 123.6000 25.5940 83.5500 0.3900 -1.2090
Capex 2 37668 2601800 1305600 3005130 12348490 1.4150 1.1210
Change in FA 54188 30982.77 0.0000 7725930 1910000000 231.224 53725.778
Leverage 45109 0.3058 0.2838 0.22741 1.3300 0.5090 -0.0170
CC Proxy 29546 0.0364 0.0323 0.04145 0.8200 8.4860 108.107
Net Margin 51471 0.0093 0.0200 0.06171 0.8900 -3.4670 24.9660
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modifying factor in the agency attributes and unit characteristics.  In particular, the 
size variable takes into account the production capability of the ACH when looking at 
FCFs in relation to %Gov_Bus.  Total Assets is a variable provided within the MCR. 
In addition, a binary variable was created from the size categories described in 
Chapter 3.  Hospital Size_1-4 was a categorical binary set of dummy variables used to 
differentiate the size of the ACH by physical size.  Category 5 was excluded from the 
binary set so as to avoid over-fitting the model.  A value of one was given to cases 
that were in the size category, and a zero given to those cases not in the category.  
This variable allowed the research to take into account the size of the ACH by bed 
size.   The size should be positively correlated to free cash flows, as FCF is the actual 
value of free cash flows.  One would expect that larger ACHs generate larger free 
cash flows.  The positive correlation of size and free cash flows however is not 
supported by the correlation matrix in Table 4.3.  In all instances of the size variable 
except hospital size one; there is a slight negative correlation with FCF.  This is most 
likely due to inefficient use of assets to generate FCF.  However, no variable is 
included in the regression that takes this into account.  The correlation of these 
variables may be distorted by underlying variables, which would only come to light in 
the regression when additional control variables are considered.  There is a limitation 
in using a binary size variable based upon bed size, as licensed beds listed within the 
MCR may not accurately indicate the actual numbers of beds in service to produce 
revenues.  However this is compensated as ACHs can quickly put these beds in to 
operations should demand require it. 
Time - (Fiscal Year):  The fiscal year was the control for time and was used 
to reduce temporal effects within the model caused by time.  The expectation was that 
this variable in the study would correlate positively with the dependent variable FCF, 
and should increase due to the inflation of reimbursement and the inflation of 
healthcare cost over the course of this study.  This relationship is supported by initial 
evidence in Table 4.3.   
  However, time is a linear construct, and its inclusion within the model did 
not completely account for inflation, so a Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflator was 
also used.  The CPI control, while increasing, does not increase at the same rate each 
year, and thus is a better control for inflation within the model, as inflation is a non-
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linear construct.  The combination of time and CPI should work in tandem with the 
model to improve explanatory power  
Inflation (CPI):  The CPI for hospital services was used to control for 
inflation within the model, and was only available from 1996 onward.  All regression 
with CPI as a control was limited to 1996-2007 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2009).  Inflation is an important variable to be considered within this research as 
healthcare inflation has increased at a greater rate for healthcare services than that of 
inflation for general products in the U.S. Economy (Jonas, 2007).This variable should 
correlate positively with the dependent variable of FCF, as the CPI for hospital 
services increases year on year.  This relationship has initial confirmation via the 
correlation matrix in Table 4.3., where there is a slight positive correlation of 0.0369. 
While the CPI control variable controls for inflation, it should increase at a non-linear 
rate each year, corresponding to the increases in the FCF due to inflation.   
Capital expense - (CAPEX), (Change in FA):   CAPEX and change in fixed 
assets (FA) were used as the control mechanisms for the uses of free cash flow and 
leverage in acquiring assets. Increases in CAPEX and positive changes in FA can lead 
to increases in leverage.  The FCFs used for acquiring new assets caused FCFs to 
decrease.  This allowed the model to account for ACH free cash flow in light of 
capital spending.  CAPEX is a calculated variable that represents the change between 
capital assets at time (t) and capital assets at time (t -1).  Change in FA is a calculated 
variable created using the change in Fixed Assets from the previous year.   CAPEX 
should deliver a negative relationship with free cash flows overall, because the 
calculation of FCF removes CAPEX, so as CAPEX increases, the FCF should 
decrease.  This relationship is initially confirmed by the relationship in Table 4.3, 
however this relationship may change in the regression due to the presence of other 
control variables.  The use of this variable is somewhat compromised and limited by 
the number of ACHs, which recorded total capital expenditures.  So Change in FA is 
expected to provide a better estimator as fewer cases will need to be ommitted. 
Leverage - (Leverage2): Leverage was used to control for size of debt in 
relation to the assets in place of the institution.  Controlling for leverage takes into 
account how differences in ACHs capital structures affect FCF.  For instance the 
greater the leverage the less FCF as FCF must be used to pay for debt coverage and 
therefore would reduce the amount of FCFs.  Leverage is one of the key 
133 
 
considerations in the agency model as it is proposed that the government seeks to 
control overinvestment in healthcare by reducing FCF which , as suggest by Calem 
and Rizzo 1995, would reduce access to debt markets and thus reduce the leverage of 
the ACH.  Leverage_2 was calculated as Total Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets.  
Leverage in the study was defined to be a non-negative number, so any negative 
values were omitted from the study.  Leverage was expected to have a negative 
correlation to the FCF, as the FCF is derived after cash flows have been used to 
service debt obligations. Therefore, as leverage increases, the amount of cash flow 
utilized to service debt increases, reducing the amount of FCF.   
Cost of Capital- (CCProxy):  CCProxy was used in the study to control for 
the cost of capital associated with the amount of debt used by ACHs.  The study 
assumed that firms with similar debt sizes would differentiate themselves in free cash 
flows due to the different costs of capital associated with the debt.  The addition of a 
cost of capital proxy extends the role of the leverage variable in explaining FCFs of 
ACHs as ACHs with higher cost of capital would incur greater interest fees associated 
with a given level of debt.  Inclusion of this variable allows the model to consider all 
levels of credit for ACHs.   A proxy was created by taking the total interest expense as 
a ratio to total long-term liabilities. The proxy actually measured the cost of debt for 
the ACH; however, the cost of debt and the cost of capital were correlated positively, 
which allows the use of cost of debt as the proxy.  In addition, ACHs are leveraged 
heavily; therefore, the bulk of their capital funding is via debt.  By measuring the cost 
of debt, the model accounted for a great portion of the cost of capital.  Limitation in 
the use of this proxy was the possibility that some of the long-term liabilities carried 
on the balance sheet did not require interest to be paid.  In cases where this was true, it 
caused the cost of capital to be understated.  One would expect that similar to 
leverage, the cost of capital would correlate negatively to FCF.  The basis for this is 
that the FCF is computed after payments for servicing debt.   
Profitability - (Net Margin):  Net Margin was used as a control within the 
study to take into account the variability of generating FCF.   Net Margin is an 
important variable as it indicates the size of net income in comparison to total 
revenues.  Net income is the primary variable in the calculation of FCF.  As is such 
net income the primary driver in the Net Margin ratio, affects the ability to generate 
FCF.  Net Margin is meant to provide a control for the variance in production of Net 
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Margin and consequently FCF of ACHs.   Net Margin should correlate positively with 
the FCF in the model, because an ACH that is more profitable should generate more 
free cash flows.  One might be concerned that Net Margin and FCF are endogenous; 
however, the correlation matrix in Table 4.3 indicates that Net Margin and FCF are 
only slightly positively correlated.  Net Margin was calculated by taking the net 
income/total revenue. 
Additional information on the variables included in Chapter 4 is included in 
the Appendix, including name, nomenclature, if the variable was provided or 
calculated, outliers and definition. 
  
4.4  Models 
4.4.1 Overview 
Two panel data regression models to test for the presence of agency effects in 
the presence of the principal-agent relationship were proposed.   As discussed 
previously, this research looked at two separate agency relationship effects:  1) 
signaling via debt; and 2) agency cost of free cash flows.  Through these two effects, 
the research searched for the presence of agency within the ACH market and the 
relationship of agency and capital structure.   
 
4.4.2  Signalling 
The premise of signaling within the ACH market put forth within this research 
would suggest that signaling is present if the amount of leverage that an ACH carries 
positively correlates with the  percentage of government business present for that 
ACH.  In other words, the act of signaling with increased leverage shows better 
compliance and greater prudence by management of ACHs due to third-party 
monitoring; thus, we would expect a positive correlation of leverage and the 
percentage of government business, as government would choose more 









Hypothesis 4-1: Signaling Hypothesis 
                               
                                                       
 
                                                                  
 
       
                                                                 
                                                              
 
We reject the null hypothesis if a significantly positive relation is found between 
%Gov_Bus and Leverage... ( ) is positive. 
 
Signaling was analyzed via the following relationship in Equation 4-1: 
 
 
Equation 4-1: Signaling Equation 
                                                         
                                      
 
The model consists of conducting a random effects panel data regression on 13 
years of ACH financial data to provide evidence of signaling. Random effects allow 
the regression coefficient to be driven by variation over time within each ACH.  The 
signaling equation examines the relationship between the percentage of revenues 
derived from government payors (%Gov_Bus) and the amount of debt of the ACH 
(Leverage). The equation contains no instrumental variables. 
The primary dependent variable %Gov_Bus denotes the amount of business of 
an ACH consumed by the government as a percentage of total business measured in 
patient days.   Leverage is represented by one of the leverage ratios discussed in 
Section 4.3.2.1.  The primary independent variable leverage ratio alternates between 
Leverage, Leverage_2 (non-negative leverage), Debt to Equity, and the Debt Ratio.  
The alternation of the leverage variable allows for different calculations of leverage to 
be considered within the research.   A dispersion of leverage may be caused by 
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changes in capital expenditure policy of the ACH, free cash flows, growth rate, bank 
covenants, and market opportunity. 
All of the control variables have been included to capture the operating 
characteristics of the ACH.  Profitability is defined in Section 4.3.2.1 as the net 
margin of the ACH (net income/sales). The inclusion of profitability is to control for 
profitability of the ACH in the model, as fluctuations in profitability may affect the 
ability of the ACH to leverage, and the government may seek more profitable or less 
profitable ACHs depending on policy.  Dispersion of the profitability variable may be 
caused by reimbursement, patient volume, operating costs, changes in tax policy, 
patient mix, and payor mix.  Cash flows denote cash flows of the ACH.  Cash flows 
are defined as free cash flows + capex; as such, any changes in either underlying 
variable will cause dispersion.  The variable of Cash flows is to control for free cash 
flows of the ACH and account for capex.  Excess cash flows may lead to investment 
in negative NPV projects. Liquidity denotes the liquidity of the ACH-measured ratio 
of current assets to total assets.  Liquidity affects capex capability of the ACH, which 
affects leverage.  The government may consider ACHs with greater liquidity more 
likely to invest in negative NPV projects.  Variance or dispersion of the liquidity 
variable may be caused by any changes in current assets or total assets.  Size denotes 
the size of the ACH, represented as the natural log of total assets of the ACH.  Time 
denotes the annual period of the study, represented as the fiscal year reported of the 
CMS cost report.  
  denotes the error term.  In this case, the error term is comprised of issues 
such as the national budget for CMS, the patient mix (the acuity of patients), aging of 
the population (older people require more ACH services), health policy shifts, and 
changes to the geometric length of stay.   
 
4.4.3  Agency Cost of Free Cash Flows (FCF): 
This research suggests that the presence of agency cost of free cash flows in 
the U.S. healthcare market is between the government (principal) and ACHs (agent).  
The research has suggested that the government is trying to limit overinvestment by 
the ACHs, compensate for an inability to monitor the agents output and thus a 
inability to form a complete contract due to the market structure, by  reducing 
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reimbursement to ACHs.  While some may suggest that, the lower reimbursement for 
healthcare services has nothing to do with agency problems, but is merely just a 
typical market behavior where the consumer wants to achieve the best price. In this 
case, the government just wants the best price for purchased services.  However, 
evidence suggests that the government is trying  to solve issues of agency through its 
reimbursement strategies (Eldridge and Palmer 2008; McLean 1989; Lee and Zenios 
2007;Schneider and Mathios 2006; Conrad and Perry 2009; Melnick 1999). Evidence 
of this is provided by changes in reimbursement, post the time frame of this study 
(2008). 
6
  Examples include evidence based reimbursement to pay for outcomes based 
upon quality of care, avoidance of perverse incentives to avoid unintended 
consequences for ACHs, and to increase transparency in the delivery of care that will 
improve quality that leads to moderate cost growth (Trude et.al, 2006, Rosenthal, 
2007, Diamond and Kaul, 2009).   
 Therefore, if we assume that the government is trying to control for agency 
problems via its reimbursement strategy we would expect that as the level of 
consumption by the government of health services for an individual hospital 
increases, the less free cash flows available to ACH, thereby limiting overinvestment 
by the restriction in free cash flows.  It is from this premise that Hypothesis 4-2 is 
derived.  The null hypothesis is that there is no significant relation between the 
amount of government business and the free cash flows of an ACH, or there is a 
significant positive relation between the amount of government business and an 
ACHs free cash flows. However, if there is a significant negative relationship between 
the percentage of government business and the free cash flows of ACHs, then the null 
hypothesis in Hypothesis 4-2 can be rejected, providing evidence of agency cost of 
free cash flows. 
 
 




 Congress order the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 20005, (which runs CMS) to 
change reimbursement methodologies to reduce perverse incentives for ACHs which caused increased 
cost of healthcare due to poor delivery which included preventable secondary health conditions created 








Hypothesis 4-2: Agency Cost of Free Cash Flows 
 
                                    
                                                            
 
                                 
                                    
 
                                                         
 
        
                                                       
 
We can reject the null hypothesis if we find a statistically significant negative 
relationship existing between the FCF and % Gov_Bus... (  ) is negative in 
Equation 4-2. 
Agency cost of free cash flow was analyzed by observing the following linear 
regression model expressed in Equation 4-2: 
 
Equation 4-2: Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow 
 
                                                   
                                                     
                         
 
The linear regression model present in Equation 4-2, above, is used to analyze 
the correlation and magnitude of such between free cash flows and the percentage of 
government business while taking into account inflation, capital expenditures, the 
debt of the ACH, the cost of capital paid on such outstanding debt, the profitability of 
the ACH, the size of the ACH, and any effect time might have on the model.  The 
model consist of a random effects panel data regression on 13 years of ACHs’ 
financial data to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the presence of 
agency cost of free cash flows.  The model examines the relationship of ACH free 
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cash flows and the percentage of government business (%Gov_Bus).  The regression 
contains no instrumental variables.   
The dependent variable free cash flows denotes the amount of free cash flows 
for the ACH using the definition provides in Section 4.3.2.1.  The primary 
independent variable %Gov_Bus represents the percentage of government business of 
an ACH’s total revenue measured in patient days.  Dispersion of the primary 
independent variable can be caused by policy shifts, reimbursement changes for 
procedures, changes in the GMLOS (geometric length of stay), and/or variation in the 
acuity of patients covered by government programs. 
All of the control variables included within the regression are included to 
provide controls for the operating and financial characteristics of the ACH.   Inflation 
is represented by use of the CPI for health services and is included in the regression to 
correct for changes in both reimbursement and free cash flows that may be derived 
from inflationary influences.  A capital expenditure variable is included to provided 
control for capex policies and trends within the ACH, as these influence the FCF of 
the ACH.  Leverage was included within the model to control for the use of external 
debt financing.  As the debt of an ACH increases, more of the ACHs cash flows are 
used to support repayment of principal and interest.  This is combined with a proxy 
for the cost of capital.  Cost of capital proxy is included to control for variation in 
FCFs due to higher or lower cost of debt.  A definition for the cost of capital proxy 
can be found in Section 4.3.2.1.   
Profitability of the ACH has an influence on the amount of FCF, as ACHs 
with higher profitability normally have higher free cash flows.  Profitability has been 
defined in the previous section on signaling as well as in Section 4.3.2.1.  Size is 
controlled for in the model, as larger ACHs usually have larger FCFs, and vice versa.  
Size is controlled for using a binary categorical variable with the five categories used 
in Chapter 3.  Time is controlled for using the fiscal year in which the financials were 
filed.   
  (the error term) is comprised of issues such as volume of patient, physician 
practice patterns (some physicians order more test than others), cost of labor and 
efficiency of the ACH with its assets and its human capital, acuity of the patients in 
any given year, and external pricing pressures by the open market. In light of agency 
theory, one would expect a negative correlation between the percentage of 
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government business (%Gov_Bus) and the FCF, given the control variables.  In other 
words, more government business would harm the amount free cash flows an ACH 
would be able to generate.  The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship or a 




4.5.1  Signalling: 
Several variations of the model were built based on the different definitions of 
Leverage that were discussed earlier and the number of control variables.  All 
regressions were performed at the 95% confidence level.  No outliers were removed, 
except in the utilization of leverage_2, which removed all negative values for the 






















Table 4.3: Signaling Models:   
All models are random effects panel regression covering 13 years (1995-2007).   All 
significant P-values for leverage are denoted by an asterisk prior to the P-Value ( * denotes 
10% significance, ** 5%, and *** 1%). Three out of eight models proved significant for the 
variable representing leverage.  In all models where the primary independent variable 
representing leverage is significant, the coefficient is negative, which does not allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis.  Therefore, no evidence of signaling was found.  All regressions 
have been scaled by 1,000,000.
 
4.5.1.1 Interpretation of Signalling Results 
All the models controlled for size, time, and profitability.  Different 
specifications controlled for liquidity effects using either operational cash flows or 
liquidity in the models.  The independent variable variously was leverage, leverage2, 
the debt ratio, or the debt/equity ratio. 
All models were statistically significant at the 95 percent level, with p-values 
of 0.000 and F values between 1917 and 2514. The for all models was small 
because signaling itself only explains a small portion of the overall relationship 
Signalling Model (1-4) Model 1 P Value Model 2 P Value Model 3 P Value Model 4 P Value
N 38761 31888 38273 31462
Dependent Variable 
% Gov_Bus % Gov_Bus % Gov_Bus % Gov_Bus
Independent Variables
Leverage -5.09E-09 0.167 -1.25E-09 0.745
Leverage 2 -6.80E-09 * 0.092 -2.59E-09 0.542
Debt Ratio
Debt/ Equity
Net Margin 1.63E-08 0.189 3.53E-08 ** 0.025 1.84E-08 0.144 3.82E-08 ** 0.017
OCF -1.72E-17 0.606 -9.96E-18 0.767
Liduidity -1.48E-08 *** 0.007 -1.45E-08 ** 0.01
LnTA -2.10E-08 *** 0.001 -2.33E-08 *** 0.000 -2.12E-08 *** 0.000 -2.37E-08 *** 0.000
Fiscal Year -7.15E-10 *** 0.000 -4.88E-10 ** 0.03 -7.60E-10 *** 0.000 -5.53E-10 ** 0.015
Within 0.003 0.001 0.0033 0.002
Between 0.177 0.173 0.178 0.175
Overall 0.197 0.166 0.197 0.166
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Signalling Model (5-8) Model 5 P Value Model 6 P Value Model 7 P Value Model 8 P Value
N 43909 37052 36145 30229
Dependent Variable 




Debt Ratio -8.62E-09 *** 0.000 5.84E-09 ** 0.015
Debt/ Equity 3.27E-10 0.366 5.03E-10 0.694
Net Margin 2.25E-08 **.040 2.65E-08 ** 0.043 1.78E-08 * 0.055 2.48E-08 * 0.089
OCF -5.31E-18 0.867 7.38E-18 0.826
Liduidity -1.60E-08 *** 0.001 1.47E-08 * 0.055
LnTA -2.04E-08 *** 0.000 -1.68E-08 *** 0.000 -2.22E-08 *** 0.000 -2.22E-08 *** 0.000
Fiscal Year -5.77E-10 0.004 -6.74E-10 ** .003 -2.54E-11 ** 0.025 1.15E-10 0.621
Within 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.000
Between 0.173 0.162 0.174 0.162
Overall 0.185 0.149 0.193 0.156
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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between government business and the amount of leverage of ACHs.    The debt 
variable was significant in Models 3, 5, and 6, with p-values ranging from 0.000 to 
0.092.  Where debt was significant, the coefficients were negative.  On the other hand, 
the liquidity variable was the better control compared to operational cash flows 
(OCF), which was insignificant in all of the models.  In models in which only the 
liquidity variable was changed,  was lower for operational cash flows.   Although 
Models 3, 5, and 6 were significant for the primary independent explanatory variable, 
the negative beta for Leverage did not allow us to reject the null hypothesis.  
Therefore, no evidence of signaling was found. 
In all of the cases where the Leverage was significant, the explanatory variable 
was negative.  This suggested a very small negative relationship with % Gov_Bus.  
Although not in line with the signaling hypothesis put forward within this research, 
these findings were consistent with that of Calem and Rizzo (1995), suggesting that 
agency costs of debt may limit investment when firms depend on the availability of 
internal funds.   In this case, ACHs may be restricted in their access to debt markets 
by reduced FCFs. In other words, the liquidity of the firm is determining access to 
debt markets because the FCF must be promised in the future to service debt.  Calem 
and Rizzo (1995) suggested that limits on payments to ACHs affect liquidity, and thus 
limit their ability to acquire financing.  There is an additional possibility that ACHs 
are using the stability in cash flows from government to replace investments 
purchased via debt by using pay-as-you-go strategies utilizing excess free cash flows.  
However, if there is evidence of agency cost of FCFs, this would be unlikely. 
Further research on signaling theory is suggested, as other factors may have 
affected the results. Other distortions within the data or other countermanding forces 
within the market that are not accounted for within this study may be restricting 
signaling, such as noisy or inconsistent data, which was unrecognized and 
unaccounted for in the data preparation or the methodologies used in the signaling 
models.  There also may be variables that would have improved the regression results, 
but were either unavailable or unknown.  Measurement errors or human mistakes 
entering the data by CMS also could have skewed the results.  In addition, agency 
cost of free cash flows may be interfering with the ACHs’ ability to signal, as 




4.5.2  Agency Cost of Free Cash Flows 
Several different models were used in order to take into account the different 
explanatory power of the primary independent, dependent, and the control variables. 
Random effects linear regression was utilized to examine the relationship of FCF to 
%Gov_Bus for each model.  All the control variables account for size, time, and 
inflation.  Other control variables were added in subsequent models.   
Eight different specifications of the model were used to provide evidence of 
the agency cost of free cash flows.   The core model, which accounts for the primary 
independent variable, % Gov_Bus,  also controlled for size and time.  Seven 
additional control variables were added on the core model.  Each subsequent control 
variable was added one at a time into the model, creating a total of eight models 
overall.  All eight models removed the outliers for the FCF, the dependent variable.  
The approximate (n) for all eight models ranged from 33,324 on the low end to 
38,860 on the high end.  Total (N) for the population was 55,582.  Losses of cases 
were the result of system missing values within the dependent, independent, and 
control variables.  The majority of cases were lost due to the removal of outliers for 
the FCF.   As control variables were included, the (n) for those models dropped as a 
result of system missing data.   
The results of the models are presented in Table 4.4. The models were ordered 
by the number of control variables used in the first model, and additional control 
variables were added in each subsequent model.  The primary driver for adding 
additional control variables was to increase the explanatory power of the model.  Each 
variable added additional explanatory power as the increased with each model, 












Table 4.4: Agency Cost of FCF Models:  
Random effects regressions with standard errors are corrected for clustering.  All significant 
p-values for the primary independent variable % Gov_Bus are denoted by the grey shaded 
fields.  Regressions have been scaled by 1,000,000. 
 
 
4.5.2.1 Interpretation of agency cost of free cash flow models 
All eight models were found to be significant at the 95% confidence level.  
Models 4 through 8 were significant for the primary independent variable % 
Gov_Bus.  The time period used was shortened for Models 4 through 8, as the CPI 
N 38860 37906 37906 33916
Dependent Variable FCF FCF FCF FCF
Independent Variables
% Gov_ Bus 0.223053 0.657 0.091947 0.857 -0.554022 0.271 -0.953518 * 0.084
Ln TA -1.245335 *** 0.000 -1.246793 *** 0.000 -0.684044 *** 0.000 -0.814541 *** 0.000
Fiscal Year 0.196422 *** 0.000 -0.004685 0.964 -0.123997 0.225 -0.235225 ** 0.032
CPI 0.028555 ** 0.042 0.041239 *** 0.003 0.054491 ***0.000
CAPEX 2 -2.51E-07 *** 0.000 -2.36E-07 *** 0.000
Leverage -1.53E-06 *** 0.000
Net Margin (2)
Change in FA





within 0.004 0.0044 0.0316 0.204
between 0.063 0.063 0.048 0.041
Overall  0.026 0.026 0.041 0.041
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
wald chi2 488.29 489.85 573.73 603.1
Model 5 P Value Model 6 P Value Model 7 P Value Model 8 P Value
N 33546 33324 33324 33324
Dependent Variable FCF FCF FCF FCF
Independent Variables
% Gov_ Bus -1.14844 ** 0.037 -1.16609 ** 0.035 -1.16432 ** 0.036 -1.05869 **  0.055
Ln TA -0.99534 *** 0.000 -0.98471 *** 0.00 -0.98480 *** 0.000 -1.31915 *** 0.000
Fiscal Year -0.01281 0.909 -0.01705 0.880 -0.01763 0.876 0.03257 0.775
CPI 0.02817 * 0.063 0.02840 * 0.062 0.02849 * 0.061 0.02538 **  0.097
CAPEX 2 -2.38E-07 *** 0.000 -2.41E-07 *** 0.000 -2.41E-07 *** 0.000 2.66E-07 *** 0.000
Leverage -1.71E-06 *** 0.000 -1.70E-06 *** 0.000 -1.70E-06 *** 0.000 2.10E-06 ***  0.000
Net Margin (2) 2.09E+01 ***0.000 2.09E+01 *** 0.000 20.93769 *** 0.000 21.64283 *** 0.000
Change in FA -5.08E-09 *** 0.000 -5.08E-09 *** 0.00 4.85E-09 *** 0.000
Cost of Capital Proxy 0.04100 0.114 0.040621 0.113
Hospital Size_1 -11.41172 *** 0.004
Hospital Size_2 -10.58711 *** 0.008
Hospital Size_3 -9.79953 *** 0.014
Hospital Size_4 -5.04388 0.210
within 0.0459 0.0458 0.0458 0.0455
between 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.057
Overall  0.056 0.053 0.053 0.056
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
wald chi2 708.01 710.94 714.29 817.81
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was the limiting control variable, and only the years 1996-2007 were used.  The 
reduction was due to a limitation in the CPI for hospital services; the series lacked 
information for the year 1995.  While the generalized CPI would have been available 
for use in modeling, it was decided that it would be more appropriate to use a CPI for 
hospital services, which allowed a more precise measurement of inflation in relation 
to the cash flows studied.  This meant reducing the period of the study by one year 
when including the inflation variable as a control. Models1, 2, and 3 proved not to be 
significant for the primary independent variable %Gov_Bus. This primarily is driven 
by the lack of explanatory variables within these models.   
Model 1 only controlled for size and time in addition to the primary 
independent variable.  A sample size of 38,860 cases was included in the regression.  
The adjusted for Model 1 was 0.026, or 2.6%.  The control variables for size and 
time remain significant within the model with P-Values of 0.000.   
Model 2 provided an  of 0.026; however, it was not significant for 
%Gov_Bus, the primary independent variable.  Only the natural log of total assets 
remained significant within the model, with a P-Value of 0.000; all other variables 
were insignificant.  Model 2 was insignificant most likely because of the lack of free 
cash flow explanatory variables.  This was confirmed, as the  between Model 1 and 
Model 2 remained unchanged.   
Model 3 added Capex as an explanatory variable to account for capital 
expenditures’ affect upon free cash flows.  Inclusion of this variable increased the  
from 0.026 to  0.041.  The primary independent variable (%Gov_Bus) remained 
insignificant within the model; however, the sign was negative.  The most likely cause 
was the lack of additional explanatory variables for free cash flows in the model. 
Model 4 with an overall  of 0.041 provided the smallest explanatory power 
for a model in which the primary independent variable %Gov_Bus was significant.  
Model 4 controlled for size, time, inflation, capital expenditure, and leverage. The 
%Gov_Bus variable beta coefficient was -0.952518 with a P-value of 0.084, and a 
model significance of 0.000.  The inclusion of leverage as a control variable improved 
the performance of the primary independent variable % Gov_Bus, changing the P-
Value to significant in the process from 0.271 in the previous model, to 0.084 at a 10 
percent significance level.  The negative correlation presented in the beta for 
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%Gov_Bus suggests that there is a negative relationship between FCF and the 
percentage of government business derived by an ACH.   
This model suggested that for every percentage increase in government 
business,  an ACH would lose $953,518 in free cash flows.  This supports the theory 
of agency cost of free cash flows presented within this research.  Natural log of total 
assets (LnTA) was significant as well for the model, with a P-Value of 0.000.  The 
beta presented for LnTA was -0.814541.  The beta presented for LnTA was not in line 
with the expectations of the research.  This suggested that larger ACHs have less free 
cash flows, and that larger hospitals overinvest more than smaller ones.  This follows 
Parrino and Weisbach (1999), who suggested that firms with large FCF and little 
growth opportunities have a greater propensity to overinvest.  This also is in line with 
Nahata (2005) and Glied (2003), who stated that ACHs in highly competitive markets 
spend more on capital investments, and therefore a have lower FCF. Larger hospitals 
would be located in more competitive markets, as they generally are found in larger 
urban centers with multiple hospitals.   
 Fiscal year was significant, with a P-Value of 0.032. It should be noted that 
the beta coefficient was negative, with a value of -0.235224.  This suggested that as 
each year progresses, the FCFs decrease by $235,224.50, which perhaps would 
suggest that reductions in reimbursement over time are having an effect on ACHs.  As 
expected, the variable CPI was significant with a P-Value of 0.000.   The beta value 
of 0.054491 confirmed the positive correlation with the FCFs, as expected.   Capex 
had a negative correlation with the FCFs.  Capex was significant with a P-Value of 
0.000 and a beta of -2.36E-07.  Capex was expected to have a negative relationship, 
and results are in line with expectations, as it should reduce the FCFs.  Leverage was 
significant with a P-value of 0.000, and presented a negative beta of   -1.53E-06.  This 
was also in line with expectations, as an increase in leverage should increase 
borrowing costs, which decreases the FCFs.   
Model 5 increased  to 0.056, an increase of 0.015, or 1.5%. Model 5 
controlled for the same variables as Model 4, plus the additional control variable of 
profitability via the variable Net Margin. The beta for %Gov_Bus variable was -
1.148436 similar to Model 4, and had a P-value of .036.  Model 5 was significant with 
a value of .000.  The large negative beta for %Gov_Bus suggested that for every 
percent increase in government business by an ACH, the ACH experienced a decrease 
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in the FCFs of $1,148,436.  For larger institutions, this may not be of concern; 
however, for smaller ACHs, this presents concern, as they are more susceptible to 
changes in the FCFs (Calem & Rizzo 1995).   
The size variable LnTA remained significant with a P-Value of 0.000, and this 
is consistent with Model 4, as the beta remained largely negative at -0.99534.  This 
continued to suggest that larger ACHs are more likely to overinvest.  This is 
counterintuitive and goes against the initial expectations outlined previously.  Fiscal 
Year was not significant within this model.  The CPI almost was significant in this 
model, with a P-Value of 0.063, and presented a positive beta coefficient, which is in 
line with the expectations.  Capex was significant with a P-Value of 0.000, and a beta 
of -2.38E-07 remained in line with expectations.  Leverage was significant with a P-
Value of 0.000, and presented a beta of -1.71E-06, which was in line with 
expectations and continued to suggest that as leverage increases, borrowing costs 
decrease the FCFs. 
Model 6 was significant for the primary independent explanatory variable, 
%Gov_Bus, with a P-Value of 0.035 and a negative beta of -1.16609.  In this model, 
for every percent change in government business, there was a reduction of $1,166,087 
in the FCFs.  This continued to suggest that government is heavily affecting the FCFs 
of ACH. While adding controls for change in fixed assets in addition to controlling 
for size, time, inflation, capital expenditure, leverage, and profitability, the  
decreased slightly to  0.053.  The decrease in explanatory capability of the model was 
explained by the change in the fixed assets control variable. The variable was 
significant with a P-value of 0.000; however, the change in fixed assets provided less 
explanatory capability when added to the model.  The size variable LnTA remained 
negatively correlated with the FCFs, which continued to support previous models that 
suggested that as ACHs get larger in total assets, this negatively affects FCF.  The 
negative correlation also supported previous concerns of overinvestment or 
investment in negative NPV projects.  In other words, while ACHs may be adding 
additional assets in place, they are not efficient at producing FCFs.  This lack of 
inefficient use of assets in place suggests that concerns of overinvestment and 
investment in allocative inefficient services are valid.   
Model 7 added cost of capital to the control variables.   The cost of capital 
variable was not significant, with a P-value of 0.114, and does not improve the 
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explanatory power of the model.  The  remained at 0.053 and was significant at 
0.000.  The primary independent variable %Gov_Bus had a value -1.16432 and a P-
value of 0.036.  For every increase in the percentage of government business, an ACH 
experienced a decrease in FCFs of $1,164,322.  These results continued to support the 
presence of agency costs of free cash flows within the U.S. healthcare market.   The 
lack of change in the  was due to the insignificance of cost of capital to the model.  
The LnTA was significant, with a P-Value of 0.000, and continued to support 
negative correlation with the FCFs with a beta of -0.98480.  This beta continued to 
suggest that increases in total assets negatively affect FCFs.  Overinvestment by 
ACHs and investment in negative NPV projects or allocative inefficient services has 
been suggested as the underlying cause for agency cost of free cash flows,  and these 
results confirmed the premise that larger hospitals overinvest more than smaller ones..   
Model 8 added four binary variables to control for size.  While five categories 
were discussed in Chapter 3, only four binaries were included to minimize over-fitting 
the model (n-1).  The model presented an overall  which was computed at 0.056, 
and %Gov_Bus was  significant, with a P-Value of 0.018, and a negative beta 
coefficient of -1.05869   For every 1% increase in the percentage of government 
business, free cash flows decreased by $1,058,690.00.  The LnTA remained 
significant within the model, with a P-Value of 0.000.  The coefficient for the LnTA 
was highly negative at -1.1915.  The beta value continued to support the 
overinvestment problems of larger ACHs, or ACHs investing in negative NPV 
projects.   
If this is compared with the other size variable in this regression, 
Hospital_Size 2-5, which provided a large negative correlation with the FCFs as well, 
one sees that hospital bed size is suggesting that larger hospitals have less free cash 
flows.  This would further reinforce the results from obtained via LnTA, which 
suggest that larger hospitals overinvestment more and invest in allocative inefficient 
services, which adds to lower free cash flows.  The evidence that LnTA correlates 
with bed size and the FCF further supports the overinvestment problem.  This 
evidence, along with %Gov_Bus negative correlation with the FCFs, further supports 
agency cost of free cash flow within the healthcare market.  
The  value of all models were low.  In order to ensure against bias due to 
specification error in the estimated coefficients, all data that could be obtained to 
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explain the relationship between percentage of government business and free cash 
flows were included as variables.  Additional explanatory variables that would have 
improved the  values were either not available or non-definable.  In addition, to 
allow for a more efficient model, a random effects panel regression was performed.  
Improvement on the regression performed may be possible with a larger dataset that 
provides greater explanatory variables to be included. 
 
4.6  Conclusions 
The use of agency theory to describe the relationship of payors and providers 
of healthcare is well established by previous literature. 
7
  The research undertaken in 
this chapter sought evidence of agency costs of signaling and agency costs of free 
cash flows that might be a result of reimbursement schemes or schedules used by the 
government insurer, CMS.  Payments have long been known to be used to incentivize 
agents to align the goals of  the agent with those of the principal.  Previous research 
suggests that payment methodologies are used in healthcare to solve agency problems 
created in the principal-agent relationship between payor and provider (Conrad and 
Perry 2009; Melnick et al 1999; Peterson et al 2006).   Alignment of incentives is 
important in healthcare as problems regarding the principal agent relationship are 
acute due to the inability of the insurer to monitor output of the provider (McLean 
1989). 
 By analyzing the principal-agent relationship between the government and 
ACHs, this chapter investigated evidence of signaling and agency cost of free cash 
flows.  Both characteristics of agency costs are suggested to exist as a result of the 
federal government’s need to monitor ACHs and reduce free cash flows under the 
ACHs’ control. The environment in which ACHs operate is skewed by the existence 
of a moral hazard on the part of patients, whereby they are not exposed to the 
consequence of consumption via price, and therefore make choices to consume based 




The use of Agency Theory in healthcare is supported by the previous research of McLean (1989); 
Chalkley and Khalil (2005); Jack (2004); Schneider and Mathios ( 2006); Ryan (1994); and Mooney 
and Ryan (1993). 
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on quality or perceived quality.  The empirical results extend prior research that 
suggested that the presence of moral hazard within the ACH market causes ACHs to 
compete on quality or perceived quality as a result (Glied 2003; Newhouse 1981; 
Nahata 2005).  The presence of the moral hazard within the ACH market is important 
as it creates conditions that lead ACHs to overinvest and take on projects that have a 
negative NPV or are considered allocative inefficient (Pauly et al. 1986; Gaynor et al. 
2000; Wang 1999; Glied 2003; and Nahata 2005).   
Glied (2003) made the case that ACHs make some investments in projects that 
have little or negative economic worth in order to compete via quality or perception of 
quality. Under these conditions, the CMS seeks to monitor ACHs better and therefore 
minimize wasteful overinvestment.  Adding the agency relationship between the CMS 
and ACHs and agency theory indicates the behavioral outcomes of this relationship.  
In Chapter 4, two testable hypotheses—signaling and agency cost of free cash 
flows—were demonstrated.  
The premise of signaling was proposed under the notion that ACHs wish to 
indicate efficiency to government through debt in order to avoid lower reimbursement 
for health services.  Expanding on the premise put forward by Jensen (1986), that debt 
can reduce agency costs by lenders acting as a third-party monitor, this research 
promotes a premise that ACHs seek to signal compliance with the government and to 
signal that ACHs are running efficiently and not choosing negative NPV projects.  
Lenders acting as third-party monitors ensure that ACHs are performing with 
documented financial loan covenants and are able to repay borrowed capital plus 
borrowing costs.    
The premise suggests that ACHs with greater amounts of revenues from 
government payors will want to signal more, and those with less revenue from the 
government will signal less.  The reason for such consideration is that due to its long-
term relationship with ACHs, the government will try to reduce overinvestment and 
other problems with the agency relationship through changes in reimbursement, a 
known methodology used to solve problems of agency and incentivize agent 
behavior(Lee and Zenios 2007; Jack 2004; Eggleston 2005).  These changes in 
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reimbursement usually negatively affect revenues, and consequently free cash flows; 
therefore, ACHs with larger revenue streams at risk will signal more.  
8
 
The testable hypothesis put forward was that the greater the percentage of 
revenues derived from the government, the more ACHs will take on debt to signal 
their compliance with government wishes. Eight linear regression models for 
signaling were created with the percentage of government business as the dependent 
variable, and leverage of the ACH as the primary independent variable.  Additional 
variables controlled for profitability, liquidity, size, and time. 
All eight models were significant, with three of the eight significant for 
leverage.  The significant coefficients for leverage were all negative, indicating a 
negative correlation between government and leverage.  Therefore, the regression 
analysis did not support the signaling premise put forward within this chapter.  There 
was no positive correlation between the amount of debt within ACHs and the 
percentage of government revenues derived by those ACHs.  Therefore, no evidence 
of signaling was found.  The negative correlation may be due to noisy data, or 
signaling may be affected by other countermanding forces within the market that 
prohibit either a desire or capability by ACHs to signal via debt, such as the agency 
cost of free cash flows and or other agency costs. 
The second premise in this chapter was that agency cost of free cash flow is 
suggested to exist because the government, acting as the principal, wishes to reduce 
free cash flows to ACHs in order to inhibit overinvestment or investment in allocative 
inefficient services, as well as other abhorrent agent activity.  The research indicated 
that ACHs are overinvesting due to the presence of moral hazard within the ACH 
market, which causes ACHs to compete on quality.  The government, seeking to 
reduce free cash flows, lowers reimbursements to ACHs, and thus controls the 
overinvestment and other agency problems (Peterson et al 2006; Melnick et at 1989; 
Conrad and Perry 2009; and Mclean 1989).  The argument was constructed using the 




 Penalties have been shown to be more effective in curbing abhorrent agency behavior than 
bonuses or additional payments (Conrad and Perry 2009; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Town et al 
2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1986). 
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premise that the more ACHs derive their revenues from government payors, the lower 
the free cash flows of the ACH.   
The testable hypothesis was that there is a significant negative correlation 
between the percentage of government business and the ACHs’ free cash flows.  Eight 
regression models were created, with ACH free cash flows as the dependent variable, 
and percentage of government business as the primary independent variable.  
Additional control variables were size, time, CPI, capital expenditure, leverage, 
profitability, and cost of capital. Size was controlled via two variables: natural log of 
total assets, and four binary variables accounting for hospital bed size. 
All eight models were significant; however, only five of the eight were 
significant for the primary independent variable Percentage of Government Business.  
In all cases of significance, the beta coefficient for %Gov_Bus was highly negative, 
suggesting that for every percentage change increase in government business, free 
cash flows are likely to suffer anywhere from $953,518 to $1,164,322.  The results 
supported the presence of agency cost of free cash flows in the ACH market. 
Additionally, analyzing the regression models for agency cost of free cash 
flows showed that the beta coefficient for the variable for natural log of total assets 
was significant and highly negative.  The negative correlation of assets and free cash 
flows would suggest underperforming or inefficient assets.  Typical assets are a 
measurement of the production capability of a firm to produce revenues, and 
consequently free cash flows, and thus correlate positively; the greater the assets in 
place, the greater the revenues.  The evidence in the regression models suggested the 
presence in larger firms of overinvestment and/or investment in allocative inefficient 
services .  This confirmed the research of overinvestment and inefficiency (Pauly et 
al. 1986
9




; and Glied 2003
12
). 




 Pauly (1986) argued that large inefficiencies in healthcare were driven by tax subsidies, which 
cause more insurance to be acquired.  The presence of more insurance within the market removed the 
consequence of consumption for patients as well as created perverse incentives for providers, which led 




The empirical results provided evidence to supports agency cost of free cash 
flows, as five out of eight of the agency cost of free cash flow models showed 
significance.   The negative beta demonstrated an inverse relationship between free 
cash flows and government business.  The results indicated that as an ACH increased 
the percentage of business derived from government sources, the lower its free cash 
flows were.  These limitations placed upon the free cash flows of the ACHs have an 
adverse effect upon their capital structures.  As ACHs have less free cash flows, the 
choices of capital structure become limited, as their access to debt markets is 
restricted.  This restriction of free cash flows and limitation of access to debt markets 
causes managers to become dependent on internal funds (Calem and Rizzo 1995).  
The reduction in capital structure choices forces ACHs to incur higher opportunity 
cost, and thereby ACHs have more selective criteria for new projects.   
Based upon the findings within this chapter, signaling is not likely to exist 
within the U.S. ACH market.  However, the most likely cause is the effect of the 
agency cost of free cash flows on the ACH’s ability to signal by limiting free cash 
flows.  By limiting free cash flows, not only is the government restricting 
overinvestment, but also limiting ACHs’ access to debt markets.  These findings make 
sense as alignment of goals between principal and agents via payments in healthcare 
are widely recognized (Peterson et at 2006; Eldridge and Palmer 2009; Melnick et al 




 Gaynor et al (2000) had suggested that moral hazard due to insurance introduces a distortion into 
the medical market that requires analysis of the second-best outcome.  In the presence of moral hazard 
due to health insurance, consumers will demand “too much” medical care ex post.  They suggest that 
the presence of moral hazard may lead to overinvestment by hospitals. 
11
 Wang 1999 examined efficiency amongst hospitals and found that larger hospitals were more 
inefficient.  They suggest that larger hospitals were inefficient due to excess services that were under-
utilized.  Underutilization via excess services was promoted in this research to be a form of 
overinvestment. 
12
 Glied (2003) blamed the moral hazard of insurance for creating an environment which created 
demand for new healthcare technologies and consequently created demand for healthcare facilities to 
purchase these new technologies.  She suggests that this maybe exists even though there is not enough 
utilization of such resources.  The research presented suggests that the demand and purchase of new 
technologies by hospitals when underutilized is overinvestment.   
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1989; Conrad and Perry 2009; Lee and Zenios 2007; Jack 2004; and Eggleston 2005).  
Furthermore, the findings of this chapter are similar to Calem and Rizzo (1995), 
which suggests that payments by insurers have an effect on free cash flows of 
hospitals and where hospitals had lower free cash flows this affected their ability to 
attain debt or limited their access to debt and made them more dependent on internal 
funds for investment.  The similarity of these findings also explains why signaling 
was not found. As Calem and Rizzo (1995) suggest hospitals with lower free cash 
flows are restricted in their ability to obtain debt.  ACHs with greater government 
business have less free cash flows this makes it difficult for them to have access or 
take on additional debt, therefore limiting their ability to signal compliance via debt.  
Findings within this research supported previous research that suggested that the 
limitation of payment to ACHs impedes their ability to invest, as it restricts cash 
flows and cash under management.  The restriction of cash flow available to 
management limits the ability of the ACH to overinvest (Stulz 1990).  While Stulz 
(1990) research was applied in a traditional firm perspective it is applicable to the 
agency environment described in this research.  
The evidence of agency costs of free cash flows in this research suggests that 
these costs have an effect on the capital structure of ACHs.  The results presented here 
confirm the previous findings of McLean (1989), who suggested, “Some of the 
supposed unequal access to capital among providers may be a result of differing 
degrees of agency costs.”  The findings of the current research suggest that the 
variation in access to capital could be due to the varying amount of government 
business, which has the effect of limiting free cash flows.  These limitations following 
on from Calem and Rizzo (1995) constrain access to debt markets and thus as 
variation in free cash flows occurs, so does access to capital via debt.   
Agency costs of free cash flows partially explain McLean’s (1989) statement.  
Thus, the presence of agency costs of free cash flows is important for us to understand 
fully as it may prohibit ACHs from acquiring new equipment and services, and may 
have consequences (e.g. reducing the quality of health care).  By constraining the 
financial freedom of ACHs may lead to variation in quality of healthcare between 
hospitals, as ACHs with greater cash flows would be able to provide better quality 
and possibly even better access to newer forms of treatment.  This is important to 
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consider, as current policies are concerned with better quality and equal access to 




5. Monopsony in Healthcare and Literature 
5.1 Introduction 
Monopsony rarely exists in markets. However, when it does exist, it creates 
inefficiencies within that market.  As a result of monopsony, firms encounter 
situations in which financial decisions about their capital structures can be affected. 
Previous chapters of this thesis contemplated inefficiencies and tested theories 
of firm behavior (with respect to capital structure decisions, agency cost of free cash 
flows, and signaling). Using economic theory, this chapter focuses on an alternative 
and/or complementary condition within the ACH market, monopsony.  Just as Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) used agency as a substantial factor in decisions of the firm, 
monopsony also affects firm behavior and must be considered as an underlying reason 
for management decisions regarding capital structure, especially within the U.S. 
healthcare market.  This is driven by a legal framework, which allows monopsony to 
exist within healthcare, while other markets must comply with traditional 
interpretations of the antitrust laws present within the U.S.  Taking this point further 
there is prior research, which either indicates the possible presence of monopsony or 
that it is present within U.S. Healthcare.  The purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
review of the economic theory of monopsony, antitrust via the Sherman Antitrust Law 
and monopsony, and an examination of previous relevant research, in order for the 
reader to have a greater understanding of monopsony within healthcare and to 
contextualize the empirical research presented in Chapter 6. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of monopsony in its traditional form and 
compares it with the monopsony structure under the all-or-nothing contract scenario 
considered in this research.  The construct of monopsony is then examined in the 
context of U.S. antitrust law, with an in-depth discussion of how monopsony is able to 
exist within the healthcare market.  The research then provides an overview of 
monopsony literature as it relates to non-healthcare and healthcare contexts, providing 
evidence of monopsony of healthcare via prior studies and market relationships. The 
discussion presented here, provides a basis for the empirical research conducted later 
in Chapter 6 as similar studies present considerations and constructs for the models 
used there,  including collusive monopsony, the dichotomy of healthcare insurance as 
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two markets, and the misunderstanding of monopsony and its effects on consumer 
harm via financial harm to the supplier, as represented by Zerbe(2005).  
 
5.1.1 Theory of Monopsony 
Monopsony in a market causes distortion within that market from its efficient 
form. The demand side of the market reaps excess economic rents by setting lower 
prices for input goods/services than it would in a perfectly competitive market and 
ultimately consuming less than if the market was perfectly competitive.  The supplier 
within the market suffers from lower prices, less consumption, and consequently 
lower profit margins and less free cash flow.  The traditional model of monopsony 
often is used for insight into the allocation of resources and the distribution of income 
as a consequence of buyer power.  Traditional monopsony assumes the 
followingabout the monopsonist and seller of inputs: Sellers are free to determine the 
quantity of inputs to supply for a given price; prices paid by the monopsonists are 
equal to the marginal cost; and the monopsonist has full knowledge of the industry 
supply curve and will use this knowledge of the industry supply curve to leverage 
price discounts. 
All monopsonists exhibit profit maximizing behavior, thereby seeking to 
capture additional rents available within the market.  By using knowledge of the 
industry supply curve, the monopsonist is able to lower the price paid to the supplier 
to the marginal costs of the supplier.  This behavior can be seen in the following 
description of traditional monopsony.  In Figure 5.1, we see that market equilibrium at 
Point C where supply equals demand.  The supply curve typically answers the 
question of what is the quantity of goods that will be supplied at a given price. In this 
case, Qc represents the quantity demanded, and Pc represents the market price under 
the competitive market equilibrium.  Thus, the supplier is choosing to supply 
quantities equal to full demand.  Under the traditional model of monopsony, the 
monosonist forces the supplier to sell at the monopsonist’s price, Pm, which reduces 




Figure 5.1: Monopsony Welfare Loss:     
Qm =  Monopsony Output, Qc =  Competitive Output ; Consumer surplus (Insurance) = 
A,C,Pc; Producer Surplus (ACHs) = Pc,C,D; ACH surplus declines by area (Pc,C,F,Pm); 
Insurance surplus rises by the difference between the rectangle (Pc,E,F,Pm), and triangle 
BFC.  The area Pc,E,F,Pm represents a wealth transfer from ACHs to Insurance companies.  
Illustration based upon Sevilla (2005). 
This shift from a competitive market to a monopsonistic market allows the 
monopsonist, or buyer in this case, to obtain additional rents along the areas of Pc, E, 
F, and Pm, while losing the area of BFC to the inefficiencies of monopsony.  The 
supplier loses Pc, C, F, and Pm.  While there is an overall loss due to inefficiency 
within the market, the monopsonist is able to obtain additional rents, therefore 
complying with firm profit maximizing behavior.  Monopsony under this scenario still 
allows the supplier to choose quantity of output for a given price, and thus the supply 
curve is still answering the question: How much to sell at a given price (Taylor 2003).  
In this case, quantity supplied at Qm is less than the market demanded.  The under 
consumption or lower output of Qm and the lower monopsony price Pm of 
monopsony often are  used in conjunction to provide evidence of the existence of 
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Under consumption occurs because the monopsonist’s marginal factor cost 
curve (marginal expenditure curve) is greater than and thus lies above their supply 
curve (average expenditure curve).  The monopsonist chooses to consume until the 
marginal value of consuming an extra input equals the marginal factor cost (marginal 
expenditure).  The marginal value curve has a negative slope; therefore, it cuts the 
marginal factor cost curve (marginal expenditure curve) to the left of where the 
marginal value curve  cuts the supply curve (average expenditure curve), and thus the 
quantities purchased choose to consume less than that  in perfect competition 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld 2009).  The level of under consumption is determined by the 
upward sloping supply curve, as the more strongly the supply curve slopes upward, 
the greater the likelihood of lower output, and hence there is  less consumption than in 
the competitive equilibrium (M.V. Pauly 1988).   
The previous research of Pauly (1988), Feldman and Wholey (2001), and Seth 
(2006) sought evidence of monopsony in the U.S. healthcare market via traditional 
monopsony indicators, such as the combination of lower prices paid with lower 
consumption of inputs.  Because lower price alone is not an indication of monopsony, 
researchers often look to a drop in quantity consumed when price is reduced as an 
indicator of monopsony.  If no drop in consumption is found, then it is normally 
concluded that such changes in price were due to monopoly-busting behavior. 
However, this research does not suggest the structure or behavior of the insurance 
companies follows the traditional monopsony model, but rather that the arrangement 
between the insurance companies and ACHs within the U.S. operate on more of an 
all-or-nothing contractual arrangement (Sevilla 2005; Taylor 2003).  Sevilla (2005) 
explains the theoretical all-or-nothing supply curve in the context of medical 
laboratories and insurance providers.  This study follows his explanation here. Under 
an all-or-nothing contractual arrangement, the supplier, ACHs, is placed in a position 
of selling services at a given price or not selling anything.  This arrangement is 
pervasive in U.S. healthcare.   The all-or-nothing contractual arrangement changes the 




Figure 5.2: All-or-Nothing Monopsony Model:  
All of the service provider surplus is transferred to the collusive payers.  In a competitive 
market, the consumer (payors) surplus is the area demarked by ABP1.  The provider’s 
surplus is the area demarked by P1BED.  After imposing all-or nothing condition on the 
providers, the collusive payors increase their consumer surplus by the area P1BEP2. 
Illustration, Sevilla (2005). 
Under the all-or-nothing scenario, the supply curve answers the question of 
what is the maximum quantity to supply at each price, when the alternative is to sell 
nothing at all. When the buyer frames the question slightly different from that of the 
traditional monopsony supply curve, the buyer seeks to obtain all of the supplier’s 
surplus.  The buyer is able to force the supplier, or ACH, off its traditional supply 
curve (marginal cost of the supplier) and onto the all-or-nothing supply curve 
(average cost of the supplier) by dictating both price and quantity.  The buyer is able 
to achieve additional rents buy using market power to push the supplier to accept a 
price for services less than that of a competitive market.  This process is illustrated in 
Figure 5.2 where the supply curve represent marginal cost and the take-it-or-leave-it 
curve represents average costs.  When the payor is able to move from P1 to P2, under 
the all-or-nothing scenario, the quantity demanded does not change.  The quantity 
supplied at the current demand does not change because the supplier only can 
determine whether to supply the quantity demanded at the monopsony price, but 
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under an all-or-nothing contract as an efficient outcome because quantity supplied 
does not change with the price, taking no consideration for supplier harm. Its 
relevance will be revisited and evidenced later in this thesis.  The additional rents 
accumulated by the buyer/payor can be seen in the area of P1, B, E, and P2. Because 
the quantity demanded did not change, there is no efficiency loss.  The only loss is 
that of the rents that are lost by the supplier (or ACH).  Those rents or excess supplier 
surplus then are recouped by the payor.  
The difference between the traditional model of monopsony and monopsony 
under the all-or-nothing supply curve is that traditional monopsony leads to a social 
welfare loss.  Under all-or-nothing monopsony, the monopsonist may be able to 
acquire excess rents from the seller or input provider while maintaining an efficient 
allocation of resources or inputs; however, the income allocation received by the 
seller is less than in a competitive market, and is close to or at their average cost.   
Suppliers, the ACHs that supply under an all-or-nothing scenario, may have supplier 
profits pushed to zero, and in doing so, increase bankruptcy risk.   
Firms placed onto the all-or-nothing supply curve find themselves with 
restricted margins, and therefore restricted free cash flows.  These distortions may 
affect capital structure decisions within the U.S. healthcare market, and are the 
concern of this research.  Monopsony is possibly a distortion; therefore, 
comprehension of its presence and effects upon capital structure are salient. 
In the U.S., monopsony can explain the behavior of the ACHs regarding 
capital structure and the amount of free cash flows that exist within the ACH market.  
This research will examine the all-or-nothing contractual arrangement.  This new 
aspect will give a much greater insight into ACHs’ behavior in regards to capital 
structure. The understanding of market behavior in the presence of monopsony, and in 
particular collusive monopsony and its effect upon firms, capital structure, and 
limitations placed upon their financial decisions is pertinent to financial research, as it 
ultimately may be detrimental to firms, restricting their performance or increasing 







5.1.2 Conditions for Monopsony 
The research conducted in this thesis differentiates the ACH market from that 
of a traditional monopsony to that of a collusive monopsony.  In this case, collusive 
monopsony describes the relationship between both government and commercial 
payers to provide a restricted reimbursement scheme to ACHs within the U.S.  The 
existence of this particular relationship is allowed to continue because the U.S. 
Government consumes more than 65% of patient days from ACHs annually 
(determined using MCR data in longitudinal study of Chapter 4).  The federal 
government is under pressure to cover as many citizens as possible for the lowest 
cost.   
This creates pressure to provide healthcare at a below-market price, which is 
compounded by the ratchet effect that occurs each year as the CMS recognizes the 
ability of the industry to cope with lower and lower prices. Each year, the CMS 
continues to lower prices until their actions are stopped politically, or ACHs’ attrition 
from the program threatens its viability, thus ensuring the lowest price possible 
without firm failure.   The government is a low-cost payer for services in this market.  
The CMS regularly releases information to the public regarding its policies and 
payment practices, and these payment practices are inclusive of reimbursement 
schedules in the form of a fee schedule by DRG.   It consists of the diagnosis of the 
patient, and results in a placement in a categorization.  The price determined for each 
categorization includes all cost and is capped in time by a length of stay measure.  
Therefore, regardless of the length of stay, ACHs are paid only for the DRG.  This 
sometimes can be altered by the severity of the patient.   
This public release of information allows other commercial payers within the 
market to utilize this information to guide their own policies, procedures, and 
reimbursement schedules.  Commercial payers within the market then utilize this 
knowledge to ratchet down ACHs’ reimbursements, thereby allowing the payor to 
gain additional economic rents that otherwise would have remained with the ACH in 
a more competitive/capitalistic market.  While there is no intention on the part of the 
commercial payers to collude with the CMS, it is their action of seeking additional 
economic rents and the use of the fee schedules that present the environment for 
collusive monopsony.  The use of the CMS fee schedule by commercial payers 
essentially creates tacit price fixing within the market, thereby reducing the 
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competitive nature of the market and increasing the inefficiencies within the market, 
as evidenced in the laboratory services market discussed by Sevilla (2005).  These 
inefficiencies are the costs of the monopsony condition.   
 
5.1.3 Antitrust 
One might assume that monopsony would not be possible within the U.S., and 
that the Sherman Antitrust Act would prohibit such an anti-competitive structure as 
monopsony.  However, previous research has suggested that U.S. courts do not 
interpret issues of monopsony as inefficient or destructive under a standard of 
consumer harm.  This is important, as current conditions within U.S. healthcare would 
be different if courts viewed monopsony in a negative light. 
Hammer and Sage (2004) cited the existence of buyer-side market power and 
the view of the consumer good provided by the use of buyer-side market power and 
its ability to reign in healthcare costs, attributing it to the year 1984 and the ruling by 
Judge Stephen Breyer in the First Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Kartell v. 
BlueShield of Massachusetts.  The case involved balance billing by physicians. 
Balance billing is when physicians accept payment by the insurer for services 
rendered, yet seek compensation from patients for any outstanding balance left unpaid 
by the insurance company. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, an insurance company, 
contractually had prohibited physicians from balance billing. A group of physicians 
had sued Blue Shield, claiming Blue Shield was the largest insurer in the state and had 
used its market power to conduct unfair business practices primarily related to the 
restriction upon physicians to balance bill patients, and therefore was in violation of 
state and federal antitrust laws.    
The judge ruled that Blue Shield had contractually prohibited balance billing 
and therefore did not violate the antitrust laws, even though the defendant in the case 
was the largest insurer in the state at that time.  In this case, Judge Breyer did not look 
at Blue Shield as a separate entity within the market, but rather as a buying group; 
therefore, any discounts forced on physicians would flow through to the insured, and 
consequently, premiums would be discounted. Judge Breyer, “focused  on the 
centrality of the insurer-insured agency relationship thereby framing the dispute in a 
manner where he could conclude that Blue Shield’s conduct did not create antitrust 
liability, even assuming Blue Shield possessed and exercised significant market 
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power” (Hammer & Sage 2004, p. 955).  The judge did not regard this market as two 
separate markets, one for purchasing healthcare services and one for health insurance, 
but combined those markets into one single market in which insurers were just buying 
agents for the insured, and therefore physicians were obligated to accept the 
discounted rate in return for the purchaser’s quantity (Hammer & Sage 2004). 
This notion that the insurer is nothing but a buying agent disregards the fact 
that insurance is a product itself and has its own markets with its own profit motives 
that are derived from inputs of purchased health services.  Insurance is a financing 
mechanism for purchasing health services.  The consideration of insurance, as two 
markets, is a key concept carried forward in this research and is a primary 
consideration of the profit maximization under monopsony.  In his decision, Judge 
Breyer also failed to verify that the lower input prices of purchased health services 
actually lowered premiums to the insured of Blue Shield.  The monopsony issue was 
completely ignored, as Breyer failed to realize that a monopsonist maximizes 
economic rents (Hammer & Sage 2004).  
The judge also was concerned that antitrust law might be used to try to 
regulate the healthcare industry, and left the responsibility up to regulatory agencies 
within Massachusetts to take on that burden.  This decision failed to ensure proper 
competition within the market itself, as it did not take into account that discounts are 
not passed on necessarily from the insurance to those being insured. Hammer and 
Sage (2004) hold that although the Breyer decision was a relatively contextualized 
ruling, further court cases involving healthcare antitrust have utilized this case as the 
foundation to suggest that insurers stand in and act on behalf of those they insure. 
Distortions of the idea presented by Judge Breyer have been used to defend 
exclusionary activities of buyers, “health insurers,” which would violate Article 2 of 
the Sherman Act.  In Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross,  the court 
upheld that having a policy that  insisted on a supplier’s lowest price was not in 
violation of the Sherman Act, as long as it was not predatory or below the supplier’s 
incremental cost, and in fact would be promoting competition.  The Kartell case has 
been used to substantiate decisions in favor of insurers; however, the Kartell case and 
others similar to it provide an inadequate basis from which to evaluate medical 
monopsony power, because they fail to see the insurance market as two separate 
markets (insurance and health services), and assume that savings or excess rents 
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generated from insurers predatory practices are passed on to the consumer (Hammer 
& Sage 2004). 
While monopsony continues to be addressed in non-healthcare arenas in the 
U.S., as per the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons 
Hardwood Lumber Co., 2007 (Rosenfelt 2008), it is unlikely to be addressed the same 
way in healthcare, as healthcare is seen to be unique by many. As James Robinson 
(2001, p. 1045) expressed,   
“…the salient characteristics of health care, including professionalism, 
licensure, nonprofit organization, third-party payment, and heavy government 
regulation, can be found in other sectors, albeit not bundled in quite the same 
distinct and dysfunctional manner. The uniqueness doctrine hence proves too 
much. More importantly, the principle serves as a two-way barrier to entry 
between the health and non-health sectors. In one direction, it discourages 
mainstream economists from importing the principles of industrial 
organization, game theory, and transactions costs to health care issues by 
raising a wall of acronyms and institutional trivia that impedes dialogue. In the 
other direction it fosters complacency among the virtuosi of health policy 
analysis, allowing us to achieve fame and fortune in our small pond without 
fear of competition from denizens of the scholarly shark tank.”  
If mainstream economists are unwilling to venture into a new area fraught 
with “walls of acronyms and institutional trivia that impedes dialogue,” then certainly, 
very little progress can be made to help courts understand the inefficiencies within 
healthcare and how consumer harm is established by allocative inefficiencies 
(Robinson 2001, p.1045).  Robinson (2001) condemned the views expressed by K.J. 
Arrow (1963), which via asymmetric and imperfect information, justified the rationale 
for the existence within healthcare of, “every inefficiency, idiosyncrasy, and interest 
serving institution in the healthcare industry,” basically stating that the rationale for 
non-traditional contracting and organizations and their market responses were, in 
effect, an “efficiency-enhancing” response to the limitations of information (Robinson 
2001 p.1046).  Robinson further explained that Arrow used such interpretations of 
distortions within the healthcare market to justify antitrust exemptions reducing costs, 
and  that consumers are incapable of comparing insurance plans and must yield this 
function to politicians (Robinson 2001).  Therefore, it is understood how judicial 
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decisions regarding monopsony could become distorted with regard to market 
inefficiency when underlying literature supports such views, especially when one 
considers that in addition to the literature, the courts use an out-of-date model to 
measure consumer harm. Such is the case with the ancillary restraints model. 
Alexander (2007) addressed the use of Blair and Harrison’s ancillary restraints 
doctrine and its use by courts in interpreting cases of monopsony.  The ancillary 
restraints doctrine is used to judge cases of monopoly, The ancillary restraints 
doctrine defines that agreements among competitors are illegal unless the 
defendant/competitors can show that the agreement has pro-competitive benefits and 
that the overall effect is good for the consumer (Alexander 2007).  Alexander (2007) 
pointed out that the overall quest of the model is to correct consumer harm, but 
appropriately, it gives evidence that within a situation of monopsony, it is not the 
consumer that is harmed, rather the supplier.  Because courts interpreting monopsony 
cases have validated the ancillary restraints model explicitly as a determinate method, 
this has left economists and attorneys with a void left from this model’s inadequacy, 
as it mostly addresses consumer harm.   
The ancillary restraints model views monopsony similarly to monopoly in that 
the case is judged on a few parameters. According to Alexander (2007), the defendant 
must address three issues when addressing the ancillary restraints doctrine: 1) The 
agreement must be shown to increase competition; 2) Price fixing is a necessary evil 
in order to bring about the benefits of increasing the nature of competition; and 3) The 
agreement is only as restrictive as necessary to bring about these benefits.  Alexander 
addressed the shortcomings of the ancillary restraints theory of monopsony within the 
courts by offering additional insight into the Sherman Antitrust Act and its intended 
beneficiaries.  She identified the shortcomings of the ancillary restraint model and 
analyzed the arguments used to fill in where the ancillary approach fails.   
The ancillary restraints model does not concern itself with harm to the 
supplier, only to the consumer.  However, supplier harm is an inefficiency of the 
market that ultimately may harm consumers, just not directly.  Zerbe (2005) 
recognized the harm created by such inefficiencies.  Zerbe had suggested that 
agreements should be analyzed for inefficiency of markets, stating that ultimately, all 
consumers are harmed by inefficiency.  Zerbe felt that any time the price for a product 
deviated from marginal costs, resources were wasted.  He suggested that resources 
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have an opportunity cost.  The limitation of resources, due to monopsonistic 
inefficiency, has repercussive effects for those resources other uses and/or markets, 
and the use of these resources in alternative markets would be beneficial to consumers 
in those markets.  Monopsony prevented the use of such resources in other markets; 
therefore, the consumers were harmed.  Additionally, he suggested the idea that the 
identification of consumer price changes to consumers for a limited set of markets is 
incorrect, and suggested that consumer and producer surpluses are the income 
equivalent measures of welfare.  Zerbe saw both consumer and producer surplus as a 
measure of reduction in satisfaction.  According to Zerbe, the use of economic 
efficiency as the general standard is a reasonable assumption; consumers will lose 
from inefficiency wherever it is found.  The presumption should be that the market 
distortion introduced by the monopsonization will cause consumer harm, both in the 
output market and in all related markets taken together (Zerbe 2005).  This is an 
important and salient point to this research as the inefficiencies of monopsony are 
suggested to have lasting effects on ACH margins and free cash flows, therefore 
possibly limiting their access to debt markets, which affects ACH decisions of capital 
structure. 
According to Alexander (2007), these arguments fall into two separate 
categories, those that claim monopsony harms end consumers, and those that claim 
the Sherman Act is intended to protect society and others in the economy and not just 
end consumers.  She pointed out that the arguments made by Zerbe (2005) are 
incorrect and inefficient, stating that it would be more efficient to ban buying cartels 
than actually to analyze the effects of the agreement at hand.  The other problem with 
Zerbe’s argument, according to Alexander (2007), is his promotion that, “effects in 
other markets to show harm to consumers,” was rejected by the Supreme Court as a 
methodology for judging consumer harm, not to mention that it is very similar to the 
current consumer welfare standard in use today Alexander (2007, p.1629). 
Others argue that consumer harm should not be the relevant standard against 
which monopsony cases are held.  According to Alexander (2007), individuals within 
this ideology fall into two categories. They are: 1) those individuals who argue that 
cases should be measured by aggregate efficiency for antitrust purposes; and 2) those 
who argue that the Sherman Act protects others within the economy equally well as 
consumers. Those who believe that aggregate efficiency should be the criteria by 
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which monopsony cases should be decided are wrong, because this is contrary to 
legislative intent, according to Alexander.  She held that while it may be good 
economic policy for antitrust laws to guard against allocative inefficiency, the 
Sherman Act was created prior to economists’ understanding of allocative efficiency.  
Therefore, the legislature’s intent could not have incorporated the use of allocative 
efficiency as the basis for antitrust jurisprudence. Alexander pointed out that those 
who believe that the Sherman Act protects all others should consider the legislative 
history of the Sherman Act.  The act clearly demonstrates a concern for consumer 
welfare.   
In her paper, Alexander (2007) concluded that under the Sherman Act, it is 
important that aggregate efficiency and consumer prices are utilized in evaluating 
contentious agreements, but that these conditions are restricted when courts consider 
the legality of the agreement itself.  It is the consideration of competition over 
efficiency or consumer prices that fills the gap of the ancillary restraint model.  She 
considers it the job of Congress, not the courts, to determine if the Sherman Act 
should reflect sound economic policy. The previous courts decisions as well as 
academic literature are helpful in understanding how monopsony could be present in 
the healthcare market in the U.S. despite antitrust legislation. This environment 
described in the literature around healthcare antitrust is one in which monopsony 
could easily be present and readily survive as a market presence.  Therefore, it is 
important to understand monopsony from an academic research perspective. 
  
5.2 Monopsony in Literature 
5.2.1 Literature  
Due to the structure of the previous monopsony research, a relevant analysis 
of monopsony in literature will be considered within two categories in this 
subchapter: non-healthcare related and healthcare related.  The first category, non-
healthcare related, will be addressed in Section 5.2.1.1, followed by healthcare related 
in Section 5.2.1.2.  Non-healthcare-related research helps establish this study within a 
larger research context, while the healthcare monopsony research helps to refine the 




5.2.1.1 Non-Healthcare Monopsony Research 
Non-healthcare monopsony research previously has focused on markets that truly 
exhibit monopsony conditions, and considers markets such as labor markets, poultry, 
or meat-processing markets for hogs and cattle, in addition to markets for public 
goods. In many nations, healthcare is considered a public good.  In the U.S., 
healthcare can be viewed as a public good provided by an agency relationship 
between ACHs and the government and private insurers.  Bish and O’Donoghue 
(1970) used a simple two-person model in a world in which there is a public good and 
at least one private good to examine equilibrium outputs of public goods, which result 
from consumer cooperation under conditions of both constant and increasing costs.  
They argued that if a market for public goods is under an increasing cost environment 
with monopsonistic demand articulation, the under consumption of the public good 
was likely.  They suggest that monopsonistic environments are to be created under 
these conditions, as the articulation of demand is likely to come from individuals 
represented by a monopsonistic organization (Bish & O’Donoghue 1970).  They 
suggested that this was true, as bargaining costs are high, and consumers of public 
goods are numerous.   This encourages individuals to be free riders; therefore, they 
would wait for others to provide the public good.  Bish and O’Donoghue (1970) 
suggested that under these conditions, the government and/or private demand 
articulating groups would emerge and incentivize individuals to join their groups.  
These groups would then act as monopsonistic buying groups.  This is similar to the 
conditional environment set forth in this research between CMS and private payors, 
because they behave as a collusive monopsony to purchase healthcare services on 
behalf of individuals.  In this case, the present research examines the market of a 
public good, healthcare.  Healthcare within the U.S. is under increasing cost 
constraints.  If monopsonistic demand articulation is present underconsumption of the 
good is likely.  While Bish and O’Donoghue (1970) remain valid, they express 
monopsony under a traditional context, which does not accurately describe the 
outcome the consumption equation.  This divergence of traditional monopsony and 
monopsony under the all or nothing contract allow for outcomes more favorable to the 




Hirofumi Shibata (1973) suggested that Bish and O’Donoghue (1970) may 
have been accurate, but refuted that the condition of increasing cost of the public good 
is a necessary market parameter for monopsony to exist.  Constant costs as well as 
increasing costs could also be an environment in which monopsony might exist.  
Shibata (1973, p. 223) pointed out that under the increasing cost of a public good, the 
presence of income redistribution affects, “a non-cooperative party solution, one 
involving over-consumption rather than under-consumption.”  
This view is counter to monopsony theory, in which the presence of 
monopsony leads to underconsumption due to the inefficient allocation of resources 
(inputs), as was displayed in Figure 5.1. While Bish and O’Donoghue (1970) assumed 
that producers of public goods are price takers rather than price makers, Shibata 
(1973) holds that both a monopsony and monopoly could exist when one party is a 
price taker and the other a price maker.  Taking issue with Bish and O’Donoghue’s 
(1970) premise that producers of public goods could not be consumers of public 
goods, Shibata pointed out that once a public good is produced, all within a given 
economy are free to consume that good.   Shibata held that both monopsony and 
monopoly could exist in markets for public goods where neither party is the price 
taker.  He suggested the assumptions that the consumer can cooperate while producers 
cannot, and that the producer can cooperate while consumers cannot, are unrealistic, 
unless asymmetric institutional or behavioral assumptions are included (Shibata, 
1973).  The presence of asymmetry of information is an important concept in 
healthcare in the U.S. and the research presented here. There is asymmetry of 
information in the consumption of healthcare as most patients are ignorant of the 
services they receive.  This transactional model is further complicated because the 
purchaser or payor has little information of services delivered as well (Mirmirani and 
Spivack, 1993; McLean 1989; Schneider and Mathios 2006). 
If monopoly or monopsony does exist in the market for public goods, then the 
environment is conducive to over- or under consumption, barring strategic behavior; 
that is to say that a Pareto-optimum outcome could not exist.  Shibata (1973) 
concluded that in the case of public goods and increasing cost versus constant 
cost/monopsony, under consumption is not the major concern, but rather what is of 
concern is the possible existence of a monopoly and overconsumption due to income 
redistribution or the situation of a bilateral monopoly under which both over and 
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under consumption equally are possible.  However, under increasing cost conditions, 
overconsumption becomes the larger problem.  Shibata held that the effect of 
redistribution of income is significant under majority rule, as the proportion of the 
population that suffers from the redistribution of income often has no effective way of 
preventing the production of the public good by the other party or being financed by 
the taxes imposed upon them.   
Overconsumption is an important characteristic of U.S. healthcare as it not 
only suggests the existence of a moral hazard created by the presence of insurance, 
but in an increasing cost setting, overconsumption is could be due to an income 
redistribution mechanism within the Medicare/Medicaid framework.  This also 
describes the legal framework under which healthcare is supplied in the U.S., in 
which ACHs are required to deliver healthcare under unfunded mandates and lower 
reimbursements than Pareto-optimum conditions.  These constructs described by Bish 
and O’Donoghue (1970) and Shibata (1973) help to provide a basis upon which the 
theoretical model of this research is based.  Newhouse (1981) and Glied (2003) 
further support this idea of overconsumption due to moral hazard of insurance in U.S. 
healthcare.  In addition to markets for public goods, one primary area of focus for 
monopsony research has been labor markets. 
Labor long has been an environment for the study of monopsony, and can be 
correlated and helpful in determining the consequences of its existence in healthcare.  
Usually, firms that are studied are isolated geographically, and therefore have market 
buyer power in the surrounding markets of labor.  Michael Bradfield (1990) examined 
the long-run consequences of monopsony in this context.  Bradfield used the 
traditional monopsony model and the Cobb-Douglas production function to lay 
framework for his argument.  He assumed monopsony power only in the input labor 
market, while the firm operates in a competitive market in the output market.  This 
allowed Bradfield to show that the long-run equilibrium for wages and quantity of 
labor are lower than in a competitive labor market, even under the presence of a union 
representing the input labor.   
Backwards integration in the healthcare market has been thought to exist 
because payors may try to internalize the inefficiencies of the input market.  An 
example of this is where HMOs directly control the production of healthcare, and 
therefore better control cost, thereby allowing them to become more competitive in 
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the upstream markets of health insurance, which is typical behavior of a monopsonist.  
In U.S. healthcare, there have been several efforts by HMOs to integrate backwards 
into supplying healthcare directly. Likewise, Azzam (1996) showed that there may be 
incentives for backwards integration in order to internalize inefficiencies of the input 
utilization of monopsony itself.  Azzam examined the U.S. beef slaughter industry, 
applying Perry’s (1978) theory of backward partial integration in order to derive the 
equilibrium condition for a profit-maximizing vertically integrated monopsonist firm 
that competes with a finished product in the final consumer market.  
Partial backwards integration is a measurement of backwards integration that 
is independent of the production decision made by a monopsonist.  The methodology 
allows for the examination of the impact of backwards integration on the choices of 
input production.  The partial integration allows for the assessment at each subsequent 
degree of integration.  This allows for consideration of the welfare implication and 
incentives for further backward integration by the monopsonist.   
Under Azzam’s (1996) study, the monopsonist only may integrate partially, as 
post-integration profits also include monopsony inefficiencies plus the economic rents 
derived from the target. Given that the monopsonist will have a purchase price for the 
target, the monopsonists are likely only to partially integrate when considering the 
cost of acquisition, internal cost of production, and the additional economic rent.  
Azzam concluded that there is support for the monopsonist’s backwards integration 
when taking inefficiency into consideration in the model.  He suggested caution for 
his research, as there may be other considerations taking place in backward 
integration that are not considered within his research examples, such as transactional 
economies and market imperfections. 
Therefore, while a monopsonist may integrate backwards to internalize input 
market inefficiencies, it does not have to be full integration to realize some additional 
economic rents.  Likewise, in the U.S. healthcare market, HMOs and MCOs have 
tried to internalize some of the production efficiencies into their organizations in order 
to be more competitive in the market for health insurance.  This is typical 
monopsonistic behavior; however, traditional monopsony does not accurately 
describe the contractual nature, which is prevalent.  It is monopsony under the all-or-
nothing contract that should be considered. 
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Taylor (2003) examined monopsony under the conditions of an all-or-nothing 
contractual situation.  Taylor argued that a monopsonist with market power could 
leave little options for suppliers of inputs.  Suppliers are offered all-or-nothing 
contracts in which the supplier can accept and supply goods at the defined 
monopsonist rate, or supply nothing.  Due to the quantity buyers represent, the 
supplier has little option because of the exploitation of the producer’s surplus.  Under 
this scenario, the input supplier is moved off its marginal cost supply curve and onto 
the average cost curve.  Taylor used a traditional monopsony model augmented to 
adjust for the all-or-nothing condition, suggesting that the monopsonist exploitation of 
the all-or-nothing contract leads to an efficient allocation of input resources.  In other 
words, under this all-or-nothing contract, the market would have efficient allocation 
of inputs to the market; thus, there would be no decrease in quantity demanded. 
However, the monopsonist would gain the surplus economic rents derived from the 
supplier, and therefore, input prices would be allocated inefficiently.  Thus, the 
monopsonist would accrue all profits normally attributed to competitive input 
suppliers.   
This is supported when one considers that the standard supply curve provides 
the quantity that suppliers will provide at every possible price.  This combination of 
supplied quantity and price for various prices form the usual supply curve.  The 
seller’s choice is how much to supply at a particular price.   According to Blair and 
Harrison (1993), the all-or-nothing supply curve is different.  It reveals the maximum 
quantity suppliers will make available at each price when the alternative is to sell 
nothing at all.  The all-or-nothing supply curve lies below the standard supply curve.  
This enables the monopsonist to exploit the seller by pushing the seller off its 
traditional supply curves and onto the all-or nothing curve (Blair and Harrison, 1993). 
Taylor (2003) concluded that monopsonist firms that take advantage of the all-
or-nothing supply curve in a competitive input industry will have a socially efficient 
allocation of resources. However, he pointed out that the distribution of income will 
not be equitable in comparison to competitive markets, as the monopsonist will have 
appropriated all the excess rents from the input suppliers.  He commented that while 
there may be no need for antitrust legislation to mediate for efficient allocation of 
resources, there should be some concern and interjection to deal with the, 
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“distributional consequences of exertion of all-or nothing-buyer power” (Taylor 2003, 
p. 14). 
Taylor’s (2003) work provided support for antitrust positions that monopsony 
can lead to the competitive market allocation of resources leading to increased 
consumer welfare.  Therefore, there is no need for intervention within a 
monopsonistic buyer market with these characteristics.  This is important to the 
research in this chapter, as this helps us gain some understanding as to why one might 
not interfere within markets with monopsonists utilizing the all-or-nothing contractual 
arrangement, especially when one considers the antitrust environment discussed 
previously.  This is also important because this contractual arrangement is 
predominantly the contractual arrangement that occurs within the ACH market 
between ACHs and insurers, both government and commercial.   
de Fontenay and Gans  (2004; hereafter DG),  carried the research of vertical 
integration further, investigating whether vertical integration by a monopsonist causes 
consumer harm. They suggested that under a normal economic environment, the 
monopsonist and the consumer interests are not aligned in regard to vertical 
integration. They modeled one-on-one bargaining between a monopsonist and 
independent suppliers when the set of suppliers cannot be expanded easily ex-post.  
They showed that a non-vertically integrated monopolist is susceptible to holdup. 
They suggested that without integration, a monopsonist has an incentive to encourage 
more upstream entrants than normally would occur in a neoclassical monopoly. 
Having more suppliers alleviates the holdup problem. This increases industry output 
and lowers the industry marginal costs in order to increase the monopsonist’s 
bargaining position. Vertical integration mitigates the hold-up problem faced by the 
monopsonist, and vertical integration allows the monopsonist to generate and 
appropriate an increased level of industry profits at the expense of consumers.  DG 
expressed that most concern for consumer harm is achieved when the monopsonist 
forces the exit/foreclosure of suppliers from the input market.  This is a salient point 
as courts have failed to see this concern, which allows monopsony to exist and allows 
monopsonistic behavior to affect ACHs, which consequently have effect on their 
capital structures decisions. 
Inoue and Vukina (2006) further analyzed the presence of monopsony power 
in agency contracts within the livestock industry.  They observed the impact of the 
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livestock integrator on the market for contract growers.  The model examined the 
relationships between the observable consequences and unobservable grower 
characteristics.  This is accomplished by imposing first-order conditions for the 
principals’ profit maximization. Their research states three reasons why the grower 
market is not competitive and might have monopsonistic characteristics: 1) 
Geographical areas show differentiation in the levels of competition for growers; 2) 
Market power may be derived from contracts with integrators and the necessary 
investment to produce inputs; and 3) Production contracts in animal agriculture 
contain issues of moral hazard.  In this last case, the monopsonistic behavior arises 
from the integrator facing an upward sloping supply curve as a result of having to pay 
the grower more for greater effort.  The integrator/monopsonist must use more 
resources to ensure compliance, and therefore hires fewer workers, in other words, 
below competitive levels.   
Inoue and Vukina’s (2006) model used three performance indexes: live grain, 
mortality, and feed conversion. They used these three indexes in a first-order 
condition to maximize the integrators profits.  Estimating with the generalized method 
of moments (GMM), using data on the individual grower contracts and one primary 
integrator, they found that no monopsony is present in this market.  They attributed 
this to the fact that integrators may not have to pay higher fees for higher output of 
production, stating that they do not believe the sample is representative of the market 
as a whole.  This outcome is important as it suggests that not all environments, which 
are ripe for a monopsonist, actually create monopsony.  The research of Inoue and 
Vukina (2006) provides a contra argument for the research presented within this thesis 
and is included to show that it is necessary to conduct research akin to this thesis, as 
the outcome is not a forgone conclusion even though there is clear evidence to suggest 
that certain market constructs should be present. 
 
5.2.1.2  Healthcare Monopsony Research 
Monopsony in healthcare is discussed widely throughout literature, although 
initially it was discussed as an allocative efficiency issue.   The healthcare industry is 
known to have distortions that affect the market: moral hazard, agency, and the 
allocative efficiency issues (monopsony/monopoly), amongst others.  Researchers 
long have tried to further understand the healthcare market within the U.S.  
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Philip Hersch (1984) examined competition and market efficiencies within 
non-profit hospitals.  Hersch created a theoretical model that assumes that hospitals 
compete in the market for physicians based upon hospital prices and resource 
allocation.  Hersch argued that an increase in market concentration results in raising 
hospital costs when adjusted for quality, ultimately reducing hospital admissions and 
the quality of care per admission.  Theory would predict that hospital prices, adjusted 
for quality, should increase with market concentration.  Hersch’s study lacked any 
measure for quality, and therefore used a proxy.  The proxy said that higher prices 
would be shown in reduced admissions and the length of stay in the hospital. 
Hersch (1984) used a sample of 260 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(SMSAs) and six potential 1972 SMSAs to create a regression of hospital stays and 
quality measures.  Hersch utilized total expenditure per admission as a proxy for 
hospital care.  Hersch concluded that despite the fact that the hospitals within the 
study were nonprofit, they exhibited profit-maximizing behavior. Hersch explained 
that the  implications of the market structure of healthcare are consistent with 
previous empirical results that market competition plays a central role in overall 
market performance.  In Hersch’s case, this led to higher admissions and greater 
levels of hospital care per patient.  His results suggested that efforts to control costs 
via competitive forces have been counterproductive, because competition has raised 
the cost of healthcare by increasing the level of care provided per admission.  The 
increases in cost more likely are the result of a misallocation of resources as a result 
of extensive hospital insurance.  The extensive hospital insurance, because of the 
moral hazard, decreases the allocative efficiency of competition (Hersch, 1984).   
Hersch (1984) recognized the implications of the moral hazard and its possible 
ability to distort markets for healthcare.  Competition under this moral hazard is 
skewed, and hospitals compete for patients and physicians utilizing mechanisms other 
than prices.  Quality certainly is one of these competing variables, as is the resources 
for both patient and physician.  Along with Hersch’s empirical results, these 
distortions help explain the excessive capitalization and thus overinvestment found in 
the ACHs and mentioned in this research.  Hersch (1984) findings are important as 
they suggest that first, non-for-profit hospitals exhibit profit maximizing behavior.  
Second, that moral hazard of insurance is prevalent and causes distortions within the 
market, which provides perverse incentives to providers and increases the costs of 
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providing services.  All of these are issues payors seek to control and as a 
consequence reduce the amount of inefficiency inherent in the supplier market. 
Mirmirani and Spivack (1993) examined the causes of distortions found within 
the healthcare market and used these distortions to explain any deviation from Pareto 
efficiency.  They cite five reasons for the deviation from Pareto efficiency: 1) lack of 
competition; 2) insufficient/asymmetric information; 3) inadequate access to health 
care services; 4) presence of externalities; and 5) market disequilibrium (Mirmirani & 
Spivack 1993).  They pointed out that these are all reasons for the failure of the 
healthcare market within the United States. 
Considering the lack of competition, Mirmirani and Spivack (1993) suggested 
that special interest groups within healthcare determine the supply of healthcare, 
conspiring to keep incomes up by restricting supply.  They suggested that two major 
groups, the AMA representing doctors, and the AHA representing hospitals hold the 
majority of control.  These two organizations have turned over, changed, or blocked 
the majority of legislative policy decisions by the U.S. Government to benefit 
themselves.  The AMA has reduced supply by lobbying against allowing foreign 
medical graduates from entering the U.S. to practice, and at the same time, reduced 
the amount of students accepted for medical school at U.S. institutions. 
Studying hospital markets, Mirmirani and Spivack (1993) pointed not only to 
the special interests influencing policy, but also to the failure of HMOs to increase 
competition. This is because the HMOs need to compete against larger, better, and 
more expensive technologies that cause their premiums to climb.  This ultimately 
resulted in HMOs’ inability to compete in the marketplace, and therefore they had less 
impact on the overall competition level.  As previously determined, providers of 
healthcare compete on variables other than price.  Healthcare consumers within the 
U.S. value quality above price.  This is driven primarily by the moral hazard created 
by the heavy presence of health insurance within the market.  In this case, health 
insurance insulates the patient from the prices of healthcare.  If individuals were to 
pay for their own healthcare, then these variables of technology and quality would be 
lessened as a determinant of market share, as individuals would strengthen the 
importance of price in the equation for determining health consumption.  Currently, 
individuals with health insurance, whether from government or private insurance, are 
not exposed to concerns of price in consumption of healthcare.  Thus, the moral 
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hazard of insurance is present.  Moral hazard effects are heightened by the lack of 
information on the part of the patient consuming the healthcare services. 
According to Mirmirani and Spivack (1993), insufficient information or 
asymmetric information exists within healthcare. They noted that all information 
regarding healthcare services is located within the servicing body, whether physician 
or hospital.  The lack of information on the patient’s behalf causes the patient to incur 
higher costs in order to acquire healthcare services.  Mirmirani and Spivack promoted 
advertising as a method of reducing this asymmetry of information, by educating the 
patient on the services offered and the benefits of such services.  They argued for 
advertising, which at the time of their research was illegal; however, advertising since 
has been utilized by both physicians and hospitals, lowering the informational 
disparity that was prevalent at the time of their research.  This is not to say that 
informational asymmetry has been removed completely from the provisioning of 
healthcare, as it has not. 
Mirmirani and Spivack (1993) promoted inadequate access to healthcare as a 
reason for the inefficiency.  They also outlined the impact that externalities can have 
upon the healthcare market.  Mirmirani and Spivack pointed out that disease 
epidemics as well as medical malpractice lawsuits can have large impacts on the 
operations of the healthcare market.  Their example cited a case of Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome that led to an increased level of insurance claims and treatment 
expenditures in the 1980s, and they anticipated this epidemic would add additional 
burdens to the health market.  Further, medical malpractice lawsuits cost the sector 
$2.6 billion by 1988 (Mirmirani & Spivack 1993).   In both cases mentioned, they cite 
the government as the intervener of choice. 
Market disequilibrium is discussed by Mirmirani and Spivack (1993), 
suggesting that a continuous disequilibrium exists due to excess demand causing 
inflation within the market.  They cited Mirmirani and Otts’ (1990) suggestion of 
increasing the patients’ contribution of payment in order to reduce the overall 
disequilibrium within the market.  Mirmirani and Spivack (1993) concluded that in 
order to countermand these market imperfections, the only solution is one in which 
healthcare is provided for all via a government plan, as all citizens would have equal 
access to healthcare.  This would remove the inefficiencies within the market of 
inadequate access to healthcare, which they saw as an underlying cause of the 
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inefficiency.  According to their view, a capitalistic market is incapable of handling 
healthcare, and only a socialist system of free healthcare with equal access resolves 
such disequilibrium.  Mirmirani and Spivack (1993), provide additional evidence for 
the context and construct of monopsony within U.S. healthcare by payors, ultimately 
suggesting that a single buyer solution organized by the government is the only 
solution.  In other words, the only methodology moving forwards is a monopsonist 
within the market controlling the input market of health services. 
Mark Pauly (1998) examined the disequilibrium within healthcare, suggesting 
the theoretical possibility of monopsony behavior by managed care insurance 
providers.  He used microeconomic theory to investigate how managed care plans 
acting as a monopsonist might behave, and the expected effects upon the consumer 
and supplier welfare.  His interests in monopsony were driven by concern that 
antitrust courts misunderstand monopsony.  He opined that the measurement of 
consumer welfare that is used as a mechanism for the justification of the presence of 
monopsony within the marketplace may need to be reexamined when interpreting 
decisions in healthcare.  He suggested this because monopsony does not necessarily 
reduce the welfare of the end consumer.  Therefore, the goal of antitrust law, 
consumer protection, and the objective of economists of welfare maximization may 
need to be revised in light of monopsony, because consumer harm and economic 
inefficiency is not readily apparent.   
Pauly’s (1998) second reason for concern was that it may be difficult to 
recognize the inefficiencies of lower prices for healthcare as below the competitive 
level, especially in light of the previous monopoly power held by providers, in other 
words, a monopoly breakup.  The lower prices may be interpreted as monopoly-
breaking activity.  Pauly used the traditional definition of monopsony power with its 
outcome of lower input prices and lower consumption of the input.  Pauly (1998), 
defines inputs as ACH services purchased by managed care providers.   
Pauly (1998, p. 1444) further stated that the input market monopsony, “arises 
when there is only one managed care play (buyer) in a local market, but there are 
multiple competitive sellers of that service, and when the market-level supply curve 
of those services is upward sloping.”  Pauly noted that it is difficult to tell if 
monopsony is taking place just from the presence of lower prices for inputs, or if it is 
bilateral negotiations taking over from a monopoly on inputs by the seller.  The 
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delineating variable is the quantity of inputs acquired by the buyer, as mentioned 
previously.  He modeled both a traditional single-buyer market monopsony as well as 
a partial monopsony, which consists of a large dominant buyer with monopsony 
power with additional fringe buyers without monopsony power in the marketplace.  In 
both cases, Pauly conceived that monopsony is possible in both markets; however, 
monopsony in the partial monopsony market is not as clear.  His partial monopsony 
market in healthcare is similar to the argument in this research of collusion between 
the U.S. Government and commercial insurers. The U.S. Government acts as the 
dominant firm, and the commercial insurers act as fringe buyers.  The research 
conducted within this thesis seeks to potentially clarify the existence of monopsony 
within the healthcare market, by finding empirical support for the theoretical work by  
Pauly (1998). 
The consideration of monopsony by MCO’s/HMOs was revisited by the 
research of Feldman and Wholey (2001).   Feldman and Wholey designed a two-stage 
study to determine the market power of HMOs and whether monopsony power exists 
under the traditional definition (monopsony implies lower input prices and lower 
consumption of those inputs).  Using time series data on all HMOs operating within 
the U.S. from 1985 to 1997, they estimated regression equations to explain prices paid 
by HMOs for ambulatory visits and inpatient hospital days in terms of the importance 
of HMOs as a buyer of these services.  Next, they regressed the utilization of 
ambulatory and hospital services per enrollee of an HMO to determine HMO buyer 
power.  They found that increased HMO buying power does reflect monopsony 
conditions, as input prices lowered, but utilization of the inputs increased.  According 
to their research, this can be attributed to the continued breakup of monopoly power 
of hospitals.  Thus, Feldman and Wholey concluded that HMO buying power 
improved the efficiency of markets for hospital services.   
This is notable, as the traditional model for monopsony does not describe the 
healthcare market accurately, or the contracted relationships therein, because markets 
for healthcare services often operate under an all-or-nothing contractual basis.  
However, Feldman and Wholey (2001) made an incorrect assumption that the 
traditional definition of monopsony will provide an accurate model for use in the case 
of U.S. healthcare markets.  They assumed that hospitals could provide partial 
quantities to the HMOs, instead of HMOs and insurers using all-or-nothing 
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contractual arrangements with the providers of healthcare services.  This incorrect 
assumption erodes their interpretations of the results.  In the case of an all-or-nothing 
relationship, utilization or quantity demanded would increase while prices decrease, 
as ACHs must either supply the quantities demanded at the offered price or supply 
nothing.  Their interpretation that the continued breakup of monopoly power results in 
increased efficiency of the market is misleading.  Feldman and Wholey’s approach is 
similar to the research conducted within this thesis; however the monopsony model 
discussed within this thesis perhaps more accurately depicts the relationship of the 
payor and hospital. This provides a more complete answer to the monopsony question 
and its effects upon decisions of the capital structure of ACHs in U.S. health care. 
M.V. Pauly (2004) examined the concepts of quality in healthcare and 
competition’s effects on quality in the marketplace. His paper mainly focused on 
hypothetical cost quality tradeoffs  in the presence of competition and the 
ramifications of such. He defining quality as, “everything about some good or service 
relevant to consumers (actual and perceived ) welfare that is not measured by 
quantity” (Pauly 2004, p.114) , and argued that quality and price often trade off 
eventually, and that competition will make consumers better off, but will not be able 
to maximize quality. He also argued that the cost of such quality has an impact on a 
firm’s financials, whether as leverage or liquidity.  He maintained that due to 
distortions within the market, such as the “medical arms race” previously noted in this 
research, the distortions have an impact because it has been shown that firms that 
cannot compete on price compete on quality, whether real or perceived (Robinson & 
Luft(1985).  However, he further noted that the average level of quality may be lower 
than if the market consisted of a competitive environment resulting from the ceiling 
on price precluding high quality at a higher price.  What Pauly (2004) expressed in his 
research is relevant, because it continues to suggest that ACHs, even under restriction, 
still compete on quality because price is not a factor, and that the market is restricted 
by asymmetric information and by artificial pricing.  It is also important as it expands 
the possible measurement for monopsony.  This is salient as it provides a contextual 
reference for how monopsony is measured within research. 
Allocative efficiency of the healthcare market was also examined by D.L. 
Sevilla (2005).  He proposed that a collusive monopsony exists in U.S. laboratory 
services between government and commercial insurers who collude to fix prices for 
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medical services.  Sevilla examined the use of the Resource Based Relative Value 
Scale (RBRVS) by government payers to determine reimbursement for medical 
procedures is a mechanism for collusion.   He  suggested that the RBRVS mechanism 
used for pricing ultimately acts as a price-fixing tool because of its availability as  
public information.  Sevilla theorized that this mechanism allows other commercial 
payers to coordinate pricing and policies following government reimbursement.  
Because the government is the largest consumer of healthcare services, it acts as the 
major market power.  Sevilla utilized collusive monopsony to describe this 
occurrence, rather than oligopsony. His reasoning was that oligopsony does not 
accurately describe the nature of the collusion that is taking place.   
The U.S. Government implemented a fee schedule in 1992 (RBRVS) to pay 
Medicare providers for their services.  Sevilla (2005) argued that the textbook 
definition of monopsony does not adequately describe the supply decisions facing a 
medical provider when confronted with a dominant health insurer.  He, like others, 
pointed to the all-or-nothing contractual nature of healthcare insurers and the effect 
this has on the healthcare provider.  He suggested, similar to Taylor (2003), that an 
insurer using the all-or-nothing contractual arrangement could lower prices for 
services while still consuming the competitive market.  This fee schedule was based 
upon RBRVS.  Sevilla (2005, p. 66) noted, “From the viewpoint of tacit collusion 
theory, the preparation and circulation of RBRVS adversely affects competition.”   
Sevilla (2005) utilized nine years of billing data (1990-1999) from CSG, Inc., 
a private laboratory operating in Orange County, California.  The data represented 
laboratory services for Pap smears, a service in which CSG, Inc. specialized.  The Pap 
smears during the longitudinal study remained a manual process performed by the 
laboratory cytologist, and the underlying technology did not change.  This limited the 
scope for lower costs by reducing the opportunities of lower prices due to underlying 
cost changes in the services provided.  California state law limits production to 80 Pap 
smears/day per cytologist, therefore limiting product output.  Sevilla analyzed 
reimbursement for Pap smears, and found that beginning in 1991, almost all private 
insurers were paying $18 per Pap smear, as invoiced, while Medicare and Medi-Cal 
were paying $9 and $8.25, respectively.  From 1991-1999, private insurers 
continuously curtailed reimbursement, coming closer to Medi-Cal and Medicare 
reimbursement, whilst CSG, Inc. continuously raised their standard billing rate for the 
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Pap smear laboratory service to reflect increases in underlying costs.  The median 
reimbursement from the private insurers decreased the reimbursement until the 
median reimbursement for Pap smears in 1999 was $9, almost in accordance with the 
Medi-Cal rate.  Sevilla pointed out that the standard deviation from the median 
reimbursement in 1991-1992 was (0.488) and changed over the years as 
reimbursement to charges changed, with the standard deviation in 1999 becoming 
(6.55). This meant that reimbursement for Pap smears was lower over time in 
comparison to charges.  
Sevilla (2005) concluded that a collusive monopsony exists within the 
healthcare field as the result of insurers reimbursing for services well below the 
competitive rate.   The government is trying to substitute for perceived market failure 
with the implementation of the RBRVS pricing methodology.  Sevilla argued that 
while some may view healthcare as influenced strongly by social non-market forces, 
he believes that traditional market forces influence the insurance market.  He argued 
that because monopsonists are profit maximizers, competition requires that medical 
laboratories be able to accept or reject a given level of reimbursement without 
punitive consequences.  Sevilla’s findings  are significant, as the proposed empirical 
methodologies of this thesis mirror Sevilla’s in many respects, with similar data and 
controls for underlying changes in cost, which are technology neutral throughout the 
longitudinal study.  While Sevilla (2005)identification of the market is slightly 
different, the two markets function similarly with similar payor/ service provider 
relationships and similar reimbursement strategies. 
Pallavi Seth (2006) carried forward the notion of monopsony by insurers, in 
particular HMOs, and presented evidence of monopsony and long-term effects upon 
input providers.  In particular, he examined the exercise of monopsony power and its 
ability to lower equilibrium levels for primary care physicians’ (PCP) earnings and 
services. Seth used a monopsony model consisting of physicians’ earnings employed 
by health providers owned or operated by MCOs, setting an environment in which 
hospitals and the levels of services are under a monopolistic health insurer, which is 
similar conceptually to that of Pauly (1998).   Seth (2006) explained physician 
behavior under monopsony as similar to Foreman (2003) and Taylor (2003).   This 
examination was comprised of creating HHIs of the HMOs, along with an additional 
control variables for 218 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) adjusted for market 
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size.  Using the HHI, he observed the impact of HMO concentration on the earnings 
of PCPs and the per capita number of PCPs.  This paper provides evidence for the 
presence of monopsony within the U.S. healthcare market.  Similarly to Paul (1998) 
and Sevilla (2005), Seth (2006) provides additional evidence to suggest that the 
presence of monopsony is a valid theory which should be tested further. 
Seth (2006) concluded that there is evidence of monopsony in the 70 largest 
MSAs in which increases in HMO concentration were associated with lower or 
decreasing PCP earnings.  He summarized that the reduction in earnings has a 
negative effect on the number of PCPs.  The lowering of wages below the competitive 
rate is accomplished by HMOs employing fewer physicians. He suggests that this 
may provide an explanation for the shortage of PCPs in many states and the declining 
applications to medical schools.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a basis for the empirical analysis in the next chapter as it 
gives evidence to an environment which monopsony is allowed to exist legally, with 
legal precedence being set by the courts for monopsony’s statutory basis as a market 
force in the Kartell vs Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts case.  The courts 
ignored one of the crucial pieces of evidence against health insurers, that health 
insurance is in fact two separate markets, one for the financing of health coverage and 
the other as a purchase of the inputs (health services) for the financing of health 
coverage (Hammer & Sage, 2004).  The existence of these two markets causes 
insurers to exhibit profit maximizing behavior.  Thus, insurers seek to maximize their 
profit at the expense of the supplier (ACHs), via lower reimbursement for healthcare 
services.  The legal framework used to examine monopsony by the courts fails to 
consider the harm to the consumer via the detrimental effects of monopsony on the 
supplier and allocative inefficiency, which affects ACHs (suppliers of health inputs) 
financially by restricting revenues akin to zerbe (2005). 
Previous research supports the existence of monopsony within the healthcare 
market.  Both traditional monopsony as well as monopsony under the all-or-nothing 
contract were considered in previous literature. In general, monopsony is considered 
under the framework of one entity; however, under the scenario considered in this 
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research, monopsony is a collusive behavior between government and private payors. 
The government via the CMS is the lowest payor for services within the market and 
acts as the market leader.  The government publicly posts policies, procedures, and 
fee schedules for other private payors to consider in directing their own behavior 
within the market.  This mechanism allows all payors to extract additional rents from 
the market, effectively establishing price fixing. 
Previous research supports monopsony within healthcare under the traditional 
and non-traditional definitions of monopsony (Pauly 1998; Sevilla 2005; Seth 2006).  
It is on the premise of monopsony as a market force and its effects upon ACHs’ 
decisions of capital structure that underlies this research.  Chapter 6 provides a 
detailed discussion of the monopsony argument, in addition to outlining the model 




6. Empirical Evidence of Collusive Monopsony 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 discussed collusive monopsony under the all-or-nothing contract 
and described the conditions within the healthcare market that led to its existence.  Its 
existence is supported directly by the previous research of Pauly (1998), Sevilla 
(2005), and Seth (2006). The purpose of this chapter is to address one of the primary 
research questions of this thesis, which is to examine collusive monopsony under the 
all-or-nothing contract. In doing so, it seeks to provide empirical evidence of the 
existence of collusive monopsony and an understanding of its influence on ACHs’ 
decisions of capital structure. This is important, as collusive monopsony is thought to 
have negative effects upon ACHs’ decisions of capital structure, thereby affecting 
ACHs’ behavior and financial health.   
By combining two datasets, one private and one public, the research formed a 
new dataset that provides insight into the ACH market.  The MCR from Chapters 3 
and 4, which contains ACHs’ financial data for each year, was combined with private 
electronic claims and payment data from individual ACHs.  While the sample of 
ACHs within the private data is smaller, all ACHs found in the private database were 
included in the MCR.  This allowed for pricing information and health services 
information to be combined with ACHs’ financial information.   
In order to provide evidence of collusive monopsony, the research combines 
two separate indexes, thereby measuring different market attributes.  The first index is 
is the Lerner’s Index (LI), which measures market power of ACHs.  This provides the 
ability to examine the supply side of the market and any market power contained 
therein.  This is combined with a regression of the real FCFs of ACH’s to examine the 
effects of market power upon FCFs to determine if those affects may influence 
decisions of capital structure of the ACH.  Additionally, the LI is also regressed 
against the NISP (Net Income from Service to Patients) of the ACH’s.  This 
regression allows the research to consider market powers effects and correlation with 
NISP.  In this case, NISP is used in addition to FCF as NISP provides a better 
indication of ACHs revenues derived from insurers (payors).  The FCFs of ACH’s 
derived from the MCR might be distorted by revenues classified as Other Income by 
the MCR.  These Other Incomes are revenues derived from avenues other than 
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services provided to patients.   Thus, with both regressions the research is able to 
examine market power direct via a Lerner’s Index calculated on behalf of the ACH’s, 
but also account for price taker status of the ACH, which might be evident via the 
Lerner’s Index correlation via the NISP.   
The second index the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), which is used to 
measure market concentration of payors.  To show evidence of collusion, the real FCF 
of ACHs was then regressed on concentration via the HHI.  Presence of collusion 
would be indicated by the negative effects of concentration on real FCFs. Combining 
concentration and collusion (if any) with an assumption of price inelasticity using the 
New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO), the research attempts to provide a 
measure of market power for payors.  This ability to measure the market power of 
payors is important as it provides the research with the ability to examine the market 
power of the consumer, which cannot be measured directly via a calculated Lerner’s 
Index as price and marginal cost data is not available.  This methodology enabled the 
research to consider both sides of the market equation simultaneously, i.e. market 
power of the supplier (ACHs) and the consumer (the payors), to capture a self-
supporting condition of monopsony power, and to gain insight into the effects it has 
on the capital structures of ACHs.   
 
6.1.1 Monopsony’s Importance to the Study 
Monopsony is important to this study, as it has proven through research to 
place distortions on upstream markets for goods and services, causing inefficient 
allocation or unfair prices for inputs (Bradfield 1990; Shibata 1973; de Fontenay 
2004; Taylor 2003; Alexander 2007).  For the purposes of this research, unfair prices 
are considered prices below a competitive market price.  In the case of the U.S. ACH 
market, these distortions have serious implications for the decisions of capital 
structure chosen by ACHs, as monopsonist prices under the all-or-nothing contract 
move the supplier (ACHs) off its marginal cost curve and onto the average cost curve.  
The consequences of this action are less ACH free cash flows, which influence 
decisions of capital structure.  
“...the all-or-nothing monopsonist appropriates all the profits that would 
accrue to the competitive input suppliers.  Thus, the all-or-nothing monopsony 
solution is equally efficient to the competitive solution, but it is inequitable or 
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unfair compared to the competitive norm because exploitation of the 
monopsonist’s power to dictate both price and quantity to suppliers results in 
appropriation of all potential profits in the input industry.” (Taylor 2003, p. 
11-12)   
By pushing ACHs onto their average cost curve and reducing free cash flows 
to ACHs, insurers force ACHs into difficult financial positions, because restrictions in 
free cash flows limit access to debt markets and thus affect ACHs’ decisions of capital 
structure, akin to Calem and Rizzo (1995).  This is a problem, as hospitals compete on 
quality or perceived quality, or in the case of the research of Stein (2001), if hospitals 
are leveraged heavily, they are prone to underinvestment.  In these cases, lower free 
cash flows increase bankruptcy cost. Under these conditions, managers of ACHs must 
consider these influences when deciding the capital structure of the firm. 
If one takes into consideration Taylor (2003), payors can limit reimbursement 
to ACHs without affecting the health-consuming public, as ACHs operate under the 
condition of all-or-nothing contracts.  This is cause for concern, as the consequences 
for operating under monopsony conditions are not a short-run, but rather a long-run 
problem (Bradfield 1990).  Although there is research on the effects of monopsony in 
the U.S. healthcare market, there is little study on ACHs and the effect the 
monopsony construct has on their decisions of capital structure.  A better 
understanding of collusive monopsony’s effect on the capital structures of ACHs is 
necessary.  Healthcare is a market that is full of distortions and complexities, and this 
likely is the reason that so few economists and financial researchers have addressed 
this specialized market (Robinson 2001).  
 
6.2  Data 
6.2.1 Data Description 
Data for this research was provided via two databases on U.S. hospital 
financial information.  The first is the MCR data provided by the U.S. Government.  
U.S. hospitals are required to file information with the CMS annually regarding 
financial operations.  The first set of data is comprised of this filed data.  This 
database relates to all hospitals that accept Medicare and Medicaid patients.  The time 
periods covered in the database are 1995-2007.  There are 6,000 ACHs in the U.S.  
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This cost report data covered between 5,500-6,000 of those hospitals at any given 
time.  Details of this data were explained in Chapters 3 and 4.  This data remains 
exactly the same as the data used previously. 
The second database is compiled by the researcher via the SSI Group, Inc., a 
company specializing in the healthcare electronic billing industry.  The data consist of 
12,722,238  electronic claims (837s, bills) submitted to both private insurers as well 
as government payers for services delivered by ACHs.  The electronic remittance 
(835s, payment) for each claim within the database is tied to the original claim filed 
so that a match can be made, a comparison of services delivered, and so that the 
payments made for each service can be determined.  This provides the reimbursement 
information on health services delivered by ACHs.    The claims/remittance data was 
merged into the MCR financial data for each hospital so that a comparison of the 
ACHs’ financials can be compared with reimbursement for procedures.  The ACHs 
used are a subsample of the hospitals used in the agency study in Chapter 4.  The 
database relates to 1,500 hospitals that correspond to the MCR database.  The 
longitudinal time frame (2000-2007) for this receivables cycle information 
corresponds with a partial overlap of the time frame found in the larger MCR 
database, ultimately representing eight years of data. The second database provides 
information such as detailed accounts of the claims filed with insurance companies, 
and remittance data, such as the amount billed, date billed, payment date, and amount 
of payment received.   
It must be noted that the information on claims and remits (payments) contains 
some negative numbers.  While all payments to the ACHs were positive in dollar 
terms, there are two reasons for such an occurrence.  The first is that the payor lists 
the notation on the electronic remit as negative because it is in fact a “take back.”
13
  
The second is due to the notation of the insurer on the electronic claim, and while it is 
not a notation of a negative value, the notation has another meaning within the 




   “Take backs” are when a payer rescinds a payment previously awarded, and is common place 
within the industry to compensate for over or wrongful payment. 
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individual payor’s computer system.  All such values were removed in the process to 
expunge outliers from the study for clarification and sterilization purposes. 
The geographic coverage of the two databases represented is slightly different.  
The MCR database covers the entire U.S., while the smaller claims database 
geographically covers parts of the U.S.  The use of these two datasets provides the 
opportunity to investigate monopsony using a combination of methodologies that 
allowed for the analysis of the effect of monopsony on the capital structure of the 
ACH.  
 
6.2.2 Advantages of Data 
The data provided covers multiple ACHs.  This allowed for a broad 
comparison of payment data across a broad geographic area.  When combined with 
the cost information contained within the MCR, the research was able to calculate an 
LI for each ACH, thereby measuring the market power of the ACH at the ACH’s 
market level.  In addition, payor concentration could be calculated for each ACH 
market, as the payor information was recorded within the private claims data, thus 
allowing an HHI to be calculated.  For this research, 12,722,238 claims provided the 
nucleus for the calculation of both the LI and the HHI.  This granularity of billing and 
remittance data was significant, and it provided the basis upon which this research 
was able to create a snapshot of the relationship for each ACH in the study and its 
individual market conditions. 
Both government and private payer reimbursement was included for inpatient 
and outpatient procedures ranging from simple to complex.  The data was constructed 
in a panel data format, allowing longitudinal studies to be conducted over a significant 
time frame.  Panel data linear regressions could be conducted that allowed insight into 
previously unrecognized relationships, both across the MCR and private ACH 
reimbursement data.  The data allowed analysis of both payer and ACH market power 
simultaneously within the same data.  Therefore, the data combined with proper 
methodologies provided for the possibility of evidence of monopsony on the part of 






6.2.3 Limitations of Data 
The data provided does not completely cover the geographic area covered in 
Chapter 4.  This may lead to geographic bias within the study, as there may be a 
greater presence in the sample of hospitals from one geographic region.  Due to 
differences in reimbursement by both government and private insurers by geographic 
region, this may skew results and may not be representative of the entire nation.  This 
especially was true when the price of healthcare services was utilized.  The ACH 
reimbursement database does not cover the exact time frame of the previous chapter; 
therefore, a limitation must be placed upon the temporal frame of the study.  The 
claims data represented a unique set of procedures that may not fully represent all the 
procedures provided by an ACH or ACHs within the market.  This may skew results 
that use pricing information from these procedures.  An additional breakdown of the 
results by ownership type was not possible due to limitations within the data.  
However, this did not affect the research as this limitation in the data can be ignored 
in the light of the ownership effects of capital structure considered within this 
research  This was possible due to the findings of Wedig et al (1988) that indicate the 
ownership structure of U.S. ACHs has no effect upon their capital structure. 
 
6.3 Data Organization, Behaviour, and Sample Creation 
6.3.1 Overview 
Monopsony often is studied via the inputs and outputs of a market.  Previous 
monopsony studies have dealt with different markets and industries, in particular, 
labor markets and the meat-packing industry, and this study references Bradfield 
(1990), Azzam (1996), Taylor (2003), and Inoue and Vukina (2006), among others.   
Inputs are identified as the prices paid for goods and or services, and outputs are the 
goods and or services generated by the inputs and labor.  This study intends to use the 
two indexes previously discussed, the HHI and the LI, to provide evidence of 
monopsony in the U.S. healthcare market.  The HHI is a measure of market 
concentration, and the equation using HHI is illustrated in Equation 6-6 (p. 162). The 
LI is a measure of market power, as is illustrated in Equation 6-3 (p. 155).  The LI 
measures the excess margin captured by a market participant, and normally is used to 
examine monopoly power.  Through the combination of measurements of the HHI, 
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the NEIO, and the LI, this research attempts to provide evidence of monopsony.  For 
the LI study, nine procedures generated by ACHs were chosen to be studied as the 
outputs of this market.  The procedures are broken down in Table 6.1, below. 
 
Table 6.1: Monopsony Study Clinical Procedures (DRG = Diagnosis Related Grouper) 
(ICD9= International Classification of Diseases):  
The table provides a list of the nine procedures used in creation of the Lerner’s Index.  Each 
procedure is listed along with its DRG and the matching ICD9 code and diagnosis codes.  
The right-hand column provides the methodology for determination of the match between the 
diagnosis codes and both the ICD9 codes and the DRG.  The DRGs are used by the 
government for determining reimbursement, while ICD9 codes are used by the commercial 
payors to determine reimbursement. 
 
All procedures included must have existed during the entirety of the 
longitudinal study (1995-2007), and each service delivered must not have changed 
technologically.   It is important to isolate any price changes in the market as just 
pertaining to market pressures, with no underlying technological changes in the 
services delivered, similar to Sevilla (2005). The ACHs participating in the sample for 
the monopsony study were not predetermined; rather, they were determined by the 
match of the claim submitted with the remittance received.  The ACHs represented in 
the study must have had both government and commercial payments represented in 
the same year. In order to ensure a clear comparison between government and 
commercial payers, claims were chosen that had a single procedure rendered, or a 
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combination of procedures and an underlying diagnosis that was tied to a single DRG.  
The government reimbursement is calculated via a DRG, and the commercial payer 
reimbursement via a combination of ICD9
14
 procedure codes along with a primary 
diagnosis.  
In order to improve the sample size included for the study, an assumption of 
procedure frequency was made.  To clarify, the frequency of a procedure and 
diagnosis each year within the study was assumed to remain stable, i.e. minimal 
changes in the frequency of each procedure from year to year and therefore the 
research could expand the number of procedure/diagnosis combinations as long as 
they were continually tied to a single DRG.  Charges for services were derived from 
the use of an electronic claim (837) that denoted the services provided to the patient 
and the associated charges.  Payment information was derived from electronic 
remittances (835) picked up by the SSI Group, Inc. for the ACH.  By selecting only 
the nine procedures listed in Table 6.1, the large pool of hospitals was limited to 372 
distinct hospitals.  The primary reasoning for this limitation was that both a claim and 
a remit must be available for one of the nine procedures.  The parameter of nine 
procedures as well as the combination of the claim remit data resulted in the limitation 
of ACHs in the sample.  The restriction via the nine procedures only applies to the LI 
sample.  Greater detail of the sample creation is found in Section 6.3.2. 
This study proceeded with the analysis of the data to find evidence of 
collusive monopsony within the ACH market, as well as to provide explanation of 
these conditions within this market via monopsony cost.  The study relied on the data 
of prices paid by insurance companies for services rendered over time and the price 
paid via the fee schedule of the CMS for the same services over the same time frame.  
Sevilla (2005) conducted research using claims data similar to the data utilized in this 




 The ICD9 code is version of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems (most commonly known by the abbreviation ICD).  It is a code created by the World 
Health Organization to classify diseases and a wide variety of signs, symptoms, abnormal findings, 
complaints, social circumstances, and external causes of injury or disease. Under this system, every 
health condition can be assigned to a unique category and given a code, up to six characters long.  Such 
categories can include a set of similar diseases  (World Health Organization 2010). 
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ACH research.  As previously discussed, Sevilla’s research compared prices paid for 
the same service (Pap smears) in laboratories over time between private insurers and 
the CMS.  His hypothesized RBRVS was used as a mechanism for price collusion and 
information sharing by private insurers.   
The U.S. Government implemented a similar fee structure to RBRVS on 
January 1, 1992, in order to control escalating ACHs’ costs in healthcare (Sevilla 
2005).  Using data from CSG, Inc. for the years 1991-1999, Sevilla (2005) showed 
that insurance companies decreased the reimbursements for Pap smears.  The 
adjustment of reimbursements was guided by the usage of RBRVS. While Sevilla’s 
research dealt with laboratory data and not ACH data, the ACH market operates 
similarly.   
In order to measure the market concentration of payors, an HHI was calculated 
of the payors in each hospital market within the study for each year.  The HHI was 
calculated in this fashion in order to take into account the different competitive 
markets facing each hospital, as they vary geographically, similar to Seth (2006).  The 
payer matrix for one hospital will differ from that of another with a different 
geographic location. 
 
6.3.2 Sample Outline 
The subsamples used in this study come from the same overall sample of 
ACHs used in Chapters 3 and 4; different subsamples were used to calculate the HHI 
and LI. The sample for the LI was limited only to those ACHs with claims associated 
with DRGs outlined in Figure 6.2.  The subsample for the HHI was not restricted, but 
made use of all 12,722,238 claims available for study. 
 
6.3.2.1 Lerner’s Index Sample 
The sample for the monopsony research consisted of 457,146 individual cases 
of reimbursement by both government and commercial payers.  There are nine 
procedures defined in Figure 6.2, which encompasses the spectrum of services 
delivered.  Each procedure met the required specifications of no technological change 




Figure 6.2: Procedure Name and Definition:   
The table provides the full name for the procedures in the Lerner’s Index study along with the 
definition describing each procedure. 
The count of claims within the study and their distribution is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3.  ChgStatus is the indicator of payer type, with zero referencing the 
government and one referencing the commercial payers.  The distribution of the 
claims in the study was equally distributed, roughly.  It is important that there was 
roughly equivalent representation of government and private insurers in the sample.  
Equal representation reduces the likelihood that the LI will be biased due to over-
weighted representation by one type of payor over the other. 
This monopsony study was possible through insights into the reimbursement 
by procedure.  This was accomplished via the variable PriPayments, later labeled 
Reimbursement $.  If we analyzed PriPayments, N = 457,146 payments in the sample 
with a mean payment of $7,995.98.  The range within the sample via PriPayments 
was $3,927,300.00.  This large range suggested that outliers were present within the 
sample.  This was also confirmed by stem and leaf plot, which uses Tukey’s (1977) 
definition of outliers: three inter-quartile ranges below the twenty-fifth percentile or 
above the seventy-fifth percentile.  This method of identifying outliers suggested that 
approximately 10% of the samples identified by PriPayments were outliers or extreme 
values.   While identification had been made of outliers in the overall sample, 
exclusion or removal of outliers were done at a more granular level of the procedure.  
The removal at the granular level was important as a result of the comparison of 
reimbursement by payer type, in other words, government or commercial at the case 
Procedure Rendered  Full Name Definition
LAVH Laparoscopic Assisted Vaginal Hysterectomy a surgical procedure using a laparoscope to guide the removal of the uterus,Fallopian tubes and ovaries through the vagina.
Coronary Bypass Coronary artery bypass surgery a surgical procedure performed to relieve angina and reduce the risk of death from coronary artery disease.
Cholecystectomy Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy the surgical removal of the gallbladder
ESWL Extracorporeal Shock Wave Lithotripsy the non-invasive treatment of kidney stones (urinary calculosis) and biliary calculi .
Bronchoscopy Bronchoscopy technique of visualizing the inside of the airways for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes.
Colonoscopy Colonoscopy the endoscopic examination of the large colon and the distal part of the small bowel with a fibre optic camera on a flexible tube.
EGD Esophagogastroduodenoscopy a diagnostic endoscopic procedure that visualizes the upper part of the gastrointestinal tract up to the duodenum
Total HIP Total Hip Replacement Surgery a surgical procedure whereby the diseased cartilage and bone of the hip joint is surgically replaced with artificial materials.
Total KNEE Total Knee Replacement Surgery a surgical procedure whereby the diseased knee joint is replaced with artificial material.




count or number of reimbursements per year by payer.  Cases were defined for these 
purposes as a procedure performed for which an electronic reimbursement was 
captured.   
Although the study was conducted on the data from 1995-2007, 
reimbursement data was available starting in 2000.  While the SSI Group, Inc. (the 
supplier of electronic claims information), has been in business for over 20 years, the 
use of electronic remittance that made this study possible only gained acceptance 
around the year 2000.  For this reason, the majority of our data was found in the later 
years, which is evidenced by the skewing of the sample distribution to the right, as 
shown in Figure 6.4. 
 
 
Figure 6.4:  Case Count by Year and Payer:   
The case counts are relatively small in the year 2000, increasing throughout the remainder of 
the study for both government and commercial claims.  The years 2000-2009 are shown in 
order to provide the reader with a greater sense of frequency behavior within the data to show 
that trends that occur in year 2007 continue through 2008.  This is important, as the research 
makes assumptions based upon stability of claim submittal.  The year 2009 is one-half of a 
year.  The increase in 2004 was due to the Administrative Simplification Compliance Act of 
2001. 
 In Figure 6.4, the case count was extremely small, less than 1,000 in the year 
2000, but it built up quickly through 2007.  Large increases in visible cases were 
evident in the year 2004, approximately three times the cases as in 2003.  This large 
increase in cases was created by ACHs accepting the electronic remittance as a 
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methodology for keeping track of payment.  The ACHs used these electronic 
remittances to automatically post to their accounting systems.  Both government and 
commercial reimbursements were present, with the government representing a larger 
percentage of cases than commercial reimbursement until the year 2005.  Beyond 
2005, commercial cases outnumbered government cases by a two-to-one margin.  
Government cases were higher in the early years, due to the standardization of their 
electronic remittance in comparison to the commercial market
15
.  When PriPayments 
(Reimbursement $) was analyzed by the mean reimbursement by year and by payer, a 
similar trend within the data appeared, and is outlined in Figure 6.5.  The average 
payment increased year after year, with a stabilization of payment in 2005-2006.   
Figure 6.5: Mean Reimbursement by Year and Payer 
 
In addition to the examination of the overall sample with all procedures and 
reimbursements together, each procedure was analyzed separately and outliers were 




 The Administrative Simplification Compliance Act 2001 (ASCA) amended the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and required that all claims submitted to Medicare 
on October 16, 2003 and beyond must be done electronically except for certain circumstances, hence 
the increase in 2004.  
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removed.  Outliers removed at the procedure level will provide a more accurate 
identification methodology.  This method for excluding outliers provides greater 
accuracy, because payment distributions for the chosen nine procedures vary.  By 
removing outliers at the individual procedure level, we were able to take into account 
the payment distribution for each individual procedure.  Therefore, outliers in the 
reimbursement for one procedure may not have been considered an outlier for 
another.  This accuracy provided better results further into the study when the 
regression analysis was performed.   
All ACH medical procedures 
16
represented in the claims data within the study 
were invasive procedures, and six of the nine were surgeries.  The three remaining 
medical procedures in the claims data were physically invasive examinations.  This 
may not have been a representative sample of all procedures conducted within a 
hospital; however, they comply with the previously mentioned requirements of 
consistent technology and procedure over the course of the study, and have the ability 
to match directly with a single DRG of government reimbursement.  Further analysis 
of each procedure is shown in Figure 6.6, below 
 
Figure 6.6: Procedure Name, Descriptives, and Outliers: 
Detailed procedure exploratory data, outliers, and data adjustments can be found in the 
appendix. (X) represents outliers within the sample for each medical procedure.  Values of 
outliers are represented in dollars.  Greater detail of data exploration, outlier removal and data 
adjustments  for each procedure is provided in the appendix for Chapter 6 under the heading 
“Chapter 6 Procedures”. 




 .  Greater detail of data exploration, outlier removal and data adjustments for each procedure is 
provided in the appendix for Chapter 6 under the heading “Chapter 6 Procedures”. 
Procedure LAVH CBYP CHOLX ESWL BRON COLO EGD HIP KNEE
(n) 9,143 141,054 52,120 12,532 22,467 118,253 61,019 75 40,483
Mean ($) 5730 12838 6142 4204 15945 1775 5640 14556 12496
Median ($) 3842 7044 4475 3205 5638 788 2375 10455 10260
min ($) -1024 -16050 -21264 0 -48614 -8443 -14116 247 1
max ($) 322971 1145851 354169 122910 1138980 611159 904256 59075 3878659
Range ($) 323995 1161901 375433 122910 1187594 619602 918372 58828 3878660
Skewness 15 10 12 6 8 36 17 2 151
Kurtosis 405 213 312 102 102 2,573 551 3 27,609
Outliers ($) x>=13804 x>=30692 X>=16312 X>=10639 X>=34755 X>=3069 X>=12701 X>=30972 X>=20507
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6.3.2.2 Herfindahl-Hirschman Sample 
The sample obtained for use in calculating the HHI was significantly larger 
than that of the LI:  N= 12,722,238 initial cases (2000-2009).  Each case represented a 
matched claim and remittance for any medical procedure/DRG that was provided by 
the ACH in a given year. The ACHs had multiple claims per year, from which a 
single HHI per ACH is calculated.  No limitations were placed on medical 
services/procedures rendered.  Limitations of the study were temporally set for 2000-
2007.  Only payer information by procedure was necessary to calculate the HHI; 
therefore, no outliers were present within the data.   
 
6.4 Methodology 
6.4.1 Lerner’s Index: 
In order to show price pressures on the ACH, a modified Lerner’s Index (LI) 
17
was created for each ACH by year of study (2000-2007).  The LI also requires 
marginal cost data.  Normally, the LI is created by using the formula in Equation 6-1. 
Equation: 6-1: Lerner’s Index 
 
    
 
 
 P = Price Received  
 MC= Marginal Cost 
 




 The Lerner’s Index in traditional econometric research has been commonly utilized to measure 
market power of the firm by analyzing the marginal profitability of the firm and was created by Abba 
Lerner in 1934 (Lerner,  1934, Martin, 1994, Cabral, 2000, and Lipczynski et al., 2009).  The Lerner’s 
Index traditionally generates a value between 0 and 1, with 0 denoting no market power and 1 perfect 
market power, such as a position of monopoly or monopsony (Martin, 1994, Cabral 2000 and 
Lipczynski,et al, 2009).  This research uses the Lerner’s Index in its traditional role to measure market 
power.  Lerner (1934), Martin (1994), Lipczynski, et al (2009) and Cabral (2000) support this approach 
to measurement of market power via the Lerner’s Index. 
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Here, P is the price received within the market for the good, and MC is the 
marginal cost associated with producing the good.  The LI also provides a measure of 
the monopoly power of each ACH.  The LI traditionally provides an index from zero 
to one, with one being true monopoly power, and zero possessing no monopoly 
power.  This is achieved, as, marginal cost (MC) equals price under perfect 
competition.   Effectively, the formula becomes price minus price under perfect 
competition, as a proportion of price. 
In this case, an adaptation of the LI was valuable to address concerns in the 
previous research of Shibata (1973), Pauly (1998), Feldmand (2001), and Taylor 
(2003), that ACHs are monopolistic in that the lower prices paid for services are a 
function of monopoly busting and not a condition of monopsony. By utilizing the LI, 
one can answer two questions: 1) what, if any, are the price pressures on ACHs (are 
they price makers or price takers)?  2) Is there any concern of a monopoly power still 
prevalent with ACHs?  By analyzing price pressures, one is able to understand 
whether ACHs are price takers or price makers within the market.   
As market power for ACHs is bounded geographically, the research 
considered the geographically bounded market power in order to reduce the likelihood 
of misrepresenting market power due to the distortion of the geographically bounded 
markets.  A problem with creating the LI for each hospital for each of the years 
studied was that marginal cost data was not provided via the MCR.  Therefore, 
another method was used to obtain access to cost data.  This approach provided an 
approximate value of the LI.   This modified LI provided valuable information and 
insight into market power of hospitals.   In order to calculate the modified LI, the 
average total cost was used instead of the marginal cost.   
The average total cost (ATC) per procedure was calculated by taking the total 
operating expenses provided in the MCR for each ACH per year, and dividing that by 
the total number of inpatient and outpatient days provided by the ACH that year 
which provided the average cost per patient day (ACPPD) for the ACH.  The ACPPD 
is then multiplied by the geometric length of stay (GMLOS).  However, total 
operating costs include depreciation and interest expenses along with general and 
administrative expenses.  These additional expenses can be regarded as fixed costs. 
Therefore, in taking the ATC to equal the MC, we assume that the ATC= average 
variable costs (AVC) (that is, the average fixed costs are close to zero), and that the 
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AVC are constant with respect to output (patient days) at output ranges observed in 
practice.  The ATC per procedure is represented in Equation 6-2.  This is the fully 
burdened cost of providing services to a patient per day.  The ACHs utilize the total 
cost per patient days to measure the productivity and efficiency of the firm.   
Equation: 6-2:  Average Total Cost Per Procedure 
 
     (
  
   
   )
 
 
C = Avg. Total Cost (ATC) 
j = procedure 
E = Total Annual Operating Expenses 
D= Total inpatient and outpatient days 
g = Geometric Length of Stay 
 i = firm 
 t = Year 
 
Each of the nine procedures outlined within the study were reimbursed by the 
government utilizing a DRG.  Each DRG is assigned a Geometric Mean Length of 
Stay (GMLOS)
18
, which is the geometric mean length of stay in days for that 
particular procedure or diagnosis.  Through studies, the government has determined 
the GMLOS to be the amount of time for a patient to be in the hospital with each 
particular procedure or illness treated, weighted by frequency of the number of days.  
The commercial insurers also utilize this same geometric length of stay in order to 
determine reimbursements, as well as to determine whether scrutiny of a claim is 
necessary.  In other words, this process is utilized to determine the appropriate length 
of patient stay for the commercial and government payor alike.   
An assumption made in this research was that the ACH incurs the geometric 
length of stay cost of treating the patients.  This assumed that a patient with a given 
DRG actually stayed in the hospital the amount of time noted by the GMLOS.   When 




 A table outlining the Geometric Length of Stay for each procedure and date range is provided in 
The Appendix.  This GMLOS provided for each procedure is listed in days.  The date ranges 
correspond to the time period of this research. 
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the actual patient time in the hospital differed from GMLOS, it is likely that the ATC 
will not equal the average cost (AC). 
The geometric length of stay is measured in patient days.  Therefore, the AC 
per patient day multiplied by the geometric length of stay for a specific procedure 
equals the ATC for a given procedure.  The ATC was calculated for each procedure 
within the study by using the preceding equation, Equation 6-2. The ATC for each 
procedure was calculated, and the approximation of the LI was created using the 
formula in Equation 6-3. 
Equation: 6-3: Lerner’s Index (Modified) 
    ∑
(




   
 
   
 
L = Proxy for the Lerner’s Index 
P= Price paid by the insurer 
C= Average Total Cost (ATC) 
i = individual ACH 
t = year 
j= procedure 
n = total number of procedures within (t) for ACH (i) 
 
By using the ATC, a modified LI was calculated for each claim within the 
study, for a total of 273,399 LIs.  The LIs were then summed by year and ACH, and 
divided by the total number of procedures conducted in the study by the ACH for a 
given year.  This calculation yielded an average LI for each ACH for each year it 
participated within the study.  Using this methodology, 1,603 LIs were produced.  
  
6.4.1.1 Lerner’s Index Hypotheses: 
This research examined the lack of market power on behalf of ACHs in the 
healthcare market, and its negative consequence for decisions of capital structure.  In 
order for the research to proceed under this premise, two conditions must be evident: 
1) The LI values must be low to show lack of market power; and 2) The LI values 
must positively correlate with the Real FCF.  The hypothesis for this examination is 
found in Hypothesis 6-6. 
Pauly (1988) proposed that monopsony market power was a possibility given 
the constructs of the U.S. healthcare market.  He proposed that monopsony within this 
market may not be beneficial from the supplier or consumer’s perspective, as it most 
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likely could lead to lower input prices and higher insurance prices, all while making 
less medical services available.  This was possible, as services with a value above 
their cost simply would not be furnished.  All this was proposed as a result of discount 
pricing by the monopsonist insurer.  Pauly (1998) furthered this inquiry by creating an 
empirical model to test for the presence of monopsony within the healthcare market.  
He concluded that the empirical model indicates a possibility of monopsonistic 
behavior by some insurers.  In line with Pauly’s suggested possibility of insurer 
monopsony, we would expect to find that low LI values for ACHs negatively affects 
free cash flows of ACHs  indicating lack of ACH monopoly power.  This implies the 
statistical hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6-6: Lack of Monopoly Power Negatively Affects Real FCF 
 
                                     
                                
 
                                            
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the LI and FCF, or 
that they negatively correlate.  If there is positive correlation, then we can reject the 
null hypothesis.  In addition to the relationship between the LI and the Real FCF, this 
research also proposed that ACHs operate under an all-or-nothing contractual 
arrangement, and that this is the primary cause for the lower prices paid to ACHs.  In 
order for this to be true, ACHs must be price takers, as Real FCF has additional 
variables that can influence its value and can distort consideration of price taking.  In 
consideration of this, the research proposed constructing an additional model using 
the NISP instead of Real FCF, as this better measures the contractual relationship 
between ACHs and payors. The hypothesis for this model can be seen in Hypothesis 
6-7.  Lack of monopoly power or market power is expressed in low values of the LI.  






Hypothesis 6-7:  Lack of Monopoly Power Negatively Affects NISP 
 
                                  
                                   
 
                                       
 
Evidence of price taking would be provided by way of positive correlation of 
the LI and NISP.  If values of the LI are low and these positively correlate with the 
NISP, then price taker status can be supported.  This would suggest that low market 
power or lack of monopoly power by ACHs has a negative impact on market rents 
derived from insurers, and hence on revenues. 
In order to understand the possible implications of these price pressures, and 
the market power of the ACH on the capital structure of the ACH, the LI was utilized 
in a random effects panel regression using the model in Equation 6-4, below (random 
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 Note: (Bi) prior to variable denotes a binary variable. 




 The Hausman test is a test of whether the loss in efficiency is worth removing the bias and 
inconsistency of the OLS estimators.  The Hausman test involves fitting the model by both IV and 
OLS, and compares a weighted square of the difference between the two estimators.  The 
difference in estimators is used to confirm use of the random effects model over OLS (Gibson, 2010). 
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The model provided an estimate of the strength and relationship of market 
power measured in the LI and the real FCFs (FCF measured in real [1996] terms).   
This relationship allowed for a better understanding of the real FCF created by the 
market power of the ACH, and gave the research insight into the considerations of 
managers who decide the capital structures of the ACHs. In addition, a second model 
was constructed, with the LI as the primary independent variable and Net Income 
from Service to Patients (NISP) as the dependent variable, as shown in Equation 6-5.  
The additional model was to examine LI in relation to the NISP.  The change to 
utilizing the NISP was because the real FCF can be distorted by the variable Other 
Income in the MCR.  Other Income is the sources of income other than revenue from 
service to patients, and was defined in Chapter 3.  The NISP encompassed all revenue 
streams derived from insurance reimbursement, and would better reflect monopoly 
power or lack thereof, in relation to the payors.  In other words, if ACHs are 
monopolist and can obtain a higher price margin and therefore have a higher LI, then 
this should be evident in the revenues derived from that monopoly power.  Likewise, 
if ACHs lack monopoly power and have low LIs, this too should be more evident in 
the relationship with NISP.   
The NISP was a better measure than Real FCF for price taker status because 
the revenue stream was supported largely by payor reimbursement.  The NISP is 
defined as Net Patient Revenues minus Total Operating expenses.  Net Patient 
Revenues is defined as Total Patient Revenues minus Contractual Allowances.  Total 
Patient Revenues is defined from sources such as inpatient care, outpatient care, 
ancillary services, home health, ambulance, outpatient rehab, ASC and hospice.  It 
was evident that the services included in NISP captures all revenue streams for which 
insurance reimbursement is likely. The NISP is included in net income calculation in 
the MCR; therefore, it affects the calculation of FCFs, and likewise, Real FCFs.  If 
lower Real FCFs affect capital structure, a low value of the LI and positive correlation 
in the LI and NISP provide evidence of two things: price taker status for services to 
patients and the lack of monopoly power on the part of the ACH for services to 
patients, thus providing an alternative to examining monopoly power with just the 
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 Note: (Bi) prior to variable denotes a binary variable. 
Table 6.2: Summary Statistics for all variables included in the Lerner’s Index 
Regressions: 
 
Table 6.3: Correlation Matrix for Lerner’s Index Variables: 
The highest correlation value present is for the relationship of Capex and the natural log of 
total assets (.4586).  This value makes sense as increases in Capex expand Total Assets. 
There is no concern for multicollinearity in any of the values. 
 
Lerner's Index Variable Summary Statistics
Variable n Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Real FCF 1367 -2837295 5.12E+07 -2.45E+08 4.56E+08
NISP 1386 -2315778 4.18E+07 -4.59E+08 1.75E+08
LI 1387 -25.208 262.7757 -8767.8 1
CC Proxy 1387 0.015113 0.0795501 -1.19634 2.298824
Capex2 1387 1.04E+07 2.07E+07 0 2.32E+08
LnTA 1380 18.33174 1.31E+00 12.07128 2.15E+01
Leverage 1319 0.292267 5.73E-01 -4.91121 4.46E+00
% Gov_Bus 1343 0.614048 1.49E-01 0.036481 9.47E-01
Fiscal Yr 1387 2004.05 1.45E+00 2000 2006
Net Margin 1376 0.198613 5.91E-02 -0.96536 1.41E+00
Variables Real FCF NISP LI CC Proxy Capex 2 LnTA Leverage %Gov_Bus Fiscal Yr NetMargin
Real FCF 1
NISP 0.2312 1
LI -0.2144 -0.0087 1
CC Proxy 0.0088 -0.01 0.0084 1
Capex 2 -0.171 -0.0862 0.0078 -0.0463 1
LnTA -0.2037 -0.1113 0.0302 -0.0094 0.4586 1
Leverage -0.0375 -0.1011 0.0187 0.0271 0.0061 0.0609 1
% Gov_Bus 0.0584 0.0529 0.015 0.0498 -0.2106 -0.3821 -0.0398 1
Fiscal Yr 0.0197 0.0469 -0.0661 -0.0709 0.2063 -0.0113 -0.062 -0.0474 1





LI- (Lerner’s Index) was the primary independent variable and is a 
measurement of market power of ACHs.  Given the premise that monopsony by 
payers exists within the healthcare market, and that ACHs presented as lacking 
market power, we expected the Lerner’s Index, a measurement for market power, for 
each ACH to have a strong positive correlation with the Real FCFs of ACHs and 
NISP of ACHs.  The lack of market power on behalf of ACHs was the primary reason 
for the expectation of ACHs to be price takers.  Therefore, a low value of a LI will 
equate to a low Real FCF and NISP.  There are limitations in the use of the LI in this 
case as the LI is a modified LI, which uses average total cost instead of marginal 
costs.  However, it is assumed that ATC  equals the MC, that  ATC equals the average 
variable costs (AVC) (that is, the average fixed costs are close to zero), and that AVC 
are constant with respect to output (patient days) at output ranges observed in 
practice. 
Leverage – (Leverage) was used to measure the outstanding debt of the ACH.  
Leverage is defined as total long-term liabilities divided by total assets. This is 
included in the regressions to control for the effect Leverage has on Real FCFs. As 
hospitals are heavily leveraged, inclusion of the variable allows the regression to 
control for any effects or explanation it might have on Real FCFs.  Leverage was 
expected to have a negative correlation with Real FCFs.  As leverage increases, 
borrowing costs associated with leverage increase, thereby reducing FCFs.  Leverage 
was used to control for the amount of debt of an ACH.  Leverage is a calculated 
variable within the data. A definition for the variable can be found in the appendix for 
Chapter 4 variable nomenclature and definitions.  There were no limitations in 
calculating the variable from the data. 
Profitability – (Net Margin) was included as the control for profitability while 
observing the relation between real FCF and LI.  Profitability of the ACH affects the 
generation of Real FCFs and therefore its inclusion in the regression as a control 
variable is important.  Net Margin has been deflated using the CPI for hospital 
services (1996-2007; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). Net Income iis a primary 
variable in calculating Net Margin; it therefore has and impact on the ability of an 
ACH to generate free cash flows.  Net Income is comprised of two revenue streams 
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for ACHs Net Income from Service to Patients and Other Income. Profitability was 
expected to have a positive correlation with Real FCFs. 
Size – (LnTA) the natural log of total assets used as a control for size in the 
research.  This logic followed previous research in its utilization to control for size.  
Controlling for size takes into account the magnitude and production capability of the 
ACH when looking at real FCFs and its relation to the LI.  Total Assets is a variable 
provided within the MCR. Total Assets has been deflated by the CPI for hospital 
services (1996-2007; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009).   
In addition to LnTA, a binary variable was used to represent the size 
categories created in Chapter 3.  Four out of the five categories were represented by a 
binary variable.  Size was expected to have a positive correlation with Real FCF’s and 
NISP. As assets increase, so too does the production capability of the ACH.  There is 
a limitation in using a binary size variable which is based upon licensed beds as 
ACHs may not have all the licensed beds in production at all times which may cause 
this variable to slightly overstate their production capabilities.  The concern is 
somewhat reduced as ACHs can quickly put these beds back in to production should 
demand require it. 
Time - (t) Fiscal year was the control for time.  Its inclusion was to reduce 
temporal effects within the model caused by time.  Fiscal year is a provided variable 
within the MCR.  Time was controlled for by the inclusion of a binary variable for 
each year of the study minus one.  Therefore, while the data covered the years 2000-
2007, only 2001-2007 had a binary variable.  Time was expected to have a positive 
correlation with the Real FCFs and NISP as revenues are expected to increase slightly 
with inflation and increasing costs. 
Real FCF- (Real FCF) The Real FCF was the free cash flow of each ACH in 
1996 dollars.  It is the dependent variable in both the regression for the Lerner’s Index 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  Free cash flows were presented in 1996 dollars 
in order to remove changes in the FCF due to inflation during the longitudinal period 
of this study. It is expected that Real FCF will have a negative correlation with the 
Lerner’s Index and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  A limitation in the use of Real FCF 
comes from the underlying issues in calculating FCFs.  As was mentioned previously 
FCF is missing data on total depreciation and capital expenditures.  The majority of 
cases within the MCR data were missing both of these variables.  Where both data 
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components are missing FCF may be may be slightly understated.  It should also be 
noted that free cash flows are calculated using net income as a  starting point.  Net 
income is comprised of net income from services to patients (NISP) and other income.  
While margins calculated using only the net income from service to patients were 
negative for the time period of this study, margins calculated using both NISP and 
Other Income were positive.  This suggests that other income provides the necessary 
revenues for ACHs to have positive margins overall.  As the Lerner’s Index in this 
research is a measure of margin on selected health services, it may present a problem 
in the expected correlation between the LI and Real FCF’s.   
Individual ACH – (i) was the individual ACH for which the all the variables 
pertain. 
Capital Expense - (Capex2)  Capex2 was used as the control mechanisms for 
the uses of free cash flow and leverage in acquiring assets.  This allowed the model to 
account for ACH free cash flow in light of capital spending.  Capex was a calculated 
variable that represented the change between old (time t-1) capital assets and new 
capital assets (time t) as used in calculating the FCF and mentioned previously.  
Capital expense was expected to have a negative relation with Real FCFs.  Any 
increase in Capex decreases the amount of FCFs available to the ACH.  The use of 
Capital Expense is limited by the number of cases, which originally contained value 
for old and new capital assets.  Where the data was missing, a zero was added. This 
may cause the capital expenditures of ACHs to be over or under stated. 
Cost of Capital - (CCProxy) was used in the study to control for cost of 
capital associated with the size of debt.  The study made an assumption that firms 
with similar debt sizes would differentiate their use of cash flows when servicing debt 
if the firms had different costs of capital.  Taking total interest expense as a ratio to 
total long-term liabilities created a proxy for cost of capital. One would expect that 
similar to leverage, the cost of capital would negatively correlate to the FCF.  The 
basis for this is that the FCF is computed after all cash flows for maintenance of 
leverage and short-term liabilities have been paid.  The more it costs to maintain the 
debt of an ACH, the more it reduces the FCF.  Including this variable accounts for all 
Real FCF fluctuation due to debt, both Leverage and its costs.  A limitation in the 
variable CCProxy is generated by the possibility of long term liabilities on the balance 
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sheet not requiring any interest to be paid.  Where this is the case, it is likely that CC 
Proxy is understated. 
Percent of Government Business – (%Gov_Bus) was used within the study 
to control for the amount of business an ACH receives from government payors.  
Government payors typically pay less than private ones.  The calculation for this 
variable was provided in Chapter 4.  Percent government business also controlled for  
agency cost by taking into account the amount of the Real FCFs derived from the 
government, and  %Gov_Bus will have a negative correlation to the real FCFs, as per 
Chapter 4.  Limitations of the Percent of Government Business were fully discussed 
in Chapter 4; these were generated by the difference in reimbursement between 
government and private payors. In this case the government reimburses ACHs less for 
a given patient days services, therefore it is likely that because the proxy is based 
upon the use of patient days consumed by the government of total patient days 
rendered by the ACHs, the proxy will overstated the revenues derived from 
government sources.  The said the proxy does capture the amount of resources 
consumed by the government as ACHs output is measured in patient days. 
Net Income from Service to Patients- (NISP) was the net income from 
service to patients, comprised of net patient revenues minus total operating expenses.  
The NISP was presented in 1996 dollars in order to remove influence in NISP due to 
inflation during the longitudinal period.  NISP was included as the dependent variable 
in a subsequent Lerner’s Index model to analyze the correlation of the Lerner’s Index 
with those revenues derived solely from services rendered to patients where 
reimbursement was from the payors.  This was done to exclude any distortion Other 
Income may have had on the model analyzing LI with Real FCFs.  It also provided a 
better way for modeling price taking by ACH’s in comparison to payors. 
 
6.4.2 Herfindahl Hirschman Index: 
While the LI provided value in understanding price pressures that ACHs are 
under and the possibly monopoly power that exist for ACHs (the suppliers) in their 
markets, an additional understanding of market power contained within the payors 
(the consumer or buyer) side of the market was required.  While the research was not 
able to measure the market power for the payor directly, it was able to achieve 
measurement via use of an alternative approach. This alternative approach allowed the 
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research to infer a value for market power via The New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO).  While the NEIO model will be discussed later in more detail, 
an important variable used to achieve this inference must be created and measured as 
it provides the basis of the research to move forward under the NEIO model.  The 
research utilizes this alternative methodology using the NEIO by measuring 
concentration of payors in the market faced by ACHs via the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index (HHI)
20
.  Measuring concentration of payors allowed the research to examine 
concentrations effect on free cash flows via regression analysis possibly providing 
evidence of collusive behavior.  By combining concentration, collusion and demand 
elasticity for the market of healthcare services the model seeks to infer a value for the 
market power of the payors, which supports collusive monopsony. 
Evidence of collusive monopsony was created in three basic steps:  The 
primary base to support collusive monopsony was the calculation of the HHI, which 
measured concentration ofthe payor market faced by ACHs.  The HHI value 
supported concentration via its numerical value in comparison to that of acceptable 
values applied by the U.S. Department of Justice for other instances of market power.  
Secondly, concentration via the HHI was analyzed to observe its influence on Real 
FCFs of ACHs to provide evidence of collusion of government and commercial 
payors via random effects panel regression.  Thirdly, using evidence of collusion, the 
research combined both the concentration of the payor market via the HHI, an 
estimate of demand elasticity for healthcare services and evidence of collusion via the 
regression analysis into the NEIO to estimate the market power of the payor.   




 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is and index used to measure concentration of a market by 
looking as the size of firms market share in relation to industry as an indicator of the competition 
amongst them (Miller, 1982, Cahen and Sullivan, 1984 and Rhodes, 1993).  Orris Herfindahl and 
Albert Hirschman created the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  It is widely used as an econometric 
concept in competition or antitrust law.  The HHI takes the sum of the squares of the market shares of 
the 50 largest firms within an industry.  This formula provides an average market share weighted by 
market share.  It provides a measurement from 0 to 1.0 with 0 representing large competition and 1 
representing monopolistic or monopsonistic power.  The HHI is often express as the value between 1 
and 0 multiplied by 10,000.  The use of this methodology is similar in approach to Hersch (1994). 
Schramm and Renn (1984). 
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In order to proceed, an understanding of the HHI is necessary. The HHI is 
defined by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission as:  
“The HHI takes into account the relative size and distribution of the firms in a 
market and approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of firms 
of relatively equal size. The HHI increases both as the number of firms in the 
market decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases.  
Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 points are considered to 
be moderately concentrated and those in which the HHI is in excess of 1800 
points are considered to be concentrated. Transactions that increase the HHI 
by more than 100 points in concentrated markets presumptively raise antitrust 
concerns under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.” (DoJ, 2009) 
The HHI is the best measurement due to its ability to indicate level of market 
concentration similar to methodologies employed by Seth (2006).  In Seth’s research, 
the index measured concentration amongst health insurers and its effects upon 
physician earnings and services.  Similarly, in this study, the HHI measured the 
concentration of insurers within the ACH market and its effects on the free cash flows 
of ACHs.  A problem that arises when using the HHI as a measurement within 
healthcare is the geographically different markets of ACHs.  Insurers/payers often are 
restricted from crossing state lines, making it difficult to compete in a broad 
geographic area.  Therefore, ACHs face different competitive markets of insurers, 
which vary according to location.    
In order to overcome this estimation problem, buyer side concentration must 
be analyzed by each individual ACH geographic region.  This was accomplished by 
taking the payer for each claim by ACH and Year, which was available within the 
claims/remit database, and calculating the market share that the payer possessed out 
of the total number of procedures of the ACH within the study that year.  Then, this 
value was squared and summed by ACH and year.  The HHI formula is listed below 












   




HHI = Herfindahl Index 
q = quantity procedures consumed by insurer (b) of ACH (i) 
Q = total quantity of procedures consumed of ACH (i) 
 
Therefore, in effect, each ACH would have an HHI per year (t).  This takes 
into account the geographical issues with market power, in other words, the insurers 
that have market power, and that the magnitude of that market power in one 
geographical area will be different for an ACH in a different geographical area.  The 
value of the HHI determined the concentration of the market.  The U.S. Department 
of Justice (2009) suggested that values above 1,800 are considered concentrated 
markets.  If the values found within this research are above this number, then the 
payor market will be considered concentrated.  Highly concentrated markets are more 
likely to generate collusion than less concentrated markets (Cabral 2000).  Therefore, 
in order to validate the presence of collusion, the research examined the effect of 
concentration on the Real FCFs.  Collusion via concentration will provide a negative 
correlation with Real FCFs. 
In order to show collusion, the Real FCFs was regressed on the HHI using a 
random effects panel regression model adjusted for clustering.  The random effect 
model was confirmed as necessary by a Hausman Test.  The model can viewed in 
Equation 6-7, below.   
Equation 6-7:  Collusion Regression 
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The beta for the HHI provided evidence of the strength of the relationship of 
concentration ability to influence free cash flows.  Control variables (CV) were added 
factors that might explain changes in the Real FCF over time.   
Table 6.4: Summary Statistics for all variables included in the Herfindahl-Hirschman 




Table 6.5: Herfindahl-Hirschman Correlation Matrix: 
 The matrix below provides evidence that there is little concern for multicollinearity in the HHI 
regressions.  The highest value for correlation presented with the matrix is for the relationship 
of for the natural log of total assets with the percentage of government business.  The value 
of -.4355 suggests that total assets and percent government business is negatively 
correlated.  This confirms previous statements that smaller hospitals have more government 
business.  Thus, they are more likely to only have one payor.  No other correlation values 
present a concern.   
Variable Definitions: 
HHI – is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is a measure of market 
concentration.  In the case of this research, the HHI represented the concentration of 
payors within a given ACH market.  This research proposed that a collusive 
monopsony exists within the market for healthcare services.  This variable was 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Variable Summary Statistics
Variable n Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Real FCF 4581 1712729 1.08E+07 -2.52E+06 2.82E+07
HHI 4581 0.9023582 1.91E-01 9.50E-02 1.00E+00
CC Proxy 4581 0.0171296 0.1859329 -3.05781 9.315964
Capex 2 4581 4257356 1.02E+07 0 2.55E+08
LnTA 4520 1.75E+01 1.44E+00 0.693147 2.18E+01
Leverage 4109 0.26238 1.11E+00 -30.7978 3.30E+01
%Gov_Bus 3813 0.6439854 1.48E-01 0.005353 1.00E+00
Net Margin 4523 0.018182 6.10E-02 -1.57139 5.56E-01
Fiscal Yr 4581 2003 2.02E+00 2000 2007
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Regression Correlation Matrix
Variables Real FCF HHI CC Proxy Capex 2 LnTA Leverage %Gov_Bus Net Margin Fiscal Yr
Real FCF 1
HHI 0.0188 1
CC Proxy -0.0009 -0.0118 1
Capex 2 -0.1836 -0.1179 -0.0177 1
LnTA -0.1907 -0.1306 0.0166 0.3928 1
Leverage -0.0969 -0.0393 0.0085 -0.0056 -0.0615 1
%Gov_Bus 0.0366 0.1249 -0.0185 -0.1895 -0.4355 -0.0123 1
Net Margin 0.0965 0.029 -0.0051 0.0806 0.1659 -0.2698 -0.0609 1
Fiscal Yr 0.002 0.1676 -0.0492 0.1151 0.008 -0.0331 0.0094 0.0194 1
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included in the regressions as it allowed the research to analyze the effect 
concentration has on the real free cash flows of ACHs.  Concentration affecting free 
cash flows negatively provides evidence of collusion.   As collusion was expected, 
concentration, or the HHI, will have negative correlation with Real FCFs.  
Concentration of the payor market would not have a negative impact on the Real 
FCFs if collusion was not present.  Concentration was calculated using the payor 
count that a hospital submits electronically.  Where this deviates from the actual 
number of payors that an ACH submits bills to in any format, will cause the 
concentration measurement to skew, with an overstatement of concentration being the 
most likely.  In order to control for this likelihood the research structures the models 
and set limits within each model for the least amount of payors a hospital could 
submit electronically.  For instance, in the models the least amount of payors that an 
ACH was allowed to submit electronically ranged from 7 in one model to 1 in 
another.  As the least allowable payor count approaches one, the model is more likely 
to have error due to overstatement of concentration.  Payor count was also controlled 
for via direct variable inclusion within the model. 
Payor Count - Payor Count was controlled for, as ACHs may have multiple 
payors.   The number of payors can affect real free cash flows.  A binary variable was 
created for each payor count up to 50.  All payor counts above 50 were included in 
one variable.  An n-1 strategy was followed, meaning that there was one less binary 
for the number of payor counts included in the model.  Payor count was calculated 
directly from the claims data by counting the exact number of different payors that an 
ACH submitted bills electronically for.  It was included also to account for the 
variability in payment that comes with an increase in the number of payors.  This is 
important and most payors differ on reimbursement of the same procedure or health 
service. 
All other variables used in the HHI analysis have the same definitions as 
described in the LI analysis. 
 
6.4.2.1 Hypothesis for Collusive Monopsony Power based on the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index: 
The null hypothesis is that there is no collusion; therefore, the HHI does not 
have a negative correlation with Real_FCF.  If the HHI does not correlate with Real 
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FCFs, then concentration does not affect the Real FCFs of ACHs, and therefore no 
evidence of collusion can be shown.  Likewise, if the HHI has a positive correlation 
with Real FCFs, then concentration is having a positive effect on Real FCFs.  In other 
words, the more concentrated the insurer market faced by the ACH, the more the 
ACH Real FCFs increase.  Both of these situations undermine the presence of 
collusion by the payors.   However, the null hypothesis can be rejected if a negative 
correlation is found, as this provides evidence of collusion. In this case, the presence 
of collusion indicates that the payors are using market power to affect prices paid to 
ACHs  The interaction of concentration and collusion with market power via NEIO 
are discussed in greater detail in Section 6.5.2.3.  A negative correlation between 
Real_FCF and HHI was expected, as per previous literature (Seth 2006).   This 
implies the statistical hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6-8: Collusion Hypothesis 
                                     
                              
 
                                             
 
6.4.3 Expected Results 
The combination of the LI and the HHI allowed analysis through the research 
to determine whether collusive monopsony is present.   Based upon previous research, 
the model will provide evidence of lower values for the LI of ACHs, indicating low 
market power for ACHs.  The low market power of ACHs will show and affect 
capital structure via the FCF, and likewise, there will be positive correlation of the LI 
of ACHs with the NISP and Real FCF, indicating that ACHs are price takers, as the 
ACHs will be unable to demand prices paid.  Thus, FCFs will suffer and will be 
reduced.  The reduction of FCFs will limit access to debt markets, as less FCFs will 
be available to be promised to pay principle and interest on loans from borrowers. 
This limitation on debt will change the way ACHs’ managers approach the capital 
structures of their organizations.  Additionally, measuring concentration through the 
HHI of the ACH payor market will provide evidence of high concentration of the 
ACH payor market, and that the higher concentration of the ACH payor market will 
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have negative effects upon free cash flows, indicating collusion in ACH markets with 
concentrated markets.  It is only by use of market power that concentration negatively 
affects FCFs of ACHs.  Concentrations negatively affecting FCFs suggest collusion.  
Collusion provides the framework by which market power expresses itself.   
Feldmand and Wholey (2001) suggested that lower reimbursement indicated 
that conditions within the U.S. healthcare market were those of monopoly busting and 
not of monopsony.  If the conditions within the market were those of monopoly 
busting, then one would expect to find that the HHI calculated for the payors has no 
affect upon FCFs, and therefore, there is no evidence of collusion.   In addition, one 
would expect the LI (on behalf of the ACHs) to show evidence of market power.  One 
also would expect ACHs to be price makers, or at least not price takers within the 
market.  If a low value was found for the LI (on behalf of the ACH), this would 
evidence a lack of monopoly power. Thus, ACHs as price takers would suggest that 
payors are exploiting market power.  
 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Monopsony Results Using the Lerner’s Index 
In an attempt to uncover market power on the part of ACHs, the LI was 
calculated on behalf of the ACH.  Calculating the LI for the ACH enabled the 
researcher to analyze two questions within one calculation. The first was, is there 
monopoly power on the part of the hospital?  Thus alleviating the concerns expressed 
in the research of Feldman and Wholey (2001). If the hospital had monopoly power, 
then it would be reflected by a high LI.  If however a low value for the LI was found, 
then this would provide the research with the ability to refute the findings of Felman 
and Wholey (2001).  Feldman and Wholey (2001) had suggested that lower 
reimbursement to hospitals by HMOs represented a breakup of monopoly power of 
the ACH rather than traditional monopsony by the HMOs.  The second question is if 
ACHs are price takers.  If ACHs are price takers then they will not be able to 
determine prices paid for healthcare services rendered to patients.  ACHs are more 
likely to be price takers under a collusive monopsony as business terms are dictated 




Figure 6.13: Lerner’s Index Descriptives by Fiscal Year:  
All mean value of the LI is negative for all years. While there is some variation in the value of 
the mean LI over time, the values have a declining trend.  This suggests that market power of 
ACHs was declining over the time presented in this study.  This is supported via median 
values for the LI, which are also negative for all years, and they exhibit negative trending over 
time.   
Observing mean values for the LI found in Figure 6.13, large negative values 
were present in all years.  While negative LI values normally are not considered a 
possibility, two conditions allowed this to occur:  One is that this LI used average 
total costs, rather than marginal costs.  The second is that low reimbursement by 
payers is not enough to cover costs, whether marginal or average.  Median values also 
were negative in every year of the longitudinal study.  These mean and median values 
supported a lack of market power by ACHs because the LI is calibrated in such a way 
that if the ACHs had market power, then the LI values would have approached one, 
and one is a monopoly condition. The evidence provided in the low LI values 
suggests that ACHs lack monopoly power.  The lack of monopoly power affects on 
capital structure via the FCF is analyzed in Model 1, and price-taking status is 
analyzed in Model 2 by way of relationship with the NISP. 
 
6.5.1.1 Lerner’s Index Correlation with Free Cash Flows 
Two models were constructed for use with the ACH LI.  Each regression was 
conducted using random effects panel data regression.  A Hausman Test confirmed 
the use of the random effects model.  Standard errors were adjusted for clustering 
within each model based upon the case identifier (prv_num).  This corrected the 
model for the assumption that each value with the variable was independent of every 
other value for the same case.    In each model, the LI was used as the primary 
independent variable.   
In the first model, the Real FCFs were regressed upon the LI.   Control 
variables included size, capital cost, capital expenditures, leverage, amount of 
government business, and time.  Additional binary variables were included as control 
variables for size and time.  
Lerner's Index Values
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Mean -3.3886 -5.4785 -5.347 -6.8187 -6.342 -6.4891 -6.9472 -6.7088




Figure 6.14: Lerner’s Index Random Effects:  
GLS, unbalanced panel data regression, adjusted for clustering.  In addition to independent 
variable, listed binary variables for size and time were included.  Full results are located in the 
appendix.  LI is the Lerner’s Index.  CC proxy is the control variable for cost of capital.  Capex 
is the control variable for capital expenditure.  Leverage represents a control for ACH debt 
levels. %Gov_Bus represents a control for the amount of revenues an ACH receives from 
government payors. Fiscal year controls for time.  Model 1, the dependent variable, is the 
Real FCF.  In Model 2 the dependent variable is net income from service to patients.   * 
denotes 10% significance, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.  Full statistical software outputs can be 
found in The Appendix under Chapter 6 Panel Data Regression Models.  All regressions 
scaled by 1,000,000. 
Model 1: LI was highly significant with a P-value of 0.000 for the primary 
independent variable Li.  The beta coefficient was highly negative with a value of -
0.0427535.  There were 1,264 observations, with 454 ACHs participating.  The 
average observation per ACH was 2.8 with a maximum of 7 and a minimum of 1.  An 
overall  of 0.24 was calculated for the model. 
The results of Model 1 show that LI has a negative correlation with Real FCF.  
Therefore, there is no evidence to support the rejection of the null hypothesis.  These 
findings suggest a lack market power as evidenced by the low values of the LI for 
ACHs has a negative impact on ACHs’ Real FCF. This would suggest that as ACHs 
experience lower margin on their procedures that are able to create greater FCFs.  
This runs contrary to what the Lerner’s Index is created to measure.  A possible 
Model 1 2
N 1254 1269
Number of Groups 453 454
Min Obs/ Group 1 1
Avg Obs/Group 2.8 2.8
Max Obs/ Group 7 7
Standard Error Adjustment 453 Clusters 454 Clusters
Dependent Variable Real FCF
Net Income from 
Service to Patients
Independent Variables
LI -0.0427535 *** 0.0039882 **
CC Proxy 0.7287221 -0.2136986
Capex -3.04E-07 ** -1.07E-07 **
LnTA -4.133715 ** -0.4059566
Leverage 0.031512 -1.013522
%Gov_Bus 1.362973 5.396817
Fiscal Year -0.8164543 -0.0479383





reason for the outcome of this regression is that free cash flows are calculated using 
Net Income from the MCR (Medicare Cost Report).  Net Income is a combination of 
two variables, NISP (Net Income from Service to Patients), and Other Income.  In 
context of the MCR, Other Income had great influence over Net Income in that Other 
Income had values that represented income streams other than patient services.  Other 
Income included items such as contributions, donations, income from investments, 
and revenues from television and phone.  A more complete list was provided in 
Chapter 3.  The effect on Net Income can be seen in the difference between Net 
Margin and Operating Margin that were expressed in Chapter 3, Table3.5.  Net 
Margin was calculated from Net Income, which included both NISP and Other 
Income, while Operating Margin was derived solely from NISP.   
In Chapter 3 Operating Margins were negative, while Net Income Margins 
were positive.  There were significant differences in the values between the margins 
with a range between the two financial measures of 2% on the low end and 5% on the 
high end.  In each case, the Net Income Margin was always positive while the 
Operating Income Margin was always negative. The divergence between these two 
suggest that ACHs have negative margins on NISP as denoted by the negative 
Operating Margins from Chapter 3, while Net Margins suggest that ACHs have 
positive Net Margins as Other Income included in the Net Income equation is able to 
compensate for any losses on NISP and thus provide a positive overall Net Income 
Margin.  The Lerner’s Index estimated for the ACHs was calculated based upon 
services rendered to patients.  Just as the Operating Margins shown in Table3.5 from 
Chapter 3 is negative in all years reflected within the monopsony study, so too is the 
Lerner’s Index.  This is understandable as the Lerner’s Index is calculated using 
procedures, which supply revenue via service to patients.  These services to patients 
are also representative of the operating margins expressed in Chapter 3, while FCF’s 
are more representative of Net Income Margin, which is positive every year.  Net 
Income is a primary component in the calculation of both and is representative of all 
income streams.   This may explain the negative correlation between the Lerner’s 
Index and Real FCFs, as the Lerner’s Index is representative of services rendered to 
patients, while Real FCFs is representative of the combination of services rendered to 
patients and other income streams. The negative correlation of the two variables 
represented here highlights one of the concerns expressed previously that the 
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procedures used to calculate the Lerner’s Index may not fully represent all of the 
procedures of the ACH or may not fully represent all the cash flows of the ACH.  
These results do not allow the research to exam the consequence of the Lerner’s Index 
for ACHs impact on decisions of capital structure.  While Model 1 was the best for 
examining ACH market power on decisions of capital structure, the model did not 
provide an adequate basis to confirm price-taking status, hence Model 2. 
Model 2: The Net_Income_from_Patient_Services was regressed upon LI.   
The control variables included size, capital cost, capex, leverage, amount of 
government business, and time.  Additional binary variables were included as control 
variables according to the methodology laid out previously in the methodology 
section within this chapter.  Model 2 was exactly the same model as Model 1, with 
only a change in the dependent variable.   
LI was highly significant with a P-value of 0.014.  The beta coefficient was 
positive with a value of 0.0039882.  There were 1,269 observations, with 454 ACHs 
participating.  The average observation per ACH was 2.8 with a maximum of 7 and a 
minimum of 1.  An overall of 0.28 was calculated for the model.   
The primary reason that Model 2 was able to confirm price taking is that the 
NISP is a more accurate representation of income derived from insurers and is not 
distorted by other revenues and/or other components of FCFs that may add noise 
within the model.  As the NISP is comprised primarily of revenues from insurers, it 
provided a better variable to judge the price-taking status of ACHs.  The model 
confirmed that a lack of market power by the ACHs or lower LI values leads to lower 
revenues derived from insurers.  If this correlation is combined with the values of the 
LI in Figure 6.13, then the lower average annual values for the LI for this study 
suggests that two things are occurring.  One is that the LI values presented were very 
low.  This provides evidence that for the study sample of procedures that ACHs on 
average do not wield any considerable market power in setting prices on patient 
services.  The low values of the LI provides evidence that on average monopoly 
power is not present.  Second is that the annual average LI values decrease over the 
period of the study, suggesting that ACHs on average have less market power each 
subsequent year.  This provided additional evidence that the all-or-nothing nature of 
the contract with insurers has a negative impact on ACHs, at least in determining 
price. Model 2 supports the lack of market power on behalf of ACHs.  The regression 
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of the LI values and the LI values themselves supports that hospitals are price takers 
on services to patients, as defined by the MCR. 
 
6.5.2 Monopsony via HHI: 
There are approximately 6,204 cases within this paper's study of monopsony 
using the HHI from 2000-2007, down from an initial N of 55,582, representing 
approximately 11.2% of the original population.  An HHI for each ACH was 
calculated from the twelve million claims in the claim remit data.  The reduction in 
cases resulted from several factors: temporal restrictions to the years 2000-2007 and 
ACH claim/remit participation. The HHI is an index from zero to one, and it was 
created by a sum of the squares of the share of healthcare consumption by payors for 
an ACH for a given year, with one representing full monopsony, and zero 
representing maximum competitiveness within a market.   In this case, a “market” 
was defined as all consumption of healthcare services by payors for a given hospital 
in which a claim for the transaction was recorded.  It was not restricted by geography 
in this case, but was restricted by the availability of electronic claims within the data.  
The distribution of HHI values was skewed to the right, with most values close to one, 
as is evident in Figure 6.15.   
 
Figure 6.15: Histogram HHI (2000-2007):  
The scale for this histogram has been reduced from the traditional zero to ten thousand to 
zero to one.  This was done to better scale the histogram for presentation.  As shown by the 
histogram, the distribution is highly leptokurtic, with a majority of the population concentrated 
around a value of one.  The distribution also is skewed to the right.  The histogram suggests 
that ACH payor markets are heavily concentrated. 
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The resulting values close to one provided initial evidence of the high 
concentration with which ACHs are confronted.  The number of payors that ACHs 
submit to electronically for reimbursement affected HHI values within the study.  The 
HHI or measure of market concentration was derived in this case by the amount of 
healthcare consumed from a given hospital by payors.  The ability to have an accurate 
value for the HHI was determined by how many different payors and ACHs submitted 
claims electronically.  The lower the proportion of the number of payors submitting 
electronically, the higher the likelihood that the HHI was skewed by not accounting 
for all payors and services rendered.  This may be the case, as some ACHs still submit 
claims via paper.   
In order to control for the payor count within the regression, a better 
understanding of payor count is needed.  In Figure 6.16, the box plot of the payor 
count is very condensed and remains relatively compressed, with outliers present at 
the upper end of the value range above 10 payors.  The box plot is representative of 
payor count values within the sample prior to the removal of outliers.  The 
distribution of payor count remained skewed to the left with high kurtosis.  In Figure 
6.17, a majority of the distribution of payor count values remained below a payor 
count of 20. 
 
Figure 6.16: Box Plot of Payor Count (2000-2007):   
The box plot shows that the box and whiskers representing the normal distribution is being 





Figure 6.17: Payer Count Histogram (2000-2007):   
The distribution for payor count is skewed to the left, with the highest frequency around 1.  
This suggests that ACHs face payor markets with few participants, which leads to 
concentration, as was seen in Figure 6.7. 
As a result of the way  payor_count affected the HHI, an HHI calculated with 
one payor generated a HHI value of 10,000.  While the CMS consumed 65% of 
healthcare services rendered, it is unlikely that a payor count of 1 is feasible, except 
for rural facilities.  Payor counts were expected to positively correlate with hospital 
size.  The trend line in Figure 6.10 provides evidence of this.  As the Hospital Size on 
the (x) axis increased so did the Payor Count on the (y) axis.  As discussed previously 
within this research, small/rural hospitals are more likely to have a few payers, 
primarily from government.  One would expect that as the size of the ACH increases, 




Figure 6.20: Scatter Plots Payor_Count by Hospital Size by Number of Beds  (ABOVE): 
The scatter plot of payor count by hospital size provides evidence that larger hospitals have 
larger payor counts.  The trend line near the X-axis is able to provide a better visualization of 
this trend.Outliers excluded (BedSize x>4000)  (BELOW): Evidence of the trend line is more 
pronounced with the exclusion of payor counts of one.  Note: the scatter plot below was 
provided just to show how payor counts of one skew the trend line and to enhance 
visualization of the trend line itself.  Outliers excluded (BedSize x>4000 and Payor_Count 





Figure 6.21:  Scatter Plot of Concentration (HHI) vs. Hospital Size (number of beds): 
We can see from the scatter plot above that it provides evidence that concentration is 
negatively correlated with hospital size.  This confirms the previous illustrations regarding 
payor count and hospital size.  In this case, as the payor count gets higher the HHI value gets 
smaller.  What we saw in the previous figure was payor count was positively correlated with 
hospital size.  In this figure, we see that HHI is negatively correlated with hospital size.  Both 
support the same findings.  Larger Hospitals face less concentration. 
The mean payor count throughout the study is demonstrated in Figure 6.22.  
The figures shows that by the time the study begins in 2000, the average payor count 
was 2.18, increasing to 4.50 in 2007.  The payor count is important, as it determines 
the maximum efficiency (perfect competition) that can be calculated by the HHI.  In 
other words it determines the value of the HHI assuming perfect competition or an 
equally shared market amongst competitors. A chart of maximum competitive 
measures, determined by the HHI, is presented in Table 6.1. An HHI of below 1,800 
is acceptable according to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  Any HHI value 
above 1,800 is cause for concern, as the market is considered concentrated, and any 
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Figure 6.22: Mean Payer Count by Year (1995-2007) 
In this case, the lower payor counts need to be excluded.  In the research, we 
wanted to accept the higher payor counts, as it increased the likelihood of having an 
accurate HHI not distorted by a low payor_count. 
In order to combat the issue of payor count within the study, the panel data 
regression model had to be controlled and limited at certain payor counts.  Therefore, 
multiple models were constructed to limit minimum payor count.  It was deemed that 
a payor_count of 7 and higher generates an acceptable HHI by DOJ standards; 
however, when this was used as a restriction, it still left a significantly sized sample.  
Therefore, seven models were constructed beginning with payor_counts >=7.  This 
allowed the model to have a maximum competitive value for HHI calculated as 1,429, 
which is below the DOJ standard for an acceptable HHI.   
Table 6.6: HHI Maximum Competitiveness Values as Determined by Payor Count :  
(Table was created for this research by calculating an HHI for an evenly-shared market 
between the payors).  Payor Count 7 is highlighted, as this generates an HHI of 1429.  Payor 
Count of 7 is utilized, as it is two units from a payor count that generates an unacceptable HHI 
per the DOJ.  In addition, when used as a restriction for modeling, it still allowed a large 
enough sample size. 
 
 
Acceptable U.S. Department of Justice Herfindahl
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The correlation of number of payors and the traditional Herfindahl score can 
be seen in Table 6.6.   The calculated value assumed an equally-shared market 
between all payors, thus creating the most competitive market, one with the lowest 
possible HHI value for that number of payors.  Acceptable DOJ values for the 
Herfindahl were used in the study, as they present a marker for limits on other 
markets in which the DOJ would interfere if concerns of monopoly were evident.  To 
qualify, monopoly is a form of inefficient market in which one supplier controls the 
supply of a good for an entire market; it reflects the levels of market concentration of 
supply. The buy side of the equation warrants the same concern as those on the supply 
side, as they represent buyer market power and may cause consumer harm via 
allocative inefficiency.  Models then were constructed for payor_counts >=7, 6, 
5…payor_counts>=1.  The inclusion of all payor_counts allowed the maximum 
sample to be utilized in the study.   
The minimum mean HHI values, presented in Table 6.2, represent the smallest 
HHI that could be calculated assuming equal pro-rata participation by all payors 
within the research data for each year. While the minimum mean HHI values were of 
concern when analyzed against the mean payor counts determined in the study, the 
major concern was not the minimum mean HHI that could be calculated, but rather 
the deviation of the actual mean HHI from that of the minimum mean HHI that could 
be calculated.  Table 6.2 shows the comparisons of the actual mean HHI with that of 
the minimum mean HHI (most efficient). The deviation from the most efficient mean 
HHI is quite extraordinary.   
Even when the mean payor count moves to 4.56 in 2005, and an efficient 
market HHI of 2,193 is possible, the actual mean HHI remains extremely high at 
8,751.  The evidence of market concentration is apparent in the difference in the 
actual mean and the minimum mean possible.  The high values of the HHI in Table 
6.7, when compared against the acceptable DOJ standard of 1,800, verified that the 
market is concentrated.  In addition, the market is more highly concentrated than 
would be available should all of the payors equally share the market equally.  Given 
the level of concentration on the buyers’ side of the market, as evidenced by the actual 
mean HHI values, the question remains: Does such concentration of the buyer side of 




Table 6.7: Efficient (minimum) HHI Possible to Actual Mean HHI by Fiscal Year Reported: 
The mean payor count is the mean payor for each fiscal year of the study.  The minimum 
mean HHI that has been calculated is the HHI value should the mean payor count have equal 
market share.  This then is able to be compared with the actual mean HHI found within the 
study.  The large deviation from the minimum mean provides evidence that the payor markets 
faced by ACHs are concentrated.  The acceptable limit by the U.S. DOJ is an HHI value of 
1,800. 
 
All values above the minimum payor count for each model were allowed to 
remain in the study.  In theory, the large payor counts should generate lower HHI 
values.  Competition for acquiring service, in other words, increased demand for 
healthcare products by payors, assuming a limited supply constrained at the number 
of beds within a hospital should lead to increased prices, therefore more profit, and 
greater FCFs for the ACHs.  Similarly, if the level of competition for services 
rendered is concentrated in the hands of a few payors, then more power would be 
attributed to those consuming the services rendered.  Concentration of buyer power 
forces sellers to enter into transactions that are most likely less than optimum and are 
inefficient.  Under this condition, ACHs are more likely to have less profit and less 
FCF, as was outlined previously. 
By observing Figure 6.23, we can compare actual HHI versus the theoretical 
competitive HHI values determined by the limitation of payor count on each model.  
The theoretical competitive mean HHI was determined by taking the minimum payor 
count allowed within the sample for each model and calculating an HHI based upon 
equal sharing of the market.  Therefore, in a market with seven payors, each payor 
would have one-seventh of the market.  If an HHI is calculated based upon this pro-
rata sharing of the market, we get an HHI value of 1,429.  While higher payor count 
values exist within the sample, by using the minimum, we set up the maximum 
competitive HHI value achievable. The actual mean HHI was found to have a higher 
value than that of the theoretical competitive HHI value for the same sample 
limitations or payor count minimums. The difference between the actual and 
Comparison Minimum HHI to Actual by Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year Mean Payor Count Minimum Mean HHI Actual Mean HHI
2000 2.18 4587 9434
2001 2.91 3436 9239
2002 3.33 3003 9148
2003 3.46 2890 9031
2004 3.59 2786 9050
2005 4.56 2193 8751
2006 4.37 2288 8458
2007 4.5 2222 8568
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theoretical does not show the behavior of the payors within the U.S. healthcare 
market, but shows higher market concentration of payors that ACHs face.  
 
 
Figure 6.23: Comparison of Actual HHI vs. Theoretical Competitive HHI:  
The graph provides a graph of the comparison of the actual HHI found in the study to the 
theoretical competitive HHI.  The sample is limited by the number of payors on the X-axis with 
the HHI value on the Y-axis.  The theoretical competitive HHI is calculated by taking the 
lowest number of payors possible in the sample and assumes equal market share between 
the payors.  The distance between the two graphed lines shows the disparity between reality 
of the market concentration and what should be achievable in a perfectly competitive market.   
 
6.5.2.1 HHI correlation with Free Cash Flows (collusion): 
Seven panel data regressions were performed with controls as outlined 
previously in the methodology section, with the addition of a control variable for 
payor_count. All of the regressions performed were conducted using a random effects 
panel data regression for an unbalanced data set.  All models’ standard errors were 
adjusted for clustering, thus compensating for the assumption that all values for each 
case are independent of one another.  Results are shown in Figure 6.24.  All 





























Figure 6.24: HHI Unbalanced Panel Data Regression Results: 
 (using random effects, adjusted for clustering). *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 
1%.  GLS regression used.  
 Four out of the seven models are significant for the primary independent variable HHI.  This 
provides evidence that real free cash flows are affected negatively by higher concentration 
with the U.S. ACH market. It should be noted that all models provided a negative coefficient 
for HHI.  Higher payor counts improved the explanatory capability of the model.  This is 
despite the case of smaller sample sizes.  In addition to the regression results, the deviation 
of actual mean HHI from that of a competitive mean HHI for each model sample provides 
additional evidence that the market is far more concentrated than what should be, given the 
number of payors within the sample for a competitive market.  Full statistical software outputs 
can be found in The Appendix under Chapter 6 Panel Data Regression Models.  All 
regressions scaled by 1,000,000. 
 
All of the models generated a highly negative beta coefficient for the HHI.  
Models 4, 5, 6, and 7 proved significant for the HHI variable; these models had higher 
sample sizes and a greater number of ACHs participating.  The ACHs are listed as 
groups in Figure 6.12. All models had values from 0.21 to 0.10.  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Description payor_count >=7 payor_count >=6 payor_count >=5 payor_count >=4 payor_count >=3 payor_count >=2 payor_count >=1
Number of Obs 372 471 632 891 1324 2118 3503
Number of Groups 188 242 322 433 600 847 1243
Min Obs/ Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Avg Obs/Group 2 1.9 2 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.8
Max Obs/ Group 6 6 6 6 7 7 7
Standard Error Adjustment 188 Clusters 242 clusters 322 clusters 433 clusters 600 clusters 847 clusters 1243 clusters
Dependent Variable Real FCF Real FCF Real FCF Real FCF Real FCF Real FCF Real FCF
Independent Variables
HHI coefficient -0.7907834 -0.836686 -1.856242 ** -3.68104 ** -3.469228 ** -2.730321 ** -2.819972
HHI p-Value 0.789 0.736 0.396 0.039 0.021 0.036 0.025
CC Proxy 0.8004249 *** 1.05756 *** 1.060866 ** 0.840239 * 1.085651 * 0.9500599 0.7571171
Capex *** -1.21E-07 *** -1.47E-07 *** -1.35E-07 *** -1.28E-07 *** -1.27E-07 *** -1.59E-07 *** -1.74E-07
LnTA *** -3.185476 *** -3.11706 *** -2.845651 *** -0.236606 *** -2.363778 *** -2.281873 *** -2.102105
Leverage -1.254144 -1.447085 * -1.853029 * -1.483338 ** -1.294987 -0.569505 -0.664492
%Gov_Bus * -8.725174 ** -9.71394 * -8.33088 ** -7.498846 * -4.658025 * -4.015043 *** -5.301605
Net Margin * 9.58404 * 9.47596 * 10.36292 * 12.02302 ** 15.42476 *** 22.02755 *** 22.11875
Fiscal Year 0.2224521 0.256113 0.54965 0.442729 * 0.4470001 ** 0.419705 * 0.2060823
Rho 0.3534 0.3463 0.3737 0.3412 0.3227 0.3196 0.2553
R^2 0.2104 0.1879 0.1739 0.147 0.1304 0.112 0.1001
Actual Mean HHI 6896 7053 7292 7633 7999 8398 9024
Competitive Mean HHI 1429 1667 2000 2500 3333 5000 10000
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Model 1 - which represented cases with payor counts >=7, and HHI was not 
significant with a P-value of 0.789.  The coefficient generated for HHI was -
0.7907834  Model 1 was constructed so that an efficient competitive market would 
generate an HHI value below what the DOJ determined to be concentrated.   Although 
the coefficient was negative, the sample size was extremely small for a longitudinal 
study, with only 372 observations and 188 hospitals participating for the duration of 
over eight years.  It was speculated that the small sample size prohibited the model 
from being significant, as it was no longer representative of the population of ACHs 
with a payor count greater than seven.  On average, there were only 2 observations 
per ACH, with a maximum number of observations of 6, and a minimum of 1.  
Observing the HHI mean for the Model 1 sample showed that the actual mean HHI 
was high, with a value of 6,896, in comparison to a competitive mean HHI of 1,429, 
based upon the least payor count within the Model 1 sample.   
Model 2 - represented cases with payor counts >= 6, and HHI was not significant 
with a P-value of 0.736.  The beta coefficient for the HHI variable was highly 
negative with a value of -0.836686.  Sample size remained small.  There were 471 
observations in total, with 242 participating ACHs.  On average, there were 1.9 
observations per ACH, with a maximum of 6 observations and a minimum of 1. The 
HHI mean for Model 2 was 7,053, compared with a competitive HHI of 1,667, which 
was based upon the minimum payor count within the sample for Model 2. 
Model 3 - represented cases with payor counts >=5, and HHI was not significant, 
with a P-value of 0.396.  The beta coefficient for the HHI variable was highly 
negative with a value of -1.856242.  Sample size remained relatively small, with only 
632 observations and 322 ACHs participating.  On average, there were 2observations 
per ACH, with a maximum of 6 and a minimum of 1.  The actual mean HHI for 
Model 3 was high, 7,292, in comparison to the competitive HHI value of 2,000.  The 
competitive value was the lowest HHI value that could be attained based upon the 
minimum payor count within the sample. 
Model 4 - represented cases with payor counts >=4, and HHI was significant for 
with a P-value of 0.039.  The beta coefficient for the variable HHI was highly 
negative with a value of -3.68104.  The sample size still was relatively small, with 
831 observations; however, the number of ACHs participating had increased to 433 
separate institutions.  On average, there were 2 observations per ACH, with a 
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maximum of 6 and a minimum of 1.  The actual mean HHI for Model 4 was 7,633, 
which was high in comparison to the competitive HHI possible at 2,500.  The 
difference in the most competitive HHI value possible based upon the minimum payor 
count within the model was large.  While 2,500 is considered concentrated by the 
DOJ, it is not nearly as concentrated as the actual HHI reflected within the sample.  
This gives evidence of the market concentration of payors faced by ACHs.  This 
provided the first model that allowed us to reject the null hypothesis (there is no 
correlation or positive correlation between the HHI and Real FCF’s) and accept the 
alternative hypothesis that market buyer concentration provides a significantly 
negative correlation with Real FCF, thus providing evidence of collusion of 
buyers/payors in ACH markets with high concentration of payors.  Given the actual 
mean of the HHI in Model 4 of 7,633 suggests that on average the payor market faced 
by ACHs is highly concentrated.  Thus, ACHs on average are facing collusion of 
payors within those concentrated markets within the sample. 
Model 5 - presented cases with payor counts >=3, and HHI was significant with a 
P-value of 0.021.  The beta coefficient for the variable HHI was highly negative with 
a value of -3.469228.  The sample size was 59% larger than that of Model 4, with 
1,324 observations and 600 individual ACHs participating.  On average, there were 
2.2 observations for each ACH, with a maximum of 7 and a minimum of 1.  The 
actual mean HHI for Model 5 was 7,999, which was a high value in comparison to the 
most competitive HHI value possible, 3,333, which was calculated by the minimum 
payor count allowed in the model sample.  Model 5 provided a negative coefficient 
for HHI, which allowed for the rejection of the null hypothesis and the acceptance of 
the alternative hypothesis.  This significant correlation allowed us to affirm the 
presence of buyer side or payor collusion in ACH markets with higher concentrations 
of payors, as concentration of payors was shown to have a negative effect upon Real 
FCF.  Considering the high value of the mean HHI suggest that the average ACH in 
this market faces highly concentrated markets and therefore on average ACHs face 
collusion of payors with the ACH’s market. 
Model 6 - represented cases with payor counts >= 2, and HHI was significant with 
a P-value of 0.036.  The beta coefficient for the variable HHI was highly negative 
with a value of -2.730321.  The sample size was 60% larger than that of Model 5, 
with 2,118 observations and 847 individual ACHs participating.  On average, there 
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were 2.5 observations for each ACH, with a maximum of 7 and a minimum of 1.  The 
actual mean HHI for the sample of Model 6 was 8,398, with the mean competitive 
HHI for the sample at 5,000.  The difference between the two confirmed 
concentration within the market by DOJ standards, as well as the deviation from the 
most competitive HHI score possible based upon the minimum payor count within the 
model.  Model 6 also confirmed the alternative hypothesis and allowed us to reject the 
null hypothesis.  Concentration via high HHI values had a negative effect upon Real 
FCFs; therefore, payor collusion is present in markets with higher payor 
concentration.  The high concentration represented by the mean HHI values in the 
sample suggest on average ACHs in the sample face collusion of payors within the 
ACHs market. 
Model 7 - represented cases with payor counts >=1, and HHI was significant with 
a P-value of 0.025.  The beta coefficient for the variable HHI was highly negative 
with a value of -2.819972.  The sample size was 65% larger than that of Model 6, 
with 3,503 observations representing 1,243 individual ACHs.  On average, there were 
2.8 observations per ACH participating, with a maximum of 7 and a minimum of 1.  
The actual mean HHI for the sample was 9,024, with a competitive score of 10,000, 
based upon the minimum payor count allowed in the sample of 1.   Model 7 was 
unique from the rest of the models created for the HHI in this research, as it was the 
only one with a greater expected competitive HHI value than actually was found in 
the sample in the model.  The score of 9,024 provided evidence that the market was 
more competitive than expected; however, it should be noted that 9,024 is still a 
highly concentrated market.  Of all the models created for this research, this model 
provided the least evidence of collusion, even though it was significant.   
 
6.5.2.2 Payor Concentration, Collusion, and NEIO: 
The purpose of this section is to make use of the HHI and the findings of the 
regressions within the section 6.5.2.1 along with the NEIO model to draw an 
inference of the market power of payors within the healthcare market.  This is 
important, as no data is available to measure market power directly by calculating 
Lerner’s index for payors within this research.  The NEIO provides a methodology, 
which allows the research to examine, and infer the market power of the payors by 
inferring values of the payors Lerner’s Index.  This allows the model to consider not 
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only market power of the ACHs (the consumer) via the previously calculated Lerner’s 
Index for ACH’s, but also allows the research to exam market power for the other 
market participant on the demand side of the transactions the payors.   
While market concentration does not directly correlate with market power, we 
know that cooperative pricing, as suggested via collusive monopsony, is more likely 
in a concentrated market (Cabral, 2000).  In addition, payors within the market are 
competing with one another for inputs of healthcare services to deliver to their 
insured.  Payors [insurance companies] only can affect demand by their insured for 
health services slightly via co-pays and deductibles.  As payors do not compete for 
inputs (health services) and cannot readily control demand for inputs (health services), 
it is more likely that they will try to reduce the amount paid for inputs (health 
services) to its minimum.   
Ordinarily, in a competitive market with many payors, there would be 
competition for inputs from ACHs.  The demand for inputs of health services would 
lead many payors to increase the prices paid to a more competitive price for the 
inputs.  In a concentrated market this is not so, as the competition for inputs is less.  
Now, consider the opposite side of the equation for payors (health insurance 
companies), in which they compete in a competitive market to supply financing of 
healthcare services.  Their product (healthcare financing) is the combination of price 
and quality/breadth of coverage provided.  In the market for healthcare financing 
(health insurance), price is elastic to demand; therefore, the pricing of their product 
(health insurance) has influence on demand and therefore revenues. If prices are 
lowered to compete with other insurers, some revenues are forgone from the current 
customer base in order to obtain new customers from competing firms.  If payors are 
to maintain margins, they must reduce their costs of coverage.  Their largest expense 
is the health services that they finance via insurance premiums.  The lower they obtain 
these inputs (health services), the better their margins, or the better they can compete 
in the competitive market.   Payors have tremendous incentive to obtain inputs at the 
lowest possible price. Given the payor’s ability to obtain pricing information from the 
price leader, Medicare and Medicaid, via public information, payors are able to utilize 
this information to press ACHs into pricing for health service inputs parallel to those 
of Medicare and Medicaid.  In addition, one must consider that contracts are 
negotiated with ACHs once a year, which gives payors additional strength in 
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negotiations, due to the renewals and length of contractual time periods. Given the all-
or-nothing contractual nature of payors with ACHs, this pricing does not take place on 
the marginal cost curve, but rather on the average cost curve, as suggested by Taylor 
(2003).    
 
6.5.2.3 The New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO): 
It has been suggested when using the NEIO
21
 that market power measured by 
the LI is comprised of three main variables that determine market power: 
concentration of the market, collusive behavior, and price elasticity of demand 
(Cabral 2000).  The relationship is expressed in Equation 6-8. 
In order to show that payor concentration within the market for healthcare 
services equates to collusion and market power, one must consider two variables that 
have not been calculated yet within the research: price elasticity of demand and 
collusive behavior.  Evidence provided by previous research suggests that the moral 
hazard of insurance is strong within the market for healthcare services and that 
competition for patients is driven by quality of health services, not the price of 
healthcare services, as patients are not exposed to price due to health insurance 
(Nahata 2005).  Given this characteristic of the market, one must assume that demand 
for ACH services by patients is strongly inelastic to the price.  Any change in price is 
less likely to cause a large percentage change in demand by patients.  Therefore, we 




 NEIO or The New Empirical Industrial Organization is an empirical methodology, which seeks 
to use systematic statistical evidence in the effort to study single industries as opposed to a cross 
section of industries, utilizing the relationship between demand elasticity, market concentration (as 
measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index) and collusive behavior and market power (as measured 
by the Lerner’s Index), (Cabral  2000).  The main principles behind the use of the NEIO model is that 
price cost margins cannot be observed, therefore an inference can be made from the behavior of 
industry firms to identify changes in marginal cost (Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  The primary focus of 
the NEIO and most research that utilize this methodology is its use to measure the market power of 
firms.  The NEIO has been especially helpful to researchers seeking to find evidence of collusive 
behavior and in research, which focuses on analysis of market structure, firm conduct and market 
performance in oligopolistic markets (Martin 1994; Walden and Jensen 1998 and Cabral 2000).  The 
NEIO is meant to be an improvement on the Structure-Conduct-Performance model or SCP. 
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assume elasticity of demand for the industry as a constant value within the course of 
this research.  In addition to this, an assumption can be made for the value of elasticity 
of demand: that it is most likely close to zero (a zero value denotes complete price 
inelasticity).   
The equation for market power (NEIO) shows that a constant value for the 
elasticity of demand implies a positive correlation between the HHI and the LI.  This 
leaves the calculation of market power (Lerner’s Index) reliant on the presence of 
collusive behavior within the market.  If there is collusion, then there is market power, 
and if no collusion is present, then no market power is present.   
 
Equation 6-8: New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) 
 





L- Lerner’s Index (measuring market power of the Payors) 
H- Herfindahl Hirschman Index (measures market concentration of the Payors) 
Θ- Collusive Behavior (measures market collusion of Payors) 
ε – Demand Elasticity (measure percentage change in quantity demanded per 1% 
change in price) 
 
We now explain why we believe that in Equation 6-8 that Θ has a value 
indicating collusion in this industry.   If the high concentration measured by the HHI 
has a negative effect upon real free cash flows of ACHs, then collusion between 
insurers is likely to exists.  It is known from the regression analysis that payor HHI 
values are correlated negatively with real free cash flows of ACHs.  Therefore, a high 
HHI  in the payor market results in low real free cash of the ACH.  Hence, collusion 
must be present within the market.  If there were no collusion by payors, then a more 
concentrated market would not have a negative effect upon the real free cash flows of 
ACHs.    
The ACH market has shown a high concentration of payors within the market.  
This is reflected in the high actual HHI values calculated in this research.  In addition, 
empirical evidence has shown that a high HHI has a negative effect upon free cash 




Given the assumption of high inelasticity of demand within the market for 
healthcare services, the presence of highly concentrated payor markets with clear 
evidence of collusion reflects that payors within the ACH market wield market power. 
Market power is manifesting itself in the empirical evidence via high HHI values 
(measuring concentration) and the negative correlation of free cash flows (measuring 
collusion) associated with the HHI.  The evidence provided by the regression analysis 
suggests two conditions exist within this U.S. ACH market: 1) There is collusion 
present among the payors of the U.S. healthcare system in concentrated markets; and 
2) There is high market power of insurers in markets with high concentration.  If there 
is no market power, there is no collusion.  If there is no collusion, how is it that ACH 
real free cash flows suffer when there is an increase in the payor concentration?  
 
6.5.2.4 Payor Market Power and Cournot Equilibrium: 
If one considers this market in light of the Cournot equilibrium, in which all 
payors choose how many healthcare services to consume at the same time, Θ
22
 in the 
NEIO model would be valued at one (no collusion).  This would allow for a high LI 
as well, and explain the correlation between the HHI and LI.  The dilemma with this 
inquiry is that in this case, payors do not choose the amount of healthcare services 
consumed, rather, the individual patients covered by health insurance do.  Therefore, a 
Cournot equilibrium is not possible, as payors cannot choose consumption rates or 
rather the output of healthcare insurance dollars.  Therefore, Θ must represent either 
collusion (1/H) or a value close to zero.   
Assuming collusive behavior and the high inelasticity of demand in Equation 
6-8, if the HHI is increased, the LI increases.  Therefore, if there is a high HHI, then 
one can equate the high value of the HHI in this case into a high LI. The high LI for 




 Definitions for the Possible Values of Theta: 
1 = Cournot Equilibrium 




payors represents the market power of the payor, which in this case represents 
collusive monopsony amongst payors. 
The environment, which consists of payor market power, is one that is creating 
inefficiencies within the market for ACHs.  This inefficiency of payor market power 
is having a negative effect on ACHs’ free cash flow, and is affecting capital structure 
decisions accordingly.  The lower the free cash flows, the greater the limitation ACHs 
have accessing debt markets, and the higher the opportunity cost becomes for the uses 
of those cash flows.  We know that ACHs must compete on quality, as price greatly is 
removed from the equation due to moral hazard; consequently, patients are choosing 
ACHs upon perceived quality of care.  This great reliance on the perceived quality of 
care causes hospitals to invest in capital items that allow for increases in perceived 
quality (Nahata 2005).  As discussed in Chapter 4, the limitations placed on access to 
capital and possibly an increased cost of capital hinder the organization’s growth, as 
well as cause ACHs’ management to have higher requirements for the investment of 
the capital that is available.  Therefore, monopsony restricts choices of capital 
structure, making ACHs more dependent on internal funds. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The primary goal of the research within this chapter was to provide evidence 
of collusive monopsony and examine its effect upon decisions of capital structure.  
This is important, as it has been proposed in previous research that the government 
allows a collusive monopsony to exist in order to control the costs associated with 
overinvestment.  It also has been suggested that low prices compensating ACHs for 
healthcare services resulted from a function of collusive monopsony impacting FCFs, 
which consequently affected decisions of capital structure, as limiting FCF restricts 
access to debt markets and causes ACHs to be more dependent on internal funds.   
While the previously discussed literature of Pauly (1998), Sevilla (2005), and 
Seth (2006) has suggested the presence of monopsony within the healthcare market, 
others, such as Feldman and Wholey (2001), have suggested that conditions within 
the healthcare market were not an effect of monopsony, but rather of monopoly-
busting behavior.  For the research to proceed, it was prudent to provide evidence of 
two phenomena: 1) the existence of collusive monopsony and the resulting negatively 
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impacted free cash flows of ACHs; and 2) ACHs do not possess market power and are 
price takers within the market.   
Evidence of monopsony was provided via a three-step process.  An HHI value 
was calculated for each ACH for each year of the study from claim and remittance 
data.  This provided a basis to measure market concentration of the payors within the 
ACH market.  The values calculated then were compared with values of the HHI 
considered by the U.S. DOJ to be representative of a concentrated market.  
Concentration was confirmed, as the lowest actual mean HHI of 8,458 compared with 
the DOJ limit of 1,800 is proof of concentration of the market; however, more 
remarkable was the actual mean HHI comparison to a value of HHI for equally shared 
market of 2,288 for the same year.   
Evidence of collusion of payors was provided by the panel data regression on 
the Real FCFs, which shows the negative effects that concentration has upon Real 
FCFs.  The beta for the HHI was highly negative, and the P-value was significant in 
Models 4-7.  While Models 1, 2, and 3 were not significant, this can be construed as 
the result of the small sample skewing the results.  In all cases, the beta for the HHI 
was highly negative, indicating that the HHI has a negative relationship to the Real 
FCF.  For every 1-unit increase in the HHI, Real FCFs were reduced by a range of 
$2,730,321 to $3,681,040.  Cabral (2000), suggested that collusion is more likely to 
occur in markets with greater concentration.  
The NEIO supports collusive monopsony by combining the concentration and 
collusion of the payor market faced by ACHs.  The NEIO provided a model with 
which to examine the relationship of payor concentration, collusion, and demand 
elasticity with market power.  In this case, payor market power is interpreted as 
collusive monopsony.  An assumption was provided in the research for demand 
elasticity of health services consumed by payors, which allowed the NEIO to support 
market power by payors.  The effect of concentrated payor markets on Real FCF was 
shown to be collusion, as a Cournot equilibrium was ruled out.   
The lack of monopoly power by ACHs was supported by the calculation of an 
LI using payment information provided via the claims data.  The LI is a measurement 
of market power that analyzes the excess return captured by firms.  Using nine health 
procedures that are technologically stable throughout the longitudinal study, akin to 
Sevilla (2005), LIs were calculated for each procedure. Then, all of the LIs were 
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averaged for each ACH each year.  The LIs supported the lack of monopoly power by 
ACHs, as all mean LI values presented were negative for each year of the study.  Each 
LI then was regressed upon the NISP to confirm price taker status.  The regression 
provided a positive correlation of the LI and NISP, suggesting that market power or 
the lack thereof affects revenues derived from insurers.  As each LI provided low 
values, this suggested that the lack of market power by ACHs meant the lack of 
market power was reflected in lower revenues derived from insurers, which supports 
the price-taking status of ACHs.   
The research provided evidence of collusion of payors equating to market 
power of the payor, or monopsony.  In addition, it showed that ACHs lack market 
power and are price takers.  Therefore, the research supported the previous findings of 
Pauly (1998), Sevilla (2005), and Seth (2006), all of whom suggested that monopsony 
has effects within the healthcare market.  Likewise, the research was able to utilize 
ACH price-taking status to confirm evidence of impact resulting from the all-or-
nothing contractual arrangement with ACHs.  There is clear evidence of collusive 
monopsony by payors in the ACH market.  Collusive monopsony has a negative 
impact on Real FCFs, restraining access to debt markets and increasing borrowing 
costs.  The restriction in access to debt markets limits choices of capital structure by 
managers of ACHs; thus, ACHs are more reliant upon internal funds for investment.  
Higher borrowing costs force managers to limit the use of debt.  Reliance upon 
limited internal funds for investment increases opportunity costs of investments, and 
thus increases the requirements for performance of investments.   
The increase in requirements for the performance of investments means 
managers of ACHs are less likely to invest in questionable projects or projects that 
might be viewed as over investment by the government.  Thus, the government is able 
to control overinvestment by allowing collusive monopsony to exist within the 
market.  This reduction in overinvestment lowers the costs of providing healthcare to 
citizens covered by government programs, as costs associated with low return projects 
usually were supported by increased costs to insurers, including Medicare and 
Medicaid.  Collusive monopsony is an effective tool in controlling ACH behavior. 
Capital structure decisions are affected, as a reduction in FCFs limits access to 
debt markets and leaves ACHs reliant upon internal cash flows in order to finance 
projects.  Given that ACHs compete on quality and must make heavy capital 
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investment in order to remain competitive, this restricts ACHs in their investment 
opportunities, and as a result, they may be harmed fiscally by an inability to compete.   
Because low FCFs limit access to debt markets, any debt taken on by the ACH 
in such a condition may be burdened by the higher capital cost associated with such 
debt.  In all cases, whether totally reliant on internal funds or borrowing in restrained 
debt markets, the ACH’s management is impacted negatively by the presence of 
monopsony within the ACH healthcare markets.  While some may view the presence 
of monopsony within the market as a necessary construct to keep costs down, it is 
unlikely that the true understanding of the impact on ACHs is being realized. It is in 
the long run that the greatest harm due to exposure to monopsony is realized 
(Bradfield 1990) 
 
6.7 Contributions to Knowledge 
These findings contradict the findings of Feldman and Wholey (2001), who  
concluded that lower prices for healthcare services were  emblematic of a breakup of 
the ACHs’ monopoly power.  The ACHs are impacted by collusive monopsony, and 
combined with the lack of market power of ACHs, this means that ACHs’ decisions 
of capital structure are affected heavily by the construct in the healthcare market.  
This research concluded, similarly to Pauly (1998), Sevilla (2005), and Seth (2006) 
that healthcare is affected by monopsony power.  Although Sevilla (2005) analyzed 
the laboratory market for services, the payment mechanisms are similar to the ACH 
market, and similar behavior is found in both.  While Pauly (1998) suggested that the 
quantities of inputs consumed under lower prices would determine the possible 
presence of monopsony, the present research added the consideration of the all-or-
nothing contractual arrangements, analogous to Sevilla (2005), under which many 
ACH services are provided.  This research showed evidence of monopsony power 
using the NEIO framework.  The research also considered both the market power of 
the payor and the ACH within the same framework.  A clearer understanding of  
pricing and payor concentration by ACH was provided by a combination of the MCR 
and claims data provided by the private sector.  This combination of methodologies 




7. Thesis Summary and Conclusion 
The goal of this research was to provide evidence of market distortions via 
agency and collusive monopsony and examine the effect of such distortions on 
decisions of capital structure of ACHs within the U.S.  The MCR and a unique 
proprietary database of electronic healthcare billings and remittances from 2000-2007, 
allowed for the examination of the U.S. healthcare market and ACHs for these 
distortions.  The ACH financial data was examined for evidence of agency cost via 
signaling and agency cost of free cash flows.  Both were proposed to exist because of 
the underlying principal-agent relationship created by the inability to form a complete 
contract between the federal government and ACHs.  This was suggested because the 
U.S. Government covers or provides insurance for citizens via several government 
programs, namely Medicare and Medicaid.   
 
7.1 Agency Costs 
Competition within the ACH market is driven by quality or the perception of 
quality due to the moral hazard of insurance for patients.  Previous research has 
shown that competition on quality leads to overinvestment by ACHs in cutting-edge 
technologies and services as well as facilities (Newhouse, 1981; Glied, 2003; Nahata, 
2005).  The excess cost of healthcare derived from overinvestment is of concern to 
government, as it consumed 65% of health services delivered during the term of this 
study (1995-2007).  The government, concerned with overinvestment, seeks to control 
free cash flows of ACHs, thereby limiting the overinvestment behavior and reducing 
agency costs.  Because the government does not provide healthcare services directly, 
and must contract for these services, this research theorized that agency cost exists 
and affects acute care hospitals financially.  This is similar in structure to the way that 
agency affects the traditional firms, as was proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Jensen (1986), with an expansion of the principal agency relationship akin to 
Milgram and Roberts (1992) and Ross (1973).   
Two linear regression models were created to seek the existence of both 
phenomena of the agency relationship.   Signaling was tested via the regression of 
debt on the percentage of government business, using an alternative hypothesis of 
positive correlation of debt and government business.  The model was designed to 
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show whether ACHs signaled efficiency via debt in order to obtain greater 
government business.  The ACHs signaled efficiency with the use of debt, thus 
incorporating third-party monitoring, which reduces agency cost.   
Agency cost of free cash flows was tested via a linear regression of the 
percentage of government business on free cash flows of ACHs using an alternative 
hypothesis: the higher the percentage of government, the lower the free cash flows.  
While no evidence of signaling was found, there was significant evidence of agency 
cost of free cash flows.  For a one percent change in government business, free cash 
flows of ACHs were reduced by a range of $953,518.00 to $1,166,087.00.   The 
presence of agency cost of free cash flows helps explain the lack of signaling present 
within the market, as the reduction in free cash flows restricts access to debt markets, 
thereby limiting ACHs’ ability to signal.  In addition, the restriction in debt markets 
limited via agency cost of free cash flow limits decisions of capital structure by 
ACHs, as they are dependent upon internal funds for access to debt markets (Calem & 
Rizzo 1995).  As ACHs are more dependent on internal funds due to lower free cash 
flows, the opportunity cost of investment increases, changing the performance 
requirements for future projects and thereby reducing overinvestment. 
 
7.2 Collusive Monopsony  
Previous research by Pauly (1998), Sevilla (2005), and Seth (2006) suggested 
that monopsony was or could be present in the U.S. healthcare market.   The research 
hypothesized a collusive monopsony to exist within the U.S. healthcare market, as the 
U.S. Government via Medicare and Medicaid consumed, on average, 65% of health 
services during the years of 1995-2007.  In addition, the fee schedule and policies of 
Medicare and Medicaid are made public, allowing other payors to obtain this 
information.  It was proposed that the use of this information by other payors allowed 
them to change the prices paid for procedures in correlation with Medicare and 
Medicaid, thus creating collusion and market power by allowing them to internalize 
additional market rents above the competitive norm.  Similar to Seth (2006), in order 
to capture the concentration of the payor market relative to each ACH individually, 
using unique claims data, an HHI was created for the payor market faced by each 
ACH. This effectively measured the concentration of payors in each geographic 
245 
 
healthcare market. In addition, using the unique claims/remittance data for nine 
patient procedures, a modified LI using average total cost was calculated for each 
hospital, thereby allowing an examination of market power and price taker status of 
the ACHs.   
In order to provide evidence of collusion within the market, a regression was 
conducted using panel data regression of the concentration of the payor (HHI) on the 
real free cash flows of the hospital. This provided significant evidence of collusion, as 
the concentration of payors was shown to have negative effects upon ACHs’ real free 
cash flows.  For every increase of one in the value of the HHI, real free cash flows 
decreased, ranging from $2,730,321 to $3,681,040.  This suggested that collusion 
manifests in markets with higher payor concentration, as was expected (Cabral 2000; 
Lipczynski et al 2009).  An additional inference of the market power of payors was 
made, as prior research had shown a high inelasticity of demand within the market 
due to the moral hazard, which insulated patients from price (Maynard 2001; Gaynor 
et al. 1999; Glied 2003; and Pauly 2004).  While ruling out Cournot equilibrium, the 
research was able to show via the New Empirical Industrial Organization NEIO 
model that high concentration and collusion equates to market power of payors; thus, 
a collusive monopsony is present in the U.S. ACH market.   
The numerical value of the modified LI provided evidence of a lack of market 
power, as the average modified LI for each year was negative. The low value of the LI 
confirmed that ACHs have negative margins on the procedures rendered to patients of 
payors.  This suggested that ACHs have little market power.  In order to provide 
additional evidence of this, two models for the LI were proposed.  First, a regression 
of the LI on real free cash flows of the ACH that used panel data regression to 
understand better the lack of market power of hospitals effect on decisions of capital 
structure via free cash flows.  The second, a regression of the LI on the NISP, which 
provided support of ACHs as price takers.  The use of both models provided an 
alternative viewpoint to the results of the HHI.   
The LI regression provided evidence that suggested that the FCFs were not 
affected by the lack of market power of ACHs.   The results did not match expected 
outcomes as components within free cash flows were thought to be distorting the 
effects of the lack of market power of ACHs.  Namely revenues derived from other 
income as defined by the MCR was thought to be skewing results as they are counter 
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balancing negative margins received by ACHs on services rendered to patients.  This 
intellection is supported by the evidence comparing the net income margin and 
operating margin for ACHs.  Net income margin, which comprised both Net Income 
from Service to Patients and Other Income, was positive, while Operating Margins, 
which comprised only revenues from services to patients, was negative during this 
longitudinal study.  Therefore, a further regression of the LI on the NISP was 
conducted to show that market power as measured by the LI did significantly support 
price taking within the ACH market for the NISP.  This provided better results, as the 
net income from patient services is income primarily received from insurers, and 
therefore delivered a better indication of price taking. The result of the HHI and the LI 
regressions supports the existence of collusive monopsony and the price-taker status 
of the ACHs.  In addition, collusive monopsony had a large negative influence on free 
cash flows.  Thus, collusive monopsony had negative consequences for decisions of 
capital structure by reducing or limiting free cash flows. 
 
7.3 Implications 
The implications of these results require us to consider how the research may 
effect, agency research, monopsony research , constructs in market that cause 
distortional effects upon market participants and future research directions. 
 
7.3.1 Agency Research 
The research presented here has implications for future agency research.  This 
contends that agency costs are present in a principal-agent relationship which is not 
considered amongst the traditional agency relationships.  As such, this research 
considers the agency problem more in line with Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and 
therefore views agency relationships as more widespread in society than perhaps that 
considered in the mainstream finance literature or as expressed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976).  The presence of agency costs of free cash flows suggests that 
researchers should look at markets and relationships where agency might not be 
thought to exist and to realize that the implications of these agency costs could be 




7.3.2 Monopsony Research 
The implications for monopsony research are not quite as obvious as those for 
agency theory.  The research presented evidence of collusive monopsony as proposed 
by Taylor (2003) under the all or nothing contract.  This presents a slight deviation 
from the traditional monopsony approach, and the one in which the previous literature 
had sought, unsuccessfully, for evidence of monopsony in healthcare, due to the 
approach of examining the market for a reduction in consumption along with price.  
This research, on the other hand, suggests that monopsony may in fact be present in 
markets where previous empirical studies had suggested there was none, leaving one 
to consider the validity or need to readdress current views as exppressed in prior 
research on this topic.  The contractual arrangements inherent within a market can 
change how market power should be analysed and how a researcher might seek 
evidence thereof.  Likewise this research undertaken in this thesis may suggest that 
more consideration be given to the detrimental effects of monopsony when regulating 
a market for antitrust behaviour and policy determination.  The findings presented 
here suggests that monopsony’s presence while initially apparently a good outcome 
for the payor and a benefit for the end consumer, ultimately may not be in the long 
run as the distortions created by its presence take time to manifest. 
 
7.3.3 Research Structure and Methodologies 
The research presented novel ways of seeking evidence of both agency and 
monopsony.  Both the methodologies used were structured to analyse the data and 
seek evidence of the primary theory along with an alternative, namley a mirror image 
phenomena which would give negative results.  In the case of the research on agency, 
both a theory of signalling and agency cost of free cash flows were considered.  No 
evidence of signalling was found and yet evidence was found for the agency cost of 
free cash flows.  Combined these results provide evidence that a reduction in free cash 
flows was effected by agency.  It should come as no surprise that lower free cash 
flows would reduce the ability of ACHs to signal via debt.  So a lack of evidence of 
one condition helps to support the evidence that another condition was present.   
Likewise, when seeking evidence of monopsony, market power for both sides of 
the market was considered (buyer and seller).  This allowed the research to provide 
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evidence that collusive monopsony was present for buyers (payors) but lacking for 
sellers (ACHs).  This dual approach allowed the findings of a lack of market power on 
the part of ACHs to support the findings that the payors have collusive monopsony 
power.  This is important as these twin approaches to the research may provide an 
alternative method for finance and econometric research going forward to address 
similar questions as to those covered in this thesis.  In addition, the combination and 
use of the Lerner’s Index, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the NEIO model in a 
combined approach presents a possible consideration to move forward monopsony 
research, especially in the area of healthcare.  Finally, suitably adapted, the combined 
approach used here might have implications for other areas of research in economics 
and finance. 
 
7.3.4 Market Implications 
While agency cost of free cash flows was found to affect free cash flows of 
ACHs, the influence of monopsony on real free cash flows of ACHs is much more 
profound.  In either case, managers of ACHs are placed under constraints in managing 
capital structure, as free cash flows are limited by both distortions in the market. 
23
  
The ACHs’ access to debt markets is limited, as they must promise future free cash 
flows in order to obtain debt.  Without access to or constraints on debt, ACHs find 
themselves squeezed as they compete in a market that requires large capital 




 While some may suggest that reductions in free cash flows do not constrain decisions of capital 
structure, let us consider if a reduction in free cash flows actually constrains the ability to obtain debt.  
Lending institutions have lending limits, which usually encompass covenants, which require firms to 
stay within a given ratio during the term of the financing.  Likewise, firms falling below given financial 
ratio requirements will not be able to raise debt.  Further, let us consider moreover that lenders have a 
maximum multiple of free cash flows they are willing to lend, for example a coverage ratio.  Now let 
us assume that hospitals always borrow at the maximum allowed by the lender.  If the ACH 
experiences a reduction in free cash flow then the lending limits allowed by the lender will be reduced 
by the multiple of the reduction in free cash flows multiplied by the lenders maximum lending ratio.  
This therefore limits the amount of debt that a lender is willing to consider providing to ACHs.  This 
reduction in debt capacity places a constraint on capital structure as it reduces that ability of ACHs to 
take on additional projects, which would cause the ACH to exceed its debt capacity. 
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investments.  In addition, moral hazard within the market insulates their consumers 
from payment, so that ACHs compete more readily on quality or perceived quality 
(Newhouse 1981; Nahata 2005).  Therefore, if ACHs cannot take on projects that 
enhance perceived quality, their competitiveness within the market is hindered.  The 
possibility of ACHs being marginalized financially in the presence of agency and 
monopsony is possible, thus pushing already troubled ACHs into the margin or into 
insolvency.  
These findings are troubling for an industry that already is having financial 
difficulties.  Management of the ACHs in this current environment is challenging at 
best, and at worst, impossible.  The real concerns of these distortions, especially 
monopsony, are that it is not the short-run effects that harm the industry, but rather the 
long-run consequences 
24
(Bradfield 1990).  The ACHs deliver healthcare in a very 
difficult market in which consumers seek the most advanced healthcare provider 
covered by their insurance.  Moving forward, because of the lack of free cash flows 
and consequently limited or lacking access to debt markets, ACHs may choose not to 
invest in additional capital projects, but to maximize utilization on older technologies.  
While at first this may seem to be an excellent management choice for a firm’s 
survival, given the healthcare market and the moral hazard, the quality of services will 
ultimately suffer, as ACHs cannot afford to modernize, therefore perhaps leaving 
better treatments for ACHs with better cash flows.  This alludes to a reduction in 




 The long run consequences presented by both agency costs of free cash flows and collusive 
monopsony are that cash flows of ACHs are negatively impacted.  Mean net margins for ACHs over 
the study range from 1% to 3%.  Any slight decrease in free cash flows affects the ability of ACHs to 
invest in future capital projects and/or services, as it limits both investment via internal funds, but also 
reduces access to debt as ACHs have less cash flow to promise for debt repayment.  As reimbursement 
increases have not kept up with inflation in healthcare costs, this leads to an erosive effect in on two 
fronts.  One that free cash flows are reduced by increasing business with the federal government and/or 
through negotiations with payors via collusive monopsony.  This may lead to a scenario where margins 
are squeezed as ACHs can only cut so much cost and efficiency before they affect quality of care.  Two 
is that if reimbursement scheme are kept low and increases do not match inflation then ACHs will be 
losing revenues in real dollar terms.  Neither of these facts immediately present themselves as a 
problem in the short term, but rather in the long term become detrimental to ACHs financial wellbeing. 
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quality or breadth of healthcare services provided, which brings light to the concern 
over long-term consumer harm.  This is cause for concern as antitrust legislation, as it 
is currently enforced, ignores consequences to consumer harm via indirect means.  
Previous research has recognized the gaps between small, rural hospitals and large, 
urban medical centers; these gaps only will widen under this scenario, making equal 
access to healthcare difficult.  The continuation of these market distortions is not 
healthy for the ACH market or for the patients.  This research may suggest that better 
methods for controlling cost may need to be found as price paid by the payors has 
little control over healthcare cost.  Perhaps a more relevant strategy would be to 
increase cost sharing by patients, thereby leaving a margin on which ACHs may 
depend to remain valid providers of quality healthcare and relying on greater control 
of consumption by the end consumer. 
 
7.3.5 Policy Implications 
The findings of this research presents a difficult problem for policy makers.  The 
U.S. Government has been under pressure by some in American society to expand its 
role in supplying healthcare to its citizens.  There are currently approximately 43 
million uninsured in the U.S., which many say have little or no access to healthcare 
(Jonas 2007).  Additionally the U.S. has experienced significant rises in the costs of 
healthcare as a percentage of GDP, which have been rising faster than inflation caused 
by rising prices and demand distorted by the moral hazard of insurance. Theselead to 
overconsumption of health resources (Glied 2003; Nahata 2005).  This is complicated 
by enormous waste due to the overtreatment of patients, failure to coordinate care, 
administrative complexities of the healthcare system, high regulation of the system 
and outright fraud, which accounts for 20% to 30% of health expenditures every year 
(Khan 2011).  These market phenomena have led to high healthcare costs and even 
higher insurance premiums (White 2004).   
Government efforts to manage these problems have led to legislation being 
passed, which tries to provide a resolution via changes in policy and pricing 
methodologies or by creating market constructs and/or participants.  The research 
conducted here suggest that the government’s efforts to manage its relationships with 
ACHs via pricing methodologies meant to curb costs and abhorrent behavior, may be 
creating a negative environment for ACHs moving forward as ACH cash flows are 
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reduced by both agency costs and monopsony costs within the market.  This will 
likely reduce some ACHs access to debt markets and thereby make them more 
dependent on their own internal cash flows, as suggested by Calem and Rizzo (1995).  
As discussed previously this may lead to a reduction in investment by ACHs perhaps 
leading to lower quality of services or a lack of services in areas where ACHs are 
unable to invest in new capital equipment and services.  This makes the government’s 
need to address equal access for all difficult, as the long run effects of both agency 
and monopsony would seem to undermine processes and market constructs put in 
place to solve these dilemmas.  The government has recently passed The Affordable 
Care Act, which institutes new market participants called Consumer Operated and 
Oriented Plans.  These effectively are a modern version of the MCO’s (Managed Care 
Organizations).  The Act seeks to reduce the premium cost for health insurance by 
ensuring that consumers get most of the health insurance premiums back in the form 
of services by limiting the use of insurance profits to covers certain expenses.  This 
likely means that insurers will seek to obtain their profit in different ways. Hence not 
necessarily back from the consumer but by  lowering reimbursement for health 
services provided by ACHs.  Thus creating a vicious cycle that is likely to continue 
for some time to come until the long-term effects of these policies are fully 
understood and a better understanding of the market drivers of demand are realized by 
policy makers.   
For now, policy makers will continue to try to manage healthcare delivery and 
costs through improper methodologies that do more harm than good. This is 
compounded by the further goal of The Act, which is to cover every American with 
some form of health insurance either purchased by the individual or through 
government programs.  While at first this seems a noble goal however, the 
mechanisms put in place only exacerbate problems already in existing in the market.  
Government plans, which cover citizens, will continue to use market power to control 
agency problems that arise due to lack of monitoring, fraud, over consumptions of 
healthcare services and failures to coordinate care, by changing incentives for ACHs 
via pricing.  It is unlikely that prices paid to ACHs will go up in real terms and due to 
the additional volume and limited dollars will mean the government will have to care 
for more people with not a proportional increase in funding.  This means that 
government will seek to lower the average price per procedure.  It is simple math.   
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Given the findings from this research, this suggests that ACHs will be worse off 
financially under the new government programs.  This is complicated by the fact that 
all individuals, which are not covered by the government programs, will be required 
to purchase insurance on their own.  This means that consumers will purchase health 
insurance based upon price and quality.  However due to a promise of greater 
consumer awareness of insurance products through the new insurance exchanges to be 
set up in each state, plans will most likely be very similar in price and breadth of 
coverage.  This is not a problem. On the other hand, a problem exists on the other side 
of the market between insurers and ACHs where ACHs are required under the act to 
meet certain quality measures for patient care.  Ensuring a minimum quality level 
would seem like a good thing.   It is for the patient, but these new regulations mean 
that ACHs cannot vary quality with price and neither can the insurer.  So if ACHs are 
marginally profitable under the best rates and quality delivered, they cannot lower 
quality delivered to match lower reimbursement and therefore will be straddled with 
the costs of generating a certain level of quality product while not being able to 
compensate via lower costs.  This means profit margins will most likely go down 
under this scenario.  From the perspective of this research, this will have implications 
on free cash flows and once again will have the potential to influence ACHs ability to 
continue to invest in capital equipment and services.  Thus current changes to 
healthcare provision take us right back to where we started with these research 
findings.  Policy makers must understand the long run consequences of their 
regulations and created market structures and participants.  Until they fully 
comprehend what the outcome will be, they will continue to make similar mistakes in 
trying to manage the U.S. healthcare market. 
 
7.4 Contributions of the Research 
The research provided an excellent opportunity to examine the financial and 
economic theories of agency and monopsony and their effects upon free cash flows of 
ACHs and the consequences these effects have upon decisions of capital structure.  
ACHs offered a unique subject with which to study impacts on capital structure. Prior 
research indicated that the ownership structure (for-profit or non-for-profit) of the 
ACHs considered within this study has no effects on their capital structure  (Wedig et 
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al, 1988).  By utilizing data on a single industry, this has allowed the present research 
to avoid problems of systematic structural differences between industries, similar to 
Calem and Rizzo(1995).  The complementary approaches adopted in this thesis 
allowed the present research to proceed under the recommendation made by Eisenhart 
(1989) for agency research to include of secondary complementary theories which 
may also explain possible outcomes.  Furthermore, the analyses presented here were 
able to take advantage of new data which had never been utilized for the study of 
agency and monopsony by using the Medicare Cost Report data for ACHs and a 
proprietary database of 12 million insurance claim records.   
The research expanded the consideration of agency as expressed initially by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Meckling (1986), to included agency in line of 
thought as expressed by Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Ross (1973), which 
considered principal agent relationship to exist at any place, organization, contract or 
society where an agent acted on behalf of a principal, as in between employer and 
employee or the state and the governed, essentially all contractual arrangements 
(Ross1973; Milgrom and Roberts 1992).  The agency research was able to consider a 
slightly altered form of agency relationship than that which might be studied in 
corporate finance.  In this case the principal and agents primary communication 
methodology was price as monitoring for quality and delivery of service remain 
difficult during the period of time considered within this research.   
The complementary theory of Monopsony (collusive) via the all or nothing 
contractual arrangement akin to Taylor (2003) was considered, expanding upon the 
previous research of Sevilla (2005), Pauly (1988 and 1998),  The research was able to 
examine a similar scenario to that of Sevilla (2005), where he studied reimbursement 
for laboratory services for evidence of collusion amongst payors in the market for lab 
services.  This expansion of previous research is important as there is little previous 
empirical evidence regarding monopsony in the U.S. healthcare market and none 
found in regards to the impact such distortions caused by the market constructs 
presented here have on decisions of capital structure.   
Overall, the research provides an in-depth examination of the consequential 
effects of both agency and monopsony on firms’ decisions of capital structure within 
the same market utilizing the same data.  The evidence provided in this research is 
important as it may be used as a basis for understanding the consequence of 
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theoretical relationships and market constructs.  This gives us new insights with 
which to make future policy decisions regarding some of the problems of which have 
been discussed previously. 
The thesis contributed to knowledge by utilizing a novel approach to both agency 
and monopsony research methodologies by seeking evidence of opposing theories of 
explanation within the same research.  In agency, this involved the combined use of 
both signalling and agency cost of free cash flows theories.  In monopsony, the 
consideration of looking at market power for both sides of the healthcare services 
market, buyer and seller, analysing both their effects on free cash flows. 
  
7.5 Limitations of the Research 
The research presented within this thesis employs a sound structure, organization 
and methodology to provide evidence of agency and collusive monopsony and their 
effect on capital structure via free cash flows. On the other hand, no research is 
without its limitations.  There are several limitations to this research and they 
primarily fall into two categories: data and methodology. 
 
7.5.1 Data 
The limitations inherent in the data primarily presented themselves in the 
Medicare Cost Report (MCR).  The MCR is a non GAAP based presentation of 
financial statements provided to CMS annually by all hospitals that accept payment 
from CMS.  Criticism by Kane (2001), suggested that the MCR was unreliable, 
unauditable and vaguely defined. While the information provided in the MCR allowed 
the present researcher to reconstruct an income statement and balance sheet there is 
no statement of cash flows provided.  The absence of a cash flow sheet is a major 
deficiency (Largay and Stickney 1980; Sloan 1996; Magnus 2001).  This meant that 
the research had to create a statement of cash flows in order to calculate free cash 
flows, which was one of the primary variables included within all regressions 
performed in this research.  In doing so, this presented certain problems, which were 
that underlying variables used to create free cash flows were missing for some cases 
and had to be excluded for those cases.  This data problem was primarily driven by a 
lack of information on capital expenditures and total depreciation, two of the primary 
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variables in calculating free cash flows.  Consequently, this may have led to the cash 
flows being slightly understated or overstated.  This might mean that the regressions 
where free cash flows was a variable suffer from being over or understated. However, 
in the absence of evidence in the data and from other researchers that there are 
systematic biases in the data, the large number of cases that were used, give some 
comfort that while a problem this does not affect the validity of the results. 
Problems also exist within the data for the creation of the Lerner’s Index utilizing 
nine procedures.  It potentially creates a problem as cases were included where a 
claim or bill and a remit or payment could be matched together.  This limited the 
number of ACHs which could participate as well as the number of cases and types of 
procedures which could be included.  Additional parameters regarding the types of 
services which could be included presented a limitation as they may not have been 
representable of all the procedures rendered by a hospital.  Likewise the procedures 
included in calculating the Lerner’s Index were primarily of an inpatient basis and 
therefore may not be able to represent any market power or marginal profit on 
outpatient services.  Likewise it may not have been representable of ACHs where 
their volumes frequency of procedures or procedure types differed from those in the 
sample. That said, the use of multiple procedures and different models for the number 
of claims provides a robust structure for the approach used. 
 
7.5.2 Methodologies 
The methodologies contained within the research provided an excellent basis to study 
both agency and monopsony as considered within this thesis. However there were 
several areas where limitations may have affected the research.  The concerns 
primarily come from the use of the Lerner’s Index, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
and the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO).  The Lerner’s Index provided 
an excellent measurement of market power for the ACH; however the lack of 
marginal costs on hospital services is a limitation.  The research used a way of 
calculating the Lerner’s Index using an average Lerner’s Index which utilized average 
total costs instead of marginal costs.  In doing so, the models made the assumption 
that ATC was equal to AVC and that AVC (average fixed costs were close to zero) 
and that average variable costs were constant with respect to output (patient days) at 
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output ranges observed in practice and therefore ATC equalled MC over the long run.  
This may have caused the value of the Lerner’s Index to be skewed. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index provided a well tried and tested approach to 
calculate concentration of payors in the ACH market place.  The regression utilizing 
this along with free cash flows allowed the research to gain insight into the effects of 
payor concentration on the free cash flows of ACHs.  However, the HHI calculation 
was sensitive to the variable payor count which was the number of payors which 
consumed hospital services.  Where the payor count approached one it created a value 
within the HHI representing one buyer. The value of the HHI could be skewed if the 
electronic claims data was missing payors or if the ACH filed claims with payors 
electronically.  This meant that the methodology was limited by the number of payors 
electronically billed for by ACHs. This meant that as the payor count approached one, 
the value of the HHI could be skewed as the use of electronically submitted claims 
could not account for missing payors, which might have filed via paper.  This might 
have caused the HHI to be overstated.  Where the HHI was overstated there may have 
been a weaker positive correlation than that presented in the results. 
The research made use of the New Empirical Industrial Organization model to 
infer market power of the payors and consequently collusive monopsony via the 
combination of the concentration of the payor market faced by ACHs, the effect of 
concentrations effect on free cash flows (evidence of collusion) and an assumption of 
price inelasticity within the healthcare market. While Milgrom and Roberts (1992), 
Pauly (1986), Gaynor (2000), Smet (2002) and Glied (2003) all support the price 
inelasticity in the market for healthcare services, no value was actually calculated nor 
was price inelasticity measured directly.  Therefore the assumption of price 
inelasticity and value for this variable in the NEIO presents a limitation of the 
research insofar as the underlying elasticity of demand differs from the values present 
in the market place.  To the extent that the actual values differ from assumed values, 
then the NEIO would overstate market power on the part of the payor.   
 
7.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
The research presented within this thesis expanded our understanding and 
knowledge of both agency and monopsony Costs inherent in the market for healthcare 
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services during the timeframe of this study.  However, further research is suggested in 
this area as many questions still remain.  Additional questions remain regarding both 
agency and monopsony and how they affect the quality of healthcare delivered.  This 
is important as this research suggests that presence of both of these costs manifesting 
itself in the market place limit cash flows and therefore have a negative influence on 
the ability of ACHs to access debt markets, akin to Calem and Rizzo (1995).  The 
question still remains as to whether this reduction in free cash flows and limitations in 
access to debt markets actually affect the quality of care provided to patients or 
whether it limits possible services, better quality and new equipment to hospitals with 
better cash flows.  As suggested by this research, the limitations of free cash flows 
caused by both agency and monopsony may cause ACHs to be financially 
marginalized or, ultimately, insolvent.   
Additional research is recommended to see if agency and monopsony can explain 
the volume and frequency of ACH bankruptcies.  This would be important as current 
policy and future policy still contemplate reimbursement strategies similar to those 
that existed during the course of this research.  If these strategies do indeed partially 
explain bankruptcies then it might provide impetus for policy and market changes.  
One may also suggest repeating the research contained herein with better data on 
marginal costs. This would allow further research to have an accurate representation 
of the Lerner’s Index. The researcher can also recommend a broader range of 
procedures than just nine; however additional data may be required for this to be 
possible.  So one might encourage proprietary owners of relevant data to make these 
available for such research purposes. In addition, one may also suggest seeking data 
which might allow one to accurately measure the price inelasticity in healthcare, so 
that it might not be an assumption in the calculation of market power presented within 
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Chapter 3 Definitions, Ratios and Equations  
 
 
3.5.1 Profitability Ratios 
3.5.1.1 ROE (RETURN ON EQUITY) 
Return on Equity is defined as per Table 3.4. RoE (N) = 54,619 with 963 
missing from the original data of 55,582.  The missing data was due to either a blank 
value in one or both of the variables, or was created with a divide by zero error, which 
created a system missing or undefined value.  Statistically, the RoE (N) represents a 
large sample size.  From the histogram in Figure 3.1A, the RoE had a non-normal 
distribution; the distribution was Leptokurtic with a kurtosis of 19,801.25.  Also seen 
in Figure 3.1A and Figure 3.2A, the mean RoE (N) value was not realistic, presenting 
a value of 41.98.  Standard error in the statistical descriptives was high at 316.91.  The 
confidence interval at 95% was large in size, with a range of 1,242.30.   The 




Description Equation Equation using Data Variables
Profitability 3.5.2.1 Return on Equity Net Income/ Equity net_income/(balance_sheet_accts_G0_P0_L27_C1-balance_sheet_accts+G0_P0_L43_C1)
3.5.2.2 Return on Assets Net Income/Total Assets net income/ balance_sheet_accts_G0_P0_L27_C1
3.5.2.3 Net Income Margin Net Income/  Sales net_income / total_patient_revenues
3.5.2.4 Operating Income Margin Operating Income/ Net Sales net_income_from_svc_to_patients / net_patient_revenues
Leverage 3.5.2.5 Debt Ratio Total Debt/ Total Assets balance_sheet_accts_G0_P0_L43_C1 / balance_sheet_accts+G0_P0_L27_C1
3.5.2.6 Debt to Equity ratio Long-Term Debt/Equity total debt/total liabilities- total assets)




(balance_sheet_accts_G0_P0_L1_C1 + balance_sheet_accts_G0_P0_L2_C1 + 
balance_sheet_accts_G0_P0_L4_C1) / balance_sheet_accts_G0_P0_L36_C1






Efficiency 3.5.2.11 Days Sales Outstanding (Gross Receivables/Net Sales) x 365 (balance_sheet_accts_G0_P0_L4_C1/ net_patient_revenues) x fiscal days




Figure 3.1A: Histogram ROE no limitations 
The box plot in Figure 3.2A shows that the distribution was non-normal, with 
population density and a mean RoE around the 0 value.  Outliers and extremes existed 
in the Tukey (1977) definition.  The scale represented in the box plot shows that 
values spread widely throughout a large range.   
 
Figure 3.2A: ROE box plot, no limitation 
Outliers were identified using the box plot and stem and leaf plot as those 
values below or equal to -0.26, and those greater than or equal to 0.42. The population 
was adjusted using these variables and a new subset or sample of RoE (N) was 
created.  The new sample was named RoE (n). A histogram of RoE (n) was created, 
as shown in Figure 3.3A.  While the histogram reflects a leptokurtic distribution, the 
overall distribution was closer to that of a normal distribution curve.  The limitations 
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on RoE (N) to create RoE (n) reduced the number of cases in the sample to that of 
44,629.  This reflected a loss of 9,990 cases from RoE (N), or a reduction of 18.3%.   
 
Figure 3.3A: Histogram ROE w/limitation (-0.26, 0.42) 
This adjustment to create RoE (n) provided us with a new standard error of 
0.00056 with a mean RoE (n) of 7.43%, which is in the expected range for RoE.  The 
range provided in the descriptives gave us a smaller value range for the mean RoE (n) 
of 7.4%.  The sample distribution was slightly positively skewed, with a skewness of 
0.125, and is still considered somewhat leptokurtic, with a kurtosis value of 0.624.   
Looking at the box plot in Figure 3.4A, it shows that RoE (n) presented us 
with a closer approximation to that of a normal distribution.  Both whiskers and boxes 
are noticeable in comparison to RoE (N)’s box plot.  Fifty percent of the population 
represented by the boxes was between 0 and 0.20.  Whiskers extend below zero in 
Figure 3.4A.  While outliers were still present, it was thought that these were not 
significant enough to distort the research in RoE, due to the sample size of RoE (n), 
the size of the standard error, and the range of both the confidence interval and the 
range of values overall. 
 
Figure 3.4A: Boxplot ROE w/limitation (-0.26, 0.42) 
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In Figure 3.2A, we have taken the mean RoE (n) and viewed the mean by 
fiscal year reported.  RoE (n) = 44,629 in this comparison. The data shows that ACHs 
experienced lower years of mean RoE in the years 1998 to 2002, with a mean RoE (n) 
of 5.7%, 5.5%, 5.8%, 6.2% and 5.7%.  No mean RoE (n) was presented by fiscal year 
above 10%. 
Table 3.2A: Descriptive statistics for Return on Equity by year w/limitation (-0.26, 0.42) 
 
A histogram was created to verify case distribution throughout the sample of 
mean RoE (n) by fiscal year.  Table 3.2A shows that the number of cases spread 
throughout the sample was approximately the same, except for the years 1995 and 
2007.  These years,1995 and 2007, each represent approximately 25% of the number 
of cases in each of the other years in the sample. A comparison of mean RoE (n) to 
hospital size was conducted to see what effect hospital size had on the mean. In this 
comparison, (n) = 44,599.  According to the data presented in Table 3.3A, hospital 
size had an effect on mean RoE (n), with larger hospitals having a greater mean RoE.  
Category 1 remained the underperformer of the group.  The underperformance was 
possibly due to the lack of volume or reimbursement in comparison to the other sizes 
of ACHs.   





A greater proportion of (n) ACHs were under 100 beds, which is represented 
by Category 1.  This was consistent with previous research that shows that smaller 
ACHs struggle financially due to size, geography, demographics, and patient volume.  
Also, we see that more beds equated to a larger mean RoE (n).  Therefore, a larger 
ACH would generate a larger RoE. Table 3.3A shows the distribution of the ROE (n) 
sample by bed size.  Category 5 remained small in comparison to the other categories.   
The results of Category 5 may be subject to bias because of its size. 
 
3.5.1.2 ROA (RETURN ON ASSETS) 
Return on Assets is defined as Net Income/Total Assets.  The RoA (N) = 
54,047 with 1,535 cases missing from the original data set of 55,582.  The missing 
cases were due to missing variables in the original data or divide by zero errors, which 
resulted in variables being classified as system missing.  The RoA (N) represents a 
large statistical sample size. 
 
Figure 3.5A: Histogram RoA (N) with no limiters 
The histogram provided in Figure 3.5A of RoA (N) shows that the distribution 
is non-normal with a leptokurtic distribution.  The large standard error represented in 
the statistical descriptives for RoA (n) was large, which indicates that the mean RoA 
(N) presented at 37,566 was skewed with outliers and extremes, and thus was 
inaccurate.  This is confirmed by Table 3.4A.  In it, the mean RoA (N) was also a 
non-realistic value for RoA.  The range of values for the mean RoA (N) was 
extremely large, which is indicative of outliers and extreme values.  The distribution 
was skewed negatively, with a skewness value of -121.52.  The leptokurtic 




Table 3.4A: Descriptive Statistics Return on Assets (RoA -X, denotes removal of outliers) 
 
Outliers were identified using Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers via box 
plot and stem and leaf plot.  The outliers identified were those values less than or 
equal to -0.15, and greater than or equal to 0.22.  All cases that were identified as 
outliers were removed from the RoA (N) population and then used to create a 
subsample, RoA (n).  RoA (n) = 45,634 cases, representing a reduction of 8,413 or 
15.6% from the original RoA (N) of 54,047.  The histogram representing RoA (n) is 
shown in Figure 3.5A, which shows a more normalized distribution.  The mean RoA 
(n) was a realistic value of 3.34%.   
 
Figure 3.6A: Histogram RoA (n) with limitation @ (-0.15, 0.22) 
The RoA (n) was slightly negatively skewed, as is reflected in a skewness 
value of -0.057.  The sample distribution remained leptokurtic, with a kurtosis of 




Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
RoA 54047 37566.92 0.03 5088640 8.81E+08 -121.52 16973.44 x<= -0.150 & x>= 0.220




Figure 3.7A: Box plot RoA (n) with limitation @ (-0.15,0.22) 
A box plot of RoA (n) was created to look at the distribution of the sample.  
Figure 3.7A illustrates that the distribution of RoA with the sample had a more 
normalized distribution.  While outliers can be seen in the box plot of RoA(n), these 
should not affect research conducted with this sample, due to the standard error 
presented as well as the number of outlier and outlier values in comparison to the 
sample size and sample values of RoA.  The values for mean RoA presented in RoA 
(n) were within acceptable limits.   
The case distribution by year, as seen in Table 3.5A, was similar to the 
previous ratio distributions, as well as to the overall population of the study.  The only 
exception was that of 2005.  This was most likely due to missing total asset values 
within the sample.  No exact reason for the reduction in cases presented in 2005 has 
been found.  The years 1995 and 2007 represent 25% of the number of cases 
presented in other years within RoA (n).  Values presented for 1995 and 2007 could 
be skewed by a smaller representation of the overall population within those years.   
 




Mean RoA (n) by fiscal year is presented in in Table 3.5A, and for the sample 
(n) = 45,634.  All years presented in the study generated a positive mean RoA.   Years 
1998 through 2002 were years of lower mean RoA (n).  The mean RoA was (n) = 
2.55%, 2.47%, 2.63%, 2.78%, and 2.48% for the years 1998 through 2002, 
respectively.  These years coincided with the underperformance recognized in the 
mean RoE by fiscal year that was presented in the previous section.  Also noted is that 
no mean RoA (n) was above 0.05 or 5%.   
 
Table 3.6A: Descripritives for Return on Assets by hospital size limit @ (-0.15, 0.22). 
When mean RoA by hospital size was analyzed in Table 3.6A, it showed that 
again, hospital size affects return.  In this case, RoA (n) = 55,526.  While a complete 
linear relationship did not exist, we can see that as the size of the ACH increases, so 
too does its mean RoA (n).  The overall range of the mean RoA when compared to the 
RoE was smaller.   This was most likely due to the larger total asset values presented 
in comparison to the equity values presented in the RoE.  Again, underperformance 
was characterized in Category 1.  The entities representing larger returns had more 
beds.  Both of these findings are consistent with previous research. 
 
3.5.1.3 Net Margin 
Net Margin (NM) is defined as Net Income/Sales.  Net Margin (NM), N= 
54,078, with 1,504 cases missing from the total population of 55,582 cases.  The 
histogram of NM (N) in Figure 3.8A gives us some indication that the distribution of 




Figure 3.8A: Histogram Net Margin with no limitation 
The descriptives of NM (N) in Table 3.7A show a mean NM (N) of 1.48% 
with a standard error of 0.000788.  The range was 33.87, which was large, and 
provided evidence of the existence of outliers and extremes within the population.  
The distribution was skewed negatively, with a skewness of -99.12.  The leptokurtic 
distribution was confirmed with a kurtosis value of 14,886.32.   
A box plot of NM (N) confirmed an abnormal distribution of the population.  
Boxes and whiskers are not visible in the plot, which indicates a very condensed 
population, the result of the presence of outliers and extreme values compressing the 
plot.  Extremes and outliers were evident within the plot as stars and circles beyond 
the central population core. 
 
 
Figure 3.9A:  Box plot Net Margin with no limitation 
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Using Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers and extremes, and utilizing box 
plot and stem and leaf plot for identification, outliers and extremes were identified as 
NM (N) values of less than or equal to -0.08, and values greater than or equal to 
0.118. Limiting NM (N) at these values presented us with the sample NM (n).  The 
NM (n) = 49,699 was a reduction of 4,379 cases, or 8% of the 54,078 cases present in 
NM (N).    
 
Table 3.7A:  Descriptive statistics for Net Margin ( Net Margin -X, denotes removal of 
outliers). 
The histogram of NM (n) in Figure 3.10A reveals a normalized distribution 
that is leptokurtic and contains symmetrical tails.  Both tails were truncated in the 
limitation.   
 
 
Figure 3.10A: Histogram Net Margin w/limits (-0.80, 0.118) 
The box plot of NM (n) in Figure 3.11A confirmed normalization of the 
distribution, with both boxes and whiskers present and symmetrical.  Outliers were 
present, but were not necessary to remove as values, and the number of outlier cases 
were insignificant in comparison to the overall sample size and values. 
Chapter 3
Descriptives of Variables
Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
Net Margin 54078 0.0148 0.01742 0.183182 33.872 -99.124 14886.324 X<= -0.80 X>=0.118




Figure 3.11A: Box plot Net Margin w/limits (-0.80, 0.118) 
Mean NM (n) by fiscal year reported (n) = 49,699. Table 3.8A provides a view 
of mean NM (n) by fiscal year reported. The best performing years within the 
longitudinal study were prior to 1996, followed by the years 1998-2003, which were 
the worst performers.  The lowest performing year was 2002.  The years 2002-2005 
saw a positive trend in mean NM (n), with the years 2006 and 2007 retreating.   
The distribution of mean NM (n) by fiscal year, as indicated in Table 3.8A, 
was similar in character to the overall population, with 1995 and 2005 having lower 
case counts in comparison to other years in the study. 
 
Table 3.8A: Descriptives for Net Margin by fiscal year w/limits (-0.80, 0.118) 
The mean NM (n) by hospital bed size, provided in Table 3.9A, identifies 
Category 3 and 4 as the best performers of NM.  Category 1 is the lowest performer, 
with Category 2 and 5 having similar mean NM (n).   
The distribution for mean NM (n) by hospital size is provided in Table 3.9A, 
and was similar to the distribution of cases by bed size within the overall population 
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in the longitudinal study, where for the NM (n), n = 49,671 cases.  Missing values 
were due to missing bed size variables within the NM (n) sample.   
 
Table 3.9A: Descriptives for Net Margin by hospital size w/limits (-0.80, 0.118). 
 3.5.1.4 Operating Margin 
The Operating Margin (OM) is defined as Operating Income/Net Sales.  The 
OM was (N) = 54,019 cases, with 1,563 missing from the original population of 
55,582.  The distribution of OM (N) had an abnormal distribution and was leptokurtic.  
This is evident in the histogram in Figure 3.12A. 
 
Figure 3.12A: Histogram Operating Margin (N) with no limitation 
Statistical descriptives for OM (N) in Table 3.10A provided a mean OM (N) 
of -0.0546, with a standard error of .00378.  The 95% confidence interval was small: 
0.148.  The range was large for OM(N), 182.67.  The distribution was skewed 
positively, with a skewness of 16.029.  Leptokurtic was confirmed, with a kurtosis of 
6,679.60. 
The box plot in Figure 3.13A confirmed the abnormal distribution of OM (N).  
Boxes or whiskers were not visible, with a line representing the core population at 




Figure 3.13A: Box Plot Operating Margin (N) with no limitation 
Outliers and extremes are defined using Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers 
and extremes.  Both box plot and stem and leaf plot were used to identify the outliers 
and extremes at values less than or equal to -0.26 and greater than or equal to 0.23.   
 
Table 3.10A: Descriptives for Operating Margin ( Oper Margin-X, denotes removal of 
outliers). 
Limiting the population to omit these values provides us with OM (n).  The 
OM (n) = 48,615, which is a reduction of 5,404 cases, or 10% of the OM (N) of 
54,019 cases.  The OM (n) was a statistically significant sample.  The sample 
distribution was normalized via the omission of the outliers and extremes, as evident 
in Figure 3.14A.  While remaining leptokurtic, the distribution was symmetrical, with 
both right and left tails truncated in the removal of outliers.        
Operating Margin
Descriptives of Variable
Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
Oper Margin 54019 -0.0546 -0.01 0.87927 182.67 16.029 6679.606 x<= -0.26 & x>=0.23
Oper Margin -X 48615 -0.0136 -0.1 0.09045 0.47 -0.112 0.146
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Figure3.14A: Histogram Operating Margin w/limitation (-0.26, 0.23) 
The descriptives of OM (n) in Table 3.10A calculated the mean OM (n) to be -
0.136 with a standard error of .00041.  The 95% confidence interval was reduced, 
with an interval of 0.016.  The range for the sample was decreased significantly, with 
a value of 0.47.  The OM(n) was skewed negatively in the sample, with a skewness of 
-0.112, and slightly leptokurtic, with a kurtosis of 0.146. The box plot in Figure 3.15A 
confirmed the normalization of the sample distribution.  Boxes and whiskers were 
visible.  The mean OM (n) was visible at approximately zero on the Y-axis, with the 
lower box and whisker extending below the zero value on the Y-axis.   
 
Figure 3.15A: Box plot Operating Margin w/limitation (-0.26, 0.23) 
The OM (n) by Fiscal Year Reported was n = 48,615.  The years 1997 through 
2002 were the worst performing years for the mean OM, with the lowest OM value 
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presented in year 1999.  These coordinated with underperformance in previous ratios 
within this same time frame.  All years presented had a negative OM.    
The distribution for mean OP (n) by Fiscal Year Reported as shown in Table 
3.11A was similar to the distribution of cases by year presented in the population.  
The exception is the year 2005, which had approximately 500 fewer cases.   
 
 
Table 3.11A: Descriptive statistics for Operating Margin by fiscal year w/limitation (-0.26, 
0.23). 
When mean OM (n) is observed by hospital bed size, we see in Table 3.12A 
that Categories 1, 4, and 5 were the lesser performers, and Category 1 was the worst.  
 
Table 3.12A: Descriptives for Operating Margin by hospital size. 
 
 
3.5.2 Leverage Ratios 
3.5.2.1 Debt Ratio 
Debt Ratio is defined as (Total Debt to Total Assets).  The Debt Ratio (DR), N 
= 53,904, with 1,678 missing from the total population of 55,582.  All missing data 
was defined as system missing, due to one or both variables missing that were used in 
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the calculation of the debt ratio.  There were some null values due to the missing 
variables, either total assets or total liabilities.  The distribution for DR (N) was 
abnormal, as illustrated in Figure 3.16A. The  DR (N) was leptokurtic, with a large 
range of values for the debt ratio, as evidenced by the scale on the histogram created 
via SPSS. 
 
Figure 3.16A: Histogram Debt Ratio with no limitations 
The mean DR (N) in Table 3.13A was 300.08, with a standard error of 299.05.  
The 95% confidence interval for mean DR (N) was large, with a -286.07 lower bound 
and an 886.22 upper bound.  The range of values in DR (N) was large, with a range 
value of 16,120,298.12.  The distribution was skewed positively, with a skewness of 
232.17. Leptokurtic distribution characteristics were confirmed, with a kurtosis of 
53,903.80. 
The box plot in Figure 3.17A confirmed an abnormal distribution with 
extremes and outliers present.  The range of outliers was extreme; however, fewer 
extremes existed than in previous ratio populations.  No boxes or whiskers were 
visible.  Whiskers and boxes have been compressed to a line representing the core of 




Figure 3.17A: Box plot Debt Ratio with no limitations 
Using Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers and extremes, box and stem and 
leaf plots were used to identify outliers and extremes.  Outliers and extremes were 
determined to be those values of DR (N) less than or equal to -0.39, and those values 
greater than or equal to 1.34.  Using these limitations upon DR (N) provided the 
sample DR (n). For DR (n), (n) = 49,996, a reduction of 3,908 cases, or 7% of DR (N) 
at 53,904 cases. In Figure 3.18A, a histogram of DR (n) provides a normalized 
distribution.  The distribution remained slightly leptokurtic.  The distribution was 
observed to be slightly positively skewed, with an outlying frequency of cases at 
approximately 0.25 on the X-axis.  The left tail was distorted in comparison to the 
right.  The most likely reason for this distortion was the probability of having a 
negative debt ratio, which is minimal and shifts dramatically at zero.  When creating 
the new sample DR (n), the right tail was truncated in the limitation.   
 
 
Figure 3.18A:  Histogram Debt Ratio w/limits (-0.39, 1.34) 
The mean DR (n) was reduced to 0.4778, along with the standard error with a 
value of 0.00132.  The 95% confidence interval also was reduced, showing a lower 
bound of 0.4753 and an upper bound of 0.4804.  The range of values in DR (n) was 
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decreased to 1.71.  The distribution remains positively skewed, and was confirmed 
with a skewness of 0.5.  A reduction in the leptokurtic characteristic was confirmed, 
with a kurtosis of .084, in comparison to the previous kurtosis value presented in DR 
(N) of 53,908.80. 
 
Table 3.13A: Descriptive statistics for Debt Ratio (Debt Ratio-X, denotes removal of 
outliers). 
The box plot in Figure 3.19A of DR (n) confirmed normalization of the 
distribution of the sample.  Boxes and whiskers were visible in comparison to the box 
plot presented of DR (N).  Outliers were present beyond the upper and lower 
whiskers. The outliers in this sample should not affect the calculation of mean DR (n).   
 
Figure 3.19A: Box plot Debt Ratio w/limits (-0.39, 1.34) 
The mean DR (n) by Fiscal Year Reported in Table 3.14A gave evidence of an 
increasing mean DR (n) from the years 1995-2002, with a reduction from that time 
until 2007.  No mean DR(n) for any Fiscal Year was less than 0.45, with the greatest 
value presented in 2007, with a Debt Ratio of approximately 0.5.  The years 1995 
through 2002 matched previous time frames for poorer values of financial ratios.   
DR (n) by Fiscal Year Reported, n = 49,996, is presented in Table 3.14A, 
below.  The distribution matches all years in frequency of cases except for 2005, 
Debt Ratio
Descriptives of Variable
Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
Debt Ratio 53904 300.075 0.45 69431.498 16120298 232.172 53903.798 X<=-0.39& X>=1.34
Debt Ratio - X 49996 0.4778 0.44 0.29558 1.71 0.5 0.084
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which had fewer cases than presented in the overall population presented in the 
longitudinal study. 
 
Table 3.14A: Descriptive statistics for Debt Ratio by fiscal year w/limits (-0.39, 1.34). 
 
Mean DR (n) by hospital size, as presented in Table 3.15A, clearly indicated 
that no linear relationship exists between Hospital Size and mean DR (n).  Categories 
2 and 4 were shown to carry high debt in comparison to other sized hospitals.  
Categories 1 and 5 had the smaller mean DR (n), and Category 5 had the lowest.  No 
hospital size had a mean DR (n) less than 0.44. 
 
Table 3.15A: Descriptives for Debt Ratio by hospital size w/limits (-0.39, 1.34). 
 
When one observed the DR (n) by Hospital Size, the distribution was similar 
in characteristics to that of the overall population.  Category 5 remained a very small 
proportion of the sample.  This small proportion could lead to some distortion within 
calculations for that size ACH.  The distribution by hospital size was similar to 







3.5.2.2 Debt/Equity Ratio 
Debt/Equity ratio is defined as Total Debt/Total Equity.  One of the 
deficiencies with the MCR is that it has no entry for equity.  Therefore, a value for 
equity was calculated (Total Liabilities-Total Assets).  Observations where Total 
Assets or Total Liabilities were equal to zero or had a NULL value were excluded. 
The D/E (N) = 47,850, with 7,732 missing from a total population of 55,582 
cases.  The distribution of D/E (N) was abnormal and leptokurtic, as evidenced in 
Figure 3.20A.  The scale of the histogram revealed the presence of outliers and 
extremes within the data, although the data points were visible.   
 
Figure 3.20: Histogram Debt to Equity with no limitations 
 
Statistical descriptives for D/E (N) in Table 3.16A gave a mean D/E (N) of 
2,497.92 with a large standard error of 1,430.69.  The 95% confidence interval also 
was significantly large.  This value for the mean was not considered to be within 
acceptable limits for the D/E ratio.  The range was significantly large, with a value of 
66,817,239.12.  The distribution was skewed, with a skewness of 204.22.  Leptokuric 
distribution was confirmed, with a kurtosis value of 43,436.85. 
The box plot in Figure 3.21A confirmed the abnormality with the distribution 
of D/E (N).  Boxes and whiskers were not visible, giving evidence to the presence of 
extreme outliers.  Outliers and extremes were evident themselves in the plot.  A line 





Figure 3.21A: Box plot Debt to Equity with no limitations 
 
Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers and extremes was used in combination 
with the box plot and stem and leaf plot of D/E (N) to determine the outliers and 
extremes.  Outliers and extremes were identified as those D/E values less than or 
equal to -1.5, and those values greater than or equal to 3.2. 
Using the outliers defined previously, we created a new sample D/E (n), with 
n = 42,651 a reduction of 5,199 cases, or 10.8% of the 47,850 cases in D/E (N).  The 
histogram in Figure 3.42 provided evidence of a more normalized distribution.  The 
distribution curve was leptokurtic.  The left tail was distorted beginning at zero on the 
X-axis.  This was due to the small probability of D/E value being negative.   
 
Figure 3.22A: Histogram Debt to Equity w/limits (-1.5,3.2) 
 
The mean D/E (n) = 0.778, with a standard error of 0.00347.  The confidence 
interval was smaller.  The range was reduced to 4.55 within D/E (n).  The distribution 
still was skewed positively, with a skewness of 1.02, and a leptokurtic characteristic 




Table 3.16A: Descriptives for Debt/Equity Ratio (Debt/Equity-X, denotes removal of 
outliers). 
 
A box plot of D/E (n) confirmed normalization of the distribution in Figure 
3.23A.  Both boxes and whiskers were present in comparison to D/E (N).  Outliers 
were still present in the box plot; however, these were not significant due the D/E 
value and quantity of cases in comparison to the sample size. 
 
Figure 3.23A: Box plot Debt to Equity w/limits (-1.5, 3.2) 
The D/E (n) by Fiscal Year Reported, (n) =42,651 is represented in Table 
3.17A.  The years of 1997, 2001, and 2007 were the years with the highest mean D/E 
(n), with 2004 providing the lowest.  No mean D/E (n) fell below 0.75. No trends 
were evident in the bar chart; however, 2007 seems to be unusually large, and further 
review of this year will be necessary to determine its significance.   
 
Figure 3.24A: Mean Debt to Equity by Fiscal Year Reported w/limits (-1.5, 3.2) 
Debt to Equity Ratio
Descriptives of Variable
Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
Debt /Equity 47850 2497.917 0.7 3.12959 66817193 204.22 43436.85 X<= -1.5 & X >= 3.2
Debt /Equity  - X 42651 0.778 0.61 0.71562 4.55 1.024 1.03
302 
 
The D/E distribution of cases by fiscal year is presented in Table 3.17A, which 
shows us that the distribution is similar to that of the overall population of MCR.  The 
years 1995 and 2007 represented approximately 25% of the cases that all other years 
in the study provided.  In comparison to the other years of 1996 -2006, the year 2005 
had a reduction of cases.  No reason was noted for this reduction in cases.  However, 
this may be due to an abnormal amount of one or both fields used in the calculation of 
equity to have a missing value or a value of zero.  In this instance, those cases would 
have been removed in previous steps.   
 
Table 3.17A: Descriptives for Debt to Equity Ratio by fiscal year w/limits (-1.5.3.2). 
 
The mean D/E (n) by hospital size (n = 42,627) provided in Table 3.18A 
provided us with evidence that hospital size contributes to a larger debt to equity ratio.  
There was evidence of a linear relationship between greater D/E and hospital bed size.  
Consequently, Category 1 had the lowest D/E values, while Category 5 had the largest 
D/E values.  No size hospital had a mean D/E (n) below 0.70 for any one size.  This 
was consistent with the previous findings on Net Margin, as small or Category 1 
entities presented with the lowest value.  The lack of revenue expressed in this 
category likely is limiting access to debt markets.  Likewise, the facilities that are 
larger can afford more debt and are not constrained in their access to debt markets. 
The population of cases in D/E (n) by hospital size had distribution 
characteristics similar to that of the overall population, as evidenced in Table 3.18A.  
Category 5 had very few cases within the sample, but appeared to be in line with the 
overall population.  The smaller count of cases for this size hospital may distort 




Table 3.18A: Descriptives for Debt to Equity Ratio by hospital size w/limits (-1.5.3.2). 
 
3.5.3  Cash Position Ratios 
3.5.3.1  Days Cash on Hand 
 
Days Cash on Hand is defined as (Cash on Hand /(Operating Expenses/365 
Days Cash on Hand (DCOH)) N =55,564, with 18 cases missing from an original 
population of 55,582.   The distribution of DCOH (N) was non-normal and 
leptokurtic, as reflected in Figure 3.25A.   
 
Figure 3.25A: Histogram Days Cash on Hand with no limitation 
 
The statistical descriptives of DCOH (N) confirmed the leptokurtic nature of 
the distribution, with a kurtosis value of 55,399.03, and the distribution was skewed 
positively, with a skewness value of 235.20.  The mean DCOH (N) of 109 provided in 
Table 3.19A was a realistic value for the mean; however, there was a high standard 
error of 24.34, which provides evidence of its inaccuracy.  This was further confirmed 
by the 95% confidence interval, which was large.  The range of values for DCOH 
present in DCOH (N) also was large, with a value of 1,356,148.85. 
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The box plot in Figure 3.26A confirmed the abnormal distribution within the 
population DCOH (N).  The box plot highlighted the presence of extreme values, 
although they were few in comparison to previous ratio samples.  No whiskers or 
boxes were visible, with only a line to represent the population’s core cases. 
 
Figure 3.26A: Box plot Days Cash on Hand with no limitation 
 
Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers and extremes was utilized with the box 
plot and a stem and leaf plot to identify outliers with values of less than or equal to -
160, and values greater than or equal to 275.  Provided with these limitations, the 
DCOH (n) was created. 
The DCOH (n) = 52,050 cases, a reduction of 3,514 cases, or 6.75% of the 
original population of 55,582.  A histogram of DCOH (n), Figure 3.27A, revealed an 
abnormal distribution with a long right tail and relatively little left tail.  The small left 
tail, due to the negative DCOH values, was thought to be unlikely.  The distribution 
was leptokurtic and was not symmetrical. 
 
Figure 3.27A: Histogram Days Cash on Hand w/limitation (-160,275) 
Although visually abnormal, the statistical descriptives for DCOH (n) 
presented evidence that the leptokurtic nature of the sample was not as great and was 
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similar in range to other previous samples constructed.  The mean DCOH (n) of 57.78 
in Table 3.19A was a realistic value, with a standard error of 0.30.  The confidence 
interval was relatively large.  The range for DCOH within the DCOH (n) sample was 
reduced to 434.61, but remained large in comparison to previous ratio samples.  
 
Table 3.19A: Descriptives for Days Cash on Hand (DCOH -X, denotes removal of 
outliers). 
 
A box plot of DCOH (n) in Figure 3.51 reflected a normal distribution that 
was slightly skewed towards the zero value for DCOH.  The lower whisker extended 
below zero, revealing that the lower 25% of the sample exists below zero.  This was 
of concern, as a negative DCOH is most likely an unrealistic value.   
 
Figure 3.28A: Box plot Days Cash on Hand w/limitation (-160,275) 
 
The DCOH (n) by fiscal year reported, (n) = 52,050 cases.  A table of  mean 
DCOH (n) by Fiscal Year Reported in Table 3.20A  revealed a decrease in DCOH in 
the years 1995 through 2000, while roughly flattening out until 2006, where DCOH 
took another large decrease from 2006 to 2007.  This large decrease may be distorted 
due to a lower sample size in the year 2007.  The delta in mean DCOH (n) was 
roughly 20 days over the longitudinal study.  The years of 1995 and 2007 represented 
approximately 25% each of an average year’s cases in this sample DCOH (n).   
Days Cash on Hand Ratio
Descriptives of Variable
Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
DCOH 55564 108.81 36.768 5737.647 1356149 235.197 55399.032 x<= -160 & x>= 275









Table 3.20A: Descriptives for Days Cash on Hand by fiscal year w/limitation (-160, 275) 
The DCOH (n) by Hospital Size for this sample (n) = 51,996.  Hospital size 
affects DCOH.  The larger the ACH, the greater the DCOH, as exhibited in Table 
3.20A.  The only exception was Category 5, which was not in line with the trend lines 
of Categories 1 through 4.  The largest DCOH was presented by Category 4 with a 
DCOH of approximately 70, and the lowest value was 47 in Category 5.   
The distribution of DCOH (n) by Hospital Size as observed in Table 3.21A 
was similar to the total population and other samples presented.  Category 5 still 
represented a very small proportion of the overall sample.  This raised concern, as the 
Category 5 mean DCOH value given in Table 3.19A could be skewed by this lower 
case count. 
 





3.5.3.2 Cash Ratio 
Cash Ratio is defined as (Cash Equivalents + Temporary Inventory+ Account 
Receivable)/Current Liabilities).  Missing variables within the longitudinal data used 
to calculate the Cash Ratio were assigned a zero value in order to limit sample 
reduction.  Balance sheet variables not reported in the MCR had a missing value in 
the field.  In order not to create system missing data fields within the Cash Ratio, an 
overall population zero was used instead of a missing field.  This minimized the loss 
from missing and system missing fields.  The sample remained a larger sample size 
than what previously was available with missing fields. 
Cash Ratio (N) = 53,946, with 1,636 missing cases from the original sample of 
55,582.  A histogram of Cash Ratio (N) provided in Figure 3.29A revealed that 
distribution was abnormal and extremely leptokurtic.  The shape of the sample 
distribution was due to outlier and extremes present in the population of Cash Ratio 
(N).    
 
Figure 3.29A: Histogram Cash Ratio with no limitation 
 
The mean Cash Ratio (N), as provided in Table 3.22A, was calculated as 3.87. 
A standard error was provided at a value of 0.4644.  The 95% confidence interval was 
narrow, and the distribution was skewed positively, with a skewness of 92.926.  
Leptokurtic distribution was confirmed, with a large kurtosis of 13,875.72.  The range 
of Cash Ratio (N) was 23,005.77. 
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The box plot of Cash Ratio (N) in Figure 3.30A again confirmed the abnormal 
distribution, with neither boxes nor whiskers visible.  Evidence was present of large 
extremes and outliers.  The majority of the population was visible in the line at 
approximately zero on the Y-axis.   
 
Figure 3.30A:  Box plot Cash Ratio with no limitation 
Using Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers and extremes, box plot and stem 
and leaf plot outliers and extremes were identified at less than or equal to -2.1, and 
those values greater than or equal to 7.1. Limiting the data to rule out the extremes 
and outliers, Cash Ratio (n) was created.  For Cash Ratio (n), n = 50,168 cases, a 
reduction of 3,778 cases, or 7% from the Cash Ratio (N) of 53,946.   
 
Table 3.23A:  Descriptives of the Cash Ratio (Cash Ratio-X, denotes removal of outliers). 
 
As evident from Figure 3.31A, a histogram of Cash Ratio (n), the distribution 
was normalized and showed a slightly leptokurtic shape, and was skewed slightly 
positive.  The left tail was distorted due to negative Cash Ratio values that were 




Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
Cash Ratio 53946 3.87 2.27 107.866 23005.77 92.93 13875.72 x<= -2.1 & x>= 7.1




Figure 3.31A: Histogram Cash Ratio w/limitation (-2.1, 7.1) 
 
Analyzing the statistical descriptives for Cash Ratio (n), it was evident that the 
mean Cash Ratio (n) was reduced to 2.47, with a standard error of 0.00685.  The 95% 
confidence interval also was reduced.  Overall, the accuracy of the mean increased. 
The range was reduced significantly, to 9.20. The distribution remained slightly 
positively skewed, with a skewness of 0.725, and leptokurtic, with a kurtosis of 0.229. 
A box plot of Cash Ratio (n) in Figure 3.32A confirmed the normalization of 
the distribution within the sample via exclusion of the outliers and extremes.  Both 
boxes and whiskers became visible, in comparison to the box plot on Cash Ratio (N).  
Of the sample, 50% remains around the 2.50 value on the Y-axis.  While outliers were 
still present within the sample, these were not omitted, as the mean was calculated 
within acceptable accuracy limits, and the value of the cases and number of cases in 
comparison to the sample size was unlikely to skew the results further that were 




Figure 3.32A: Box plot Cash Ratio w/limits (-2.1, 7.1) 
 
Cash Ratio (n) by Fiscal Year Reported (n) =50,168 cases.  Revealed in Table 
3.24A, Cash Ratios increased over the length of the study.  The year 1995 was 
relatively high, with a value of approximately 2.2, with a sharp decrease in 1996.  The 
years of 1996-1997 remain low, with 1998-2007 increasing in the cash ratio.  The 
mean for Cash Ratio (n) remained above 2.4 for the entire length of the study.  The 
years 1995 and 2007 remained relatively large in comparison with all other years in 
the longitudinal study.   
 The distribution for Cash Ratio (n) by Fiscal Year Reported was similar in 
character to that of the overall population.  The years of 1995 and 2007 remained low 
case years, with approximately 25% of the cases of any other year in the longitudinal 
study.   It is possible that the variance in the mean value of Cash Ratio (n) in 1995 and 
2007 in comparison to all other years could be explained by the low case volume in 





Table 3.24A: Descriptives for the Cash Ratio by fiscal year w/limitation (-2.1, 7.1) 
 
Cash Ratio (n) by Hospital Bed Size for the sample was (n) = 50,123.  The 
reduced presence of Category 5 within the sample remained low in comparison to 
other hospital categories; however, this was similar to this categories’ presence in the 
overall population. 
From Table 3.25A, it is evident that smaller hospitals in Categories 1 and 2 had the 
best mean Cash Ratio (n), with Cash Ratio decreasing as size increases. 
 
Table  3.25A: Descriptives for the Cash Ratio by hospital size w/limits (-2.1, 7.1). 
 
3.5.4 Liquidity Ratios 
3.5.4.1 Current Ratio 
Current Ratio is defined as (Current Assets/Current Liabilities) Current Ratio 
(CR) N= 53,761 cases, with 1,821 missing from the total population of 55,582. Figure 
3.33A shows that CR (N) had a non-normal distribution, which was leptokurtic. 
Combining this with the statistical descriptives for CR (N) in Figure 3.26A, we see 
that there was a standard error of 0.379, with a mean CR (N) of 3.242.  A confidence 
interval was relatively small in comparison to previous ratios; however, a range of 
19,898, along with unrealistic minimum and maximum values for CR (N), showed 
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that outliers and extremes were present and were distorting the mean.  The 
distribution was skewed positively, with a skewness of 83.43, and leptokurtic was 
confirmed, with a kurtosis value of 13,976.81. 
 
 
Figure 3.33A: Histogram Current Ratio with no limitations 
 
The box plot in Figure 3.34A confirmed a non-normal distribution, with no 
boxes or whiskers visible.  Outliers and extremes were identified as extending above 
and below the line present at the 0 mark, which represents 50% of the total 
population.   
 




Outliers were identified using both the box plot in Figure 3.34A and the stem 
and leaf plot at values less than or equal to -1.4, and values greater than or equal to 
5.8.  Using these values, a new sample was created CR (n).  Descriptives were run to 
observe the new mean and characteristics of this new sample mean.   
The mean CR (n) was reduced to 2.14, a realistic value for the current ratio.  
The standard error was reduced to a value of 0.00547, indicating the increased 
accuracy of the mean value.  The 95% confidence interval also was reduced 
significantly, with the upper and lower bounds approximately .02 apart.  The range 
was reduced from 19,898 to 7.18.  The distribution was skewed positively, with a 
skewness value of 0.639.  As noted from the kurtosis value of 0.292, the distribution 
still was slightly leptokurtic.   
 
Table 3.26A: Descriptives for the Current Ratio (Current Ratio-X, denotes removal of 
outliers). 
 
The histogram in Figure 3.35A gives a better indication of the overall picture 
of distribution in CR (n).  The distribution was normalized, with a leptokurtic 
presence still visible in the histogram.  The left tail was disfigured slightly, most 




Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
Current Ratio 53761 3.24 2.03 87.75 19898.78 83.43 13976.81 x<= -1.4 & x>= 5.8




Figure 3.35A: Histogram Current Ratio with Limitation (-1.4, 5.8) 
 
The box plot in Figure 3.36A confirmed normalization of the data, with boxes 
and whiskers fully visible.  It was noted that the lower whisker extends below the zero 
value, indicating that more than outliers and extremes were present below zero.  
Outliers were still visible in the box plot; however, these should not affect further 
research using this sample, due to the values of the CR or the number of outliers 
present in comparison to the overall CR (n) case count.  Standard error confirmed 
accuracy in the mean CR (n) as well. 
 
Figure 0.1.36A: Box plot of Current Ratio w/limitations (-1.4, 5.8) 
 
Analyzing the mean CR (n) by Fiscal Year Reported in Table 3.27A (n 
=49,524), the mean was reduced from the year 1995 with a value of 2.20, finishing in 
2007 with a value of 2.12.    While there was not a complete linear decline, the overall 
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effect was a reduction in the mean CR (n).  The mean CR (n) retreated from an initial 
value in 1995 of approximately 2.2 through to a mean CR (n) value of approximately 
2.12 in 2007.   
 
 
Table 3.27A:  Descriptives for the Current Ratio by fiscal year w/limitations (-1.4, 5.8). 
 
Note:  The same years that underperformed on the RoA and RoE were not 
affected in the current ratio.  Table 3.28A illustrates the distribution of the mean CR 
(n) by fiscal year.  It closely matches that of the overall population, with the exception 
of 2005, which had a reduced case count in comparison.   
As shown in Table 3.28A, hospital size was not correlated directly to the 
current ratio.  However, the smaller ACHs in Category 1 performed the best.   Larger 
hospitals (Category 5) were penalized by their size; however, Category 5 could be 
distorted by the small number within the sample.   
 
Table 3.28A: Descriptives for the Current Ratio by hospital bed size w/limits (-1.4, 5.8) 
 
The CR (n) distribution of ACHs by size category is shown in Table 3.28A.   
While n= 49,477 and was a large statistical sample, the distribution by size was 
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similar to previous ratios within this chapter, including the low representation of 
Category 5 within the sample.   
 3.5.4.2 Quick Ratio 
The Quick Ratio is defined as (Current Assets-Inventories/Current Liabilities).  
The Quick Ratio (QR) N= 50,043, with 5,539 missing from the original population of 
55,582.  A histogram of QR (N) provided in Figure 3.37A shows the distribution of 
QR (N) to be non-normal and leptokurtic.   
 
Figure 3.37A: Histogram Quick Ratio w/no limitations 
 
The Mean QR (N) was calculated to be 2.789 with a standard error of 0.315.  
The 95% confidence interval was relatively small in comparison to other ratio 
populations.  The mean QR (N) was a realistic value for the quick ratio.  The range of 
QR (N) values was large, 19,642.78, which led to the possibility of outliers present in 
the sample.  The distribution was skewed positively, with a skewness value of 69.16.  
Leptokurtic distribution was confirmed with a kurtosis value of 18,666.36.  A box plot 
of QR (N), Figure 3.38A, confirmed a non- normal distribution.  Outliers and 
extremes were evident in the population.  No whiskers or boxes were present, 
representing a very condensed population around the line present at the zero value 
line.  Using Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers and extremes, in Figure 3.38A the 
box plot and the stem and leaf plot identified outliers and extremes at values less than 
or equal to -1.3, and values greater than or equal to 5.4.  Creating a sample using these 




Figure 3.38A: Box plot Quick Ratio w/no limitations 
 
The QR (N) = 50,043, while QR (n) = 45,991 cases, a reduction of 4,052 
cases, or 8% from the population.  The mean QR (n) presented at 2.00 with a standard 
error of .00527. The 95% confidence interval also was reduced when the sample was 
limited, in comparison to the interval expressed in QR (N).  The range was reduced 
significantly in comparison with QR (N) at a value of 6.68.  The distribution still was 
skewed positively, with a skewness of 0.65, and slightly leptokurtic, with a kurtosis of 
0.298.   
 
Table 3.29A: Descriptives for the Quick Ratio (Quick Ratio-X, denotes removal of 
outliers). 
 
A histogram of QR (n) was reflected in Figure 3.39A.  This histogram 
confirmed that the distribution was normalized.  The left tail present in the histogram 
was distorted in comparison to the right tail.  This distortion was caused by a negative 




Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
Quick Ratio 50043 2.78 1.9 70.47 19642.78 69.163 18666.36 X<= -1.3 & X>= 5.4




Figure 3.39A: Histogram Quick Ratio w/limitations (-1.3, 5.4) 
 
A box plot of QR (n) in Figure 3.40A confirmed normalization of the 
distribution. Boxes and whiskers were present, along with outliers.  The lower 
whisker protrudes below the QR (n) value of zero, indicating the part of the sample 
that was not considered an outlier or extremes exists below zero.  This was of 
concern, as a QR with a negative value was less likely to be calculated.  The mean QR 
(n) was evident at approximately 2.00, which was confirmed by the mean QR (n) 
given in the descriptives.   
 
Figure3.40A: Box plot Quick Ratio w/limits (-1.3, 5.4) 
 
The quick ratio and the current ratio were very similar, but the quick ratio did 
not include inventories. Evidence did not support that ACH working capital was 
affected by inventories.  Observing the mean QR (n) by fiscal year reported provided 
us with a bar chart in Table 3.30A that is very similar to the table created for CR (n), 
Table 3.27A. The QR (n) = 45,991 cases for QR (n) by fiscal year reported.  The 
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mean QR (n) declined in four successive three-year trends, with a mean QR (n) 
increasing slightly before continuing its trend in declining value of mean QR (n).   
There was a reduction of approximately one unit of value between 1995 and 2007.  
While both the years 1995 and 2007 had fewer cases in comparison to the rest of the 
sample, as confirmed by Table 3.30A, the values presented should not be distorted, as 
a statistical sample still was present for those years.   
The histogram for QR (n) by Fiscal Year Reported confirmed similar 
distribution to the population, with the exception of the year 2005.  The reduction in 
cases for this year was unexplained, but this did not statistically impact the 
calculations for this year, as the number of cases was still above what is a statistically 
large sample.   
 
Table 3.30A:  Descriptives for the Quick Ratio by fiscal year w/limits (-1.3, 5.4) 
The Table of QR (n) by Fiscal Year Reported in Table 3.30A indicated that 
the mean remains near two for all years within the study, with a slight downward 
trend present, and 50% of the population remains around two for the entirety of the 
duration.   
The Mean QR (n) by Hospital Size (n) = 45,954.  The table in 3.31A reflected 
the mean QR (n) by Hospital Bed Size.  Category 2 provided us with the lowest mean 
QR (n) value.  This could be due to higher inventories kept at this ACH size.  Mean 
QR (n) values were most significant for Category 1, followed by Category 4 and 5, 
respectively. The value for Category 5 could be skewed in the sample because of the 





Table 3.31A: Descriptives for the Quick Ratio by hospital size w/limits (-1.3, 5.4) 
The distribution of QR (n) by Hospital Bed Size was similar in shape to that of 
the population as a whole and was not distorted from what was shown previously for 
the population. 
 
3.5.6 Efficiency Ratios 
3.5.6.1 Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) 
Days Sales Outstanding is defined as ((Gross Receivables/Net Sales) x 365).  
The DSO (N) = 53,931 cases, with 1,651 missing from the overall population of 
55,582 cases.  The distribution for DSO (N) was leptokurtic and abnormal in shape.  
The scale on the histogram in Figure 3.41A indicated that outliers and extremes were 
present. No problems existed with any variables in any of the years. 
 
Figure 3.41A: Histogram DSO with no limitations 
 
The mean DSO (N) was defined as 126.1997 with a standard error of 9.23.  A 
relatively large 95% confidence interval was revealed, combined with the standard 
error.  This indicated  the inaccuracy of the mean DSO (N) calculation.  The range, as 
reflected in Figure 3.32A was 496,653.99, which was an excessively large range, 
indicating the presence of extremes and outliers.  The min and max of the range were 
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unrealistic DSO values; therefore, they were classified as possible outliers.  The 
leptokurtic nature of the distribution was confirmed, with a kurtosis value of 
49,005.71. 
The box plot of DSO (n) in Figure 3.42A confirmed an abnormal distribution. 
Neither boxes nor whiskers were visible, and outliers and extremes were shown to 
exist within the population.  A line representing the core population was found at 
approximately 0 on the Y-axis.  The population in this box plot was compressed by 
the scale on the Y-axis as a result of the presence of the extremes and outliers. 
 
Figure 3.42A: Box plot DSO with no limitations 
Combining the box plot for DSO (N) in Figure 3.42A, and the stem and leaf 
plot, outliers were identified using Tukey’s (1977) definition of extremes and outliers. 
Outliers were identified as those values of DSO (N) less than or equal to -27, and 
values greater than or equal to 222.  Using these limitations on DSO (N), we created 
the sample DSO (n).   
  
Table 3.32A: Descriptive statistics for Days Sales Outstanding (DSO-X, denotes removal 
of outliers) 
 
The DSO (n), n = 51,138, was a reduction of 2,793 cases, or 5% of DSO (N) 
of 53,931 cases.  A histogram of DSO (n), as visible in Figure 3.43A, provided us 
with evidence that the sample had a more normalized distribution.  Both a left and 
Days Sales Outstanding Ratio
Descriptives of Variable
Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
DSO 53931 126.199 92.64 2143.57 496654 217.61 49005.71 x<= -27 & x>=222
DSO - X 51138 96.813 89.88 41.905 245.87 0.655 0.097
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right tail were visible, with the left tail slightly distorted and truncated at zero on the 
X-axis.  Case quantities were visible below zero.  The distribution was leptokurtic in 
nature.   
 
Figure 3.43A: Histogram DSO w/limits (-27,222) 
 
A realistic mean DSO (n) was presented in the descriptives in Table 3.32A of 
96.81, with a standard error of 0.1853.  The 95% confidence interval was reduced, 
with the upper and lower boundary spread much closer together.  The range was 
reduced to 245.87 through the removal of outliers.  This was an acceptable range for 
the DSO.  The distribution remained positively skewed, with a skewness of 0.665, and 
leptokurtic characteristics were confirmed, with a kurtosis of 0.097.  Both of these 
values were reduced significantly. 
A box plot of the DSO (n) in Figure 3.44A provided further evidence that the 
sample distribution was normalized.  Both boxes and whiskers were visible, with 
outliers present as well.  The boxes were roughly even in shape and size.  It was noted 
that the lower whisker extends slightly below zero on the Y-axis.  The DSO is not 
characteristically a negative number, which presented some concern over the values in 
this range.  The outliers present were not considered to be a problem, as they were 
few in number, and their values were not extreme enough to affect the research 




Figure 3.44A: Box plot DSO w/limits (-27,222) 
 
Analyzing the mean DSO (n) by Fiscal Year Reported showed that the DSO 
spiked in the years 1996 -2001.  The mean DSO (n) never fell below 90 days. In 
comparison to the previous years, the year 2004 onward had a relatively low mean 
DSO.  Note that the time frame in this spike also matched troublesome time frames in 
other key financial ratios. 
The mean DSO (n) by fiscal year reported was n = 51,138.  The distribution of 
cases of the DSO (n) by fiscal year reported in Table 3.36 shows that cases reflected 
similar characteristics to that of the overall population.  Again, 1995 and 2007 
represented approximately 25% of the number of cases in any other year in the 
longitudinal study.   
 
Table 3.33A:  Descriptives for Days Sales Outstanding by fiscal year w/limits (-27,222). 
 
Mean DSO (n) by Hospitals Bed Size revealed in Table 3.34A that no linear 
relationship between size and DSO existed.  The smaller hospitals had a higher mean 
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DSO (n), and Category 2 was the highest with a value of 98.  Category 4 had the 
lowest mean DSO (n), with a value of 93.  
The distribution of mean DSO by Hospital Bed Size was similar to the overall 
population, as is visible in Table 3.34A.  Note that Category 5 remained a very small 
proportion of the overall sample as well as the population.   
 
Table 3.34A: Descriptives for Days Sales Outstanding by hospital size w/limits (-27,222). 
 
3.5.6.2 FATRR (FIXED ASSET TURNOVER RATIO) 
Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio is defined as (Sales/Fixed Assets).  The FATR (N) 
=53,179, with 2,403 cases missing from the original data set of 55,582.  The missing 
cases were most likely due to missing variables in the original data, or divide by zero 
errors that resulted in variables being classified as system missing within the dataset.  
The FATR (N) represented a large statistical sample size. 
 
Figure 3.45A: FATR (N) histogram prior to limitations 
 
A histogram of the FATR (N) is provided in Figure 3.45A.   The distribution 
of the FATR (N) was not a normal distribution, and was extremely leptokurtic.  These 
attributes were confirmed when looking at the statistical descriptives of FATR (N) in 
Table 3.35A.  The mean FATR (N) was not realistic, and a large standard error value 
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was presented at 822.42. The confidence interval given was large, with an interval of 
roughly 3,100.  This confirmed that the mean was not accurate, and was influenced by 
outliers and extremes within the FATR (N).   The range of values for FATR (N) was 
extremely large, with a value of 44,280,143.30.  The distribution was skewed 
positively, with a skewness value of 170.26, and was confirmed as leptokurtic, with a 
kurtosis value of 32,447.82.   
 
Figure 3.46A: FATR (N) Box plot prior to limitations 
 
A further confirmation of non-normalized distribution is presented in the box 
plot of the FATR (N), presented in Figure 3.46A.  The box plot shows that outliers 
and extremes were present within the population.  Neither boxes nor whiskers were 
present, indicating that the population would need to be refined to reach an accurate, 
normally distributed sample.  Using the box plot, Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers 
and stem and leaf plot outliers were identified at FATR values less than or equal to -
3.6, and values greater than or equal to 13.7.  Using these outliers, a sample FATR (n) 
was refined from FATR (N).   
The FATR (N) = 53,179, while FATR (n) =47,943, a reduction of 5,236 cases, 
or 9.8% of FATR (N).  Using the histogram provided in Figure 3.45A, we can see that 
the FATR (n) had a more normalized distribution, although still leptokurtic.  A 




Figure 3.47A: FATR (n) histogram with limitations (-3.6, 13.7) 
 
Using the statistical descriptives of the FATR (n) in Table 3.35A, a standard 
error of 0.01212 confirmed the accuracy of the 4.8 mean value that presented at a 
95% confidence level.  The confidence interval confirmed the above with its 
reduction in range of values presented for the mean.  The range in values presented 
for FATR within FATR (n) was reduced to 17.26.  The distribution was skewed 
positively, with a skewness value of 1.06. 
 
Table 3.35A:  Descriptives for the Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio (FAT-X denotes removal of 
outliers). 
 
The box plot presented in Figure 3.48A shows a normalized distribution 
within the FATR (n).  Both whiskers and boxes were noticeable, with the bottom 
whisker extending below the 0 value for FATR.  Fifty percent of the FATR (N) 
remained around the 5.00 value range.  Outliers were still present within the sample.  
Due to the standard error presented, and the number of outliers and their values in 
comparison to the sample size and values of cases within the sample, it was 
Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio
Descriptives of Variable
Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
FAT 53179 1022.01 4.49 189654 44280143 170.26 32447.82 X<= -3.6  & X>= 13.7
FAT - X 47943 4.8 4.16 2.65 17.26 1.06 0.764
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determined that the presence of these outliers would not distort any research or 
evidence obtained from this sample. 
 
 
Figure 3.48A:  Box plot FATR (n) with limitations (-3.6, 13.7) 
 
Looking at the data presented in Table 3.36A, a table of FATR by fiscal year 
reported, the distribution of cases was similar to that of the overall population with the 
exception of 2005, as well as a reduction in cases year after year from 1996 through 
2005.  This observance was most likely due to greater extremes or outliers being 
present in later years as opposed to prior years, or fewer ACHs reporting fixed assets.   
 
Figure 3.49A: Histogram FATR (n) cases by Fiscal Year Reported limitation (-3.6, 13.7) 
 
When Table 3.36A is used to observe the mean FATR (n) by Fiscal Year, we 
can see that ACHs became more efficient in the use of their fixed assets over time.  
From 1995 onward, there was an increasing value in the mean FATR (n) by year.  The 
lowest value presented was in the year 1995, with a mean FATR (n) of 3.82, and 
ending in year 2007, with a value of 5.73. This reflected incentives and pressures 
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upon ACHs to increase efficiencies within their organization, boosting the utilization 
of fixed assets.   
 
Table 3.36A: Descriptive statistics for the Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio by fiscal year 
w/limitation (-3.6, 13.7) 
 
Table 3.37A represents the Mean FATR (n) by Hospital Size.  The sample 
FATR (n) by Hospital Size was equal to 47,905.  Maximum efficiency was realized in 
Category 3. Category 1 underperformed in comparison to the other sizes represented, 
which was confirmed by prior research that shows the underutilization of fixed assets 
to be a problem, mainly because of lower patient volumes within that category.    
Category 5 values could be biased due to lower representation in the overall sample.   
 
 
Table 3.37A: Descriptives for Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio by hospital size w/limitation (-
3.6, 13.7) 
The distribution in the sample used to view the mean FATR by Hospital Size 









Chapter 3 Variable Nomenclature and Definitions 
 








Variable n Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Skewness Kurtosis Outliers
RoE 54619 41.98 0.0747 74064 21643214 56.875 19.801 x<= -0.26 & x>= 0.42
RoE -X 44629 0.0743 0.0713 0.11895 0.68 0.125 0.624
RoA 54047 37566.92 0.03 5088640 8.81E+08 -121.52 16973.44 x<= -0.150 & x>= 0.220
RoA - X 45634 0.0334 0.03 0.06655 0.35 -0.057 0.249
FAT 53179 1022.01 4.49 189654 44280143 170.26 32447.82 X<= -3.6  & X>= 13.7
FAT - X 47943 4.8 4.16 2.65 17.26 1.06 0.764
Current Ratio 53761 3.24 2.03 87.75 19898.78 83.43 13976.81 x<= -1.4 & x>= 5.8
Current Ratio -X 2.14 1.95 1.217 7.18 0.639 0.292
Quick Ratio 50043 2.78 1.9 70.47 19642.78 69.163 18666.36 X<= -1.3 & X>= 5.4
Quick Ratio - X 45991 2 1.82 1.13 6.68 0.65 0.298
DCOH 55564 108.81 36.768 5737.647 1356149 235.197 55399.032 x<= -160 & x>= 275
DCOH -X 52050 57.7826 31.296 68.525 434.61 1.18 0.668
Cash Ratio 53946 3.87 2.27 107.866 23005.77 92.93 13875.72 x<= -2.1 & x>= 7.1
Cash Ratio - X 50168 2.47 2.164 1.533 9.2 0.725 0.229
Oper Margin 54019 -0.0546 -0.01 0.87927 182.67 16.029 6679.606 x<= -0.26 & x>=0.23
Oper Margin -X 48615 -0.0136 -0.1 0.09045 0.47 -0.112 0.146
Net Margin 54078 0.0148 0.01742 0.183182 33.872 -99.124 14886.324 X<= -0.80 X>=0.118
Net Margin - X 49699
Debt Ratio 53904 300.075 0.45 69431.498 16120298 232.172 53903.798 X<=-0.39& X>=1.34
Debt Ratio - X 49996 0.4778 0.44 0.29558 1.71 0.5 0.084
Debt /Equity 47850 2497.917 0.7 3.12959 66817193 204.22 43436.85 X<= -1.5 & X >= 3.2
Debt /Equity  - X 42651 0.778 0.61 0.71562 4.55 1.024 1.03
DSO 53931 126.199 92.64 2143.57 496654 217.61 49005.71 x<= -27 & x>=222
DSO - X 51138 96.813 89.88 41.905 245.87 0.655 0.097
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Chapter 4 Variable Nomenclature and Definitions 
 
  
Variable Variable Nomenclature Provided Calculated Outliers Definition
hospital size Num_Bed X Hospital size denoted by number of beds
hospital size Hospital Size X Hospital size catergorized by the number of beds ( 5 categories)
Percent Government Business % Gov_Bus X X<=0.25 (TitleXVII +Title XIX)patient days/ (total In/Outpatient Days)
Debt to Equity Ratio D/E X X<= -1.5&X>=3.2 Total Debt /Equity
Cash Position cash position X Total Cash/Total Assets
Leverage Leverage X X<= -0.37 & X>=0.96 Total Longterm Liabilities/Total Assets
Leverage 2 Leverage_2 X X >= 0.99 Leverage ( non-negative value)
Current Ratio Current Ratio X x<= -1.4 & x>= 5.8 Current Assets/Current Liabilities
Quick Ratio Quick Ratio X X<= -1.3 & X>= 5.4 (Current Assets- Inventories)/ Current Liabilities
Liquidity Liquidity X X<= -0.11 & X >=0.79 Current Assets/ Total Assets
Debt Ratio debt_ratio X X<=-0.39& X>=1.34 Total Liabilities/ Total Assets
Debt Ratio 2 debt_ratio_2 X X >= 1.34 Debt Ratio (non- negative values)
Total Assets TA X
Natural Log Total Assets LnTA X natural log of Total Assets
fiscal year Fiscal Year X Fiscal Year
Net Margin net_marg X X<= -0.80 X>=0.118 Net Income/ Sales
Capital Cost Proxy CCProxy X Total Interest Expense/ Total Liabilities
Operating Cash Flows OCF X X<= -27,995,730 & X > 40,069,436 FCF + CAPEX
Free Cash Flows FCF X X<= -32,186,314 & X > 36,290,518 net income+(amortization,depreciation)-delta working capital- capex
Change in Free Cash Flows Delta_FCF x X<=-70227629 & X>=63609001 FCF - Prev_Yr_FCF
% Change in Free Cash Flows %_Delta_FCF x X<=-5.1 & X>=2.3 (FCF - Prev_Yr_FCF)/Prev_Yr_FCF
Capital Expenditures CAPEX X X <= 0 & X >= 38209778
Capital Expenditures 2 CAPEX 2 X X<= 0 & X >= 12,375,048 CAPEX (non- negative values)
Change in Fixed Assets Delta FA X X<= -23 & X>= 27 FA- Prev_Yr_FA
Change in Fixed Assets 2 Delta FA2 X X<= 0 & X>= 27 Delta FA (non-negative values)
Depreciation Depreciation X Depreciation
Depreciation 2 X X>=9509812 Depreciation (non-negative values)
RoE RoE2 X x<= -0.26 & x>=0.42 Net Income/ Shareholders Equity
RoA RoA X x<= -0.150 & x>=0.220 Net Income/ Total Assets
FAT FAT X X<= -3.6  & X>= 13.7 Sales / Fixed Assets
Days Cash on Hand Days Cash on Hand 3 X x<= -160 & x>=275 (Cash on Hand+investments+temp investments)/ operating expenses/365
Working Capital X current assets - current liabilities
Cash Ratio CashRatio_2 X x<= -2.1 &x>=7.1 (cash equilvilents+temp investments+AR)/ Current Liabilities
Operating Income Margin OperatingIncomeMargin X x<= -0.26 & x>=0.23 operating income/ net sales
Cash Turnover Cash Turnover X Net Sales/ Cash
Total Asset Turnover TA_turnover X Net Sales/Avg Total Assets
DSO DSO2 X x<= -27 & x>=222 Gross Recievables/ net sales/365
X denotes outliers beyond three standard deviations.
Note:  Not all ratios listed were used in the final study… Some ratios were removed due to reduced sample size due to missing values or could not be computed due to lack of information.   
They are listed to better understand the scope of research performed.
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Chapter 4 Regression Results 
Chapter 4 Signalling Model Results 
Signaling Regressions: Model 1 
 
 










                                                                              
         rho     .8426335   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    5.916e-08
     sigma_u    1.369e-07
                                                                              
       _cons     2.46e-06   4.07e-07     6.04   0.000     1.66e-06    3.26e-06
FiscalYear~d    -7.15e-10   2.08e-10    -3.44   0.001    -1.12e-09   -3.07e-10
        LnTA    -2.10e-08   1.27e-09   -16.53   0.000    -2.35e-08   -1.85e-08
   Liquidity    -1.48e-08   5.49e-09    -2.70   0.007    -2.56e-08   -4.04e-09
    Net_Marg     1.63e-08   1.24e-08     1.31   0.189    -8.02e-09    4.07e-08
    Leverage    -5.09e-09   3.68e-09    -1.38   0.167    -1.23e-08    2.13e-09
                                                                              
Percent_Go~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6006 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =         .
       overall = 0.1972                                        max =        12
       between = 0.1774                                        avg =       6.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.0028                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6006
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     38761
> R_NUM)
. xtreg Percent_Gov_Business2 Leverage Net_Marg Liquidity LnTA FiscalYear_Reported, re vce(cluster PRVD
                                                                              
         rho    .83516489   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.110e-08
     sigma_u    1.375e-07
                                                                              
       _cons     2.04e-06   4.41e-07     4.62   0.000     1.17e-06    2.90e-06
FiscalYear~d    -4.88e-10   2.25e-10    -2.17   0.030    -9.28e-10   -4.80e-11
        LnTA    -2.33e-08   1.31e-09   -17.78   0.000    -2.59e-08   -2.07e-08
Operating_~s    -1.72e-17   3.33e-17    -0.52   0.606    -8.26e-17    4.81e-17
    Net_Marg     3.53e-08   1.58e-08     2.24   0.025     4.41e-09    6.63e-08
    Leverage    -1.25e-09   3.83e-09    -0.33   0.745    -8.76e-09    6.26e-09
                                                                              
Percent_Go~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 5995 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(3)       =         .
       overall = 0.1662                                        max =        11
       between = 0.1729                                        avg =       5.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.0011                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      5995
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     31888
> , re vce(cluster PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg Percent_Gov_Business2     Leverage Net_Marg       Operating_Cash_Flows LnTA FiscalYear_Reported
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         rho    .84232586   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    5.929e-08
     sigma_u    1.370e-07
                                                                              
       _cons     2.55e-06   4.12e-07     6.19   0.000     1.74e-06    3.36e-06
FiscalYear~d    -7.60e-10   2.11e-10    -3.61   0.000    -1.17e-09   -3.47e-10
        LnTA    -2.12e-08   1.28e-09   -16.52   0.000    -2.37e-08   -1.87e-08
   Liquidity    -1.45e-08   5.60e-09    -2.58   0.010    -2.54e-08   -3.49e-09
    Net_Marg     1.84e-08   1.26e-08     1.46   0.144    -6.25e-09    4.30e-08
   Leverage2    -6.80e-09   4.04e-09    -1.68   0.092    -1.47e-08    1.11e-09
                                                                              
Percent_Go~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 5985 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =         .
       overall = 0.1969                                        max =        12
       between = 0.1783                                        avg =       6.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.0033                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      5985
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     38273
> cluster PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg Percent_Gov_Business2     Leverage2 Net_Marg        Liquidity LnTA FiscalYear_Reported, re vce(
                                                                              
         rho    .83257314   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.128e-08
     sigma_u    1.366e-07
                                                                              
       _cons     2.17e-06   4.46e-07     4.88   0.000     1.30e-06    3.05e-06
FiscalYear~d    -5.53e-10   2.27e-10    -2.44   0.015    -9.97e-10   -1.08e-10
        LnTA    -2.37e-08   1.32e-09   -17.93   0.000    -2.63e-08   -2.11e-08
Operating_~s    -9.96e-18   3.35e-17    -0.30   0.767    -7.57e-17    5.58e-17
    Net_Marg     3.82e-08   1.60e-08     2.39   0.017     6.93e-09    6.95e-08
   Leverage2    -2.59e-09   4.24e-09    -0.61   0.542    -1.09e-08    5.73e-09
                                                                              
Percent_Go~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 5960 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(3)       =         .
       overall = 0.1660                                        max =        11
       between = 0.1749                                        avg =       5.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.0015                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      5960
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     31462
> cluster PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg Percent_Gov_Business2 Leverage2 Net_Marg Operating_Cash_Flows LnTA FiscalYear_Reported, re vce(
334 
 
















                                                                              
         rho    .83861042   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.101e-08
     sigma_u    1.391e-07
                                                                              
       _cons     2.17e-06   3.89e-07     5.59   0.000     1.41e-06    2.94e-06
FiscalYear~d    -5.77e-10   1.98e-10    -2.91   0.004    -9.66e-10   -1.88e-10
        LnTA    -2.04e-08   1.17e-09   -17.42   0.000    -2.27e-08   -1.81e-08
   Liquidity    -1.60e-08   4.96e-09    -3.23   0.001    -2.57e-08   -6.29e-09
    Net_Marg     2.25e-08   1.10e-08     2.05   0.040     1.02e-09    4.39e-08
   DebtRatio    -8.62e-09   2.29e-09    -3.76   0.000    -1.31e-08   -4.12e-09
                                                                              
Percent_Go~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6420 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =         .
       overall = 0.1853                                        max =        11
       between = 0.1734                                        avg =       6.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0024                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6420
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     43909
> VDR_NUM)
. xtreg Percent_Gov_Business2  DebtRatio Net_Marg Liquidity LnTA FiscalYear_Reported, re vce(cluster PR
                                                                              
         rho    .83071742   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.335e-08
     sigma_u    1.403e-07
                                                                              
       _cons     2.30e-06   4.42e-07     5.21   0.000     1.44e-06    3.17e-06
FiscalYear~d    -6.74e-10   2.28e-10    -2.96   0.003    -1.12e-09   -2.27e-10
        LnTA    -1.68e-08   1.90e-09    -8.83   0.000    -2.05e-08   -1.31e-08
Operating_~s    -5.31e-18   3.18e-17    -0.17   0.867    -6.76e-17    5.70e-17
    Net_Marg     2.65e-08   1.31e-08     2.02   0.043     7.88e-10    5.22e-08
   DebtRatio    -5.84e-09   2.40e-09    -2.43   0.015    -1.05e-08   -1.14e-09
                                                                              
Percent_Go~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6455 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(3)       =         .
       overall = 0.1492                                        max =        11
       between = 0.1616                                        avg =       5.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0009                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6455
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     37052
> e(cluster PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg Percent_Gov_Business2  DebtRatio Net_Marg  Operating_Cash_Flows LnTA FiscalYear_Reported, re vc
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         rho    .84712878   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    5.843e-08
     sigma_u    1.376e-07
                                                                              
       _cons     1.10e-06   4.17e-07     2.63   0.008     2.80e-07    1.91e-06
FiscalYear~d    -2.54e-11   2.13e-10    -0.12   0.905    -4.43e-10    3.92e-10
        LnTA    -2.22e-08   1.32e-09   -16.84   0.000    -2.48e-08   -1.97e-08
   Liquidity    -1.47e-08   5.42e-09    -2.71   0.007    -2.53e-08   -4.05e-09
    Net_Marg     1.78e-08   1.14e-08     1.55   0.121    -4.67e-09    4.02e-08
DebtToEqui~o     3.27e-10   1.18e-09     0.28   0.781    -1.98e-09    2.64e-09
                                                                              
Percent_Go~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 5694 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =         .
       overall = 0.1933                                        max =        11
       between = 0.1738                                        avg =       6.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.0006                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      5694
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     36145
> cluster PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg Percent_Gov_Business2   DebtToEquityRatio Net_Marg  Liquidity LnTA FiscalYear_Reported, re vce(
                                                                              
         rho    .83946899   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.072e-08
     sigma_u    1.389e-07
                                                                              
       _cons     8.10e-07   4.59e-07     1.77   0.077    -8.86e-08    1.71e-06
FiscalYear~d     1.15e-10   2.33e-10     0.49   0.621    -3.42e-10    5.73e-10
        LnTA    -2.22e-08   1.35e-09   -16.44   0.000    -2.49e-08   -1.96e-08
Operating_~s     7.38e-18   3.36e-17     0.22   0.826    -5.85e-17    7.33e-17
    Net_Marg     2.48e-08   1.46e-08     1.70   0.089    -3.78e-09    5.34e-08
DebtToEqui~o     5.03e-10   1.28e-09     0.39   0.694    -2.00e-09    3.00e-09
                                                                              
Percent_Go~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 5690 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(3)       =         .
       overall = 0.1558                                        max =        11
       between = 0.1620                                        avg =       5.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.0001                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      5690
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     30229
> Reported, re vce(cluster PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg Percent_Gov_Business2    DebtToEquityRatio Net_Marg       Operating_Cash_Flows LnTA FiscalYear_
336 
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Agency Cost of FCF Regressions:  Model 1 
 
 














                                                                              
         rho    .13314861   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    11.315011
     sigma_u    4.4345646
                                                                              
       _cons    -370.4847   43.07192    -8.60   0.000    -454.9041   -286.0653
FiscalYear~d      .196422   .0215627     9.11   0.000       .15416    .2386841
        LnTA    -1.245335   .0640517   -19.44   0.000    -1.370874   -1.119796
Percent_Go~s     .2230525   .5025535     0.44   0.657    -.7619342    1.208039
                                                                              
Free_Cash_~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6546 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(3)       =    488.29
       overall = 0.0259                                        max =        11
       between = 0.0625                                        avg =       5.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.0042                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6546
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     38860
. xtreg  Free_Cash_Flow2 Percent_Gov_Business LnTA FiscalYear_Reported, re vce(cluster   PRVDR_NUM)
                                                                              
         rho    .12905436   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    11.355774
     sigma_u    4.3712692
                                                                              
       _cons     28.33714    205.124     0.14   0.890    -373.6985    430.3728
   CPI_96_07     .0285551   .0140265     2.04   0.042     .0010638    .0560465
FiscalYear~d    -.0046852   .1034005    -0.05   0.964    -.2073466    .1979761
        LnTA    -1.246793    .064398   -19.36   0.000    -1.373011   -1.120575
Percent_Go~s     .0919471   .5086959     0.18   0.857    -.9050786    1.088973
                                                                              
Free_Cash_~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6522 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =    489.85
       overall = 0.0259                                        max =        11
       between = 0.0628                                        avg =       5.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0044                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6522
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     37906
> NUM)




Agency Cost of FCF Regressions:  Model 3 
 
 













                                                                              
         rho    .13801719   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    11.197981
     sigma_u    4.4808152
                                                                              
       _cons     257.1672   202.5871     1.27   0.204    -139.8964    654.2307
     Capex_2    -2.51e-07   2.08e-08   -12.05   0.000    -2.92e-07   -2.10e-07
   CPI_96_07     .0412386    .013846     2.98   0.003     .0141011    .0683762
FiscalYear~d    -.1239972   .1021284    -1.21   0.225    -.3241652    .0761708
        LnTA    -.6840443   .0710912    -9.62   0.000    -.8233806   -.5447081
Percent_Go~s     -.554022   .5028183    -1.10   0.271    -1.539528    .4314837
                                                                              
Free_Cash_~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6522 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =    573.73
       overall = 0.0410                                        max =        11
       between = 0.0475                                        avg =       5.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0316                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6522
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     37906
> ster   PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg  Free_Cash_Flow2 Percent_Gov_Business LnTA FiscalYear_Reported   CPI_96_07  Capex_2, re vce(clu
                                                                              
         rho    .12407714   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    11.352126
     sigma_u    4.2725796
                                                                              
       _cons     480.3986   217.1264     2.21   0.027     54.83867    905.9585
    Leverage    -1.53e-06   1.57e-07    -9.70   0.000    -1.83e-06   -1.22e-06
     Capex_2    -2.36e-07   2.10e-08   -11.23   0.000    -2.78e-07   -1.95e-07
   CPI_96_07     .0544907   .0147957     3.68   0.000     .0254917    .0834898
FiscalYear~d    -.2352247   .1094589    -2.15   0.032    -.4497602   -.0206891
        LnTA    -.8145414   .0771211   -10.56   0.000     -.965696   -.6633869
Percent_Go~s    -.9535182   .5525551    -1.73   0.084    -2.036506      .12947
                                                                              
Free_Cash_~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6205 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =    603.10
       overall = 0.0414                                        max =        11
       between = 0.0460                                        avg =       5.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.0330                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6205
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     33916
> e vce(cluster   PRVDR_NUM)


















                                                                              
         rho     .1256156   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    11.256067
     sigma_u    4.2663576
                                                                              
       _cons     41.71102   222.5152     0.19   0.851    -394.4107    477.8327
    Net_Marg      20.8939   2.493394     8.38   0.000     16.00694    25.78086
    Leverage    -1.71e-06   1.30e-07   -13.16   0.000    -1.97e-06   -1.46e-06
     Capex_2    -2.38e-07   2.16e-08   -10.99   0.000    -2.80e-07   -1.95e-07
   CPI_96_07     .0281733   .0151337     1.86   0.063    -.0014883    .0578349
FiscalYear~d    -.0128142   .1122163    -0.11   0.909     -.232754    .2071256
        LnTA    -.9953373   .0796976   -12.49   0.000    -1.151542   -.8391329
Percent_Go~s    -1.148436   .5518697    -2.08   0.037    -2.230081   -.0667912
                                                                              
Free_Cash_~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6172 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =    708.01
       overall = 0.0532                                        max =        11
       between = 0.0527                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.0459                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6172
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     33546
> t_Marg, re vce(cluster   PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg  Free_Cash_Flow2 Percent_Gov_Business LnTA FiscalYear_Reported   CPI_96_07  Capex_2 Leverage Ne
                                                                              
         rho    .12723572   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    11.249895
     sigma_u    4.2954091
                                                                              
       _cons     50.01995    223.452     0.22   0.823    -387.9378    487.9777
new_change~A    -5.08e-09   1.13e-09    -4.49   0.000    -7.30e-09   -2.86e-09
    Net_Marg     20.93784    2.57251     8.14   0.000     15.89582    25.97987
    Leverage    -1.70e-06   1.29e-07   -13.15   0.000    -1.95e-06   -1.45e-06
     Capex_2    -2.41e-07   2.23e-08   -10.84   0.000    -2.85e-07   -1.98e-07
   CPI_96_07     .0284022   .0152081     1.87   0.062    -.0014052    .0582096
FiscalYear~d     -.017053   .1126917    -0.15   0.880    -.2379247    .2038186
        LnTA    -.9847097   .0806354   -12.21   0.000    -1.142752   -.8266672
Percent_Go~s    -1.166087   .5544491    -2.10   0.035    -2.252788   -.0793869
                                                                              
Free_Cash_~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6151 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(8)       =    710.94
       overall = 0.0530                                        max =        11
       between = 0.0525                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.0458                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6151
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     33324
> t_Marg  new_change_in_FA, re vce(cluster   PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg  Free_Cash_Flow2 Percent_Gov_Business LnTA FiscalYear_Reported   CPI_96_07  Capex_2 Leverage Ne
339 
 









                                                                              
         rho    .12721751   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    11.250086
     sigma_u    4.2951295
                                                                              
       _cons     51.15921   223.4491     0.23   0.819    -386.7931    489.1115
Capital_Co~y     .0409969   .0259397     1.58   0.114     -.009844    .0918377
new_change~A    -5.08e-09   1.13e-09    -4.49   0.000    -7.30e-09   -2.86e-09
    Net_Marg     20.93769   2.572492     8.14   0.000     15.89569    25.97968
    Leverage    -1.70e-06   1.29e-07   -13.15   0.000    -1.95e-06   -1.45e-06
     Capex_2    -2.41e-07   2.23e-08   -10.84   0.000    -2.85e-07   -1.98e-07
   CPI_96_07     .0284919   .0152078     1.87   0.061    -.0013147    .0582986
FiscalYear~d    -.0176286   .1126902    -0.16   0.876    -.2384974    .2032402
        LnTA    -.9848002   .0806331   -12.21   0.000    -1.142838   -.8267622
Percent_Go~s    -1.164322   .5544202    -2.10   0.036    -2.250966   -.0776782
                                                                              
Free_Cash_~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6151 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    714.29
       overall = 0.0530                                        max =        11
       between = 0.0525                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.0458                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6151
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     33324
> t_Marg  new_change_in_FA Capital_Cost_Proxy, re vce(cluster   PRVDR_NUM)
. xtreg  Free_Cash_Flow2 Percent_Gov_Business LnTA FiscalYear_Reported   CPI_96_07  Capex_2 Leverage Ne
                                                                              
         rho    .12630217   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    11.250092
     sigma_u    4.2774097
                                                                              
       _cons    -32.27257   225.6762    -0.14   0.886    -474.5898    410.0447
Bi_Hosp_Si~4     -5.04388   4.026324    -1.25   0.210    -12.93533     2.84757
Bi_Hosp_Si~3    -9.799534   3.993219    -2.45   0.014     -17.6261   -1.972969
Bi_Hosp_Si~2    -10.58711   3.972123    -2.67   0.008    -18.37233   -2.801896
Bi_Hosp_Si~1    -11.41172   3.976946    -2.87   0.004    -19.20639   -3.617049
Capital_Co~y     .0406208   .0256514     1.58   0.113    -.0096551    .0908967
new_change~A    -4.85e-09   1.14e-09    -4.25   0.000    -7.08e-09   -2.61e-09
    Net_Marg     21.64283   2.640682     8.20   0.000     16.46719    26.81847
    Leverage    -2.10e-06   1.77e-07   -11.85   0.000    -2.44e-06   -1.75e-06
     Capex_2    -2.66e-07   2.17e-08   -12.24   0.000    -3.08e-07   -2.23e-07
   CPI_96_07     .0253751   .0152828     1.66   0.097    -.0045786    .0553288
FiscalYear~d      .032573   .1138845     0.29   0.775    -.1906365    .2557824
        LnTA    -1.319153   .0978324   -13.48   0.000      -1.5109   -1.127405
Percent_Go~s    -1.058694   .5519411    -1.92   0.055    -2.140478     .023091
                                                                              
Free_Cash_~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 6151 clusters in PRVDR_NUM)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(13)      =    817.81
       overall = 0.0564                                        max =        11
       between = 0.0573                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.0455                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: PRVDR_NUM                       Number of groups   =      6151
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     33324
> _4, re vce(cluster   PRVDR_NUM)
> t_Marg  new_change_in_FA Capital_Cost_Proxy Bi_Hosp_Size_1 Bi_Hosp_Size_2 Bi_Hosp_Size_3 Bi_Hosp_Size
. xtreg  Free_Cash_Flow2 Percent_Gov_Business LnTA FiscalYear_Reported   CPI_96_07  Capex_2 Leverage Ne
340 
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Chapter 6 Procedures  
(exploratory, outliers, and data adjustments) 
Laparoscopic Assisted Vaginal  Hysterectomy (LAVH) 
The LAVH made up 2% of our sample (n) = 9,143, with N = 457,146.  The 
mean reimbursement was $5,730.29, with a standard error of 87.3.  A high standard 
deviation of 8,347 was present.  Outliers were evident, as there was a large range of 
$323,995.28.  The minimum and maximum values also provided further evidence of 
outliers.  A high kurtosis value of 404.97 was presented, which was to be expected 
because of the narrow band of reimbursement for procedures.  The histogram of 
LAVH shows that the reimbursement was concentrated in a very narrow dollar 
reimbursement band.  This was evident by the high kurtosis within the distribution.   
 
Figure 6.1A:  Histogram LAVH Paid 
 
A stem and leaf plot was used to identify outliers within the LAVH 
subsample.  Approximately 712 cases were identified as outliers using Tukey’s (1977) 
definition.  This represented approximately 7.8% of the subsample.  All values greater 
than or equal to $13,084.00 were to be removed.   
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Outliers were evident in the box plot of LAVH reimbursement found in Figure 
6.2A.  The plot confirmed multiple outliers, and the main distribution was 
compressed, with the mean unrecognizable within the box plot.   
 
Figure 6.2A: Box plot: LAVH_Paid 
 
From previous descriptives of the LAVH, it is known that outliers were 
present within the subsample; however, a review of the mean_LAVH reimbursement 
by Year and Payer is still helpful.  It should be noted that the means were distorted.  
The years 2001-2002 remain set apart from the overall trend in the data.  Commercial 
pay continued on the same growth rate overall.  This could be the government 
reimbursement growth rate plateauing, or outliers could distort those values of 
commercial pay. Figure 6.3A illustrates that government payments in the sample were 




Figure 0.1.3A: Mean LAVH_Paid by Year and Payer 
Figure 6.4A confirmed the presence of both government and commercial 
outliers, with government represented in blue and commercial in green.  Commercial 
had a greater number of outliers in 2007-2008.  These outliers also were greater in 
their amplitude or deviation from the mean. 
 
Figure 6.4A: Box Plot LAVH_Paid by Year and Payer 
Upon the removal of the outliers for LAVH_Paid, a new graph of mean 
LAVH_paid by year and payor type was created. For 2001 and 2002, commercial 
reimbursement, depicted by the green bar in Figure 6.5A, was not in line with regard 
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to the other years in the study.  The years prior to 2004 were smaller in sample size 
for electronic remits.   The means that the years 2001 and 2002 may be distorted by 
this fact.  Clearly, beyond 2002, both commercial and government reimbursements 
seem to correlate quite well.  The change in the mean adjusted at roughly the same 
rate, except for 2005.  Even so, this year was only mildly out of step with other 
increases in reimbursement from both.  The values presented here were not in real 
dollars; therefore, some of the increase year on year is due to adjustment for inflation 
within the reimbursement.  Through the entire study, commercial reimbursement was 
greater than that of the government.  This is typical, as the government is usually the 
low-cost payor.   
 













Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery (CBYP) 
Cardiac bypass surgery had a highly kurtosic distribution within this 
subsample. This was evidenced in the histogram outlined in Figure 6.6A. The CBYP 
(n) =141,054, out of a total N of 457,146.   
 
 
Figure 6.6A:  Histogram CBYP (outliers present) 
The CBYP had a significantly large range of $1,161,901.  Once again, this 
was evidence of the presence of outliers within the subsample.  A high kurtosis value 
of 213.39 was to be expected, as payments for the procedure should have had a 
narrow distribution due to the underlying service being the same.  Any deviation in 
payments would be payer deviations based on nuances within each claim that was 
filed for payment.  The distribution was skewed to the left, with most of the frequency 
of cases around zero.  The stem and leaf plot confirmed the presence of outliers in 
both negative and positive values.    The median payment for CBYP was $7,043.70, 
which was significantly different from the mean of $12,837.96.  This was the result of 





Figure 6.7A:  Boxplot CBYP (outliers present) 
The bar chart in Figure 6.8A illustrates the mean of CBYP for each year and 
payer.  The means were similar and seem to correlate with one another.  However, 
deviation began to take place in the years 2005 and 2006, and carried through to 2008.  
Given the box plot in Figure 6.9A, this was caused by the presence of outliers in those 
years.  The box plot also confirmed that outliers were present in both payer types.  
This led to a deviation of the mean in all of the years.  The removal of outliers would 
correct this. 
 
Figure 6.8A: Mean CBYP_Paid by Year 
As noted in Figure 6.8A, the CBYP remained a significant contributor of 
claims in the study, with good representation of both government and commercial 
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claims.  Outliers present within the subsample were identified in the box plot in 
Figure 6.9A.   
 
Figure 6.9A: Box plot of CBYP_Paid by year and payer 
 
Figure 6.10A: Mean CBYP_Paid by year and payor type (outliers removed) 
 
Figure 6.10A shows that upon the removal of the outliers, there was low 
reimbursement in 2000 from the government, in contrast to the commercial 
reimbursement.  The sample size within this year may have influenced the initial 
years, as discussed earlier.  Government and commercial payors correlated in 
payment increases over time, with both trading off leadership in reimbursement for 
the CBYP.  Commercial led with the highest reimbursement in the most years.  This 
confirmed the discussions related to government reimbursement stated previously, 
that government was the lowest reimbursement payor. Reimbursement rates for both 
348 
 
government and commercial payors increased year on year throughout the study, with 
a stabilization of reimbursement occurring in 2005.  Some reduction of 
reimbursement for the CBYP occurred in 2007.  Values present are in nominal 
dollars.   
 
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy (CHOLX) 
The CHOLX was distributed around a narrow value band around the zero 
delineation mark.  The distribution was skewed to the left. This was due to few 
negative values present within the data.  The CHOLX (n) =52,120 out of N= 457,146.    
The high kurtosis value of the distribution of 312.99 is very evident in the histogram 
in Figure 6.11A.  
 
 
Figure 6.11A: Histogram CHOLX (outliers present) 
The CHOLX distribution has a range of $375,432.87, which provided 
evidence of outliers. This was substantiated further by the difference between the 
median of $4,475.16 and the mean of $6,141.69. The sample presented a standard 
deviation of $7,700.70. 
Using Tukey’s (1977) definition, outliers were further illustrated in the stem 
and leaf plot, which identified values below -$212,264 and above $16,312.00 as 
outliers. Within the stem and leaf, 2,382 outliers were identified, with a predominance 
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of these above $16,312 (2,382 cases).  One outlier was identified below -21,264.  
These outliers are identified further in the box plot in Figure 6.12A, which illustrates 
all of the outliers along with a flattened normal distribution around the mean.   
 
Figure 6.12A: Box Plot CHOLX_Paid 
In Figure 6.13A, the mean of CHOLX_paid is presented by year and payer.  
The mean for both payers was close in value for all years, and while the box plot 
showed that outliers were present, the location of the outliers was not evident via the 
bar chart.   
 
 
Figure 6.13A: CHOLX_Paid by year and payer 
By viewing the box plot of the CHOLX_paid by year and payer in Figure 
6.12A, we see that outliers were present.  There was great amplitude of the outlier in 
350 
 
relation to the mean in 2004-2008.   The removal of the outliers will provide normal 
distributions with which to conduct any further research. 
 
Figure 6.14A: Mean CHOLX_Paid by Year and Payor type (outliers removed) 
Upon the removal of the outliers, Figure 6.14A shows Mean CHOLX_paid by 
year and payor type.  There were cases of government reimbursement for CHOLX in 
the sample for the year 2000.  This may be the result of a lack of the electronic remits 
acceptance as a primary tracking tool of the payment itself, as the federal government 
did not mandate the electronic remit until 2004, as stated previously.  The value of 
reimbursement for government and commercial payors correlate in the change of 
reimbursement over time, with the exception of 2005, 2006, and 2007.   In these later 
years, government reimbursement growth exceeded that of commercial 
reimbursement.  This was unusual, as government is normally the lower 
reimbursement payor.  No evidence was provided in the sample to lead the author to 
believe that this was caused by an extraneous value left within the data.  All values 





Extracorporeal Shock Wave Lithotripsy (ESWL) 
The distribution of ESWL is illustrated in the histogram in Figure 6.15A. This 
figure shows that while previous procedures were highly kurtosic, this distribution 
was less so.  This also was confirmed with a kurtosis value of 101.86.  The 
distribution was skewed to the left, closer to zero. 
 
Figure 6.15A: Histogram ESWL_Paid 
The ESWL (n) = 12,532, with N= 457,146.  This represented 2.7% of the total 
sample.  The range presented in this distribution was lower, with a value of 
$122,910.43, which suggested that less outliers were present in this subsample.  The 
separation of the mean and median was less, with the mean value of $4,203.98 and a 
median of $3205.25.   
The standard deviation for the ESWL was 3,959.33.  A stem and leaf plot 
confirmed the presence of outliers using Tukey’s (1977) definition, with 702 outliers 
present above $10,639.  This is illustrated further in Figure 6.16A, which contains a 
box plot of ESWL_Paid.  While previous variables showed the heavy presence of 
outliers, by compressing the box that contained the normal distribution, the normal 






Figure 6.16A: Box Plot ESWL_Paid 
The bar chart in Figure 6.17A shows the mean ESWL_paid for each year and 
payer.  From this bar chart, it was evident that the reimbursements from commercial 
payers were considerably more than that of government payers.  This trend remained 
throughout all years of the study.  As shown in Figure 6.18A, the outliers were present 
in all years and with both payers.  Removals of the outliers were necessary to conduct 




Figure 6.17A: ESWL_Paid by Year and Payer 
 




Figure 6.19A: Mean ESWL_Paid by Year and Payor Type (outliers removed) 
Upon the removal of the outliers, a bar chart of the mean ESWL_Paid was 
created in Figure 6.19A.  The bar chart revealed that no reimbursement exists for 
government payors in 2000 and 2001.  Reimbursement changes between commercial 
and government payors did not correlate, as commercial payors increased at a higher 
rate from 2000 to 2002, with commercial payors reducing reimbursement in 2003 and 
stabilizing until 2006, where increases again were evident for commercial payors.  
Government reimbursement increased year on year from 2002-2005 at a delta less 
than commercial payors, until 2003, where government reimbursement continued to 
grow until 2005. While commercial reimbursement stabilized, from 2005 onward, 
government reimbursement decreased year on year through 2007.  Commercial 
reimbursement was significantly higher in all years than government reimbursement.  





The BRON variable was heavily kurtosic and concentrated around zero.  The 
relatively high kurtosis was to be expected, as payments were concentrated around a 
given value.  The underlying procedure did not change in the population; therefore, it 
was expected that payment values would not deviate greatly from the mean.   
 
Figure 6.20A: Histogram: Bron_Paid 
 
The BRON (n) = 22,467 with N = 457,146.  This represented 4.9% of the 
overall sample. A relatively high range of $1,187,595 suggested the presence of 
outliers within the subsample. The distribution was skewed to the left, with the 
highest frequency present around zero, as shown in Figure 6.20A.  Distortions in the 
subsample via outliers were suggested further by the mean and median separation, 
with a mean value of $15,944.68, and a median of $5,639.14.  The standard deviation 
of the subsample was $36,474.42. Outliers were substantiated via stem and leaf, with 
2,284 outliers present.  Outliers are defined as values below $-48,614 and above 
$34,755.  While values below zero were present, these values were cut off, as no 
negative values were accepted in the study as take backs, and denials were not 
included in the study.   
The box plot in Figure 6.21A confirmed the presence of outliers, with outliers 





Figure 6.21A: Box Plot BRON_Paid 
The bar chart in Figure 6.22A represents mean BRON_paid by year and payer.  
What was evident is that the mean increased over time, but also that in the first few 
years of the study, government reimbursement was greater than commercial. 
However, outliers influenced those values.  Commercial payors led in reimbursement 
dollars in 2004 and onwards.   
 
Figure 6.22A: Mean Bron_Paid by Year and Payer 
The presence of outliers within each year and payer were confirmed in Figure 
6.23A.  These outliers influenced the means in Figure 6.24A.  The removal of outliers 




Figure 6.23A: Box Plot Bron_Paid by year and payer 
 
Figure 6.24A: Mean BRON_Paid by Year and Payor Type (outliers removed) 
Figure 6.24A shows a bar chart that was created after the removal of outliers, 
and depicts Mean BRON_Paid by year and payor type.  No government 
reimbursement cases existed for the year 2000.  Government reimbursement was 
higher in all of the years in comparison to commercial reimbursement.  This was 
unusual, as government is normally the lower reimbursement payor.  These trends of 
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higher payment existed throughout the entire time frame of the study.  Changes in 
reimbursement for government and commercial did not correlate at any time within 
the time frame of the study.  Both payors increased reimbursement for BRON 
procedures year on year until 2004, when commercial payors reduced reimbursement.  
A decrease in government reimbursement occurred two years later in 2006.  The 
differentiation in payment between government and commercial may have been 
driven by the average age of the patients who receive bronchoscopies; however, this is 





The distribution of the variable COLO was highly kurtosic, with very little 
distribution evident beyond the zero value on the X-axis, as shown in Figure 6.26A.    
This was confirmed with a kurtosis value of 2,573.  This concentration of the 
population was to be expected, as the procedure or service was not changing; 
therefore, the distribution should have been kurtosic.   
 
Figure 6.26A: Histogram COLO_Paid 
The COLO (n) =118,253, with N =457,186.  This represented 25.9% of the 
sample population. Outliers were suggested, with a large range of $619,602.15.  The 
difference of the mean and median also suggested that outliers were present, with a 
mean value of $177,515.16 and a median of $787.50.  Outliers were confirmed via 
stem and leaf plot using Tukey’s (1977) definition of outliers; 15,125 outliers were 
identified with values below –$1,522 and above $3,069. The bulk of the 15,122 
outliers were those above $3,069. 
These outliers were illustrated in the box plot in Figure 6.27A.  The box and 
whiskers representing the normal distribution were compressed to a single line.  This 




Figure 6.27A: Box Plot COLO_Paid 
A bar chart of the mean COLO_paid is presented in Figure 6.28A.  The chart 
indicated that the mean for both payers grew year on year, with the exception of 2004-
2007 of government payment. In 2005-2007, the mean government pay decreased 
year on year throughout the rest of the study period, with some indication of outlier 
influence in government pay in perhaps 2001, and then in 2005-2007.  This could be 
confirmed by the removal of the outliers.  The commercial pay mean continued to 
grow year after year. 
 
Figure 6.28A: Mean COLO_Paid by Year and Payer 
The box plot of COLO_Paid by year and payer, in Figure 6.29A, confirmed 
that outliers were present in each year for both payers.  Greater amplitude of the 




Figure6.29A: COLO_Paid by Year and Payer 
 
Figure 6.30A: Mean COLO_Paid by Year and Payor Type (outliers removed) 
Figure 6.30A shows a bar chart created after the removal of the outliers, 
showing COLO_Paid by year and payor type.  Both payor types were present in each 
year, with commercial as the higher reimbursement provider for all of the years with 
the exception of 2001.  Changes in reimbursement did not correlate well within the 
sample for this procedure.  Larger increases for government reimbursement were seen 
from 2000 to 2001, with very rapid erosion of the reimbursement dropping by roughly 
25% in 2002.  Further erosion in reimbursement from the government occurred again 
in 2003, with increases year on year after that until 2006, which again saw a decline.  
Commercial reimbursement was variable from 2000-2003, with a stabilization in 
reimbursement occurring in 2004.  Real increases for commercial reimbursement 
resumed in 2007.  Payments for both payers were relatively close from 2000 to 2002, 
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with a large divergence in reimbursement occurring thereafter.  Commercial 
reimbursement from 2002 onwards was approximately 25% to 50% more than 





The EGD represented 13.3% of the sample, with an (n) of 61,019 out of an (N) 
of 457,146.  A suggestion of outliers was given by the separation of the mean and the 
median.  There was also a large range present in the subsample of $918,372.  Kurtosis 
was high, as represented in the histogram in Figure 6.31A.   This was confirmed by 
the kurtosis value of 551.40.  Evidence of outliers was confirmed with a stem and leaf 
plot.  Outliers were expressed to be values below -7,022 and those values above 
12,701. 
 
Figure 6.31A: Histogram EGD_Paid 
The box plot in Figure 6.32A confirmed the presence of outliers, as the box 
was compressed and not visible.  Asterisks representing the outliers were readily 




Figure 6.32A:  Box Plot EGD_Paid 
The mean EGD in Figure 6.33A increased each year, with some early 
variation between government and commercial reimbursements. The year 2005 
onwards saw both increasing at roughly the same rate. 
 
Figure 6.33A: Mean EGD_Paid by Year and Payer 
The box plot in Figure 6.32A confirmed the presence of outliers as in the 
previous box plot; however, Figure 6.34A shows that the outliers existed for both the 








Figure 6.35A: Mean EGD_Paid by Year and Payor Type (outliers removed) 
Figure 6.35A shows the removal of the outliers.  Both payers were present in 
all of the years, 2000-2007.  Government was the higher reimbursement payor in all 
of the years except 2000.  No correlation of change in reimbursement could be seen in 
the years.  The government reimbursement for 2000 and 2001 seemed unrealistic, 
especially in 2001.  This value may have been generated by a low sample size for that 
year, which was distorting the mean.  Government reimbursement for 2003-2007 
increased year on year and was approximately 30% higher than commercial 




Total Hip Replacement Surgery (HIP) 
The histogram in Figure 6.36Ashows the distribution of HIP_Paid.  The 
distribution, while skewed to the left, was fairly dispersed in the payment spectrum. 
The HIP represented 0.00016 % of the sample population, and had the smallest 
contribution to the study with an (n) of 75, compared to an (N) of 457,146.   The 
range of payment for HIP was high, with a range of $58,827.  This also was 
recognized in the histogram.  The separation of the mean and the median suggested a 
smaller number of outliers, just as shown in the previous procedure reimbursements.  
The kurtosis value was low at 3.28.  This confirmed the histogram interpretations. 
 
Figure 6.36A: Histogram HIP_Paid 
 
A stem and leaf plot confirmed the low number of outliers, with nine total 
outliers.  Outliers were identified as values above $30,972.  This was also confirmed 
by the box plot in Figure 6.37A, which showed very few outliers, in addition to a 
well-proportioned box and whiskers, symbolizing the lack of distortion of outliers 





Figure 6.37A: Box Plot HIP_Paid 
 
Figure 6.38A shows the mean reimbursement by year and payer.  In the study, 
the HIP payments were present only from 2004 onwards.  While 2008-2009 data is 
shown, it is only for trend identification purposes and is not utilized within the study. 
 
Figure 6.38A: Mean HIP_Paid by year and Payer 
 





Figure 6.40A: Mean HIP_Paid by Year and Payor type (outliers removed) 
 
The bar chart in Figure 6.40A shows the mean HIP_Paid by year and payor 
type. Only claim/remits were available for 2004-2007.  This limitation was due to the 
small sample size. The government reimbursement was higher in all of the years than 
commercial reimbursement by approximately 20%, with the exception of 2006, in 
which there was only a modest difference in reimbursement.  Reimbursement for both 
payers increased in 2004 to 2005, with a large decrease for both payors thereafter.  
The year 2007 saw a return to preexisting payment levels, as government 
reimbursement was a little higher than previous years, and commercial reimbursement 
a little lower.    
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Total Knee Replacement Surgery (KNEE) 
The KNEE_Paid represented 8.9% of the overall sample population, with an 
(n) of 40,483 out of an (N) of 457,146.  The subsample was leptokurtic, as evidenced 
in Figure 148.  Outliers were suggested, with a range value of $3,878,658.  The 
median and mean were separated greatly, but still suggested outliers as present, with a 
mean value of $12,496 and a median of $10,259.  The low level of skewness 
identified in the histogram of Figure 6.41A was confirmed with a skewness value of 
151.  Outliers were identified as values below $2,084 and values above $20,507.  
Stem and leaf identified 5,552 outliers using Tukey’s (1977) definition. 
 
Figure 6.41A: Histogram KNEE_Paid 
 
 
Figure 6.42A: Box Plot KNEE_Paid 
The box plot in Figure 6.42A confirmed the presence of outliers; however, it is 
probable that the single outlier with a value of $338,145 caused a large portion of the 
distortion.  The box and whiskers associated with a normal distribution were 
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compressed and indistinguishable.  From the bar chart in Figure 6.43A, we can see 
that commercial pay exceeded government pay from 2000-2007, the term of the 
study.  Mean payments for KNEE decreased early in the study, while increasing from 
2003 onwards. However, the government reimbursement did not increase at the same 
rate.  
  
Figure6.43A: Mean KNEE_Paid by Year and Payer 
 
The box plot in Figure 6.44A suggests that only a few outliers were distorting 
the box and whiskers representing the normal distribution.  Outliers were identifiable 
for both government and commercial payers. 
 





Figure 6.45A: Mean KNEE_Paid by Year and Payor type (outliers removed) 
Figure 6.45A presents a bar chart displaying information on mean KNEE_Paid 
by year and payor type.  No government reimbursement cases are visible for the year 
2000.  In comparison to 2001, commercial reimbursement for 2000 was relatively 
high.  This may be the result of a low number of cases in that year. Both payor types 
were represented in all other years.  There was evidence of a modest correlation of 
both payors’ reimbursements for the years 2003-2005.  Beyond 2005, commercial 
reimbursement had a higher growth rate than that of government.  The largest 
divergence in reimbursement occurred in 2002, and was approximately 25%.  In all of 
the years with the exception of 2003, commercial reimbursement was higher than 
government.  All reimbursements increased throughout the time frame of the study.  
All values are in nominal dollars.  
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Chapter 6 Appendix (Panel Data Regression Models) 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index: Model 1 
Model 1: payor_count >=7, binary control for size, time, and payor count.  The binary 
variables for payor_count were (8-50), with 50 and above in one variable. Standard Error was 




                                                                              
         rho    .35338437   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    8.9870846
     sigma_u    6.6438436
                                                                              
       _cons    -381.5079   1033.121    -0.37   0.712    -2406.388    1643.372
FiscalY~2005    -.4224495   1.719938    -0.25   0.806    -3.793466    2.948567
FiscalY~2004    -1.535413   1.886715    -0.81   0.416    -5.233307    2.162481
FiscalY~2003     .7912266    2.37185     0.33   0.739    -3.857515    5.439968
FiscalY~2002     .8968507   2.478745     0.36   0.717    -3.961401    5.755102
FiscalY~2001    -1.783811   2.796995    -0.64   0.524     -7.26582    3.698197
PayorCnt_B~w     2.061517   3.878321     0.53   0.595    -5.539852    9.662887
PayorCnt_~50     .4244851   2.638814     0.16   0.872    -4.747495    5.596466
PayorCnt_~46    -12.82935   3.149623    -4.07   0.000    -19.00249   -6.656199
PayorCnt_~44     6.781233   7.793789     0.87   0.384    -8.494313    22.05678
PayorCnt_~43    -8.039338   4.224476    -1.90   0.057    -16.31916     .240483
PayorCnt_~42      1.13894    2.25439     0.51   0.613    -3.279583    5.557463
PayorCnt_~41    -15.01405   2.486473    -6.04   0.000    -19.88744   -10.14065
PayorCnt_~39    -16.16914   5.540476    -2.92   0.004    -27.02827   -5.310002
PayorCnt_~38      4.83679   2.732561     1.77   0.077    -.5189313    10.19251
PayorCnt_~37    -2.265571   2.583316    -0.88   0.380    -7.328777    2.797636
PayorCnt_~35    -13.46191   5.079036    -2.65   0.008    -23.41664   -3.507182
PayorCnt_~33    -3.587799   3.923726    -0.91   0.361    -11.27816    4.102562
PayorCnt_~32    -1.901405   3.743727    -0.51   0.612    -9.238975    5.436165
PayorCnt_~31      4.06872   7.282351     0.56   0.576    -10.20443    18.34187
PayorCnt_~30    -6.185819   2.772211    -2.23   0.026    -11.61925   -.7523847
PayorCnt_~29    -13.35534   4.282813    -3.12   0.002     -21.7495   -4.961179
PayorCnt_~28    -5.135515   6.162768    -0.83   0.405    -17.21432    6.943289
PayorCnt_~27     2.877829   4.001357     0.72   0.472    -4.964687    10.72034
PayorCnt_~26    -15.06823    3.59723    -4.19   0.000    -22.11868   -8.017792
PayorCnt_~25     -11.5625   5.712454    -2.02   0.043     -22.7587   -.3662945
PayorCnt_~24    -5.523761   5.873456    -0.94   0.347    -17.03552    5.988001
PayorCnt_~23     12.83156   10.22624     1.25   0.210    -7.211495    32.87461
PayorCnt_~22    -1.633205   2.673916    -0.61   0.541    -6.873984    3.607573
PayorCnt_~21     7.132592   2.999703     2.38   0.017     1.253283     13.0119
PayorCnt_~20      1.09736    3.49594     0.31   0.754    -5.754557    7.949277
PayorCnt_~19    -3.619728    3.03797    -1.19   0.233    -9.574041    2.334584
PayorCnt_~18    -10.73119   3.670181    -2.92   0.003    -17.92461    -3.53777
PayorCnt_~17    -9.929984    2.25969    -4.39   0.000     -14.3589   -5.501073
PayorCnt_~16     2.118589   3.262717     0.65   0.516    -4.276219    8.513397
PayorCnt_~15    -1.028257   4.281543    -0.24   0.810    -9.419927    7.363413
PayorCnt_~14     2.781213   2.565803     1.08   0.278    -2.247669    7.810095
PayorCnt_~13    -7.745565   4.105405    -1.89   0.059    -15.79201    .3008811
PayorCnt_~12    -3.857453   2.873466    -1.34   0.179    -9.489342    1.774436
PayorCnt_~11    -.1125899    2.87528    -0.04   0.969    -5.748034    5.522854
PayorCnt_~10     -1.78258   2.463447    -0.72   0.469    -6.610848    3.045688
PayorCnt_~_9     1.648157   2.154766     0.76   0.444    -2.575107     5.87142
PayorCnt_~_8    -1.313248   1.831249    -0.72   0.473    -4.902431    2.275934
FiscalYear~d     .2224521   .5153129     0.43   0.666    -.7875426    1.232447
    Net_Marg      9.58404   5.043516     1.90   0.057    -.3010707    19.46915
Percent_Go~s    -8.725174   5.194519    -1.68   0.093    -18.90624    1.455896
    Leverage    -1.254144   1.355294    -0.93   0.355    -3.910472    1.402183
        LnTA    -3.185476   .8072393    -3.95   0.000    -4.767636   -1.603316
     Capex_2    -1.21e-07   4.49e-08    -2.69   0.007    -2.09e-07   -3.27e-08
Capital_Co~y     .8004249   .5278028     1.52   0.129    -.2340495    1.834899
Bi_Hosp_Si~5     9.066729   3.618602     2.51   0.012     1.974399    16.15906
Bi_Hosp_Si~4     9.452296   5.853535     1.61   0.106    -2.020421    20.92501
Bi_Hosp_Si~3     2.951923   2.904785     1.02   0.310    -2.741351    8.645197
Bi_Hosp_Si~2      .520624   1.782343     0.29   0.770    -2.972704    4.013952
         hhi    -.7907834   2.954739    -0.27   0.789    -6.581966      5.0004
                                                                              
   real_fcf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 188 clusters in prvdr_num)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(46)      =         .
       overall = 0.2104                                        max =         6
       between = 0.1973                                        avg =       2.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2543                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: prvdr_num                       Number of groups   =       188
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       372
note: PayorCnt_Bi_49 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_48 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_47 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_45 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_40 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_36 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_34 dropped because of collinearity
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Herfindahl Hirschman Index: Model 2 
Model 2: payor_count >=6, binary control for size, time, and payor count.  The binary 
variables for payor_count were (7-50), with 50 and above in one variable. Standard Error was 





                                                                              
         rho    .34628039   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    8.9087856
     sigma_u    6.4839058
                                                                              
       _cons    -450.4745   803.9166    -0.56   0.575    -2026.122    1125.173
FiscalY~2005     .7688406   1.463165     0.53   0.599     -2.09891    3.636591
FiscalY~2004    -1.007094   1.561207    -0.65   0.519    -4.067004    2.052816
FiscalY~2003     .1400753   1.958551     0.07   0.943    -3.698614    3.978764
FiscalY~2002     .5696517    2.09207     0.27   0.785     -3.53073    4.670034
FiscalY~2001    -.2308872   2.496359    -0.09   0.926    -5.123662    4.661887
PayorCnt_B~w     2.074541   3.805137     0.55   0.586     -5.38339    9.532472
PayorCnt_~50     1.738038   2.484988     0.70   0.484    -3.132449    6.608524
PayorCnt_~46    -13.54832   3.140258    -4.31   0.000    -19.70311   -7.393525
PayorCnt_~44     7.142922    7.44888     0.96   0.338    -7.456614    21.74246
PayorCnt_~43    -6.227932   4.336697    -1.44   0.151     -14.7277    2.271838
PayorCnt_~42      1.31608   1.970187     0.67   0.504    -2.545415    5.177576
PayorCnt_~41    -15.16885   2.688445    -5.64   0.000     -20.4381   -9.899591
PayorCnt_~39    -16.20656   5.835999    -2.78   0.005    -27.64491   -4.768211
PayorCnt_~38     5.073881   2.819659     1.80   0.072    -.4525487    10.60031
PayorCnt_~37    -1.865154   2.731862    -0.68   0.495    -7.219506    3.489198
PayorCnt_~35    -13.41653   4.106737    -3.27   0.001    -21.46559   -5.367473
PayorCnt_~33    -2.635527   4.178623    -0.63   0.528    -10.82548    5.554424
PayorCnt_~32    -1.201851   3.466374    -0.35   0.729     -7.99582    5.592117
PayorCnt_~31     5.226138   6.856835     0.76   0.446     -8.21301    18.66529
PayorCnt_~30    -3.953716   2.751921    -1.44   0.151    -9.347381     1.43995
PayorCnt_~29    -12.50335   3.700258    -3.38   0.001    -19.75573   -5.250982
PayorCnt_~28    -4.608916   5.448305    -0.85   0.398     -15.2874    6.069566
PayorCnt_~27     4.022255   3.924292     1.02   0.305    -3.669216    11.71373
PayorCnt_~26    -13.30193   2.997575    -4.44   0.000    -19.17707   -7.426794
PayorCnt_~25    -10.69801   5.341924    -2.00   0.045    -21.16798   -.2280274
PayorCnt_~24    -5.207758   6.207737    -0.84   0.402     -17.3747    6.959182
PayorCnt_~23     13.94187   9.914308     1.41   0.160    -5.489814    33.37356
PayorCnt_~22    -.1569702   2.867373    -0.05   0.956    -5.776918    5.462978
PayorCnt_~21     7.151199    2.69631     2.65   0.008     1.866527    12.43587
PayorCnt_~20     1.043676    3.45569     0.30   0.763    -5.729353    7.816704
PayorCnt_~19     -2.33376   2.857604    -0.82   0.414    -7.934562    3.267041
PayorCnt_~18    -10.35763   3.479787    -2.98   0.003    -17.17789   -3.537378
PayorCnt_~17    -9.115063   2.105031    -4.33   0.000    -13.24085   -4.989279
PayorCnt_~16     2.493433   3.174535     0.79   0.432    -3.728541    8.715408
PayorCnt_~15    -.2424922   4.130975    -0.06   0.953    -8.339054     7.85407
PayorCnt_~14     2.598777   2.652206     0.98   0.327    -2.599452    7.797005
PayorCnt_~13    -7.113977   4.097109    -1.74   0.083    -15.14416     .916208
PayorCnt_~12    -3.101275    2.75047    -1.13   0.260    -8.492097    2.289548
PayorCnt_~11     .2038708   2.661228     0.08   0.939    -5.012041    5.419782
PayorCnt_~10    -.8219982   2.435224    -0.34   0.736     -5.59495    3.950954
PayorCnt_~_9     2.388259   2.104629     1.13   0.256    -1.736739    6.513257
PayorCnt_~_8    -1.054818   1.924334    -0.55   0.584    -4.826443    2.716808
PayorCnt_~_7     .5156602   1.554173     0.33   0.740    -2.530462    3.561783
FiscalYear~d     .2561131   .4008228     0.64   0.523    -.5294852    1.041711
    Net_Marg      9.47596   5.210856     1.82   0.069    -.7371306    19.68905
Percent_Go~s     -9.71394   4.648209    -2.09   0.037    -18.82426   -.6036188
    Leverage    -1.447085   1.185254    -1.22   0.222     -3.77014    .8759711
        LnTA     -3.11706   .7588358    -4.11   0.000    -4.604351   -1.629769
     Capex_2    -1.47e-07   3.96e-08    -3.71   0.000    -2.25e-07   -6.93e-08
Capital_Co~y      1.05756   .3936477     2.69   0.007     .2860248    1.829095
Bi_Hosp_Si~5     9.249199    3.31492     2.79   0.005     2.752075    15.74632
Bi_Hosp_Si~4     11.14671   5.284668     2.11   0.035     .7889481    21.50447
Bi_Hosp_Si~3     3.602507   2.489165     1.45   0.148    -1.276166     8.48118
Bi_Hosp_Si~2     .6874729    1.58319     0.43   0.664    -2.415522    3.790467
         hhi    -.8366864   2.483555    -0.34   0.736    -5.704365    4.030992
                                                                              
   real_fcf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 242 clusters in prvdr_num)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(47)      =         .
       overall = 0.1879                                        max =         6
       between = 0.1716                                        avg =       1.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.2206                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: prvdr_num                       Number of groups   =       242
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       471
note: PayorCnt_Bi_49 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_48 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_47 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_45 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_40 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_36 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_34 dropped because of collinearity
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Herfindahl Hirschman Index:  Model 3 
Model 3: payor_count >=5, binary control for size, time, and payor count.  The binary 
variables for payor_count were (6-50), with 50 and above in one variable. Standard Error was 





                                                                              
         rho    .37372003   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    8.8789399
     sigma_u    6.8588301
                                                                              
       _cons    -1042.579    726.299    -1.44   0.151    -2466.099    380.9406
FiscalY~2005     .6902363   1.246759     0.55   0.580    -1.753366    3.133839
FiscalY~2004    -.2773392   1.351116    -0.21   0.837    -2.925477    2.370799
FiscalY~2003     .5844427    1.62811     0.36   0.720    -2.606595     3.77548
FiscalY~2002     2.249943   1.961393     1.15   0.251    -1.594316    6.094202
FiscalY~2001     1.316038     2.1452     0.61   0.540    -2.888477    5.520552
PayorCnt_B~w     1.499544   3.600222     0.42   0.677    -5.556761    8.555849
PayorCnt_~50     1.471019    1.85987     0.79   0.429    -2.174259    5.116296
PayorCnt_~46    -14.66782   2.382358    -6.16   0.000    -19.33715   -9.998483
PayorCnt_~44     6.858617   7.144824     0.96   0.337    -7.144982    20.86222
PayorCnt_~43    -7.123898   2.697124    -2.64   0.008    -12.41016   -1.837631
PayorCnt_~42     .4010839   1.768874     0.23   0.821    -3.065845    3.868013
PayorCnt_~41    -16.29846   2.396023    -6.80   0.000    -20.99458   -11.60234
PayorCnt_~39    -17.20005   5.612034    -3.06   0.002    -28.19943    -6.20066
PayorCnt_~38     4.648067   2.669459     1.74   0.082    -.5839764    9.880111
PayorCnt_~37    -2.242324   2.441754    -0.92   0.358    -7.028074    2.543426
PayorCnt_~35    -11.66595   2.388639    -4.88   0.000     -16.3476   -6.984304
PayorCnt_~33    -3.326839   3.845616    -0.87   0.387    -10.86411    4.210431
PayorCnt_~32    -2.104197   3.396422    -0.62   0.536    -8.761062    4.552668
PayorCnt_~31     5.585466   7.298783     0.77   0.444    -8.719885    19.89082
PayorCnt_~30    -4.575727   2.247194    -2.04   0.042    -8.980146   -.1713075
PayorCnt_~29    -10.75678   3.433326    -3.13   0.002    -17.48597   -4.027583
PayorCnt_~28    -5.276247   5.238523    -1.01   0.314    -15.54356    4.991069
PayorCnt_~27     4.552973   3.642762     1.25   0.211    -2.586708    11.69265
PayorCnt_~26     -12.4829   2.481414    -5.03   0.000    -17.34638   -7.619414
PayorCnt_~25    -11.91655   5.138134    -2.32   0.020    -21.98711   -1.845993
PayorCnt_~24    -6.389744   5.470586    -1.17   0.243     -17.1119    4.332408
PayorCnt_~23     12.60758   9.227347     1.37   0.172    -5.477684    30.69285
PayorCnt_~22    -1.024919   2.588779    -0.40   0.692    -6.098833    4.048994
PayorCnt_~21     7.062624   3.169854     2.23   0.026     .8498244    13.27542
PayorCnt_~20      .691692   2.957524     0.23   0.815    -5.104949    6.488333
PayorCnt_~19    -2.725704   2.890108    -0.94   0.346    -8.390212    2.938804
PayorCnt_~18    -10.95716   3.477692    -3.15   0.002    -17.77331   -4.141004
PayorCnt_~17    -8.956828   1.924502    -4.65   0.000    -12.72878   -5.184873
PayorCnt_~16     2.086278   3.253465     0.64   0.521    -4.290396    8.462953
PayorCnt_~15    -.3412848   3.805139    -0.09   0.929     -7.79922     7.11665
PayorCnt_~14     1.322467    2.31352     0.57   0.568    -3.211949    5.856884
PayorCnt_~13    -7.359936   3.623415    -2.03   0.042     -14.4617   -.2581729
PayorCnt_~12    -3.104772   2.681401    -1.16   0.247    -8.360222    2.150678
PayorCnt_~11    -.3414467    2.63975    -0.13   0.897    -5.515261    4.832368
PayorCnt_~10    -1.625964   2.297429    -0.71   0.479    -6.128843    2.876914
PayorCnt_~_9     2.112967   2.044978     1.03   0.301    -1.895117     6.12105
PayorCnt_~_8    -1.296548   1.670529    -0.78   0.438    -4.570725    1.977628
PayorCnt_~_7     .0504687   1.451958     0.03   0.972    -2.795317    2.896255
PayorCnt_~_6    -.1999123   1.407152    -0.14   0.887    -2.957879    2.558054
FiscalYear~d       .54965   .3623606     1.52   0.129    -.1605638    1.259864
    Net_Marg     10.36292   5.575942     1.86   0.063    -.5657261    21.29157
Percent_Go~s     -8.33088   4.278339    -1.95   0.052    -16.71627    .0545112
    Leverage    -1.853029   .9771508    -1.90   0.058     -3.76821    .0621509
        LnTA    -2.845651   .6339839    -4.49   0.000    -4.088236   -1.603065
     Capex_2    -1.35e-07   3.81e-08    -3.53   0.000    -2.09e-07   -6.00e-08
Capital_Co~y     1.060866   .3103721     3.42   0.001     .4525474    1.669184
Bi_Hosp_Si~5     7.394205   2.957947     2.50   0.012     1.596735    13.19168
Bi_Hosp_Si~4     10.42367   4.027689     2.59   0.010      2.52954    18.31779
Bi_Hosp_Si~3     1.757884   2.178305     0.81   0.420    -2.511516    6.027284
Bi_Hosp_Si~2    -.7601632   1.356586    -0.56   0.575    -3.419024    1.898697
         hhi    -1.856242   2.186739    -0.85   0.396    -6.142171    2.429688
                                                                              
   real_fcf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 322 clusters in prvdr_num)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(50)      =         .
       overall = 0.1739                                        max =         6
       between = 0.1710                                        avg =       2.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1755                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: prvdr_num                       Number of groups   =       322
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       632
note: PayorCnt_Bi_49 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_48 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_47 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_45 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_40 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_36 dropped because of collinearity




Herfindahl Hirschman Index: Model 4 
Model 4: payor_count >=4, binary control for size, time, and payor count.  The binary 
variables for payor_count were (5-50), with 50 and above in one variable. Standard Error was 




                                                                              
         rho    .34116634   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    9.0455947
     sigma_u    6.5092706
                                                                              
       _cons    -834.9919   606.8728    -1.38   0.169    -2024.441    354.4569
FiscalY~2005     .9217518   1.059046     0.87   0.384     -1.15394    2.997443
FiscalY~2004     .4044304   1.157094     0.35   0.727    -1.863433    2.672294
FiscalY~2003     .2206353   1.281691     0.17   0.863    -2.291434    2.732704
FiscalY~2002     2.413085   1.540878     1.57   0.117    -.6069794    5.433149
FiscalY~2001     2.452051   1.758536     1.39   0.163    -.9946156    5.898718
PayorCnt_B~w     -.840946   3.583703    -0.23   0.814    -7.864874    6.182982
PayorCnt_~50    -.1692941   1.810633    -0.09   0.926    -3.718069    3.379481
PayorCnt_~46    -17.60035   2.124001    -8.29   0.000    -21.76332   -13.43739
PayorCnt_~44     4.773679   6.667226     0.72   0.474    -8.293843     17.8412
PayorCnt_~43    -12.59101   3.533229    -3.56   0.000    -19.51601   -5.666003
PayorCnt_~42    -1.982088   1.498321    -1.32   0.186    -4.918743    .9545666
PayorCnt_~41    -19.57126   1.965183    -9.96   0.000    -23.42295   -15.71957
PayorCnt_~39    -20.00971   5.766693    -3.47   0.001    -31.31222   -8.707203
PayorCnt_~38     2.849091   2.780096     1.02   0.305    -2.599797    8.297979
PayorCnt_~37    -4.802431   2.095147    -2.29   0.022    -8.908844   -.6960179
PayorCnt_~35    -16.57581   3.019655    -5.49   0.000    -22.49423   -10.65739
PayorCnt_~33    -6.154839   4.407915    -1.40   0.163    -14.79419    2.484516
PayorCnt_~32    -3.490009   2.863754    -1.22   0.223    -9.102862    2.122845
PayorCnt_~31     3.532007   6.651989     0.53   0.595    -9.505651    16.56967
PayorCnt_~30    -4.501604   1.805584    -2.49   0.013    -8.040484   -.9627239
PayorCnt_~29    -13.77967   3.130231    -4.40   0.000    -19.91482   -7.644534
PayorCnt_~28    -7.561098   5.528434    -1.37   0.171    -18.39663    3.274434
PayorCnt_~27     .6988369   3.951898     0.18   0.860    -7.046742    8.444415
PayorCnt_~26    -14.93318   2.276918    -6.56   0.000    -19.39586    -10.4705
PayorCnt_~25    -13.09091    4.04579    -3.24   0.001    -21.02052   -5.161312
PayorCnt_~24    -9.475638    5.44397    -1.74   0.082    -20.14562    1.194347
PayorCnt_~23       10.163   8.437729     1.20   0.228    -6.374648    26.70064
PayorCnt_~22    -2.672687   2.489662    -1.07   0.283    -7.552334     2.20696
PayorCnt_~21     4.767023   3.614744     1.32   0.187    -2.317745    11.85179
PayorCnt_~20    -2.621987   3.173471    -0.83   0.409    -8.841875    3.597902
PayorCnt_~19     -4.38513   2.934557    -1.49   0.135    -10.13676    1.366496
PayorCnt_~18    -12.92784   3.136421    -4.12   0.000    -19.07511   -6.780562
PayorCnt_~17    -11.84122   1.811577    -6.54   0.000    -15.39184   -8.290591
PayorCnt_~16     .5648718    3.24919     0.17   0.862    -5.803424    6.933167
PayorCnt_~15    -3.121813   3.836247    -0.81   0.416    -10.64072    4.397093
PayorCnt_~14    -1.311867   2.114717    -0.62   0.535    -5.456637    2.832903
PayorCnt_~13    -8.930574   3.723291    -2.40   0.016    -16.22809   -1.633058
PayorCnt_~12    -4.988857   2.678699    -1.86   0.063    -10.23901    .2612963
PayorCnt_~11    -1.972657   2.523825    -0.78   0.434    -6.919264     2.97395
PayorCnt_~10    -3.791726   2.102833    -1.80   0.071    -7.913203    .3297505
PayorCnt_~_9     .0695595    1.93426     0.04   0.971    -3.721521     3.86064
PayorCnt_~_8    -2.802169    1.44952    -1.93   0.053    -5.643175    .0388376
PayorCnt_~_7    -1.567623   1.323354    -1.18   0.236    -4.161349    1.026103
PayorCnt_~_6    -2.191027   1.330251    -1.65   0.100     -4.79827    .4162162
PayorCnt_~_5     -1.68614   1.146074    -1.47   0.141    -3.932403    .5601236
FiscalYear~d     .4427292   .3025869     1.46   0.143    -.1503301    1.035789
    Net_Marg     12.02302   6.816976     1.76   0.078    -1.338011    25.38405
Percent_Go~s    -7.498846    3.44382    -2.18   0.029    -14.24861   -.7490834
    Leverage    -1.483338   .8205969    -1.81   0.071    -3.091678    .1250022
        LnTA     -2.36606   .5128803    -4.61   0.000    -3.371287   -1.360833
     Capex_2    -1.28e-07   3.17e-08    -4.04   0.000    -1.90e-07   -6.59e-08
Capital_Co~y     .8402394   .3571994     2.35   0.019     .1401415    1.540337
Bi_Hosp_Si~5     10.23787   3.393535     3.02   0.003     3.586669    16.88908
Bi_Hosp_Si~4     10.43624   3.276446     3.19   0.001     4.014519    16.85795
Bi_Hosp_Si~3     1.476685   1.798956     0.82   0.412    -2.049204    5.002574
Bi_Hosp_Si~2    -.3749028   1.107473    -0.34   0.735    -2.545511    1.795705
         hhi     -3.68104   1.779562    -2.07   0.039    -7.168918   -.1931613
                                                                              
   real_fcf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 433 clusters in prvdr_num)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(51)      =         .
       overall = 0.1470                                        max =         6
       between = 0.1362                                        avg =       2.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.1425                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: prvdr_num                       Number of groups   =       433
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       891
note: PayorCnt_Bi_49 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_48 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_47 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_45 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_40 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_36 dropped because of collinearity




Herfindahl Hirschman Index: Model 5 
Model 5: payor_count >=3 binary control for size, time, and payor count.  The binary 
variables for payor_count were (4-50), with 50 and above in one variable. Standard Error was 




                                                                              
         rho     .3226942   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    8.9419143
     sigma_u    6.1721104
                                                                              
       _cons     -847.273   468.9786    -1.81   0.071    -1766.454    71.90819
FiscalY~2005    -.1619422   .8212768    -0.20   0.844    -1.771615    1.447731
FiscalY~2004     .8668369   .9502951     0.91   0.362    -.9957074    2.729381
FiscalY~2003      .336907   .9999638     0.34   0.736    -1.622986      2.2968
FiscalY~2002     2.139524   1.185957     1.80   0.071    -.1849083    4.463957
FiscalY~2001     1.960803   1.424314     1.38   0.169    -.8308015    4.752407
PayorCnt_B~w     1.573629   3.460173     0.45   0.649    -5.208186    8.355443
PayorCnt_~50     1.422211   1.633018     0.87   0.384    -1.778444    4.622867
PayorCnt_~46     -14.9459   1.904227    -7.85   0.000    -18.67811   -11.21368
PayorCnt_~44     6.417277   7.399322     0.87   0.386    -8.085128    20.91968
PayorCnt_~43    -10.91984   2.906882    -3.76   0.000    -16.61723   -5.222459
PayorCnt_~42    -.9413851   1.296619    -0.73   0.468    -3.482711    1.599941
PayorCnt_~41    -17.35489   1.791882    -9.69   0.000    -20.86691   -13.84286
PayorCnt_~39    -18.04015   5.623315    -3.21   0.001    -29.06165   -7.018656
PayorCnt_~38     5.309358   2.133531     2.49   0.013     1.127714    9.491003
PayorCnt_~37    -3.080967   1.567283    -1.97   0.049    -6.152786   -.0091478
PayorCnt_~35    -14.97932   2.790757    -5.37   0.000     -20.4491   -9.509536
PayorCnt_~33    -4.961622   4.936582    -1.01   0.315    -14.63715      4.7139
PayorCnt_~32     -.595708   2.716562    -0.22   0.826    -5.920072    4.728656
PayorCnt_~31     5.028099   6.442243     0.78   0.435    -7.598466    17.65466
PayorCnt_~30    -3.253117   1.464554    -2.22   0.026     -6.12359   -.3826435
PayorCnt_~29    -11.87437   2.908334    -4.08   0.000     -17.5746   -6.174141
PayorCnt_~28    -4.192323   5.769322    -0.73   0.467    -15.49999    7.115339
PayorCnt_~27     2.347385   3.989875     0.59   0.556    -5.472627     10.1674
PayorCnt_~26    -13.45042   1.919116    -7.01   0.000    -17.21182   -9.689025
PayorCnt_~25    -10.34436   2.795823    -3.70   0.000    -15.82407   -4.864645
PayorCnt_~24    -6.829725   5.425269    -1.26   0.208    -17.46306    3.803606
PayorCnt_~23     12.02765   7.785348     1.54   0.122    -3.231352    27.28665
PayorCnt_~22    -.8573344   2.429452    -0.35   0.724    -5.618973    3.904304
PayorCnt_~21     6.099994   3.559445     1.71   0.087    -.8763891    13.07638
PayorCnt_~20    -.9940212   3.383202    -0.29   0.769    -7.624976    5.636933
PayorCnt_~19    -2.402616   2.776616    -0.87   0.387    -7.844683     3.03945
PayorCnt_~18    -10.29641    2.78887    -3.69   0.000    -15.76249   -4.830325
PayorCnt_~17    -10.31685   1.518243    -6.80   0.000    -13.29255   -7.341145
PayorCnt_~16      2.86948   3.245212     0.88   0.377    -3.491019    9.229979
PayorCnt_~15    -1.311943   3.554442    -0.37   0.712    -8.278521    5.654635
PayorCnt_~14     1.543676   1.720002     0.90   0.369    -1.827466    4.914819
PayorCnt_~13     -6.45928   3.654723    -1.77   0.077    -13.62241     .703846
PayorCnt_~12    -2.484016   2.624599    -0.95   0.344    -7.628136    2.660104
PayorCnt_~11      .313772   2.297664     0.14   0.891    -4.189567    4.817111
PayorCnt_~10    -1.503786   1.862287    -0.81   0.419    -5.153802     2.14623
PayorCnt_~_9      1.90178   1.730926     1.10   0.272    -1.490772    5.294331
PayorCnt_~_8    -.3690042   1.442934    -0.26   0.798    -3.197103    2.459094
PayorCnt_~_7     .0828045   1.273688     0.07   0.948    -2.413578    2.579187
PayorCnt_~_6    -.4451885   1.219692    -0.37   0.715    -2.835741    1.945364
PayorCnt_~_5    -.1188327   1.028982    -0.12   0.908    -2.135601    1.897935
PayorCnt_~_4     1.480551   .8454221     1.75   0.080    -.1764463    3.137547
FiscalYear~d     .4470001   .2336494     1.91   0.056    -.0109442    .9049444
    Net_Marg     15.42476   7.540223     2.05   0.041     .6461914    30.20332
Percent_Go~s    -4.658025   2.684658    -1.74   0.083    -9.919859    .6038089
    Leverage    -1.294987   .5793172    -2.24   0.025    -2.430427   -.1595457
        LnTA    -2.363778   .4360923    -5.42   0.000    -3.218503   -1.509053
     Capex_2    -1.27e-07   3.30e-08    -3.86   0.000    -1.92e-07   -6.26e-08
Capital_Co~y     1.085651   .5750017     1.89   0.059    -.0413321    2.212633
Bi_Hosp_Si~5     6.393814   2.794141     2.29   0.022     .9173976    11.87023
Bi_Hosp_Si~4     7.319262   3.175915     2.30   0.021     1.094583    13.54394
Bi_Hosp_Si~3      2.49038    1.50736     1.65   0.099    -.4639915    5.444751
Bi_Hosp_Si~2    -.2157893   .8802615    -0.25   0.806     -1.94107    1.509492
         hhi    -3.469228   1.501483    -2.31   0.021    -6.412081    -.526374
                                                                              
   real_fcf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 600 clusters in prvdr_num)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(52)      =         .
       overall = 0.1304                                        max =         7
       between = 0.1113                                        avg =       2.2
R-sq:  within  = 0.1139                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: prvdr_num                       Number of groups   =       600
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1324
note: PayorCnt_Bi_49 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_48 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_47 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_45 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_40 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_36 dropped because of collinearity




Herfindahl Hirschman Index: Model 6 
Model 6: payor_count >=2 binary control for size, time, and payor count.  The binary 
variables for payor_count were (3-50), with 50 and above in one variable. Standard Error was 




                                                                              
         rho    .31960603   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    9.0789247
     sigma_u    6.2224535
                                                                              
       _cons    -794.3081   361.6525    -2.20   0.028    -1503.134   -85.48231
FiscalY~2005     .3140344   .6825318     0.46   0.645    -1.023703    1.651772
FiscalY~2004     .5043008    .746121     0.68   0.499    -.9580695    1.966671
FiscalY~2003    -.3361836   .7541581    -0.45   0.656    -1.814306    1.141939
FiscalY~2002     1.233776   .9010122     1.37   0.171    -.5321753    2.999728
FiscalY~2001     2.753071   1.029123     2.68   0.007     .7360265    4.770115
PayorCnt_B~w     .8178675   3.431579     0.24   0.812    -5.907904    7.543639
PayorCnt_~50     .0405295   1.841856     0.02   0.982    -3.569442    3.650501
PayorCnt_~46    -16.51599   1.689513    -9.78   0.000    -19.82738   -13.20461
PayorCnt_~44     5.820901   7.320395     0.80   0.427     -8.52681    20.16861
PayorCnt_~43    -9.844519     3.6828    -2.67   0.008    -17.06267   -2.626365
PayorCnt_~42    -1.811335   1.164596    -1.56   0.120    -4.093901    .4712298
PayorCnt_~41    -18.19559   1.566908   -11.61   0.000    -21.26667   -15.12451
PayorCnt_~39    -19.74678   5.664866    -3.49   0.000    -30.84971   -8.643845
PayorCnt_~38     4.376198   1.987516     2.20   0.028     .4807388    8.271657
PayorCnt_~37    -3.729736   2.464409    -1.51   0.130    -8.559888    1.100416
PayorCnt_~35    -16.09842   2.354722    -6.84   0.000    -20.71359   -11.48325
PayorCnt_~33    -5.111546   5.220263    -0.98   0.327    -15.34307    5.119982
PayorCnt_~32    -.2357601   2.581991    -0.09   0.927     -5.29637     4.82485
PayorCnt_~31     4.159428   5.707523     0.73   0.466    -7.027112    15.34597
PayorCnt_~30     -4.28706   1.349263    -3.18   0.001    -6.931566   -1.642553
PayorCnt_~29    -13.02842   2.600624    -5.01   0.000    -18.12555   -7.931293
PayorCnt_~28    -5.324272   4.627197    -1.15   0.250    -14.39341    3.744868
PayorCnt_~27     1.758303   3.784448     0.46   0.642    -5.659078    9.175684
PayorCnt_~26    -13.80567   1.716733    -8.04   0.000     -17.1704   -10.44093
PayorCnt_~25    -11.05028   2.657943    -4.16   0.000    -16.25975   -5.840806
PayorCnt_~24    -7.166011   6.014396    -1.19   0.233    -18.95401    4.621989
PayorCnt_~23     12.09672   7.622352     1.59   0.113    -2.842812    27.03626
PayorCnt_~22    -1.237881   2.242157    -0.55   0.581    -5.632429    3.156667
PayorCnt_~21     5.609239   3.577598     1.57   0.117    -1.402725     12.6212
PayorCnt_~20    -2.604937   3.517756    -0.74   0.459    -9.499612    4.289737
PayorCnt_~19    -2.876996   2.739945    -1.05   0.294     -8.24719    2.493198
PayorCnt_~18    -11.36945   2.931735    -3.88   0.000    -17.11554   -5.623354
PayorCnt_~17    -11.27527   1.470685    -7.67   0.000    -14.15776    -8.39278
PayorCnt_~16     1.882334   3.150051     0.60   0.550    -4.291652    8.056321
PayorCnt_~15    -2.276258   3.677803    -0.62   0.536    -9.484621    4.932104
PayorCnt_~14     .3869989   1.778249     0.22   0.828    -3.098304    3.872302
PayorCnt_~13    -7.031105   3.463672    -2.03   0.042    -13.81978   -.2424331
PayorCnt_~12    -3.440894   2.655737    -1.30   0.195    -8.646043    1.764255
PayorCnt_~11    -.8499334   1.992054    -0.43   0.670    -4.754287    3.054421
PayorCnt_~10    -2.473704   1.881198    -1.31   0.189    -6.160784    1.213375
PayorCnt_~_9     1.151586   1.730659     0.67   0.506    -2.240443    4.543615
PayorCnt_~_8    -1.105027   1.464367    -0.75   0.450    -3.975132    1.765079
PayorCnt_~_7    -.9846462   1.255808    -0.78   0.433    -3.445984    1.476692
PayorCnt_~_6    -1.213739   1.157262    -1.05   0.294    -3.481931    1.054453
PayorCnt_~_5    -.8767582   1.009993    -0.87   0.385    -2.856307    1.102791
PayorCnt_~_4     .7039098   .7504156     0.94   0.348    -.7668777    2.174697
PayorCnt_~_3    -.7944862   .6149912    -1.29   0.196    -1.999847    .4108744
FiscalYear~d     .4197049   .1803349     2.33   0.020     .0662551    .7731547
    Net_Marg     22.02755   8.467436     2.60   0.009     5.431683    38.62342
Percent_Go~s    -4.015043   2.302029    -1.74   0.081    -8.526937    .4968509
    Leverage    -.5695055   .4799009    -1.19   0.235    -1.510094     .371083
        LnTA    -2.281873   .3415583    -6.68   0.000    -2.951315   -1.612431
     Capex_2    -1.59e-07   3.43e-08    -4.64   0.000    -2.27e-07   -9.19e-08
Capital_Co~y     .9500599   .5076786     1.87   0.061    -.0449718    1.945092
Bi_Hosp_Si~5     3.886303   3.412474     1.14   0.255    -2.802023    10.57463
Bi_Hosp_Si~4     7.153569   2.722199     2.63   0.009     1.818156    12.48898
Bi_Hosp_Si~3     3.102911   1.240283     2.50   0.012     .6720017    5.533821
Bi_Hosp_Si~2     .1470463   .7125235     0.21   0.836    -1.249474    1.543567
         hhi    -2.730321   1.302367    -2.10   0.036    -5.282913    -.177728
                                                                              
   real_fcf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 847 clusters in prvdr_num)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(52)      =         .
       overall = 0.1120                                        max =         7
       between = 0.0886                                        avg =       2.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.1075                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: prvdr_num                       Number of groups   =       847
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      2118
note: PayorCnt_Bi_49 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_48 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_47 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_45 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_40 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_36 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_34 dropped because of collinearity




Herfindahl Hirschman Index: Model 7 
Model 7: payor_count >=1 binary control for size, time, and payor count.  The binary 
variables for payor_count were (2-50), with 50 and above in one variable. Standard Error was 




                                                                              
         rho    .25533037   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    9.2708149
     sigma_u    5.4285936
                                                                              
       _cons    -368.4784    242.412    -1.52   0.128    -843.5973    106.6404
FiscalY~2005     .9084199   .5480397     1.66   0.097    -.1657182    1.982558
FiscalY~2004     .7243343   .5626771     1.29   0.198    -.3784925    1.827161
FiscalY~2003     .2185834    .555177     0.39   0.694    -.8695436     1.30671
FiscalY~2002     .8640418    .620855     1.39   0.164    -.3528116    2.080895
FiscalY~2001     1.469391   .6327748     2.32   0.020     .2291753    2.709607
PayorCnt_B~w     .3219108   3.425352     0.09   0.925    -6.391656    7.035478
PayorCnt_~50    -.6303428   2.007579    -0.31   0.754    -4.565125     3.30444
PayorCnt_~46    -15.31294   1.426433   -10.74   0.000     -18.1087   -12.51718
PayorCnt_~44     5.265068   7.247503     0.73   0.468    -8.939777    19.46991
PayorCnt_~43    -9.453109   4.411611    -2.14   0.032    -18.09971   -.8065105
PayorCnt_~42     -2.35852   .9475945    -2.49   0.013    -4.215771   -.5012687
PayorCnt_~41    -17.46933   1.233328   -14.16   0.000    -19.88661   -15.05205
PayorCnt_~39     -19.3586   5.440825    -3.56   0.000    -30.02242   -8.694781
PayorCnt_~38     4.138105   2.188148     1.89   0.059    -.1505857    8.426796
PayorCnt_~37    -3.892487   2.390762    -1.63   0.103    -8.578294    .7933202
PayorCnt_~35    -17.18462   1.994532    -8.62   0.000    -21.09384   -13.27541
PayorCnt_~33    -5.921308   6.057179    -0.98   0.328    -17.79316    5.950546
PayorCnt_~32     .0860434   2.145022     0.04   0.968    -4.118122    4.290209
PayorCnt_~31     3.204792   4.886873     0.66   0.512    -6.373304    12.78289
PayorCnt_~30    -4.095672   1.213186    -3.38   0.001    -6.473474   -1.717871
PayorCnt_~29    -15.70899   2.274833    -6.91   0.000    -20.16758    -11.2504
PayorCnt_~28    -6.258881   4.796827    -1.30   0.192    -15.66049    3.142728
PayorCnt_~27     1.034251   3.954578     0.26   0.794    -6.716579    8.785081
PayorCnt_~26    -13.76232    1.55347    -8.86   0.000    -16.80707   -10.71758
PayorCnt_~25    -10.92357   2.908792    -3.76   0.000     -16.6247   -5.222444
PayorCnt_~24    -6.636527   6.459553    -1.03   0.304    -19.29702    6.023964
PayorCnt_~23     12.53385    8.12399     1.54   0.123    -3.388879    28.45657
PayorCnt_~22    -1.473535   2.240974    -0.66   0.511    -5.865763    2.918694
PayorCnt_~21      5.51943   3.794629     1.45   0.146    -1.917905    12.95677
PayorCnt_~20     -1.98451   3.894976    -0.51   0.610    -9.618522    5.649503
PayorCnt_~19    -3.690554   2.699331    -1.37   0.172    -8.981145    1.600037
PayorCnt_~18    -11.38905   2.672264    -4.26   0.000     -16.6266   -6.151514
PayorCnt_~17    -12.40509   1.325356    -9.36   0.000    -15.00274   -9.807439
PayorCnt_~16     1.817993   3.000647     0.61   0.545    -4.063166    7.699153
PayorCnt_~15     -2.11841   3.640458    -0.58   0.561    -9.253576    5.016757
PayorCnt_~14     .5879253   1.939563     0.30   0.762    -3.213548    4.389398
PayorCnt_~13    -6.342086   3.558726    -1.78   0.075    -13.31706    .6328885
PayorCnt_~12    -3.425387   2.524934    -1.36   0.175    -8.374166    1.523392
PayorCnt_~11    -1.198571   2.109234    -0.57   0.570    -5.332594    2.935452
PayorCnt_~10    -2.497127     1.7619    -1.42   0.156    -5.950389    .9561342
PayorCnt_~_9     1.491006   1.751595     0.85   0.395    -1.942057    4.924069
PayorCnt_~_8    -1.164051   1.442162    -0.81   0.420    -3.990636    1.662535
PayorCnt_~_7    -1.011645   1.253705    -0.81   0.420    -3.468862    1.445572
PayorCnt_~_6    -1.431907   1.214966    -1.18   0.239    -3.813196    .9493825
PayorCnt_~_5    -.9996961   1.020951    -0.98   0.327    -3.000723    1.001331
PayorCnt_~_4     .5241562   .7714336     0.68   0.497    -.9878259    2.036138
PayorCnt_~_3    -1.040766   .6037075    -1.72   0.085    -2.224011    .1424786
PayorCnt_~_2    -.2881746   .4902564    -0.59   0.557    -1.249059    .6727102
FiscalYear~d     .2060823   .1209313     1.70   0.088    -.0309386    .4431033
    Net_Marg     22.11875   6.168397     3.59   0.000     10.02891    34.20859
Percent_Go~s    -5.301605   1.735829    -3.05   0.002    -8.703768   -1.899442
    Leverage    -.6644917   .4207146    -1.58   0.114    -1.489077    .1600938
        LnTA    -2.102105   .2642452    -7.96   0.000    -2.620016   -1.584194
     Capex_2    -1.74e-07   3.05e-08    -5.71   0.000    -2.34e-07   -1.14e-07
Capital_Co~y     .7571171   .4975404     1.52   0.128    -.2180441    1.732278
Bi_Hosp_Si~5      4.29351   3.078214     1.39   0.163    -1.739679     10.3267
Bi_Hosp_Si~4     6.388939   2.080755     3.07   0.002     2.310734    10.46714
Bi_Hosp_Si~3     2.801098   .9932411     2.82   0.005     .8543812    4.747815
Bi_Hosp_Si~2     .4140993   .5592943     0.74   0.459    -.6820973    1.510296
         hhi    -2.819972   1.254893    -2.25   0.025    -5.279517   -.3604268
                                                                              
   real_fcf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 1243 clusters in prvdr_num)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =         .
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(53)      =         .
       overall = 0.1001                                        max =         7
       between = 0.0964                                        avg =       2.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.0747                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: prvdr_num                       Number of groups   =      1243
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      3503
note: PayorCnt_Bi_49 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_48 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_47 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_45 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_40 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_36 dropped because of collinearity
note: PayorCnt_Bi_34 dropped because of collinearity
> iscalYear_Bi_2003 FiscalYear_Bi_2004 FiscalYear_Bi_2005, re vce(cluster  prvdr_num)
> ayorCnt_Bi_47 PayorCnt_Bi_48 PayorCnt_Bi_49 PayorCnt_Bi_50 PayorCnt_Bi_Other_New FiscalYear_Bi_2001 FiscalYear_Bi_2002 F
> ayorCnt_Bi_39 PayorCnt_Bi_40 PayorCnt_Bi_41 PayorCnt_Bi_42 PayorCnt_Bi_43 PayorCnt_Bi_44 PayorCnt_Bi_45 PayorCnt_Bi_46 P
> ayorCnt_Bi_31 PayorCnt_Bi_32 PayorCnt_Bi_33 PayorCnt_Bi_34 PayorCnt_Bi_35 PayorCnt_Bi_36 PayorCnt_Bi_37 PayorCnt_Bi_38 P
> ayorCnt_Bi_23 PayorCnt_Bi_24 PayorCnt_Bi_25 PayorCnt_Bi_26 PayorCnt_Bi_27 PayorCnt_Bi_28 PayorCnt_Bi_29 PayorCnt_Bi_30 P
> ayorCnt_Bi_15 PayorCnt_Bi_16 PayorCnt_Bi_17 PayorCnt_Bi_18 PayorCnt_Bi_19 PayorCnt_Bi_20 PayorCnt_Bi_21 PayorCnt_Bi_22 P
> 6 PayorCnt_Bi_7 PayorCnt_Bi_8 PayorCnt_Bi_9 PayorCnt_Bi_10 PayorCnt_Bi_11 PayorCnt_Bi_12 PayorCnt_Bi_13 PayorCnt_Bi_14 P
> e Percent_Gov_Business Net_Marg FiscalYear_Reported PayorCnt_Bi_2 PayorCnt_Bi_3 PayorCnt_Bi_4 PayorCnt_Bi_5 PayorCnt_Bi_




Lerner’s Index: Model 1 
Model 1: DV= Lerner’s Index   IV= Real FCF 
Binary control for size and time. Standard Error was adjusted for clustering in the model. 
 
Lerner’s Index Model 2 
Model 2: DV= Lerner’s Index   IV= Net Income from Services to Patients 
Binary control for size and time. Standard Error was adjusted for clustering in the model. 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .40184127   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    34.346331
     sigma_u    28.151361
                                                                              
       _cons     1711.312   2714.653     0.63   0.528    -3609.311    7031.935
FiscalY~2005     1.404589   3.300931     0.43   0.670    -5.065117    7.874295
FiscalY~2004     .8560525   3.797454     0.23   0.822    -6.586821    8.298926
FiscalY~2003     -5.84609    4.49839    -1.30   0.194    -14.66277    2.970593
FiscalY~2002    -3.083524   5.904363    -0.52   0.601    -14.65586    8.488815
FiscalY~2001     1.560297   9.763459     0.16   0.873    -17.57573    20.69633
FiscalYear~d    -.8164543   1.355821    -0.60   0.547    -3.473814    1.840905
    Net_Marg     120.0879   24.02219     5.00   0.000     73.00528    167.1705
Percent_Go~s     1.362973    11.7487     0.12   0.908    -21.66406    24.39001
    Leverage      .031512   1.941936     0.02   0.987    -3.774613    3.837636
        LnTA    -4.133715   1.977951    -2.09   0.037    -8.010427   -.2570026
     Capex_2    -3.04e-07   1.29e-07    -2.35   0.019    -5.58e-07   -5.08e-08
Capital_Co~y     .7287221   6.387819     0.11   0.909    -11.79117    13.24862
Bi_Hosp_Si~5      161.795   82.78411     1.95   0.051    -.4588348    324.0489
Bi_Hosp_Si~4    -33.41622   13.25473    -2.52   0.012    -59.39502   -7.437424
Bi_Hosp_Si~3    -8.280589   6.171817    -1.34   0.180    -20.37713    3.815949
Bi_Hosp_Si~2     1.414423   3.945032     0.36   0.720    -6.317698    9.146544
          li    -.0427535    .009118    -4.69   0.000    -.0606245   -.0248824
                                                                              
   real_fcf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 453 clusters in prvdr_num)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(17)      =    145.80
       overall = 0.2325                                        max =         7
       between = 0.2383                                        avg =       2.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.1611                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: prvdr_num                       Number of groups   =       453
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1254
> _Bi_2002 FiscalYear_Bi_2003 FiscalYear_Bi_2004 FiscalYear_Bi_2005, re vce(cluster  prvdr_num)
> apex_2 LnTA Leverage Percent_Gov_Business Net_Marg FiscalYear_Reported  FiscalYear_Bi_2001 FiscalYear
. xtreg real_fcf2  li  Bi_Hosp_Size_2 Bi_Hosp_Size_3 Bi_Hosp_Size_4 Bi_Hosp_Size_5 Capital_Cost_Proxy C
                                                                              
         rho    .74895433   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    14.535562
     sigma_u    25.106324
                                                                              
       _cons     96.55552   1532.167     0.06   0.950    -2906.437    3099.548
FiscalY~2005     .3397996   1.308645     0.26   0.795    -2.225097    2.904696
FiscalY~2004     1.476432   2.061085     0.72   0.474    -2.563221    5.516085
FiscalY~2003     .3996427   2.446591     0.16   0.870    -4.395588    5.194873
FiscalY~2002     .6661878   3.126132     0.21   0.831    -5.460919    6.793294
FiscalY~2001     .8914405    3.58207     0.25   0.803    -6.129287    7.912168
FiscalYear~d    -.0479383   .7643484    -0.06   0.950    -1.546034    1.450157
    Net_Marg     223.1625   48.27511     4.62   0.000      128.545      317.78
Percent_Go~s     5.396817   6.776293     0.80   0.426    -7.884473    18.67811
    Leverage    -1.013522   1.495551    -0.68   0.498    -3.944748    1.917705
        LnTA    -.4059566   .9876097    -0.41   0.681    -2.341636    1.529723
     Capex_2    -1.07e-07   4.81e-08    -2.23   0.026    -2.01e-07   -1.30e-08
Capital_Co~y    -.2136986    1.98724    -0.11   0.914    -4.108618    3.681221
Bi_Hosp_Si~5    -121.1134    124.365    -0.97   0.330    -364.8644    122.6375
Bi_Hosp_Si~4    -10.66408   8.077534    -1.32   0.187    -26.49576    5.167596
Bi_Hosp_Si~3     5.617467   2.907799     1.93   0.053    -.0817148    11.31665
Bi_Hosp_Si~2    -.2099495   1.412734    -0.15   0.882    -2.978857    2.558958
          li     .0039882   .0016261     2.45   0.014      .000801    .0071754
                                                                              
net_income~2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 454 clusters in prvdr_num)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(17)      =     82.53
       overall = 0.2776                                        max =         7
       between = 0.2649                                        avg =       2.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.3249                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: prvdr_num                       Number of groups   =       454
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1269
> ter  prvdr_num)
> Year_Bi_2001 FiscalYear_Bi_2002 FiscalYear_Bi_2003 FiscalYear_Bi_2004 FiscalYear_Bi_2005, re vce(clus
> _5 Capital_Cost_Proxy Capex_2 LnTA Leverage Percent_Gov_Business Net_Marg FiscalYear_Reported  Fiscal
. xtreg  net_income_from_svc_to_patients2 li  Bi_Hosp_Size_2 Bi_Hosp_Size_3 Bi_Hosp_Size_4 Bi_Hosp_Size
380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
